Hyping the Islamic State (ISIS or IS) threat risks generating flawed policies. The White House probably is a source of frustration, as its critics claim, but others seem too eager to commit US combat troops. Meanwhile, the administration, under constant pressure regarding the US effort, has not done enough to energize the anti-IS coalition that President Obama worked so hard to assemble. This inclines allies to believe Washington will do the heavy lifting for them. Although addressing IS full-bore (and unilaterally) might seem appealing to some, this urge undermines the patience needed for more sensible courses of action.
The Hagel Affair
The resignation of Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel last month resulted in criticism that the White House is unreceptive to outside views, such as expanding the US military effort against IS. Excessive micromanagement of military related issues by the White House (including the phone line to commanders in Afghanistan that bypassed Hagel) has also been cited.
Past Presidents have done likewise. In overseas crises, many presidents created their own channels, giving White House officials more power than cabinet secretaries. Franklin Roosevelt often relied on Harry Hopkins over Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Richard Nixon used Henry Kissinger in lieu of William Rogers, and Colin Powell found himself outside the Bush administration’s inner circle. Perhaps the most extreme example of presidential micromanagement was Lyndon Johnson’s handling of the Vietnam War.
The Obama White House has long had dicey relations with the Pentagon. This has been, according to the Pentagon’s side of the argument, the source of delays and confusing policy directions on several issues, with the White House accused of falling into “group think.” For his part, Hagel had complained in the early fall to National Security Advisor Susan Rice in a memo about a lack of cohesion in US policy toward IS.
Nonetheless, White House micromanagement or Pentagon-White House difficulties aside, Obama’s reluctance to ramp up the US military effort against IS excessively seems well founded. Of course, Hagel’s position is not entirely clear, but escalation had been advocated by Hagel’s two predecessors: Robert Gates and Leon Panetta.
Costs of US Escalation
IS appears ready to endure lopsided casualties to inflict some on American combat troops. And IS could follow through on this hope. Not only are its combatants fanatics, the radical Sunni militia also employs deadly suicide bombings against foes in close-up urban combat (as we’ve seen in Kobani). Additionally, IS likely hopes to get a hold of at least a few US military prisoners for filmed beheadings. So why hand IS exactly what it wants?
With large urban areas to be cleared just in Iraq—from Fallujah to Mosul—US combat troops would also likely incur casualties in excess of those suffered in 2003-08 against somewhat less fanatical Sunni Arab insurgents and Shi’a militias during the war.
American military difficulties could be further magnified by reduced interest on the part of Iraq’s Shi’a-dominated government in making the political concessions needed to split Sunni Arab tribes and other secular elements away from IS and marshal its own forces more swiftly. After all, why should Baghdad go the extra mile if the US seems willing to take care of Baghdad’s IS problem militarily?
Recently, despite lost ground in and around Ramadi west of Baghdad, Iraqi and Kurdish forces have made gains between Baghdad and Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) territory to the north. Moving up Iraq’s central line of communications, Iraqi forces have driven IS from some important territory. The siege of the vital Baiji refinery complex has been lifted, and gains have been made in the demographically mixed Diyala Governate northeast of Baghdad.
Meanwhile, Iraqi Kurds continue to push IS slowly westward. Baghdad and the KRG reached a temporary oil agreement yesterday that should clear the way for greater cooperation elsewhere, like battling IS. Bitter quarrelling under former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki left Iraqi-KRG relations in shambles.
Struggling to rebound from severe reverses last summer, however, the Iraqi Army is in no position to mount a major offensive deep into IS holdings. However, successful Iraqi and Kurdish attacks demonstrate the vulnerability of IS’s vast perimeter. Strong IS forces cannot be everywhere at once to repel various challenges and adequately support ongoing attacks (such as its effort against Kobani).
In terms of a military threat, IS has been largely contained. It cannot advance northward against Turkey; isolated pro-IS sympathies exist in Jordan, but the highly professional Jordanian Army would be a tough nut to crack; and in Iraq, most all Shi’a and Kurdish areas lie outside IS control and are fighting hard to maintain this status. In Syria, IS could advance against weaker rebel forces like the Free Syrian Army, but it seems obsessed with seizing Kobani despite heavy losses.
Coalition and US Escalation
The anti-IS coalition the White House assembled is contributing relatively little to the overall military effort, despite Secretary of State John Kerry’s glowing rhetoric at today’s coalition conclave in Brussels. The air campaign is mainly an American show. Committing more US assets would make it easier for others already foot-dragging over contributions to continue dithering. Now is not the time to ramp up US military efforts, but rather to pressure allies to increase their own contributions.
The bulk of IS’s reinforcements in the form of foreign fighters flow through NATO ally Turkey. The CIA in September and the UN more recently sharply increased their estimate of the number of foreign fighters reaching the Islamic State. To date, Turkey has been more helpful to IS than the coalition because of its passivity. If it cannot be pressured to vigorously interdict incoming fighters, IS would be able to replace many lost fighters—although with less experienced cadres.
The White House (and other allies) must press Turkey harder. President Obama delayed air support for beleaguered Syrian Kurds for two weeks in deference to Turkish concerns (allowing IS to gain a foothold inside Kobani). Even today’s 60-nation gathering seems short on clear goals, let alone a robust military agenda on contributions.
Admittedly, although the Administration has done too little diplomatic spadework, its leverage overseas probably has been undermined by American politicians, pundits, and many in the media demanding an expanded US effort.
Bottom Line
IS remains a daunting foe, so it will not be defeated easily, soon, or completely. To Americans pressing urgently for quick solutions, this is difficult to accept. But comments like one yesterday by Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Chair of the House Foreign Relations Middle East and North Africa Sub-Committee, suggesting IS could damage everyone’s way of life are typical of exaggerations impeding objective policymaking.
Yet those claiming the air campaign has been ineffective are also naïve. IS has mostly ground to a halt. In some places, like Kobani, IS is hemorrhaging combat casualties. Meanwhile IS’s infrastructure, leadership, training camps, heavy weapons, oil refineries, and lines of communication have been hammered by the ongoing aerial bombardment. This week, assets in IS’s “capital” of Raqqa, Syria were also subjected to a wave of airstrikes.
Many want IS crushed quickly out of fear of IS attacks against the American homeland. Yet, as we saw in Afghanistan in 2001-02 with al-Qaeda, the combatants would not be completely rounded up should substantial US forces be sent in. Many hundreds at the very least would escape to find refuge elsewhere. In that scenario, IS would likely shift toward an international terrorist mode, posing an even greater threat to the United States. Therefore, a more collective effort—forcing IS to truly understand that it faces dozens of foes and not just a few—would be a wiser way forward. It is meanwhile imperative to strip IS of as many of its non-extremist Sunni Arab allies as possible, so they do not have to be dealt with militarily.
Photo: President Obama addresses reporters during a meeting with th anti-IS coalition on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly on Sept. 24, 2014
]]>The United States withdrew from Iraq in 2012 after nine years of a brutal occupation marked by the imprisonment of over 60,000 people, the death of hundreds of thousands, the torture of prisoners, and the destruction of the country’s infrastructure. The United States also [...]]]>
The United States withdrew from Iraq in 2012 after nine years of a brutal occupation marked by the imprisonment of over 60,000 people, the death of hundreds of thousands, the torture of prisoners, and the destruction of the country’s infrastructure. The United States also left behind a system of governance based on ethnicity and sectarianism.
According to the recent parliamentary election results, Nouri al-Maliki’s bloc won 92 out of 328 seats — which passes for a strong plurality in Iraq’s fractious political system. He is nearly guaranteed a third term as a prime minister.
This was the first election since U.S. troops left Iraq and the third election since the removal of Saddam Hussein. Terrorist attacks have continued in Iraq up to the recent elections. Over the last year, approximately 1,000 civilians have died each month from the violence, much of it generated by foreign terrorists coming from Syria through Turkey and led by al-Qaeda linked forces such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
Despite the violence, the election was relatively free. Still, the recent election results have not resolved any of the underlying conflicts in the country.
Domestic challenges to Maliki
After the elections of 2010, Dawa Party head Nouri al-Maliki‘s Shia-backed coalition brokered a deal with other groups to win a second term for al-Maliki as prime minister. The central government under al-Maliki continued to enjoy the support of the oil-rich eastern and southern regions, which are Shia bastions. But al-Maliki accuses the Sunni Gulf states and Saudi Arabia of funding terrorist organizations in Iraq.
The Sunni provinces, chiefly Anbar province in the west and Nineveh in the northwest, remain a source of discontent and a fertile ground for terrorism. ISIS challenges the central government’s control of these regions and effectively holds the city of Fallujah. They have reached areas surrounding Baghdad and attacked one of its Shia universities. Al-Maliki’s government has proven willing to fight terrorists with brutal force, if necessary. However, the terrorists retain support in Fallujah and the surrounding area because of the broader anti-government sentiment in the region.
Since 1991, with the help from the United States, the Kurds have meanwhile maintained a semi-autonomous region in the north. The Kurds have a respectful and watchful relationship with Turkey in the north and Iran in the east. The Kurds’ relationship with Iraq’s central government is more contentious, as Erbil struggles to get more land and more oil under its control. The disputes even have an international dimension. The Kurds, for instance, have attempted to export oil directly to Turkey. But the government in Baghdad insists that the deals require central government approval, and Turkey would rather keep a good relationship with Baghdad. Despite the challenges of running a semi-autonomous government, the Kurdish region is thriving relative to the rest of Iraq.
Al-Maliki’s flaws
Al-Maliki has autocratic tendencies. He tends to label all of his opponents as terrorists. Instead of working with elected officials, he ignores the parliament and concentrates the levers of powers in his own hands. Corruption, graft, and favoritism have returned in force. Iraqis are leaving the country in droves, especially minorities such as Christians.
The enemies of Iraq continue to hope that the country will plunge into a civil war and fragment into three regions — Shia in the east and south, Sunni in the west and north, and the Kurds in the north. Such fragmentation is unlikely for Iraqis, who despite their infighting tend to identify with Iraq as a whole. If Iraq is divided, the Sunnis will be out of oil. The Kurds, because of opposition from Turkey and Iran, understand it is the wrong time in history to declare an independent country. (With their own large Kurdish minorities, neither Turkey nor Iran wants an independent Kurdish state on their borders.) And the Shia are Iraqis first and want to govern Iraq as whole.
Iraqi political leaders from all the factions can resolve the country’s problems if they place the interests of Iraq ahead of their personal, factional, and sectarian interests. This is a tall order. Al-Maliki has had his chance to lead Iraq. He has failed for many reasons, some of them beyond his control.
Nevertheless, al-Maliki now has a chance to put together a new team at the helm. The primary challenge facing this new government is to resolve the political divide between Sunnis and Shia created and exacerbated by the occupiers. Governance must be shared with the elected officials in parliament. The new team must come to terms with the Kurds, and the Kurds must be reasonable in accommodating the historical burden of present-day Iraq. Finally, the new team must stamp out corruption and graft.
Iraq must be given a respite to repair and rebuild the country for all of its citizens. The political leaders of Iraq must eradicate the post-occupation remnants of ethnic and sectarian animosity and control the bloody violence that is plunging the country into a new civil war.
This could be Iraq’s last chance.
– Adil E. Shamoo is an associate fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies, a senior analyst for Foreign Policy In Focus, and the author of Equal Worth — When Humanity Will Have Peace. He can be reached by email.
*This article was first published by Foreign Policy in Focus and was reprinted here with permission.
Photo: Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki listens to an opening speech during the Sarafiya bridge opening in Kadhimiya, Iraq on May 27, 2008. Credit: U.S. Air Force photo/Staff Sgt. Jessica J. Wilkes
]]>by Wayne White
In his Oct. 29 Foreign Policy article, “How We Won in Iraq”, General David Petraeus characterizes the 2003 US invasion and departure of US troops in 2011 as an American victory. This triumphant — though distorted — version of that searing saga seems acceptable to many Americans not [...]]]>
by Wayne White
In his Oct. 29 Foreign Policy article, “How We Won in Iraq”, General David Petraeus characterizes the 2003 US invasion and departure of US troops in 2011 as an American victory. This triumphant — though distorted — version of that searing saga seems acceptable to many Americans not only because it has been repeated so often, but also because it is so reassuring. Yet, despite the immense effort and sacrifice on the part of the US military and civilian personnel who served in Iraq, there are profound reasons to question such an upbeat conclusion.
Losers and winners
The Bush administration’s goal extended far beyond the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and initially focused on the destruction of his alleged Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). No WMD were found. The administration also planned to transform Iraq into a Western-style democracy that would function as a beacon to those suffering under nearby authoritarian regimes. Instead, even now Iraqis are saddled with an abusive, dysfunctional, non-transparent, corrupt, and sectarian-based government that resembles a democracy more in appearance than substance.
Rather than achieving a quick victory followed by a swift, orderly transition, the US became embroiled in a prolonged and bloody anti-insurgency campaign that cost well over 30,000 American casualties. The invasion also gave birth to al-Qaeda’s most damaging subsidiary, cost over $1 trillion, and for over five years diverted a huge amount of focus, military power, and spending from the important NATO effort in Afghanistan. Finally, instead of the US, the West, and moderate Arab states having considerable influence with Iraq’s new leaders, Baghdad’s most influential partner is Iran, and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is supporting the Assad regime in Syria.
As for the Iraqis, Sunni Arabs have been disenfranchised by the Shi’a-dominated successor regime, untold numbers of them have been killed, many of their communities have been ravaged by war, and well over a million were driven from their homes and businesses in the greater Baghdad area. A majority of Iraq’s roughly one million Christians have been forced to flee in the face of killings, church burnings and attacks on their businesses. Even the dominant Shi’a majority have suffered terrible casualties and great loss of property at the hands of the robust Sunni Arab insurgency back in 2003-2007, the depredations of their own rogue militias, and the drumfire of terrorist attacks and bombings on the part of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) to this day.
For Arab Iraqis, insurgent sabotage and waves of looting following the invasion have devastated most of the country’s state industries, large private businesses, and all government ministries save one. Universities, hospitals, schools, banks, archives, much of Iraq’s electrical and oil infrastructure and the country’s rich archaeological heritage have also been severely damaged.
If there is a relative winner, it could be Iraq’s Kurdish community. Separated from the rest of the country by their own militias defending the borders of the Kurdish Autonomous Region (KRG), the majority of predominantly Kurdish areas have been spared the high levels of casualties and damage experienced elsewhere. In fact, the KRG now enjoys considerable prosperity (and more autonomy than at any time since the creation of the modern Iraqi state) with a host of Arab Iraqis taking advantage of Iraqi Kurdistan’s booming tourist industry every year to seek a respite from life farther south. Nevertheless, from late 1991 until Saddam Hussein’s overthrow in 2003, most of the Kurds now within the KRG already had been largely protected from Saddam’s rule within a northern sanctuary with much the same borders as the KRG.
The troop surge myth
Frontloaded prominently in Petraeus’ discussion of the “Surge of Ideas” is the new strategic approach he brought to the table. Petraeus’ shift toward increasingly embedding US troops within Iraqi communities and other tactical innovations was indeed more enlightened than the approach of his predecessors. Nonetheless, he does suggest strongly that the additional 30,000 US troops made a substantial difference. Yet, of the latter, only 5,000 were sent outside Baghdad to address severe problems in mainly Sunni Arab areas, so only in Baghdad was that reinforcement of any real significance.
Buried far below and evidently rated second to Petraeus’ “clear, hold and build” strategy was the US decision to exploit the so-called “Sunni Arab Awakening.” His description of the emergence of this phenomenon — the most critical game changer from late 2006 through 2008 — contains some notable errors.
First off, the decision on the part of many Sunni Arab insurgent and allied tribal leaders to seek a deal with American forces did not “begin several months before the surge” when one “talented US army brigade commander” decided to work with one “courageous Sunni sheikh” at Ramadi. The first Sunni Arab offer to cooperate with US forces — and in a far more sweeping manner — was brought to Washington’s attention in mid-2004, over two years before the events outside Ramadi in 2006. Senior military officers in the field at the time told me that other offers at least as significant as the one Petraeus cites occurred as early as 2003.
Petraeus is correct in his assertion that in 2003 many Sunni Arabs, despite their association with the former regime, still hoped to play a constructive role in the new Iraq. However, their offers of help were cast aside by the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), Jerry Bremer, when he dismissed the entire Iraqi Army even while giving Petraeus writ to reach out locally in the latter’s northern 101st Airborne Division sector.
It is therefore wrong to place the blame for missing this opportunity exclusively on “Iraqi authorities in Baghdad” (who had precious little authority relative to Bremer’s at that point). In fact, senior US military officers on the scene acting on instructions (some pre-dating the invasion) recruited many thousands of Sunni Arab officers willing to remain in the Iraqi army to help maintain order; they also were waved off by Bremer.
Missed opportunities, lingering effects
In the summer of 2004, the US army and Marines fighting in various sectors west and northwest of Baghdad were approached by a number of insurgent and tribal leaders seeking a broad-based deal with US forces. They did not regard Iraqi forces as a significant foe, nor did they trust the largely Shi’a/Kurdish Iraqi central government. Yet, so serious were these Sunni Arab leaders about stopping the fighting with Coalition forces & turning against al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) that they agreed to meet with Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi in Tikrit, even though an agreement between the Sunni Arab leaders and Allawi could not be reached.
So, instead of grasping this outstretched hand that would have spared vast numbers of US and Iraqi casualties over the following two bloody years, the Bush administration deferred to an Iraqi government dominated by anti-Sunni Arab elements. Only when the uncontrollable maelstrom of bloodshed described by Petraeus erupted in early 2006 did the administration reluctantly decide to make the proverbial “deal with the devil.” This was driven by the need to gain some measure of traction in coping with a situation that had expanded to include the scourge of wholesale sectarian cleansing that displaced at least 1.5 million Iraqis and eradicated the once rich culture of mixed neighborhoods in Baghdad.
Once that decision had been made, the Sunni Arab “Awakening” deal took more than 100,000 insurgents off the battlefield and turned them into critical US assets against AQI. Only then could sufficient forces be freed up to crack down effectively on rampaging Shi’a militias — primarily Muqtada al-Sadr’s “Mahdi Army.”
Petraeus also wrongly paints al-Maliki as supportive of the deal with Sunni Arab combatants, albeit merely in Sunni Arab areas, in 2007. From my vantage point in US Intelligence, I watched as the Iraqi PM set about actively trying to torpedo the arrangement during 2007 — even going to the extreme of ordering a major Iraqi army attack on an Awakening force west of Baghdad (in a Sunni Arab area), thankfully headed off by US forces, in addition to other attempted attacks on specific “Awakening” commanders as well as the kidnapping of some of their relatives.
Petraeus rejects the notion that “we got lucky with the Awakening,” but that is, in fact, far closer to the truth because the “Awakening” emanated from Iraq’s Sunni Arab community — not from “a conscious decision” on the part of the US (save for a belated US decision to accept a deal that had been on the table for two years). Had the Bush administration instead continued to reject such a deal in 2007-08, US forces probably would not have had nearly such a decisive impact on the war — regardless of Petraeus’ otherwise more creative approach to the conflict. Conversely, had Washington allowed the deal to be accepted far earlier, Petraeus’ predecessor, Gen. George Casey, would have enjoyed a lot more success (despite a less savvy tactical approach).
Petraeus, nonetheless, is correct that welcoming — rather than spurning — Iraq’s Sunni Arabs is perhaps the only way out of the current escalating spiral of violence. Unfortunately, Maliki’s determination to minimize Sunni Arab political participation over the past four years especially has so poisoned the well of sectarian trust that it could be very difficult to achieve such a shift in policy so long as al-Maliki remains in power. It is, therefore, supremely ironic that after ignoring years of US entreaties to abandon his marginalization and persecution of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs and embrace reconciliation instead, al-Maliki should be meeting with President Obama today asking for American anti-terrorism assistance to address the violence he and his cronies have done so much to provoke.
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Much of this bloodletting could have been avoided had Maliki joined with the US in the deal the American military made with the vast majority of Sunni Arab insurgents between Fall 2006 through 2008. That arrangement (in response to Sunni Arab tribal and insurgent overtures known collectively as the “Sunni Arab Awakening”) was a defining moment in greatly reducing US and Iraqi casualties. It not only took the bulk of a formidable insurgency off the battlefield, it also enlisted it in a robust attempt to take down a good bit of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the source of most all bombings against the Iraqi Shi’a community and targets associated with the Shi’a-dominated Baghdad government to this day. Yet, since the departure of US forces and Maliki’s reluctant cooperation with — plus the continued marginalization, harassment and even killings of — former insurgents and their supporters, AQI has been on the rebound.
The latest demonstration of the power of both AQI and its new allied Syrian affiliate the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) was the carefully orchestrated, massive late July bombing of and prisoner break-out from Abu Ghraib prison. Hundreds of AQI cadres and many deeply embittered Sunni Arabs of various affiliations escaped to swell the ranks of Maliki’s armed enemies.
The Maliki government cannot mount an effective anti-insurgent effort aimed at Sunni Arab strongholds in Western Iraq because it lacks the means to crush its Sunni Arab tormentors. Even US forces found confronting the same challenge a difficult slog prior to their deal with the “Awakening.” But Maliki’s Iraqi military is far weaker; woefully short of tanks, heavy artillery and combat aircraft. Also, corruption within the army and security services is rampant, reducing their effectiveness and enabling insurgents to access vital information.
Making matters worse, Maliki recently has appointed a Shi’a hardliner to lead a renewed effort to rid the military, security services and government of personnel with pre-2003 links to the Ba’th Party. Tens of thousands of Sunni Arab army officers could be subject to expulsion, either making them more vulnerable targets for AQI & Co. or embittered enough to join with AQI and other hardline Sunni Arab armed elements conducting anti-Shi’a and anti-regime operations. And former government employees and officers that join with anti-government elements would carry with them a wealth of valuable training and insider information.
This is classic Maliki. At nearly every turn responding with greater mistrust and animosity toward Iraq’s Sunni Arabs, the current government feeds the very violence it seeks to eradicate.
Meanwhile, ironically, despite their exclusion from the political mainstream and Maliki’s shunning of much of the Sunni Arab community, a majority of Sunni Arabs inside Iraq may still wish to put an end to the confrontation and violence. In provincial elections held in late June in predominantly Sunni Arab al-Anbar and Nineveh Provinces, the largest grouping favoring regional autonomy, the Mutahhidun bloc, lost a considerable number of seats to relative moderates advocating dialogue with Maliki.
This suggests that despite the rise in violence and widespread anti-central government demonstrations, the percentage of Iraqi Sunni Arabs actively or passively supporting AQI and related resistance groups, despite the rise in bombings, remains relatively limited. Yet, the only signal from Maliki in the face of this sign of hope has been his initiation of another purge of Sunni Arabs from the government and the military.
It is difficult to fathom all aspects of Maliki’s motivations in pursuing such a damaging course. Some Shi’a within the general population have shown support for reconciliation with Iraq’s Sunni Arabs in order to reduce violence, but there is no reason to believe they speak for a majority. Many others are too angry (quite a few with relatives or friends who have been bombing victims) to contemplate a more conciliatory course. We must bear in mind that in addition to the horrific death tolls there have been even higher numbers of Shi’a wounded thrust upon an inadequate medical system as well as their extended families along with considerable private property damage.
Moreover, most Shi’a leaders around Maliki appear supportive of exclusionary policies. And of considerable importance has been Iranian opposition to concessions to Iraq’s Sunni Arabs (with the latter remaining generally hostile toward Iranian influence in Iraq). Maliki doubtless feels the need to retain the support of both his senior Iraqi Shi’a associates and Tehran in order to survive as prime minister.
For Washington, such dependency on the part of Maliki has translated into an inability to steer Iraqi policy toward a wiser course. Many observers have written about the steady loss of American influence over Iraqi governance since 2008 in terms of reduced US regional clout. Yet, for Iraqis, ignoring US advice has meant their leaders have moved in a direction that has undermined Iraqi stability and the safety of much of the country’s population from within.
Furthermore, ignoring US warnings not to aid the Assad regime in Syria (while helping Iran do just the opposite), has placed the Iraqi government in the crosshairs of still more trouble. If Assad prevails, much of eastern Syria would be flush with many hundreds (perhaps even thousands) of vengeful and battle-hardened Sunni Arab extremists (many of them Iraqis) driven there by defeats farther west, and a lot of them likely to move into Iraq. If, on the other hand, the rebels unseat Assad & Co., a hostile Sunni Arab regime in Damascus most likely would assist Iraq’s minority Sunni Arabs in an effort to keep Maliki and his Shi’a majority on the defensive.
]]>by Wayne White
The Biblical quotation, “whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap” could not be more relevant to what Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s near unremitting hostility toward Iraq’s powerful Sunni Arab minority has generated: a rising drumfire of mostly Sunni Arab bombings aimed at Maliki’s Shi’a base as [...]]]>
by Wayne White
The Biblical quotation, “whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap” could not be more relevant to what Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s near unremitting hostility toward Iraq’s powerful Sunni Arab minority has generated: a rising drumfire of mostly Sunni Arab bombings aimed at Maliki’s Shi’a base as well as his regime. Yet, in the face of the awful toll such bloodshed has taken in past years, Iraq’s Shi’a policymakers have remained unmoved. So, for the most part, Maliki and Co. may well continue this dangerously divisive policy, making further unrest in Iraq likely. Yet, responding with some grand offer of sectarian reconciliation might find few takers at this point.
When the US agreed to allow Sunni Arab tribesmen and former insurgents to join with American forces against al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) back in late 2006 (the so-called “Sunni Arab Awakening”), Maliki opposed the arrangement bitterly. Indeed, through late 2007, Maliki not only spurned this major initiative, he even at times attempted to attack Sunni Arab combatants working with US forces employing elements of the Iraqi Army especially trusted by him.
Initially, Sunni Arabs involved in the “Awakening” did not want to work with the Iraqi government either, only the Americans (regarding Maliki and his Shi’a allies as hostile, pro-Iranian and untrustworthy). Eventually, however, the vast bulk of the Awakening cadres agreed to serve in the Iraqi security forces in an attempt to bury the hatchet with Baghdad. Most of Iraq’s equally war-weary Sunni Arab tribal leaders came to feel likewise. This represented a strategic opportunity to initiate a process of meaningful Sunni Arab re-integration, though gradual and on terms set by Washington and the Maliki government.
The US duly extracted assurances from Maliki by 2008 (albeit with difficulty) allowing a large number of Sunni Arab fighters to obtain mostly low-level, often localized positions in the security forces. Yet, as US forces left the scene, Maliki not only backed away from the full thrust of these commitments, but began to target Awakening leaders and even some of the rank and file for extrajudicial arrest and assassination.
Thousands of former insurgent cadres remained on the government payroll for years — some even today — but lots of others left or were hounded out of their jobs (caught between the very real threat of arrest — or worse — from government authorities and bloody revenge attacks from AQI). Meanwhile, many Sunni Arab parliamentary candidates became victims of the Shi’a-controlled and highly politicized “de-Ba’thification” commission (which excluded them from running for or ever holding government office).
Quite a few of the small number of Sunni Arab officials to secure senior government rank were then accused of abetting terrorism. Ultimately, the most prominent of them all, Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, was accused in December 2011 of running an anti-Shi’a hit squad. Hashimi fled first to Iraqi Kurdistan (even Iraq’s Kurds refused to turn him over to Maliki) and then to Ankara. In this way, from 2008 through 2013 (and counting), Maliki and his Shi’a allies not only threw away an opportunity to reduce violence dramatically. They also gave AQI a new lease on life as an unknown number of disaffected Sunni Arabs apparently turned a blind eye to AQI’s activities or even gave it sanctuary once again.
For months now, Sunni Arabs also have taken to the streets, holding demonstrations throughout areas where they predominate to protest their mistreatment at the hands of the Iraqi government. Feeding seething sectarian resentment was a heavy-handed attack by government security forces late last month on a Sunni Arab protest camp in a public square near the disputed northern city of Kirkuk in which 26 died.
Making matters still worse has been the mainly Sunni Arab uprising just across the border in Syria against the minority Alawite-led Assad regime. Perhaps the only Arab government not siding with the rebels is Iraq’s (aligned instead with the Syrian regime’s only regional ally: Iran). Even more provocative has been the stream of Syrian-bound Iranian resupply flights passing over Iraq with Maliki’s permission. In response to US protests against these over-flights, Maliki has had a few flights land for inspection (doubtless a clever ruse I observed before while serving in the Intelligence Community: the country conducting military over-flights secretly informs the government needing to inspect a few for the sake of appearances which flights contain no military contraband and thus would pass inspection).
Since the Syrian rebel al-Nusra front declared its affiliation with both al-Qaeda and AQI, Maliki promised to crack down on al-Nusra’s roots in Iraq’s Sunni Arab northwest. With Sunni Arab Iraqis now so profoundly suspicious of the government in Baghdad, others sympathizing with al-Nusra, AQI or both, and still others assisting them, any major operations inside Iraq aimed at al-Nusra almost certainly would either encounter resistance or waves of even heavier AQI retaliatory bombings against government and Shi’a targets.
In fact, with fellow Sunni Arabs defiant in neighboring Syria (and many tribes and families sharing close cross-border ties), more trouble for Maliki from within Iraq’s Sunni Arab community was inevitable for a leader who has supplied them with a host of grievances since 2008. Now Maliki finds himself in a serious bind: even if the Assad regime succeeds in rebounding substantially, its control over the vast expanse of eastern Syria would remain iffy (providing Iraq’s more restive Sunni Arabs a ready sanctuary and a possible source of munitions and recruits — many of them now combat veterans of the Syrian civil war).
If, however, Maliki tries to mend his ways and promises better treatment, a fair share of the government rebuilding cash, and a lot more political representation, the offer’s credibility could be nil. Such a gesture now could look more like a temporary sop tossed out under pressure than a genuine commitment to end the longstanding policies feeding the animosity between Iraq’s Sunni Arabs and Maliki’s increasingly autocratic, pro-Iranian, Shi’a-led government.
]]>by Wayne White
With a long history of misguided, damaging American intervention and meddling in the Middle East, the reported CIA effort to target the al-Nusra Front in Syria by helping Iraqi anti-terrorism units to attack its roots in Iraq seems to be the former and possibly destined to be the [...]]]>
by Wayne White
With a long history of misguided, damaging American intervention and meddling in the Middle East, the reported CIA effort to target the al-Nusra Front in Syria by helping Iraqi anti-terrorism units to attack its roots in Iraq seems to be the former and possibly destined to be the latter.
The Sunni Arab politics of Iraq, already complicated by the 2003 American invasion, have been further harmed by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s unremitting hostility toward Iraq’s Sunni Arab community. He and his Shi’a cronies bitterly opposed the American deal with Sunni Arab insurgents back in late 2006 through 2008, and attempted to undermine the arrangement while US-Sunni Arab Awakening efforts to take down much of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) were in progress.
In the years since, Maliki has been rather consistent in his exclusion of the bulk of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs from the Baghdad political mainstream. He has driven away many of those who have sought or secured office using the machinery of so-called “de-Ba’thification” and has even purged, assassinated or arrested large numbers of former Awakening cadres as well as various other key Sunni Arabs, often on trumped up charges of terrorism (or no formal charges at all — frequently employing his own extrajudicial security forces or Iraq’s mainly Shi’a Anti-Terrorism Service, which answers directly to him).
In this context, it is hardly surprising that a robust measure of Sunni Arab extremism flourishes in Iraq (apparently more now than back in 2008 when most Sunni Arabs were, by contrast, relatively more war-weary and eager for some sort of enduring engagement with the government in Baghdad). Resentment over Maliki’s disinterest in anything that would re-integrate Iraq’s Sunni Arab minority into much of the country’s core activities has done a lot to sustain a drumfire of AQI bombings inside Iraq and, since late 2011, sent gaggles of Islamic fighters from Iraq’s Sunni Arab northwest into the raging battle for Syria.
Al-Nusra probably is to a large extent an arm of AQI, as the US alleges, but also could be the recipient of many Iraqi fighters simply enraged over the plight of Sunni Arabs in their own country more generally. Additionally, there are quite a few historic tribal and family connections that extend far beyond the Syrian-Iraqi border, making events in Syria that much more palpably personal for quite a few Sunni Arabs inside Iraq.
So al-Nusra most likely is more than an organization; a phenomenon welling up from the profound resentment among many Sunni Arabs toward hostile political orders in both countries. If so, that’s not something that can be surgically extracted. Unfortunately, there always is the possibility that somewhere down the road a frustrated Washington (after Baghdad inevitably fails to address al-Nusra, just as it has been unable to deal a crippling blow to AQI) might think drones offer such a capability. If, however, they ever were employed over Sunni Arab areas of Iraq, the anger currently aimed primarily at the Maliki government and the Assad regime would become far more focused on the US.
Al-Nusra clearly is an unwelcome and dangerous player on the opposition side amidst the fighting in Syria. Yet, the sheer length, brutality, mass destruction, horrific casualties and more than a million refugees generated by the violence so far, predictably have rendered more extreme certain elements of the opposition. The seeming rise in regime-like rebel atrocities most likely is linked to some extent to the duration of the carnage.
The US already has become unpopular in broad Syrian opposition and popular circles for not providing desperately needed military assistance. At first, this frustration centered upon frantic requests for a US/NATO no fly zone over Syria. Since hope for that evaporated, attention shifted to arms and ammunition needed by rebels to take on regime-armored vehicles and air power. Some oppositionists in Syria may understand why the US remains wary of providing surface to air missiles that could very well fall into the hands of international terrorist groups, but anti-tank rockets are less of a concern in that respect. Yet, Washington decided not to send any arms whatsoever to opposition fighters — even vetted ones — late last summer and once again recently.
The US designation of al-Nusra as a terrorist group does not appear to have reduced that group’s high military profile as the tip of the opposition’s combat spear against the forces of the Assad regime. And involving the US in a campaign against al-Nusra’s support base in Iraq now could easily be perceived more broadly as being anti-Sunni Arab. After all, many of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs might ask pointedly why the US has chosen not to take a stronger stand against Maliki’s ongoing persecution of and human rights violations against Iraq’s Sunni Arab community — concerns that extend far beyond AQI and its supporters.
Iraq essentially remains in a state of sectarian conflict with Maliki playing the leading role as provocateur. The opposition effort to take down the Assad regime in Syria also has become, in large measure, a sectarian conflict.
By doing little to cross Maliki about his mistreatment of Sunni Arabs, going after al-Nusra in Iraq and providing meager support to the Syrian opposition, Washington potentially is setting itself up to be viewed — at least by Sunni Arab participants in these struggles — as anti-Sunni Arab across much of the greater Arab al-Jazira region as well as the northern Levant. The US faces enough grievances in the region as it is. Why add more to the list?
]]>News and views relevant to US foreign policy for Sept. 15
“No Rush to War“: The editorial board of the New York Times highlights the Iran Project report – authored and endorsed by a bipartisan group of high-level national security experts – that we discussed earlier this [...]]]>
News and views relevant to US foreign policy for Sept. 15
“No Rush to War“: The editorial board of the New York Times highlights the Iran Project report – authored and endorsed by a bipartisan group of high-level national security experts – that we discussed earlier this week, adding that:
There is no reason to doubt President Obama’s oft-repeated commitment to keep Iran from having a nuclear weapon. But 70 percent of Americans oppose a unilateral strike on Iran, according to a new poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, and 59 percent said if Israel bombs Iran and ignites a war, the United States should not come to its ally’s defense.
Iran is advancing its nuclear program in defiance of the United Nations Security Council. That’s a danger to Israel, the region and all efforts to curb proliferation. But administration officials and many other experts say Iran is still a year or more away from producing an actual weapon, and, if it begins to build one, they will know in time to take retaliatory action.
The best strategy is for Israel to work with the United States and other major powers to tighten sanctions while pursuing negotiations on a deal. It is a long shot, but there is time to talk. And that’s where the focus must be.
“Leadership Rifts Hobble Syrian Rebels“: Charles Levinson of the Wall Street Journal reports on the tensions among anti-regime militias in Aleppo. While the regime’s crackdown against the militias there has been blunted somewhat, at the same time the rebels are hobbled by dearth of unity, men and material. In one camp that Levinson reported from are self-proclaimed local Islamists known as the “Tawhids,” while the other camp is led by an ex-Syrian Army colonel, who does not wholly trust the “Tawhids” because they have carried out extrajudicial killings and are a recruiting rival for his own command:
The colonel’s main tools to force loyalty are his control of weapons caches and a belief by urbanites and exiles funding the cause that Islamist peasants aren’t the proper leaders of the rebellion.
…. For commanders, arms are the way to secure the loyalty of fighters—and cadres of loyal fighters translate into political influence.
…. Similar tensions hurt rebel efforts in the battle for Aleppo’s strategic Salaheddin neighborhood, the bloodiest and most pivotal battle in the war for Aleppo so far.
The divisions among these two forces highlight the problems that proponents of arming the rebels – such as Senators John McCain (R-AZ), Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Joe Lieberman (I-CT) – face in convincing the Obama Administration to authorize arms transfers to the militias. And the Syrian Support Group, so far the only Syrian Diaspora organization authorized (by a special Treasury Department exemption) to raise private funds in the US for the militias, says it has not disbursed any of its funds due to logistical and “vetting” hurdles.
The White House has so far only approved the transfer of several millions dollars worth of non-military aid (as well as some personnel) to assist Syrian exiles in Turkey set up refugee camps and run counterpropaganda campaigns against Syria’s state-run media.
“Watching and waiting as Syria’s violence spreads“: The Washington Post’s editorial board criticizes the Obama Administration for withholding “lethal aid” to Syrian militias fighting against the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Claiming that an al Qaeda resurgence in Iraq (and Syria) and the destabilization of Turkey and Saudi Arabia will likely be the fruits of further US indecision, the editors urge Obama to “reconsider” his decision against arming the anti-Assad militias:
The United States has consequently withheld lethal aid — only to watch a deepening war in which al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups are gaining ground, while Shiite-Sunni clashes have steadily escalated in Iraq and Lebanon.
…. If the fighting continues to spread, important U.S. allies, including Saudi Arabia and Turkey, could be destabilized; both are indirectly backing Sunni fighters. The fragile political order in Iraq, bought with thousands of American lives, could collapse. Al-Qaeda could acquire new recruits and sanctuaries across the region.
The best means of preventing this, as State Department Middle East experts have been pointing out for months, is to accelerate the downfall of the Syrian regime. There are several ways of doing that, short of direct military intervention: materiel aid to the rebels is one. Now that its refusal to take that step has led to the very consequences it warned of, the administration would be wise to reconsider.
“Iraq’s Maliki says backs Syrian people’s wish for reform“: Reuters reports on the “tightrope” that the Iraqi government is walking over the Syrian conflict, caught between Iranian and American expectations as well as its own sectarian fault lines:
]]>Close to Iran himself, Maliki has taken a more muted stance on Syria. He has not joined calls for Assad to quit, much less enforce sanctions against Damascus approved by the Arab League, but has called for reforms to end one-party rule in Syria.
Ali al-Moussawi, Maliki’s media adviser, said the meeting was not the first time Baghdad government leaders had met with Syrian opposition.
“We are with the demands of the Syrian people. We confirmed to the delegation that we are with them, stand with them, but we will never dictate to them and will not interfere in their affairs,” he said.
In August I was one among several people who wrote about a well-funded lobbying campaign by the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) to get delisted from the US’s foreign terrorist organizations (FTO) list. The MEK is an exiled Iranian group that has killed US and Iranian citizens. Armed and supported by Saddam Hussein, it helped Hussein repress Iraqi Shias and Kurds and fought against Iran during the Iran-Iraq war. It’s also described as a “cult” that has committed human rights abuses against its own members as documented by the Rand Corporation and Human Rights Watch.
Analysts have urged against delisting for various reasons. Some have noted the potential blowback and the danger the brainwashed and militarily trained members still present. Others like neoconservative Michael Rubin concede that the group would not be able to implement regime change in Iran due to its unpopularity with most Iranians.
President Obama was put in a tough spot not only because of the political heavyweights that expressed differing degrees of endorsement for the MEK after thousands were paid to them in “speaking fees“, but also because of the leadership’s dishonest merging of the humanitarian concerns at Camp Ashraf with their FTO listing. The administration was expected to announce a decision in September after dragging its feet for over a year following a 2010 Court of Appeals order that the designation be reevaluated, but no final announcement has been made and to date the MEK remains listed.
Under increasing Iraqi pressure to relocate and from human rights organizations urging leader Maryam Rajavi to allow independent access to over 3,000 Iranians at the camp, many feared mass suicide. While that is still a possibility, some progress has been made after the UN convinced Iraq to extend a deadline to expel the members and sign a memorandum of understanding to temporarily resettle them to a former US military base north of Baghdad. The Head of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq Martin Kobler said relocation would be voluntary.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said on Sunday that the temporary solution had the U.S’s “full support” and that the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) would be conducting refugee status determinations for the members “toward resettlement to third countries.” She also stressed that for the initiative to be “successful”, the camp’s residents would have to give their “full support” and urged them to “work with the UN”–an indication that resistance is expected from the MEK’s avid supporters (many are believed to be held against their will).
While the majority of MEK members have never left the camp, Rajavi has been living in Paris where she has successfully lobbied the group off the UK and EU FTO lists. The whereabouts of her husband Masoud are unknown, but some suspect he’s inside the camp. It will be interesting to see whether any new information about him is revealed and if Maryam Rajavi will ultimately relinquish her hold on the camp’s inhabitants.
So far there have been no independent confirmations of a MEK claim that Iranian rockets struck their camp on Sunday. We’ll also have to wait and see whether the residents allow themselves to be relocated out of Iraq. The only thing that’s certain is that these people–especially those who have been lured and born into Camp Ashraf–deserve a better life.
The following is an excerpt from the RAND report (pg. 38-9) for those who want to understand the MEK better.
- The MeK as a Cult
From its earliest days, the MeK had had tight social bonds, but these began to be transformed into something more sinister during the mid- 1980s after the group’s leaders and many of its members had relocated to Paris. There, Masoud Rajavi began to undertake what he called an “ideological revolution,” requiring a new regimen of activities—at first demanding increased study and devotion to the cause but soon expanding into near-religious devotion to the Rajavis (Masoud and his wife, Maryam), public self-deprecation sessions, mandatory divorce, celibacy,enforced separation from family and friends, and gender segregation.
Prior to establishing an alliance with Saddam, the MeK had been a popular organization. However, once it settled in Iraq and fought against Iranian forces in alliance with Saddam, the group incurred the ire of the Iranian people and, as a result, faced a shortfall in volunteers. Thus began a campaign of disingenuous recruiting. The MeK naturally sought out Iranian dissidents, but it also approached Iranian economic migrants in such countries as Turkey and the United Arab Emirates with false promises of employment, land, aid in applying for asylum in Western countries, and even marriage, to attract them to Iraq. Relatives of members were given free trips to visit the MeK’s camps. Most of these “recruits” were brought into Iraq illegally and then required to hand over their identity documents for “safekeeping.” Thus, they were effectively trapped.
Another recruiting tactic was arranged with the assistance of Saddam’s government. Iranian prisoners from the Iran-Iraq War were offered the choice of going to MeK camps and being repatriated or remaining in Iraqi prison camps. Hundreds of prisoners went to MeK camps, where they languished. No repatriation efforts were made.
For coalition forces, the MeK’s cult behavior and questionable recruiting practices are significant insofar as they affect both the daily operations at the camp and the strategic disposition options available to the group. The leadership is unlikely to cooperate with policies that would undermine its ability to exert direct control over its members. Indeed, Human Rights Watch reports that the MeK long ago instituted a complicated process to retain members who expressed a desire to leave, which included a “trial,” forced confessions of disloyalty, and even torture. Although this process has been modified since the group was consolidated at Camp Ashraf, would-be walkaways are still “debriefed” for days or even weeks while held in some form of solitary confinement, during which they are encouraged to change their minds.
Conversely, the long-term indoctrination and isolation experienced by MeK members are likely to have instilled an exaggerated sense of loyalty, causing them to reject offers to separate themselves from their leaders. This would apply in particular to repatriation to Iran, where the expectation of persecution has been dramatically instilled in their minds.
By Nir Rosen
With the U.S. withdrawal [...]]]>
By Nir Rosen
With the U.S. withdrawal coming up we are going to be subjected to an assault of alarmist articles about the role of Iran in Iraq. It makes me hope I won’t have an Internet connection for the next two months. There is this silly fear that there is a “vacuum” in Iraq that will result from an U.S. departure, but there is no vacuum because the Iraqis are there.
The real U.S. withdrawal, the real test, took place in 2009 when they largely withdrew from cities, towns and streets and stayed in U.S. bases. That’s when Iraq became in essence occupied by Iraqi security forces and most Iraqis didn’t see Americans anymore.
Then, last year before the pretend withdrawal of “combat” troops, there were similar alarmist concerns about Iran. But nothing changed. The same Iraqi security forces manned checkpoints around the country and conducted operations, and nothing will change now. That’s because the U.S. was not doing much on the ground in Iraq.
Iraq’s Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki, was mainly running the show so there was neither a political nor a security vacuum, nor will there be one now. When the Americans were in Iraq they posed an existential threat to Iran. Regime change in Iran was practically an open U.S. policy, so the Iranians were given a perfectly good reason to blow up the occasional American soldier or undermine U.S. ambitions. The Iranians are also paranoid about an openly anti-Iranian government in Iraq because they remember what Saddam Hussein did to them. They therefore have an interest in preventing the likes of Ayad Allawi from taking power, something which is unlikely to happen anyway.
One real mistake is thinking that the Badr and Mahdi militias still exist. That hasn’t been an issue since 2008. We don’t see militias on the ground, but we see the Iraqi security forces everywhere. The militia phase of Iraq is long over and the Badr militia has long been incorporated into the state, so it’s wrong to think of them as a militia anymore. Likewise, there is no real Mahdi army to speak of. Militias in Iraq can no longer hold a neighborhood, a street, or even a checkpoint. We have more gang-like violence and assassination squads of course, but not militias.
Why would the Iranians have to wait for this final U.S. departure to deepen their influence? Who was stopping them until now? What were the Americans doing to prevent anybody from influencing things in Iraq since 2009? Not much, and what about al-Maliki? He is no Iranian pawn. He doesn’t even like Iran (nor do most Iraqis) and al-Maliki is in control of a very powerful state.
What about Turkish influence which is very significant? Why is Iranian influence worse than U.S. influence? The Americans have caused far more damage in Iraq than the Iranians have.
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Instead of tendentious conclusions that would, for the most part, support escalating measure against Iran, Hanna actually looks at the Iraqi political machinations that have resulted in an apparent second term as prime minister for Maliki.
After that, he offers reasons why — both on the left and the right — the U.S. view of these political maneuvers tends to see out-sized U.S. influence. It’s got little to with Iraq or Iran, actually. It’s all about electoral politics in the U.S. And here’s the rub: The hyperventilating is actually bad for Iraq and, therefore, bad for U.S. interests there.
Here’s a chunk from Hanna at the Atlantic website, with my occasional emphasis:
]]>Our perception of Iran as the puppet master of Baghdad is rooted in decades of enmity between the U.S. and Iran, which continue today. Also, Iran’s broad support for Hezbollah in Lebanon and its monetary support for Hamas in Gaza makes it easy to imagine Iran replicating this strategy in Iraq. But the biggest factor in our willingness to see exaggerated Iranian influence in Iraq is something much simpler: partisan U.S. politics. For years, both parties have exaggerated Iran’s role to score political points. Iran hawks on the right have done so to bolster their case for greater U.S. hostility to the perceived Iranian menace. During the 2008 presidential primaries and general election, Republicans also used the threat of Iranian encroachment to argue against any drawdown in Iraq. Today, they maintain this line in attacking President Barack Obama’s Iraq policies as strengthening Iran. Meanwhile, voices on the left have, since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, latched onto to the notion of an unstoppable Iran expanding its influence throughout the region. This extension of the recriminations against the Iraq war, much like the conservative criticism of Obama, is an effort to further discredit President George W. Bush’s invasion by accusing him of ceding Iraq to Iran. This distortion on both sides is unfortunate because it paints Iraq as a mere prop for the purpose of polemics and because it is unmoored from the more prosaic reality of contemporary Iraq.
It is true that the toppling of Saddam Hussein was a strategic windfall for the Islamic Republic, but it has not allowed Iran to dictate Iraq’s agenda. Iraqi nationalism and suspicion of Iranian intentions, nearly universal in Iraq, simply do not allow for the kind of Iranian power one hears about in the U.S. While Maliki and Sadr’s ascent in Baghdad are in line with the Iranian desire for Shiite Islamist supremacy, their rise is a reflection of Iraq’s demography and politics. Of course a Shiite-majority, Islamist-leaning country will elect a Shiite-majority, Islamist-leaning government. Unfortunately, this is how democracy works in a war-scarred country where ethno-sectarian identity remains stubbornly vital to political affiliation. Sadr’s political participation, though it may make Iraq less likely to follow every American interest, is simply a reflection of the realities of Iraq’s nascent, flawed democracy.
Vilifying and exaggerating Iran’s role in Iraq will cloud U.S. perception of both countries and runs the danger of contributing to the formulation of bad policy. Simplistic notions of Iranian hegemony will poison U.S.-Iraqi bilateral relations, with each development judged in blunt zero-sum terms of whether it benefits the U.S. or Iran. In assuming such inherent conflict, the U.S. will be tempted to try to use Iraq as an American proxy in a broader struggle against Iran. This would serve no useful purpose; why wage a proxy war where none exists? Worse, it would weaken Iraq and enable the very Iranian influence we are so afraid of. In fact, American and Iranian long-term interests converge in Baghdad to a great extent. At root, both countries need a stable Iraq.
While still dependent to a large degree on outside assistance, thus prone to interference and meddling, Iraqis are not interested in being a puppet of either the U.S. or Iran. Pushing a proxy conflict and asking Iraq to be a front-line pillar in the wider regional struggle against Tehran would subordinate Iraqi interests to those of United States, alienate Iraqis, and potentially undermine Iraq’s relative stability.