Graham offered his curious take on what it means to negotiate — demanding that Iran accept all U.S. demands prior to negotiation — in a conversation with Fox News host Greta Van Susteren, who indicated that his negotiating tactic was probably a non starter. Graham first emphasized his hawkish bent by noting that the “only way” for an agreement to be reached between the sides was for the U.S. to threaten “a strike by the United States.” He went on:
GRAHAM: Here’s what we should do. We should tell the Iranians, no negotiations, stop enriching, open up the site on the bottom of the mountain, a secret site. Then we will talk about lifting sanctions. You are not going to get to enrich uranium any more, period.
VAN SUSTEREN: I think they will probably stay “go fish” on that one.
Watch the video:
Leave aside that the Fordow site is not “secret” (it’s under U.N. inspections and monitored by camera) and that reports on U.S. and Israeli estimates state that these intelligence agencies don’t believe Iran has made a decision to build nuclear weapons (Graham doubts the intelligence), Graham’s position prompts one to ask: What’s the alternative to negotiations, since Graham is proposing pre-conditions that Iran would never meet? The Senator from South Carolina’s been busy on that front, too — and falsely citing the Obama administration to back himself up. The House yesterday passed a resolution that seeks to shift U.S. “red line” for an attack to an Iranian “nuclear capability” — something Graham mentioned on Fox News — from an Iranian push for nuclear weapons.
While the CIA has laid out a specific definition, the “nuclear capability” language is a complex issue. The word “capability” has a special meaning in the non-proliferation context, but it’s not always clear exactly what. Sen. Joe Lieberman (I-CT), one of the Sentae’s most vociferous Iran hawks, said this year, “I guess everybody will determine for themselves what that means.”
Before the House version passed, co-sponsor Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA) clarified what he meant by “capability,” defining it as Iran mastering all elements of a weapon and kicking out U.N. inspectors. (The move allayed the fears of some critics that the measure could be interpreted as taking Graham’s hard-line on “no enrichment.”) House Foreign Affairs Committee chair Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) forthrightly noted that the “capability” language was a shift in U.S. policy that stood in contrast to “decision to develop nuclear weapons.” But Graham was most circumspect indefending his version of the bill on the Senate floor yesterday, conflating “capability” with the Obama administration red line of “weaponization.”
But Graham is wrong that blocking an Iranian nuclear “capability” is, as he said, an “echo (of) a policy statement made by President Obama.” In March, Obama committed (again) to “preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon” and that it was “unacceptable for Iran to have a nuclear weapon” — not a “capability.” He added, “I do not have a policy of containment; I have a policy to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.” Earlier this year, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said: “The United States… does not want Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. That’s a red line for us.”
While a potential Iranian nuclear weapon is widely considered a threat to both the security of the U.S. and its allies in the region, as well as the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The intelligence estimates give the West time to pursue a dual-track approach of pressure and diplomacy to resolve the crisis. Questions about the efficacy and consequences of a strike have led U.S. officials to declare that diplomacy is the “best and most permanent way” to resolve the crisis.
]]>The fact that the letter lays out positions — among them, zero uranium enrichment on Iranian territory under the current regime, ever — that would be dead on arrival in Tehran tells me that the not-so-subtle implication of Wright’s title is correct: AIPAC’s leadership wants war with Iran and opposes any negotiated outcome that falls short of Tehran’s complete abandonment of its nuclear and missile programmes. This observation probably comes as no great surprise to readers of this blog. But I think the letter is useful insofar as it exposes precisely what AIPAC, which is understandably sensitive about being tagged as a warmonger, really wants. How strongly that message is communicated in AIPAC’s upcoming annual convention will be particularly interesting.
There’s an important point that I’ve been wanting to write about for some time and still hope to at some greater length: while the Iraq invasion was an adventure championed by neo-conservatives, as well as aggressive nationalists and the Christian Right, the conventional Israel lobby, led by AIPAC, did not play a leading role in the drive to that war (although Netanyahu, who is very close to neo-conservatives, was quite enthusiastic and even testified before Congress in its favor). What I think happened was that then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who had long asserted that Iran was far more dangerous to Israel that Iraq, was quite skeptical of the idea. But, after becoming convinced that Bush was bound and determined to invade, he got on the bandwagon and told AIPAC to do the same in order to preserve his close ties with and influence on Bush. But AIPAC and other major lobby actors never fought for the war with the nearly same conviction and enthusiasm as the neo-cons.
With respect to Iran, I think we see a different dynamic, one in which the main impetus for war is coming from the political leadership of Israel and the lobby here, with the neo-cons acting for now as the most visible point of the spear. And because the lobby enjoys much more influence with Democrats than the neo-cons ever have, it’s a significantly more formidable force, as recent votes in Congress make clear.
While neo-conservatives and the lobby overlap and often share common goals, they do not always agree. Neo-cons typically think they know better than the Israeli government (and the U.S. government, of course) what is in its interests, while organizations like AIPAC tend to defer more (however reluctantly, given the increasingly right-wing sympathies of its leadership) to Jerusalem’s judgment. You can see this in the contrasting attitudes of the two groups to the situation in Syria: the neo-cons are united, as they have been for years, in wanting to see Assad deposed by any means necessary. (Remember that the 1996 “Clean Break” was aimed ultimately at Syria, not Iraq. AIPAC, while it clearly prefers such an outcome, seems much less committed to it, no doubt reflecting the ambivalence on the issue that exists in Jerusalem.
]]>The key lines in the resolved case have been highlighted by a Washington policy expert:
(6) Strongly rejects any policy that fails to prevent the Iranian government from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability and that instead would settle for future efforts to “contain” a nuclear weapons capable Iran;
(7) Urges the President to reaffirm the unacceptability of an Iran with nuclear-weapons capability and to oppose any policy that would rely on containment as an option in response to the Iranian nuclear threat.
Laura Rozen reports that the resolution is not “technically binding”, but would “put additional pressure on the administration to limit diplomatic efforts to resolve concerns about Iran’s nuclear program, without recourse to another war.”
The pressure follows draconian measures proposed by members of Congress in 2011. In November, Ali Gharib reported about an amendment to H.R. 1905, the Iran Threat Reductions Act, which essentially bars contact between U.S. and Iranian officials unless a special waiver is requested by the president 15 days in advance. Associate Professor of Political Science at Swarthmore College, Dominic Tierney, responded in the Atlantic that the bill was based on “severe illusions” and that it would seriously limit the U.S.’s options if a “crisis” with Iran did break out.
According to Harvard’s Professor of International Affairs, Stephen Walt, the Graham-Lieberman-Casey resolution could do more harm than good:
If Congress is serious about U.S. national security, it would do nothing to tie the hands of an administration that clearly takes Iran’s nuclear program very seriously. Trying to rule out containment by fiat is worse than laughable; it is positively dangerous.
Walt added that the resolution isn’t really intended to advance U.S. interests. “It’s merely another opportunity for legislators to pander and posture to AIPAC and other hardline extremists,” he said.
Pundits and analysts that oppose diplomacy with Iran in favor of harsher measures and/or military strikes and Iranian regime change argue that Iran has failed to embrace offers of engagement and is not serious about reaching a negotiated settlement about its nuclear program. But what “options” with Iran will the U.S. be left with if official communication is almost completely prohibited and if even considering containment is being opposed?
If the Obama administration wants to avoid further confrontation with Iran, aren’t these measures making it increasingly difficult for it to do so?
Note: This post was updated with information from Laura Rozen’s Yahoo News report.
]]>The two countries have seen their relations deteriorate for years now, highlighted by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan’s dressing down of Israeli President Shimon Peres at the World [...]]]>
The two countries have seen their relations deteriorate for years now, highlighted by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan’s dressing down of Israeli President Shimon Peres at the World Economic Forum in 2009 and the confrontation over Israel’s killing of nine Turks on the Mavi Marmara, a ship trying to run the blockade of Gaza last year.
Analysts have a variety of opinions on the importance of each country to US interests in the region, but US diplomats certainly want to keep a strong relationship with both. Congress, pushed by domestic pressures, especially pro-Israel lobbying groups, has a different approach.
The potential for problems for US diplomacy was previewed in March, 2010. The House Foreign Affairs Committee, which had always been reserved on the matter of the Armenian Genocide (perpetrated by the Turks during and after World War I) issued a statement calling for American recognition of that crime. Turkey recalled its ambassador in response.
The matter went no further, but it illustrated the tensions between politics and diplomacy.
The pro-Israel lobby promoted the Armenian Genocide resolution. Now, however, they are supporting Netanyahu and potential rapprochement between Turkey and Israel. But that resolution was a signal that this could change, if Turkey’s relations with Israel degenerate further.
Israel and Turkey are at odds, but still technically allied. The Obama Administration wants to mend those fences, not tear them further asunder.
The immediate issue is Turkey’s demand for an apology for the Mavi Marmara killings. The UN will soon release a UN report, delayed now until August 20, which will state that Israel’s blockade in Gaza is legal, but that it used excessive force on the Mavi Marmara. If Israel apologizes before that report is released, it will blunt the effect of the latter conclusion.
Indications are that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is willing to issue some kind of apology, though doubtless it will be worded in such a way that Israel can continue to paint it as an unfortunate incident and that it was not really at fault. Such an apology could well be enough.
But Netanyahu, who has considerable support in his cabinet for this course, is concerned by the staunch opposition to it from his Foreign Ministry, which is in the hands of the radical right-wing party, Yisrael Beiteinu.
Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman and his deputy, Danny Ayalon have repeatedly tried to poison this relationship, well before the Mavi Marmara incident. This has never sat well either with the Prime Minister or in DC.
Lieberman has already blasted Netanyahu for even considering an apology to Turkey, despite the importance of that relationship to both Israel and the US. This is a continuation of Lieberman’s campaign to sunder the relationship with Turkey. He’s also using this to punish Netanyahu for his work against Yisrael Beiteinu’s anti-NGO bill last week.
The Israeli far right has been increasingly hostile toward Turkey ever since the current government came to power. They are generally opposed to anything that places diplomatic constraints on Israeli actions, which friendship with a Muslim state inevitably does.
That mistrust grew by leaps and bounds after Erdogan’s tirade against the occupation at Davos in ‘09. Turkey is also working to increase its leadership role in the region and to find a way to defuse the tensions between Iran and the West. All of this frightens the right and one suspects this is why the Foreign Ministry has worked to sour Israeli relations with Turkey.
Netanyahu, as well as key aides such as Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Deputy Prime Minister Dan Meridor, agrees with Obama that it is better to mend the relationship than let the split fester or worsen. But Lieberman can, potentially, bring down the Israeli government, and few in Israel really believe that they have anything to apologize for over the Mavi Marmara incident.
The UN decision to delay the release of the report was probably something the US, Israel and Turkey all agreed should happen. Obama, Erdogan and Netanyahu all want to work toward finding a way for Israel and Turkey to come to terms.
But will Lieberman let them?
For the US, it brings up a nightmare scenario. While the pro-Israel lobby supports Netanyahu’s desires, if Lieberman wins this tug of war, it will mean that Netanyahu’s public stance will change, and so, quite likely, will the lobby’s behavior.
A Congress hostile to Turkey will have plenty of fodder. Turkey wishes to maintain good relations with Syria and Iran, which can be a valuable asset for a US government that doesn’t often find it easy to talk to those two countries. But the potential for anti-Turkey propaganda there is obvious, and last year’s incident was an example of how easily, and disastrously, this situation can turn.
It will be very difficult for Obama Administration, or any other, to ignore that sort of force and pursue the US’ obvious interest in a strong relationship with Turkey.
They really can’t afford to let the dispute on this issue between Netanyahu and Lieberman remain an internal Israeli issue, mostly because the lobby will ensure it impacts US policy. The Administration seems to appreciate this. They’ll have to hope their effort pays dividends, or the price for the “special relationship” with Israel could escalate quite sharply.
]]>When the news was first announced last week that the two warships would pass through the canal, Israeli reaction [...]]]>
When the news was first announced last week that the two warships would pass through the canal, Israeli reaction appeared split. Now it seems Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has joined his foreign minister in ratcheting up the rhetoric, saying, “Israel takes a grave view of this Iranian step.”
Following closely on the U.S. veto of a UN Security Council resolution denouncing Israeli settlements, Israel’s blustering approach to the Iranian warships may provide yet another instance where the “special relationship” causes the U.S. to choose between its ally Israel, on one hand, and international law and maintaining regional influence on the other.
Egyptian approval of passage for the Iranian ships was first reported when Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman said the move amounted to a “provocation” by Iran. “The international community must understand that Israel cannot forever ignore these provocations,” he warned ominously.
Covering the comments, the Wall Street Journal pointed to fissures over Lieberman’s blustering and the quieter approach preferred Ehud Barak and the Israeli Defense Ministry.
At the time, Lieberman’s comments seemed to be made for U.S. consumption. Ethan Bronner’s New York Times piece had this nugget (my emphasis):
The first word came from Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman in an address to a group of American Jewish leaders in Jerusalem. The speech, which hinted at a possible response, was closed to reporters…
The bellicose comments led National Interest writer Jacob Heilbrunn to comment: “Israel’s foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman isn’t just a thug. He’s also a moron.” On Sunday, Netanyahu told his cabinet, “Israel takes a grave view of this Iranian step.”
A former State Department senior intelligence official called on Israel “to stand down and avoid any provocative actions.” Middle East Institute scholar Wayne White told LobeLog that Israeli “muscle-flexing” and a perception of “high-handedness” now could be harmful to U.S. (and even Israeli) interests on a wide range of issues. He mentioned the still-developing and fluid situation in Egypt, anti-regime protests in Iran itself, and uncertainty in Jordan, which is facing some unrest and, like Egypt, has a peace deal with Israel.
White’s list of examples gives a taste of just how many crises the U.S. is facing in the region. With protests in several U.S.-allied countries like Egypt, Bahrain, Jordan, Tunisia, and even Iraq, the U.S. wants to keep things relatively calm. As White points out, another crisis, with Israel and the U.S. pitted against Iran and Syria (whose waters the Iranian ships are reportedly bound for), could easily inject anti-U.S. and anti-Israeli sentiments into the anti-government movements that have been sweeping the region or permit besieged autocrats to divert popular attention and agitation.
The other elephant in the room is the notion of Suez passage itself. So far, the U.S. has taken a measured tone. State Department spokesperson P.J. Crowley said on Friday: “If the ships move through the canal, we’ll evaluate what they actually do.” He said the potential issues were the ships’ cargo and destination. Crowley seemed eager to move onto a new topic, repeatedly interrupting the questioner(s).
The lack of U.S. focus on passage itself is perhaps a nod to both the Constantinople Convention (1988) governing Suez Passage and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1983, in force 1994), which allows “innocent passage” through even territorial waters. The Constantinople convention states:
The Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag.
Consequently, the High Contracting Parties agree not in any way to interfere with the free use of the Canal, in time of war as in time of peace.
One of those contracting parties is, of course, Egypt, which may not interfere or block anyone’s passage. The U.S. relies on this status quo as much, if not more, than any other country. Indeed, if the right of “innocent passage” is questioned in this case, think of all the possible ramifications for the U.S. Navy and its 11 aircraft carrier groups that span the globe, if not always to the acclaim of the natives. It’s not for nothing that the Navy has been the country’s biggest advocate for Senate ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention.
For now, it appears that the passage of the Iranian ships has been delayed, without any reason given. But if the Israelis keep pushing back against Iran, rumblings of the diplomatic sort could soon follow for the U.S. Once again, as when Israel backed ousted Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak until his last days and relentlessly pressed the Obama administration to cast his UN Security Council veto on a resolution that was entirely consistent with U.S. policy since 1967, Washington’s “special relationship” with the Jewish State could become burdensome to broader U.S. strategic interests.
]]>