by Mark N. Katz
The prospects for improved ties between Washington and Tehran have dramatically increased since Hassan Rouhani replaced Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president of Iran in August 2013. This has made several parties quite nervous, including American conservatives (who fear it is a trick) as well as Iranian conservatives, Arab Gulf [...]]]>
by Mark N. Katz
The prospects for improved ties between Washington and Tehran have dramatically increased since Hassan Rouhani replaced Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president of Iran in August 2013. This has made several parties quite nervous, including American conservatives (who fear it is a trick) as well as Iranian conservatives, Arab Gulf states, and Israel (who all fear that it is not). There is one other party, though, that is quite nervous about what the prospects of improved Iranian-American relations will mean for it: Russia.
There have already been some signs that Moscow is worried about this. For example, back in February, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov told journalists that while Moscow did not object to an Iranian-American bilateral dialogue, the Russian government “would like to know the essence of the agreements in order to be certain that no steps are taken in this sphere at Russia’s expense or [that] harm Russian interests.”
While Iran’s first revolutionary leader–Ayatollah Khomeini–was as hostile toward the Soviet Union as he was toward the United States, Moscow managed to improve relations after his death in 1989. Since then, Moscow has benefited from continued Iranian-American hostility in several ways.
First and foremost, American opposition to the export of oil and gas from Central Asia and the Caucasus through Iran to the world market has meant that much of the petroleum exports from these former Soviet republics has had to go through Russia (thus providing Moscow both with transit revenue and political leverage over them). Further, the success of American efforts to decrease Iranian petroleum exports has served to strengthen demand for petroleum from Russia (as well as other petroleum exporters).
In addition, American economic sanctions against Iran as well as Washington’s successful efforts to pressure many Western and other countries not to do business with Tehran has presented opportunities for Russian businesses to gain stakes in Iran that they might not have had otherwise (though, admittedly, the Russians have not done nearly as well in this regard as the Chinese). Finally, Iranian-American hostility has served to simultaneously increase Russia’s importance both to Tehran (as a means of restraining the U.S. vis-à-vis Iran in the UN Security Council and other fora), and to Washington (which has long sought to elicit greater Russian support on the Iranian nuclear issue).
Should an Iranian-American rapprochement actually fully develop, Moscow will lose all these advantages. Improved Iranian-American relations could lead to Caspian Basin oil and gas flowing south via Iranian pipelines to the world market, thus reducing the excess transit revenue and political leverage that Moscow now has over the Caucasus and Central Asia. An end to American economic sanctions will also lead not only to increased Iranian oil exports, but also the opening of the door to Western investment in Iran’s huge but underdeveloped natural gas sector–thus increasing the competition Russian oil and gas faces on the world market. Indeed, Iran’s overall trade with the West will blossom, thereby decreasing Russia’s share in the Iranian market. Improved Iranian-American relations will also mean that neither Washington nor Tehran will need any help from Moscow in dealing with each other.
Finally, Moscow may worry that if improved Iranian-American relations leads to Tehran reducing its support for the Assad regime in Syria, Russia will either be forced to accept whatever agreement the US and Iran reach, or be left to support Damascus all on its own.
Moscow, then, obviously hopes that the budding Iranian-American courtship will fail; it will certainly not do anything to facilitate it. If Washington and Tehran are both serious about pursuing rapprochement, however, there is little that Moscow can do to prevent this from occurring, or to avoid losing the advantages Russia has enjoyed from Iranian-American hostility up to now.
]]>by Mark N. Katz
The international relations of the Syrian conflict has taken center stage in recent days. President Obama first announced that he would launch a military strike against Syria in response to the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons against its internal opponents in August, but he also said that [...]]]>
by Mark N. Katz
The international relations of the Syrian conflict has taken center stage in recent days. President Obama first announced that he would launch a military strike against Syria in response to the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons against its internal opponents in August, but he also said that he would seek Congressional approval for doing so. And just last week, when it was becoming increasingly clear that Obama was unlikely to obtain Congressional approval, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov announced a dramatic initiative to place Syrian chemical weapons stockpiles under international control–which, despite much skepticism from its conservative opponents, the Obama administration quickly accepted. Progress on this initiative appears to be going forward.
What all this goes to show is that while Washington and Moscow have sharply differing approaches to the conflict in Syria–especially when it comes to whether Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad should remain in power–Obama and Putin also have some common interests there.
Neither Moscow nor Washington wants to see the further use of chemical weapons in Syria or elsewhere. At the same time, Putin does not want to see America use force against Syrian ally. And although Obama has threatened to use force against Assad, he doesn’t really want to have to do so. If he did, he would have gone ahead and done so without seeking prior approval from Congress.
Further, despite their differences over whether Assad should remain in power, neither Obama nor Putin wants to see his regime replaced by a radical Sunni one, which both Washington and Moscow have come to fear as being the most likely outcome to the violent downfall of Assad.
Obama’s desire not to get the U.S. too deeply involved in Syria also coincides with Putin’s desire not to see Russia lose influence there. Washington’s agreement to Moscow’s initiative on Syrian chemical weapons, then, gives each leader hope of achieving his goals.
For Putin, Obama’s acceptance of the Lavrov initiative on Syrian chemical weapons is the kind of Russian-American cooperation in resolving the world’s conflicts that Moscow had hoped would occur after the end of the Cold War but which the U.S. has rarely seen the need for.
Obama and Putin, then, have several common interests when it comes to Syria. Despite this, however, it is not clear that Russian-American cooperation on the Syrian chemical weapons issue will be sufficient to resolve it. Although he has verbally agreed to it, Assad might well not fully comply with this effort. Yet even if the Syrian chemical weapons issue is successfully resolved, this will not end the Syrian civil war nor motivate regional actors supporting different sides to stop doing so.
All this gives Obama and Putin an additional common interest in working together to resolve the Syrian chemical weapons problem: their failure to do so will demonstrate the powerlessness of both leaders–something neither can afford.
]]>by Wayne White
The main objective of the Russian chemical weapons (CW) initiative this week was to steer the US away from military action in Syria that might weaken the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Although Moscow also is concerned about CW falling into the hands of rebel extremists, it has less incentive [...]]]>
by Wayne White
The main objective of the Russian chemical weapons (CW) initiative this week was to steer the US away from military action in Syria that might weaken the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Although Moscow also is concerned about CW falling into the hands of rebel extremists, it has less incentive than Washington to pressure its Syrian ally amidst the latter’s war against the Syrian opposition. While much of the world looks to Russia and the US to chart a way to achieve international goals on Syrian CW peacefully, the Russians will be working closely with Damascus in parallel to fashion the disarmament mission to the Syrian regime’s advantage. In addition to stretching out the timeline, another Russian-Syrian objective could be to use the process to create a measure of external dependence and perhaps lend some badly needed legitimacy to Syria’s discredited dictatorship.
President Vladimir Putin’s bottom line in his New York Times editorial on Thursday is highly misleading: “We are not protecting the Syrian government, but international law.” Whatever emerges concerning the issue of Syrian CW, one must bear in mind that Syria is Russia’s only remaining Middle East ally, a major market for Russian weapons, and plays host to Russia’s only Mediterranean naval base.
Although claiming to defend international law against “ineffective and pointless” American style “brute force,” Putin has done most everything to assist the Assad regime’s widespread, often indiscriminate use of just that (reducing much of Syria to rubble) to suppress what was initially a reform movement, while opposing any use of force to punish the regime for what increasingly appears to have been a major violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol against chemical warfare. Finally, much of Putin’s rhetoric revolves around the extremist threat posed by the rebels, while skirting references to the Syrian regime’s own extensive barbarity. In fact, the regime’s ruthless repression since 2011 played a key role in driving many rebels toward greater radicalization.
The complex process of accessing, accounting for, seizing, and eliminating Syria’s huge CW arsenal might well be exploited by Damascus to assist its own cause against the rebels. The work at various CW sites, the sequencing of such access, as well as the inspectors’ need to move around other areas of the country to make sure CW has not been hidden elsewhere could be used to demand that the rebels cease fighting across broad stretches of territory (potentially providing any regime personnel accompanying the inspectors opportunities to collect information on rebel deployments). A telling signal of Putin’s desire to give the regime as much maneuvering room as possible in all this was Moscow’s immediate rejection of France’s proposal to include in the relevant UN Security Council resolution a tough enforcement clause.
Just the amount of time required to catalogue, transport and dispose of Syria’s CW arsenal (possibly years) is likely to provide the regime with respites it could exploit to revive its battered military. Meanwhile, to weaken the rebels, Assad might argue, for example, that all lethal aid to them (on the part of the US, reportedly just getting under way) cease, or demand certain local rebel withdrawals to supposedly facilitate the work of the inspectors. During this lengthy process, Assad could at times halt cooperation unless his demands are met (such as his latest: the US must renounce any potential use of force against his regime). Absent a tough enforcement mechanism, the international community would have little clout with which to push back via the UN.
Furthermore, Assad’s agreement to sign the 1925 Geneva Protocol is no guarantee–just an opening formality. Egypt signed the protocol, but later used Mustard Gas against the side it opposed in the 1960s Yemen Civil War. Italy’s Benito Mussolini accepted the protocol during his early years in power, only to turn round abruptly in the mid-1930s and use Mustard Gas in his war against Ethiopia. Japan, also a signatory, attacked Chinese forces amidst hostilities in the 1930s with both chemical and biological weapons.
It is not surprising that even the relatively moderate Free Syrian Army (FSA) working with the West has reacted negatively to the emerging arrangement. They know all too well that Moscow has stood by the brutally repressive regime against which they have fought and are shocked to find Russia now at the head of the diplomatic table. Also, with the UN inspection report on the August 21 Damascus CW attack reportedly set for release on Monday (amidst rising evidence the regime carried out the attack), the opposition was stunned as focus abruptly shifted from punishing the Assad regime to cooperating with it on a CW arsenal the same regime previously denied it possessed. Nevertheless, any lack of cooperation on the part of the opposition would make Assad & Co. appear reasonable by comparison.
The Russian proposal, however, should be explored fully. That said, while a peaceful way out of this aspect of the Syrian conflict is preferable, all concerned must also proceed cautiously given Moscow’s stake in the Assad regime. An additional great advantage to most everyone would be to remove Syria’s CW arsenal from the battlefield so no party to the conflict could gain further access to it–neither the regime nor rebel extremists. Yet, although the current approach stems from a likely regime atrocity, if Assad agrees, for the most part, to cooperate in dismantling his CW arsenal in a timely manner, the international community could become vested in an otherwise loathsome regime for a long time as the sole guarantor of that process.
]]>You’re no doubt aware by now of a proposal by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov for Syria to hand over its (still only accidentally acknowledged) chemical weapons to international control, which his Syrian counterpart Walid al-Moualem said Syria “welcomes”. Syrian ally Russia was jumpstarted into action after [...]]]>
You’re no doubt aware by now of a proposal by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov for Syria to hand over its (still only accidentally acknowledged) chemical weapons to international control, which his Syrian counterpart Walid al-Moualem said Syria “welcomes”. Syrian ally Russia was jumpstarted into action after Secretary of State John Kerry apparently went off script in London today by floating the proposal (suggested over a year ago by former Senator Richard G. Lugar) and doubting its feasibility in the same sentence after CBS reporter Margaret Brennan asked if there was any way Syria could avert military action:
Sure, if he could turn over every single bit of his chemical weapons to the international community, in the next week, turn it over. All of it, without delay and allow a full and total accounting for that, but he isn’t about to do it and it can’t be done, obviously.
Novelist Teju Cole has broken all this down for us in Twitter-speak
Kerry: We won’t attack…if you do this impossible thing. Syria: Oh? We’ll do it. Russia: They’ll do it. UN: They’ll do it. Kerry: Shit!
— Teju Cole (@tejucole) September 9, 2013
While it’s too soon to get excited with the proposal’s details still in the making, Kerry’s words have taken on a life of their own (though some have suggested this was at least somehow related to a behind-the-scenes diplomatic maneuver). The State Department and White House seem to have forgotten to talk to each other before issuing statements on all this earlier today. State Department Deputy Spokesperson Marie Harf called Kerry’s words “hypothetical” and “rhetorical” and said the Russian proposal was considered “highly unlikely”. She also — wait for this — categorically stated that “the Secretary was not making a proposal.” Later the White House said during its daily press briefing that it would take a “hard look” at the Russian proposal, but Press Secretary Jay Carney also repeatedly emphasized that all this would not have occurred without the credible threat of force against President Bashar al-Assad’s alleged actions. He meanwhile urged Congress to vote for an Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) against Syria, which the administration has been strongly pushing for, and which Kerry’s words may have now endangered.
Speaking at the White House during a Forum to Combat Wildlife Trafficking immediately after Carney’s appearance, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said she had just met with President Obama and seemed to have the most updated speech on the issue:
…if the regime immediately surrendered its stockpiles to international control as was suggested by Secretary Kerry and the Russians, that would be an important step. But this cannot be another excuse for delay or obstruction.
While many are labelling Kerry’s words a “gaffe”, Clinton strategically tried to frame it as a purposeful move by Kerry, being forced, of course, to include the Russians. Perhaps the White House is hoping everyone will eventually forget Harf’s opposing description.
In any case, here’s Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications and Speechwriting Ben Rhodes with the most recent WH statement:
US will review Russian proposal. We want Syrian CW under intl control. Important that this only proposed bc credible threat of mil action
— Ben Rhodes (@rhodes44) September 9, 2013
It should also be noted that earlier in the day UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon had said following the Russian announcement that he was “considering urging the Security Council to demand the immediate transfer of Syria’s chemical weapons and chemical precursor stocks to places inside Syria where they can be safely stored and destroyed” if it was proven that chemical weapons have been used.
It will be interesting to see how Obama tackles all this during his many scheduled interviews today and during his speech to the nation Tuesday night wherein he will urge for military action against Syria, especially considering how a majority of Americans continue to oppose it, even after the release of those horrific videos of the Syrian victims of the Aug. 21 attack.
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