by Wayne White
Since 2005, Iraqis have voted in four parliamentary elections yearning for decisive positive change. In three of those elections, popular hope for more effective governance and a decline in violence were dashed with governments consumed by their ambitions and flawed policies. Indeed, elections often have seemed less important than [...]]]>
by Wayne White
Since 2005, Iraqis have voted in four parliamentary elections yearning for decisive positive change. In three of those elections, popular hope for more effective governance and a decline in violence were dashed with governments consumed by their ambitions and flawed policies. Indeed, elections often have seemed less important than the evolving situation on the ground. If current Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki succeeds, as expected, in securing a third term after last week’s election, more disappointment probably lies ahead.
Through the premierships of Iyad al-Alawi, Ibrahim al-Jafaari, and Maliki, Iraq’s senior leadership has included a large percentage of former exile opposition leaders along with prominent members of two long-standing Kurdish parties-cum-militias. This relative lack of turnover in terms of fresh political faces at the top has magnified the shortcomings of this narrow grouping.
The 2004 transition and a missed opportunity
Prior to the first election, a non-electoral political milestone giving Iraq its first post-occupation government triggered similar hope. In June 2004, the US-run Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) under J. Paul Bremer passed formal sovereignty to an Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) with Iyad Allawi as interim prime Minister. With the Sunni Arab insurgency raging at the time, many Iraqis hoped this step away from American control would weaken the insurgency.
At that time, high expectations also were palpable within the Bush administration. Yet, as the head of the State Department’s Iraq intelligence team, I warned such optimism was unfounded. In fact, the new Iraqi political line-up differed little from the Shi’a and Kurdish-dominated Iraqi Governing Council that had worked with Bremer. Such hopes were dashed as the insurgency raged on ever more ferociously.
One big opportunity did present itself in 2004. Many leading Sunni Arab tribal leaders and insurgent commanders sought a ceasefire with American forces (by far their premier foe). Although promising to cease attacks against US and Iraqi targets and cooperate with US forces in countering a burgeoning al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), these leaders refused to recognize the IIG. Allawi, pressured by Washington, agreed to meet with the group. However, the IIG rejected the offer (despite otherwise being unable to end the insurgency).
Ironically, just over two years later, with ethno-sectarian violence soaring out of control, the US (despite opposition from another Iraqi prime minister) accepted the same deal unilaterally. Thus, the so-called Sunni Arab “Awakening” would be born, reducing violence substantially, but too late to save the tens of thousands who died during two intervening years of bloody fighting.
The first 2005 Iraqi Election
The next political way station toward what was hoped would be a measure of normalcy was the January 2005 election of an Iraqi National Assembly to name a prime minister and oversee the preparation of a permanent constitution. Iraqi voters went to the polls amidst an intense wave of hope.
Overall turnout was high, but polling in Sunni Arab areas was nil as most boycotted the vote. The bulk of employment in such areas had involved the military or Saddam Hussein-era government bureaucracy — disbanded by Bremer. Over a million Sunni Arabs had been members of the ruling Ba’th Party; Bremer banned such individuals from future employment. Unemployment was high and disaffection from the new Shi’a/Kurdish order intense. Seeing no real stake in the elections, many Sunni Arabs continued to support the insurgency.
Shortly after the election, the Bush administration requested that the heads of all major US intelligence agencies, plus British civilian and military intelligence arms, meet at CIA, along with one expert each, to sort out the bottom line. It clearly hoped for good news. Instead, I led off for the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence & Research, pointing out the grim, unchanged dynamic on the ground. All present agreed.
As the Intelligence Community believed, in terms of fundamentals driving violence, the election had changed nothing. Once elected, the new National Assembly took two months to agree on a Prime Minister (Ibrahim al-Jaafari). Even though the constitution was completed later that year, setting the stage for the first election of a permanent parliament, insurgent and AQI terrorist violence continued unabated.
The second 2005 parliamentary vote
As with the election at the beginning of the year, the December 2005 vote for the Council of Representatives (COR) brought forth another wave of hope.
Still, the constitutional referendum preceding it had underscored the glaring sectarian divide that fueled the insurgency. In the Sunni Arab majority governorates of Salah ad Din, al-Anbar, and Ninawa, the constitution was opposed by 82%, 97% and 55% of voters (a rough reflection of the percentages of Sunni Arabs in those jurisdictions).
The results of the December parliamentary election showed far higher Sunni Arab participation, but were accompanied by Sunni Arab and secular Shi’a anger over allegations of fraud favoring Shi’a religious parties. The field of political lists was little changed from January. This time around, six months of bickering ensued before Nuri al-Maliki emerged as a compromise prime minister in April 2006.
Between two elections: 2005-2010
In February 2006, with the bombing of a revered Shi’a mosque shrine, violence spiked massively. Shi’a militias like firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s “Mahdi Army” retaliated against Sunni Arabs, especially in Baghdad. “Sectarian cleansing” of much of the capital raged out of control; over a million Sunni Arabs fled westward for safety. This maelstrom also heavily damaged Iraq’s Christian community.
In late 2006, a desperate Bush administration finally decided to accept the deal in which Sunni Arab insurgents would cease attacks on US forces and fight alongside US Army and Marine units against AQI. Although by mid-2007, tens of thousands of insurgents had switched sides, Maliki & his mainly Shi’a supporters opposed the deal. Only in late 2008, under sustained US pressure and following considerable success involving Sunni Arab “Awakening” cadres, did Maliki reluctantly accept the arrangement, albeit only partially.
Also in 2008, with Sunni Arab resistance much reduced, Maliki, with US assistance, was able to address rampaging Shi’a militias — especially those controlled by Sadr. Badly beaten in southern Iraq and Baghdad, Sadr agreed to disarm most of his forces. During 2006-2008, however, the majority of the Sunni Arab population had been driven from the capital. By that point, many Sunni Arabs once hostile toward US forces had come to view US troops as their only reliable protection from Shi’a militias and rogue elements of the Iraqi security forces.
Nonetheless, according to the 2008 US-Iraqi Status of Forces Agreement, US troops withdrew to their bases in June 2009. At that point, insurgent, AQI and militia violence was the lowest since the 2003 invasion.
The 2010 parliamentary campaign and vote
In the lead-up to the March 2010 vote, Maliki seized upon the polarizing de-Ba’thification issue to firm up his electoral support within his Shi’a base. In the run-up to these elections, US Embassy cables from early 2010 say Maliki “directed the removal” of large numbers of “some of the highest quality personnel” from Iraq’s security organizations over links to the Ba’th Party as part of his “political gamesmanship.”
Almost 500 Sunni Arab (many secular or liberal) parliamentary candidates were also disqualified by an “Independent High Election Commission” stacked with Shi’a. Even Kurdish Iraqi President Jalal Talabani urged Maliki not to be “unjust” to candidates. However, few of the bans were reversed.
Sunni Arabs still voted hoping a new alliance under the secular Iyad Allawi might unseat Maliki. Even with the deck stacked in favor of Shi’a religious parties, Sunni Arab participation was far higher than in 2005, and Allawi scored well. Nonetheless, after 8 months of maneuvering, Maliki again was named prime minister in late 2010.
Years of retrenchment
Back in business, Maliki redoubled his efforts to amass personal power and marginalize the Sunni Arab community. He placed some crack Iraqi army units and police elements under his own control. He also employed unofficial security forces for extra-judicial skullduggery. This included attacks against local Sunni Arab leaders and the detention of prisoners in private holding pens.
Meanwhile, he hounded more Sunni Arabs out of key positions in government. In late 2011, for example, Maliki’s government charged Sunni Arab Iraqi Vice-President Tariq al-Hashimi with involvement in terrorism from “confessions” exacted from arrested bodyguards. Al-Hashimi fled to Iraqi Kurdistan in December 2011.
Maliki also dumped some of his commitments on Sunni Arab “Awakening” cadres (known as “Sahwas”). Promises to integrate them into Iraq’s security forces were only partly fulfilled. He even turned loosely trusted police units — and anonymous gunmen — against Sahwa leaders in some localities.
Since the US opposed this behavior, Maliki and his government dealt the US out of the Iraqi equation. Although a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) was concluded in late 2008 to keep a limited US troop presence in Iraq beyond the December 2011 withdrawal, Maliki’s government ultimately ruled out the retention of US bases in Iraq. Soon after, Maliki also rejected judicial immunity for any US troops and military advisors left behind. Thus the Obama administration had little choice but to withdraw completely (clearly Maliki’s goal: to free himself from American oversight).
Maliki’s face-offs with his Kurdish coalition allies led to the Kurdish refusal to turn over Tariq al-Hashimi. Disputes over oil export agreements and territory as well as the Kurdish Regional Government’s (KRG) concern over Maliki’s growing personal power also darkened the period between the 2010 and 2014 elections (despite Maliki’s agreement with the Kurds to do the opposite to secure their support for his candidacy in 2010).
Meanwhile, violence on the part of a rebounding AQI had been rising. This culminated in January 2014 with the seizure of the Sunni Arab city of Fallujah by elements of the extremist Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and local tribesmen. With Sunni Arab anger rising across northwestern Iraq because of grievances against Maliki, ISIL, like AQI, found a more favorable reception.
The 2014 election
Maliki has positioned himself to secure another term. Blaming his opponents for rising violence, Maliki made his familiar appeal for renewed unity after last month’s parliamentary election. With his reputation for sectarianism and duplicity, there is little chance he will change his spots. One could be more definitive in the negative, but Maliki’s inability to restore government control over Fallujah after 3 months of trying might force him to make at least some concessions to Iraq’s Sunni Arab community to weaken ISIL.
Plus ca change; plus ce le meme chose
For nearly 10 years since the transfer of sovereignty, Iraq has failed to evolve substantially toward an inclusive democracy, reduced sectarian tensions, a more diverse ruling elite, greater rule of law, and effective governance. Also, under Maliki there has been a drift toward authoritarianism.
In addition to the serious deficiencies described above, the Iraqi government remains largely dysfunctional in almost every sense: endemically corrupt, judicially partial, administratively inept, and non-transparent. Despite the day-to-day impact of such poor governance, it is somewhat surprising that many Iraqis have not become far more cynical toward their elections.
President Barack Obama recently praised “the Iraqi people” for voting again in their pursuit of a peaceful, unified and prosperous future. Perhaps the most baleful impact of Maliki’s sustained engagement in sectarian politics has been how it has prevented Iraq’s population from finding more common ground upon which to base a more coherent “Iraqi” popular identity, instead of one that is exclusively Shi’a, Kurdish, Sunni Arab, Turcoman, or Christian.
Photo: Guarded by a barbed wire fence, Iraqis line up to vote in the 2005 parliamentary election. Credit: American Forces Press Service
]]>by Wayne White
In his Oct. 29 Foreign Policy article, “How We Won in Iraq”, General David Petraeus characterizes the 2003 US invasion and departure of US troops in 2011 as an American victory. This triumphant — though distorted — version of that searing saga seems acceptable to many Americans not [...]]]>
by Wayne White
In his Oct. 29 Foreign Policy article, “How We Won in Iraq”, General David Petraeus characterizes the 2003 US invasion and departure of US troops in 2011 as an American victory. This triumphant — though distorted — version of that searing saga seems acceptable to many Americans not only because it has been repeated so often, but also because it is so reassuring. Yet, despite the immense effort and sacrifice on the part of the US military and civilian personnel who served in Iraq, there are profound reasons to question such an upbeat conclusion.
Losers and winners
The Bush administration’s goal extended far beyond the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and initially focused on the destruction of his alleged Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). No WMD were found. The administration also planned to transform Iraq into a Western-style democracy that would function as a beacon to those suffering under nearby authoritarian regimes. Instead, even now Iraqis are saddled with an abusive, dysfunctional, non-transparent, corrupt, and sectarian-based government that resembles a democracy more in appearance than substance.
Rather than achieving a quick victory followed by a swift, orderly transition, the US became embroiled in a prolonged and bloody anti-insurgency campaign that cost well over 30,000 American casualties. The invasion also gave birth to al-Qaeda’s most damaging subsidiary, cost over $1 trillion, and for over five years diverted a huge amount of focus, military power, and spending from the important NATO effort in Afghanistan. Finally, instead of the US, the West, and moderate Arab states having considerable influence with Iraq’s new leaders, Baghdad’s most influential partner is Iran, and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is supporting the Assad regime in Syria.
As for the Iraqis, Sunni Arabs have been disenfranchised by the Shi’a-dominated successor regime, untold numbers of them have been killed, many of their communities have been ravaged by war, and well over a million were driven from their homes and businesses in the greater Baghdad area. A majority of Iraq’s roughly one million Christians have been forced to flee in the face of killings, church burnings and attacks on their businesses. Even the dominant Shi’a majority have suffered terrible casualties and great loss of property at the hands of the robust Sunni Arab insurgency back in 2003-2007, the depredations of their own rogue militias, and the drumfire of terrorist attacks and bombings on the part of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) to this day.
For Arab Iraqis, insurgent sabotage and waves of looting following the invasion have devastated most of the country’s state industries, large private businesses, and all government ministries save one. Universities, hospitals, schools, banks, archives, much of Iraq’s electrical and oil infrastructure and the country’s rich archaeological heritage have also been severely damaged.
If there is a relative winner, it could be Iraq’s Kurdish community. Separated from the rest of the country by their own militias defending the borders of the Kurdish Autonomous Region (KRG), the majority of predominantly Kurdish areas have been spared the high levels of casualties and damage experienced elsewhere. In fact, the KRG now enjoys considerable prosperity (and more autonomy than at any time since the creation of the modern Iraqi state) with a host of Arab Iraqis taking advantage of Iraqi Kurdistan’s booming tourist industry every year to seek a respite from life farther south. Nevertheless, from late 1991 until Saddam Hussein’s overthrow in 2003, most of the Kurds now within the KRG already had been largely protected from Saddam’s rule within a northern sanctuary with much the same borders as the KRG.
The troop surge myth
Frontloaded prominently in Petraeus’ discussion of the “Surge of Ideas” is the new strategic approach he brought to the table. Petraeus’ shift toward increasingly embedding US troops within Iraqi communities and other tactical innovations was indeed more enlightened than the approach of his predecessors. Nonetheless, he does suggest strongly that the additional 30,000 US troops made a substantial difference. Yet, of the latter, only 5,000 were sent outside Baghdad to address severe problems in mainly Sunni Arab areas, so only in Baghdad was that reinforcement of any real significance.
Buried far below and evidently rated second to Petraeus’ “clear, hold and build” strategy was the US decision to exploit the so-called “Sunni Arab Awakening.” His description of the emergence of this phenomenon — the most critical game changer from late 2006 through 2008 — contains some notable errors.
First off, the decision on the part of many Sunni Arab insurgent and allied tribal leaders to seek a deal with American forces did not “begin several months before the surge” when one “talented US army brigade commander” decided to work with one “courageous Sunni sheikh” at Ramadi. The first Sunni Arab offer to cooperate with US forces — and in a far more sweeping manner — was brought to Washington’s attention in mid-2004, over two years before the events outside Ramadi in 2006. Senior military officers in the field at the time told me that other offers at least as significant as the one Petraeus cites occurred as early as 2003.
Petraeus is correct in his assertion that in 2003 many Sunni Arabs, despite their association with the former regime, still hoped to play a constructive role in the new Iraq. However, their offers of help were cast aside by the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), Jerry Bremer, when he dismissed the entire Iraqi Army even while giving Petraeus writ to reach out locally in the latter’s northern 101st Airborne Division sector.
It is therefore wrong to place the blame for missing this opportunity exclusively on “Iraqi authorities in Baghdad” (who had precious little authority relative to Bremer’s at that point). In fact, senior US military officers on the scene acting on instructions (some pre-dating the invasion) recruited many thousands of Sunni Arab officers willing to remain in the Iraqi army to help maintain order; they also were waved off by Bremer.
Missed opportunities, lingering effects
In the summer of 2004, the US army and Marines fighting in various sectors west and northwest of Baghdad were approached by a number of insurgent and tribal leaders seeking a broad-based deal with US forces. They did not regard Iraqi forces as a significant foe, nor did they trust the largely Shi’a/Kurdish Iraqi central government. Yet, so serious were these Sunni Arab leaders about stopping the fighting with Coalition forces & turning against al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) that they agreed to meet with Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi in Tikrit, even though an agreement between the Sunni Arab leaders and Allawi could not be reached.
So, instead of grasping this outstretched hand that would have spared vast numbers of US and Iraqi casualties over the following two bloody years, the Bush administration deferred to an Iraqi government dominated by anti-Sunni Arab elements. Only when the uncontrollable maelstrom of bloodshed described by Petraeus erupted in early 2006 did the administration reluctantly decide to make the proverbial “deal with the devil.” This was driven by the need to gain some measure of traction in coping with a situation that had expanded to include the scourge of wholesale sectarian cleansing that displaced at least 1.5 million Iraqis and eradicated the once rich culture of mixed neighborhoods in Baghdad.
Once that decision had been made, the Sunni Arab “Awakening” deal took more than 100,000 insurgents off the battlefield and turned them into critical US assets against AQI. Only then could sufficient forces be freed up to crack down effectively on rampaging Shi’a militias — primarily Muqtada al-Sadr’s “Mahdi Army.”
Petraeus also wrongly paints al-Maliki as supportive of the deal with Sunni Arab combatants, albeit merely in Sunni Arab areas, in 2007. From my vantage point in US Intelligence, I watched as the Iraqi PM set about actively trying to torpedo the arrangement during 2007 — even going to the extreme of ordering a major Iraqi army attack on an Awakening force west of Baghdad (in a Sunni Arab area), thankfully headed off by US forces, in addition to other attempted attacks on specific “Awakening” commanders as well as the kidnapping of some of their relatives.
Petraeus rejects the notion that “we got lucky with the Awakening,” but that is, in fact, far closer to the truth because the “Awakening” emanated from Iraq’s Sunni Arab community — not from “a conscious decision” on the part of the US (save for a belated US decision to accept a deal that had been on the table for two years). Had the Bush administration instead continued to reject such a deal in 2007-08, US forces probably would not have had nearly such a decisive impact on the war — regardless of Petraeus’ otherwise more creative approach to the conflict. Conversely, had Washington allowed the deal to be accepted far earlier, Petraeus’ predecessor, Gen. George Casey, would have enjoyed a lot more success (despite a less savvy tactical approach).
Petraeus, nonetheless, is correct that welcoming — rather than spurning — Iraq’s Sunni Arabs is perhaps the only way out of the current escalating spiral of violence. Unfortunately, Maliki’s determination to minimize Sunni Arab political participation over the past four years especially has so poisoned the well of sectarian trust that it could be very difficult to achieve such a shift in policy so long as al-Maliki remains in power. It is, therefore, supremely ironic that after ignoring years of US entreaties to abandon his marginalization and persecution of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs and embrace reconciliation instead, al-Maliki should be meeting with President Obama today asking for American anti-terrorism assistance to address the violence he and his cronies have done so much to provoke.
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