by Wayne White

The Libyan Parliament’s abrupt dismissal last week of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan takes Libya another step closer to even greater confusion and instability. With an oil-starved central government also drifting closer to bankruptcy, Libya’s options going forward have become more daunting. If the international community continues to focus elsewhere [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Wayne White

The Libyan Parliament’s abrupt dismissal last week of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan takes Libya another step closer to even greater confusion and instability. With an oil-starved central government also drifting closer to bankruptcy, Libya’s options going forward have become more daunting. If the international community continues to focus elsewhere in the region while Libya merits high-level diplomatic attention, the prospects for finding a way to halt Libya’s decline will worsen.

The latest disruptive snit was triggered by the escape last week of a North Korean-linked tanker from the federalist rebel-controlled eastern Libyan oil terminal of Es-Sider with a cargo of unauthorized crude. Zeidan ordered the government’s puny navy to intercept it and bring it to a government-controlled port. The tanker was hit by Libyan naval gunfire, but eventually escaped amidst poor weather.

Eastern rebels claimed the cargo had reached its destination on March 14, but a Libyan government official said it was still in the Mediterranean on the 15^th. Finally, late yesterday, US Special Forces, acting on the request of the Libyan and Cypriot governments, seized the tanker (the “Morning Glory”) from the few armed rebels guarding it just south of Cyprus.

Earlier, however, an angry parliament (despite the government’s weak navy), chose to blame Zeidan, and voted him out of office on March 11 — ordering him to remain in Libya pending charges. On the 12^th, Zeidan fled to Europe. Zeidan was replaced by temporary Prime Minster and Defense Minister Abdullah al-Thinni, but only for two weeks while parliament, the General National Council (GNC), casts about for a more permanent figure. Al-Thinni had only been in his defense post since August 2013.

The tanker’s escape triggered such a flap because Tripoli has been trying to isolate and squeeze the shadow eastern government of former anti-Qadhafi rebel leader Ibrahim Jathran. Jathran has been facing rising discontent because the eastern government has been without enough cash to pay government officials, police, and even disaffected Libyan National Oil Corporations (NOC) workers stationed in the east and assisting in the terminal closures. If the illegally lifted crude had generated payments to new accounts established by Jathran & Co. instead of those of NOC in Tripoli, the funds would have reinforced Jathran’s position.

Meanwhile, on GNC orders, a small contingent of Libyan army troops and a larger force of battle-hardened, notoriously formidable pro-government militiamen from Misrata, Libya’s 3^rd largest city, moved east to “liberate” rebellious oil ports and block further illicit shipments. This force compelled Jathran’s troops to fall back from the city of Sirte on the way to Jathran’s area of control on March 11th.

Nonetheless, on the 12^th, GNC President Nouri Abu Sahmain, who still wields most of the authority over the military in Libya despite al-Thinni’s appointment, ordered a halt to the advance, giving the eastern rebels “two weeks at most” to restore normal operations at the oil ports before resuming the government’s military advance. The reasons for this reverse were unclear, but the GNC could be skeptical of a successful offensive 200 miles from Sirte to the nearest rebel terminal.

The halt, however, also probably relates to a rivalry between the two powerful militias typically called upon as the government’s military “firemen” (and the GNC factions with which they identify). In addition to the Misrata force, there is the powerful militia from the town of Zintan, south of Tripoli. The Zintani militia has been associated with the parliament’s secular parties. So far, the two militias have not squared off against each other. But that could change if Misrata’s fighters make major gains in the east that boost the power of the GNC’s Islamist wing that the Misrata militia generally supports.

Added to the central government’s own Islamic-secular rivalries that all too often have paralyzed parliament is the threat of going broke. With oil exports down to around 300,000 barrels per day (out of a normal 1.3 million), the government is running low on cash, losing $8 billion in oil revenues last year alone. Al-Thinni declared last week that the government needs an “emergency budget” to deal with its security challenges. Nonetheless, a GNC already unpopular for extending its own mandate last month and gridlocked over lesser matters might not respond despite the gravity of the situation.

Of concern to the international community is that as long as so much of the country remains beyond central authority, a large amount of arms from Qadhafi’s former arsenals will continue flowing across Libya’s borders.  A panel of UN experts recently submitted a 97-page report to the Security Council stating that Libya has “become a primary source of illicit weapons.” The panel is investigating alleged shipments to 14 countries. A number of its findings relate to attempts to transfer particularly dangerous shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles. One such shipment, stopped by Lebanon, was bound for Syrian rebels.

Moreover, especially lawless portions of Libya like the desert southwest and some areas in the east adjacent to Egypt serve as safe havens for Islamic extremist elements staging from Libyan territory into neighboring states or assisting foreign jihadists. This has been true of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (IQIM) elements lunging into Algeria and Mali, other groups supplying munitions to militant elements in Egypt following the suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood, and shipments into Tunisia aiding terrorist cells there.

In American minds especially, Libya is firmly associated with Muslim extremism, the result of the Benghazi attack of Sept. 2012. Despite the existence of such groups (like eastern Libya’s dangerous Ansar al-Islam), however, in the defining GNC July 2012 elections, the secular National Forces Alliance, a collection of likeminded smaller parties, and dozens of independents dominated, with Islamists coming in second. In fact, the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in Libya secured only 10% of the vote.

So, unlike the Brotherhood’s decisive electoral victory in Egypt, a majority of Libyans, at least the first time around, voted against an Islamist-dominated future (and, naturally, were horrified by the Benghazi attack and its adverse implications for ties with the US and the West).

With the GNC’s standing shaky because of its self-extended mandate and legislative paralysis, constitutional drafting to be completed in June, and votes on approving the constitution and a permanent parliament to occur this year, the next six months seems to be a make or break period for what is to become of Libya. There already has been a disturbing indicator. Turnout last month for the election of the constitutional drafting body was dismal, reflecting widespread cynicism toward the entire political process.

A conclave of mostly Western and Arab Gulf foreign ministers to discuss Libya did take place in Rome on March 6. Instability and arms smuggling topped the agenda. US Secretary of State John Kerry confirmed that “Libya is at a pivotal moment,” adding that “Libyans did not risk their lives in the 2011 revolution just to slip backward into thuggery and violence.” Yet, little in terms of concrete measures aimed at stepping up the pace — and urgency — of foreign diplomatic engagement came out of the meeting.

Clearly, the international community is far more focused, in the Middle East at least, on halting the fighting in Syria, pursuing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and trying to push the Iran-nuclear negotiations to the finish line. Sadly, however, the prospects for real progress on the first two of those issues are exceedingly poor. In fact, with Western-Russian relations taking such a beating over the Ukraine crisis, the Russian-US led effort aimed at brokering a Syrian ceasefire — already pretty iffy — might collapse.

In any case, it’s time for Western and Arab governments that came together to support Muammar Qadhafi’s overthrow so robustly to make a strenuous effort to help salvage the mess that has developed since. Under the circumstances, without, say, bringing the various key players in Libya together at a neutral venue like Geneva, there is little reason to believe Libya’s domestic agenda in the coming months will play out as planned.

The interception of the “Morning Glory” could provide an important opportunity for such an initiative. Jathran’s so-called Prime Minister Ab-Rabbo al-Barassi said on the 15^th that Jathran was ready to negotiate an end to the oil terminal blockade if the government would end its military threat. Now, with the prospect of his own illicit oil exports gone, an already financially desperate Jathran might be ready for serious talks.

by Wayne White

In Libya, which is bordering on failed state status with minimal central government control, many Libyans have made the transitional General National Congress (GNC) the latest target for blame. This followed the GNC’s decision to extend its mandate until the completion of a constitution and the sitting [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Wayne White

In Libya, which is bordering on failed state status with minimal central government control, many Libyans have made the transitional General National Congress (GNC) the latest target for blame. This followed the GNC’s decision to extend its mandate until the completion of a constitution and the sitting of a new parliament later this year. Militias clearly remain the main source of instability across the country, but only as the most obvious manifestation of a maze of regional, political, economic, and Islamist-secular rivalries and grievances. It’s questionable whether yesterday’s election for a constitutional committee will resolve such issues, so robust international engagement is still sorely needed.

The GNC recently extended its mandate to provide continuity between the expiration of its original mandate on February 7 and the work of a commission elected on the 20^th with 120 days to draft a constitution along with the subsequent election of a permanent parliament. Upon the mandate’s expiration thousands of Libyans took to the streets characterizing the extension as a power grab and blaming the GNC’s paralysis for the country’s myriad problems.

In fact, even had the GNC mustered enough consensus to enact meaningful legislation, its laws would have been implemented only in a very spotty manner with militias picking and choosing in their respective areas what to enforce and what to ignore. This has been the leading problem confronting Prime Minister Ali Zeidan all along: precious little national authority. And the reason why the GNC has been so ineffective is an ongoing split between its secular National Forces Alliance and a bloc comprised of two Islamist parties.  Worse still, each side is backed respectively by one of Libya’s most formidable militias.

At the beginning of the week powerful militias in government service from Zintan, which is southwest of the capital, threw down a gauntlet, demanding that the GNC turn power over to the Supreme Court by February 18, blaming its Muslim Brotherhood members for the gridlock. The GNC immediately promised early elections for a new parliament. Nonetheless, the militias (backing the GNC’s secular block) demanded that the GNC step down within 5 hours, and closed the Tripoli airport road in a show of force (generating a counter threat from the powerful pro-Islamist militia brigades from Libya’s 3^rd largest city, Misrata).

In response to this crisis, both UN envoy in Tripoli Tarek Mitri and Ali Zeidan stepped in to address the face-off. Additionally, the US, UK, Italy, France and the European Union issued a joint statement declaring support for “the legitimacy of the transitional democratic process.” Based on Zeidan’s intercession especially, the deadline was pushed back 72 hours until late on the 21^st, following national elections for a constitutional commission. It is doubtful, however, that the militia threat will be carried out because the GNC has terminated the Zintani militias’ government writ, ordered the arrest of those behind the attempted rebellion, and has the support of other armed elements.

In a reasonably normal national context the GNC mess would be enough to place a country in crisis. Parallel to it, however, has been a host of other more familiar challenges. In Libya’s restive east, security personnel closed the Benghazi Airport on the 18^th over the non-payment of wages, with an armed unit charged with defending the airport blocking the runways. This is the latest outburst of trouble in the east where a shadow regional government remains in tentative control of many areas, joining angry oil workers to stop eastern exports of oil months ago, but with no means of its own to pay workers under its sway.

At the other end of the country, west of Tripoli, oil workers and local militia elements closed pipelines on the 18^th, dropping Libyan oil exports to a mere 375,000 barrels per day (bpd) out of a maximum export capacity of about 1.3 million bpd. The latest closure is a discouraging reverse for Zeidan’s government after the Prime Minister worked so hard to reopen western pipelines earlier this year, restoring exports to 600,000 bpd. So, while workers in various locales protest unpaid wages, they have reduced markedly Tripoli’s ability to pay those wages — a capability that continues to decline as government financial shortfalls mount up.

Under the circumstances, less than 500,000 voted for a constitutional body (less than 1/3 of those who participated in thr 2012 parliamentary elections). Events since 2012 understandably bred widespread cynicism regarding all manners of governance. In addition, much of western Libya’s Berber minority boycotted the vote, while polls stayed closed in Derna in eastern Libya following militant attacks against five polling stations. Thus the legitimacy of the drafting process doubtless will suffer from the lack of a wide-ranging mandate.

Ironically, the latest crisis revolving around the GNC came to a head as Libyans should have been celebrating the 3^rd anniversary of Muammar Qadhafi’s fall on February 17. The very next day, the human rights arm of the UN issued a statement expressing concerns about Libya’s continued violence and shortfalls in protecting its citizens’ rights. Even far less developed Niger recently appealed to the international community to assist in reducing the threat Libyan instability poses to regional security. Nonetheless, on February 16, in a bid to bolster Libya’s beleaguered central government, Niger extradited senior Qadahfi-era intelligence official Abdullah Mansour to Tripoli for interrogation and trial.

The international community played a small role in defusing the crisis by pitting the powerful Zintani militias against the GNC. Without a far more ambitious effort, however, the transitional process that is just getting underway so shakily could easily founder. The pattern in which Libya continues staggering along the brink of wholesale state failure must be broken.

Securing a common domestic understanding of the costs for all concerned of continued chaos may be a proverbial mission impossible unless all parties can be brought together at a relatively neutral venue. This must include Libya’s large, quarrelsome militias. The biggest militias are not just thugs, but armed units from the “liberation war” against Qadhafi with their own claims to legitimacy and who refuse to disarm in the absence of what they regard as proper governance. An attempt at jumpstarting a thoroughgoing national dialogue must be made to avoid the potential worst case scenario: a sort of “North African Somalia” with instability as its leading export.

Photo: Residents from Libya’s north-eastern town of Shahat joined in on national protests against extending the congressional mandate on February 7. Credit: Magharebia/Flickr

by Wayne White

An ominous deterioration in the situation in Libya recently has been overshadowed by media stories about the Oct. 27 “60 Minutes” report on the Benghazi tragedy featuring a witness now known to have given conflicting evidence to the FBI. Meanwhile, developments in Libya reflect a sharp decline [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Wayne White

An ominous deterioration in the situation in Libya recently has been overshadowed by media stories about the Oct. 27 “60 Minutes” report on the Benghazi tragedy featuring a witness now known to have given conflicting evidence to the FBI. Meanwhile, developments in Libya reflect a sharp decline in the already tenuous authority of the central government, heightened violence, clashes between militias, as well as new demands for regional autonomy and minority rights already impacting seriously on Libyan oil and gas exports. Libya now could be drifting closer to what might be called a “failed state” scenario in terms of governance.

Continued, rising lawlessness over the past month has been evident across the country. Illustrating how little authority the police and army have in eastern Libya, the former rebel “Benghazi Brigade” announced on Oct. 22 its arrest of several men allegedly behind weekly car bombings in the city, including three Chadians. A Libyan military source called the detention a “theatrical act” in which armed groups like the one involved in this action “are trying to show…they can replace the army.”

Also in the east, militiamen from the al-Zawiya tribe seized up to 200 Egyptian drivers and demanded the release of associates being held in Egypt for weapons smuggling. On Oct. 18, gunmen murdered the head of the military police’s investigative division outside his vacation home in Benghazi, the day before the same happened to a local army commander in the eastern city of Derna, and two Libyan soldiers were stabbed to death during a militia attack on their base nearby.

The security situation in the capital of Tripoli also has skidded downward in the wake of the brief kidnapping of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan on Oct. 10 by supposedly government-supported militiamen. Last week there were two outbreaks of heavy fighting (including the use of truck mounted anti-aircraft guns) between rival militias. The Nov. 7 battle began when fighters from a powerful militia in nearby Misrata entered Tripoli to avenge the death two days before of a militia leader from that militia-dominated city (Libya’s 3^rd largest) still not under central government authority. With militias on the rampage, many Tripoli residents have armed themselves, and some have erected street barricades to block militiamen from entering their neighborhoods.

Triggers of militia violence are varied and unpredictable:  personal vendettas, territory, stolen vehicles, and disputes over smuggled goods including drugs. Although the government tried to harness militias to function as security forces subject to the authorities, most report mainly to their own leaders. On Nov. 10, Zeidan called for a popular effort to compel the militias to disarm peacefully, something unlikely to succeed.  And perhaps setting in place a trigger for a future outbreak of violence, Zeidan stated that government payments to militias operating beyond police and army authority would end on Dec. 31.

It comes as no surprise that Libya’s critical oil sector also has been in crisis for several months now, with 2 million barrels per day of normal exports falling to only a few hundred thousand. In the east, militias charged with protecting terminals and fields, joined by oil workers, for several months have squeezed or even blocked exports to pressure the government for various political and work-related concessions. Over the weekend they instituted a de-facto export blockade.

Off in the west, Berber protesters demanding minority rights seized Libya’s large Mellitah natural gas and oil complex on the coast 50 miles west of Tripoli last month. Mellitah is the terminus of the vital Greenstream pipeline operated jointly by Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) and the Italian Eni.  Yesterday, the Berbers shut it down, cutting off the flow of natural gas to Italy.

Back east, militia-associated elements seeking eastern autonomy, a fair regional share of oil revenues, and holding all key export terminals in the region announced on Nov. 3 the unilateral formation of an eastern regional “Government of Barqa.” On the 10^th, this shadowy government established a companion oil company based temporarily in Tobruk to market Libyan crude independent of Libya’s NOC. Under the more relaxed pre-Qadhafi rule of King Idris, Barqa was a semi-autonomous eastern region.  Quite a few eastern Libyans reportedly are skeptical of this move, however, because they believe the “autonomy” effort is meant merely to serve the narrower agendas of particular militias.

Nonetheless, the militias have the power, and the central government in Tripoli has had to implore foreign companies not to purchase oil from entities or militias instead of NOC. Prime Minister Zeidan also announced on the 10th that with hydrocarbon exports imperiled, the Libyan government could be unable to cover its expenditures beginning in either December or January if export problems cannot be resolved (especially those in the east).

Not surprisingly, foreign confidence in Libya’s hydrocarbon sector is fading fast. ExxonMobil already has greatly reduced its activity in Libya, with Marathon considering the sale of its portion of a joint venture with the Libyans. And BP has begun talks to relinquish its stake in a large joint natural gas explorations project with NOC. Separate entities holding major terminals turning away foreign tankers in recent days will only frighten foreign investors that much more.

Libyan instability overall also has adverse implications for neighboring countries. In addition to the gun-running into Egypt noted earlier, the remote and lawless Libyan southeast provides a convenient haven for elements linked to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and similar extremist groups that have raided into Mali and Algeria. Farther north on Oct. 30, a suicide bomber struck in the Tunisian resort city of Sousse. Another bomber was apprehended in a nearby seaside town along with five more plotters nabbed in Sousse that Tunisia’s Islamist government said were members of the radical Ansar al-Sharia movement. All those caught were Tunisians, but they reportedly sortied from Libya, where Tunisian extremists evidently have exploited disorder even in the north not far from Tripoli to obtain training, explosives and arms.

The iffy authority of the Libyan government and the power of the militias have hurt prospects for Western assistance aimed at stabilization because the central government in Tripoli is not a viable partner. Several NATO countries, including the US and the UK, want to train at least some legitimate security and military personnel, but there is concern that even these could end up behaving like militias or strengthen in a destabilizing manner only the security side of the government. In any case, British training will not begin until early next year, and Washington has not made a final decision on plans to train Libyan cadres outside Libya.

With war-weariness dominating Western thinking concerning regional intervention, no government is seriously pondering direct military involvement. As a result, the prospects for Libya seem grim. No real progress — instead quite the opposite — has come from purely domestic attempts to sort out Libya’s many problems since Muammar Qadhafi’s fall two years ago, so Libyan efforts to address this deteriorating situation do not seem likely to gain meaningful traction.

One of Libya’s Berber militiamen blocking the gas and crude oil complex in Nalut. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza/IPS