Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu pulled an “October surprise” out of his hat when he announced his Likud party would form a joint list in the upcoming election with Avigdor Lieberman’s fascist Yisrael Beiteinu party. This is more of a partnership than a merger, but it has profound implications.

In [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu pulled an “October surprise” out of his hat when he announced his Likud party would form a joint list in the upcoming election with Avigdor Lieberman’s fascist Yisrael Beiteinu party. This is more of a partnership than a merger, but it has profound implications.

In partnering with Lieberman, Netanyahu is likely chasing moderate voices out of his cabinet, his coalition and his own party. The outcome will surely mean an even harder line stance against the international community, especially the European Union.

Netanyahu obviously believes that increasing Israel’s already significant isolation is worth what he thinks will be increased impunity in dealing with the Palestinians and neighboring Arab states. He hopes that the merger will better equip him in defending against any potential comeuppance from Barack Obama if he wins re-election. If Romney wins, Bibi believes he will have a government ready and willing to take full advantage of a neoconservatives return to foreign policy power in the US. He is certain that his lobby in the US will keep Israel kosher enough, even though this move is going to alienate large numbers of US Jews and will likely increase growing tensions between the US Jewish and Protestant communities.

The effects will be even more profound within Israel. The expanding racism and xenophobia will kick into overdrive and, unless Labor or some new centrist party can truly capture an anti-racist spirit — which seems unlikely — the Israeli public will shift even farther right, and more liberals will be leaving.

But one thing this move will not affect is Iran, at least in the short run. Ha’aretz editor Aluf Benn believes that Netanyahu just created a war cabinet, one which will hasten an Israeli attack, and possibly even frighten the United States into attacking Iran itself before Israel does. I doubt it.

To start with, Benn does make some important points. He writes:

…Netanyahu has finally renounced his attempt to portray himself as a centrist, as a statesmanlike and moderate leader. The mask that he put on before the previous election has finally been tossed into the trash. With Lieberman as second in command and heir to the throne, and his supporters in prominent spots on the joint ticket, Likud will become a radical right-wing party, aggressive and xenophobic, that revels in Israel’s isolation and sees the Arab community as a domestic enemy and a danger to the state.

Quite true, and he later points out that the level of western-style democracy that was defended even by hawks like Benny Begin and others in Likud like Dan Meridor was just put in the crosshairs. What is left of that idealism in centrist Israel won’t survive.

But if, as Benn frames it (correctly, I think), Lieberman essentially replaces Ehud Barak as Bibi’s right hand man, this hardly shifts hard toward war. The final makeup of the next cabinet is still unclear. This joint list idea is going to narrow support for Netanyahu, not broaden it. The influential Shas party is no longer a realistic partner for Bibi, as they are strongly opposed to Yisrael Beiteinu. That’s a big loss. The joint list is almost certain to secure fewer seats than the parties would have separately, but this was a price Netanyahu was willing to pay to lead the biggest party in the Knesset next time (Kadima has the most seats in the current Knesset). But Bibi will have to offer someone, perhaps Yair Lapid’s new Yesh Atid party, some serious carrots to form a majority coalition without Shas. So the makeup of the cabinet and whether it will really be myopic enough to ignore what could become a growing movement against a unilateral strike in the public sphere remains to be seen.

But Benn’s calculation misses important points. First, Barak was a pro-attack force, and a powerful one, until the last few weeks, when he seemed to break with Netanyahu and strike a more moderate tone. Many analysts, as well as several people I’ve spoken to with some inside knowledge, believe this was pure theater to make Barak more electable. If that was the idea, it failed, and few expect Barak’s Atzmaut party to get enough votes in January to gain any seats at all in the Knesset. In any case, Barak is not the voice of moderation Benn makes him out to be.

More importantly, while cabinet opposition to a unilateral Israeli strike was certainly important, the major impediment remains: the military and intelligence establishment. Much like in the United States, where an AIPAC-influenced Congress has been beating the drums for war, the actual soldiers and commanders recognize the ramifications and difficulties of an attack on Iran. That’s not to say in either case that these military leaders would refuse an explicit order from their respective commanders-in-chief. But in both countries, the opposition has been much more important in preventing an attack to date than political forces.

Benn is correct in one sense: having Lieberman as deputy to Bibi’s sheriff is a war time configuration. It’s meant to strengthen the central government, to enable a greater degree of martial law in the event of war and to continue more of it when the war ends. It’s meant to diminish the influence of the military and intelligence leaders who have had the temerity to raise concerns about a war Netanyahu desperately wants.

But at this moment, it does not bring a war with Iran any closer than it was before. We can be thankful for that, at least. And, in a number of other ways, this move may backfire on Bibi in both the short and long terms. That would be more hopeful if there were a viable alternative in Israel or a president in the United States who was willing to take advantage of Israel’s radicalized image to exert real pressure (like that suggested by Protestant leaders earlier this month) for a regional peace agreement. Maybe that’s a second-term Obama, but I’m not holding my breath for that one. In an era of grim outlooks, I’ll content myself with knowing that this move by Netanyahu will not bring war with Iran any closer.

I’ve been meaning to write about this report on the multifold human costs of militarily striking Iran’s nuclear facilities and am happy to find that it’s already been noted by Golnaz Esfandiari as well as Gordon Lubold, among others. (Marsha Cohen’s well-read Lobe Log post on [...]]]> via Lobe Log

I’ve been meaning to write about this report on the multifold human costs of militarily striking Iran’s nuclear facilities and am happy to find that it’s already been noted by Golnaz Esfandiari as well as Gordon Lubold, among others. (Marsha Cohen’s well-read Lobe Log post on the same topic was the closest thing to such a study that I’ve come across so far.) “The Ayatollah’s Nuclear Gamble” is sponsored by Utah’s Hinckley Institute of Politics and was authored by Khosrow B. Semnani, an Iranian-American engineer by training and philanthropist. It will be featured this week at a joint event by the Woodrow Wilson Center and the Iran Task Force at the Atlantic Council. With the study Semnani endeavors to scientifically prove something which seems obvious: attacking nuclear facilities in Iran could have devastating effects on possibly hundreds of thousands of Iranians who would be exposed to highly toxic chemical plumes and even radioactive fallout. Case studies were conducted on the Iranian cities of Isfahan, Natanz, Arak, and Bushehr. In Isfahan, a military strike on the nuclear facility there “could be compared to the 1984 Bhopal industrial accident at the Union Carbide plant in India”:

In that accident, the release of 42 metric tons (47 U.S. tons) of methyl isocyanate turned the city of Bhopal into a gas chamber. Estimates of deaths have ranged from 3,800 to 15,000. The casualties went well beyond the fatalities: More than 500,000 victims received compensation for exposure to fumes.

The environmental consequences would also be wide-ranging:

With the high likelihood of soluble uranium compounds permeating into the groundwater, strikes would wreak havoc on Isfahan’s environmental resources and agriculture. The Markazi water basin, one of six main catchment areas, which covers half the country (52%), provides slightly less than one-third of Iran’s total renewable water (29%) (Figure 26). According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the groundwater discharge in the basin from approximately 155,000 wells, 22,000 channels and 13,500 springs is the primary water source for agricultural and residential uses.106 It is almost certain that the contamination of groundwater as a result of strikes would damage this important fresh-water source.

The report also touches on the unintended consequences of militarily striking Iran, such as a “short or prolonged regional war” and explains, as reputable analysts have, why the Israeli strike on Iraq’s Osirak facility is a “false analogy”:

The Osirak analogy is the fantasy that there will be no blowback from strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities. It discounts the complexity, severity, scale, consequences, and casualties such an operation would entail. Iran’s nuclear program is not an empty shell, nor is it a single remote target. The facilities in Iran are fully operational, they contain thousands of personnel, they are located near major population centers, they are heavily constructed and fortified, and thus difficult to destroy. They contain tons of highly toxic chemical and radioactive material. To grasp the political and psychological impact of the strikes, what our estimates suggest is that the potential civilian casualties Iran would suffer as a result of a strike — in the first day — could exceed the 6,731 Palestinians and 1,083 Israeli’s reported killed in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over the past decade. The total number of fatalities in the 1981 Osirak raid was 10 Iraqis and one French civilian, Damien Chaussepied.

According to Greg Thielmann of the Arms Control Association, the report makes a “valuable contribution to “colorizing” the bloodless discussions of the “military option.” Thielmann, who formerly worked on assessments of ballistic missile threats at the State Department’s intelligence bureau, told Lobe Log that he had not seen “a more serious look at the medical consequences for the Iranian population” than provided by this report.

While Thielmann calls the report an “impressive effort”, he also offered criticism. “I take strong exception to the author’s introductory assertion that diplomacy with the Islamic Republic “requires a willful act of self-deception,” and that regime change is the only way to achieve an acceptable resolution to the challenges of Iran’s nuclear program,” he said.

Thielmann was also “surprised” that the strike scenario analyzed in the study includes the Bushehr facility, “which is of much less proliferation concern than the other nuclear facilities mentioned, and which, because of the extensive use of Russian personnel in operating the reactor there, would carry high political costs to attack. ”

“Such an attack would also violate Additional Protocol I of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,” said Thielmann, who provided the following excerpt from Article 56 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I:

1. Works and installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population. Other military objectives located at or in the vicinity of these works or installations shall not be made the object of attack if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces from the works or installations and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.

It will be interesting to see whether the report gets mainstream media attention following the Wilson Center event and if it will spark further examination of this integral — but otherwise barely mentioned — aspect of using the “military option” on Iran.

This lonely press briefing issued today by the United Nations about ongoing political imprisonment in Iran reminds us that the more the international community focuses on Iran’s nuclear program, the less attention is given to Iranian human rights. These rights are consistently endangered and violated not only by the Iranian [...]]]> via Lobe Log

This lonely press briefing issued today by the United Nations about ongoing political imprisonment in Iran reminds us that the more the international community focuses on Iran’s nuclear program, the less attention is given to Iranian human rights. These rights are consistently endangered and violated not only by the Iranian government, but by sanctions and threats of war too.

Iran’s rial is once again in free fall while Iran and the United States remain in political gridlock. Bibi Netanyahu may have backed off his Iran campaign for now but is unlikely to stop agitating for conflict. Today during an event at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Mark Fitzpatrick said that Iran is unlikely to change it’s stance prior to the Iranian presidential election in June 2013 because no one wants to grant Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a diplomatic success while he is in office. Fitzpatrick added that the West is likely to implement even more sanctions during to this time.

So while Iranians are being strangled by the Islamic Republic’s ever-present hand in their public and personal lives, so too ar they being forced to endure a strangulated economy that will only worsen. This feeling of impending suffocation — imposed from above and below — was at the core of Asghar Farhadi’s oscar-winning film “A Separation” which resonated so strongly with Iranians. In Iran the personal is political and vice versa while absurdity has become the norm.

In a recent interview with Nazila Fathi, the Iranian human rights defender Shirin Ebadi explained that war on Iran would “stir nationalistic feelings and rally the people behind the government to defend the country” as well as “save Iran’s rulers.” But she didn’t or couldn’t provide any indication as to what can be done to ease the burden being imposed on Iranians by their government and foreign governments.

“I don’t favor more sanctions against Iran, but I do not want to see the world ignore what the regime is doing to its people,” said Ebadi.

What then is in store for Iran’s people?

Disillusioned by wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. public is becoming increasingly comfortable with a more modest and less militarised global role for the nation, according to the latest in a biennial series of major surveys.

That attitude is particularly pronounced in the so-called Millennial Generation, citizens between the [...]]]> via IPS News

Disillusioned by wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. public is becoming increasingly comfortable with a more modest and less militarised global role for the nation, according to the latest in a biennial series of major surveys.

That attitude is particularly pronounced in the so-called Millennial Generation, citizens between the ages of 18 and 29, according to the poll. They are generally much less worried about international terrorism, immigration, and the rise of China and are far less supportive of an activist U.S. approach to foreign affairs than older groups, it found.

Political independents, who will likely play a decisive role in the outcome of November’s presidential election, also tend more than either Republicans or Democrats to oppose interventionist policies in world affairs, according to the survey, which was released at the Wilson Center for International Scholars here Monday by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA).

The survey results suggest that more aggressive and militaristic policies adopted by Republicans at their convention last month may be out of step with both independents and younger voters.

“If you read the whole report,” noted Daniel Drezner, an international relations professor who blogs at foreignpolicy.com, “what’s striking is how much the majority view on foreign policy jibes with what the Obama administration has been doing in the world: military retrenchment from the Middle East, a reliance on diplomacy and sanctions to deal with rogue states, a refocusing on East Asia, and prudent cuts in defence spending.”

For the first time since the Council posed the question in 1994, a majority of its nearly 1,900 adult respondents said they believe that Asia is more important to the United States than Europe.

Reflecting perhaps the so-called “pivot” by the administration of President Barack Obama from the Middle East to Asia, 52 percent of respondents said Asia was more important, a 10-percent increase over the Council’s 2010 survey result. The Pew Research Center found a similar change in its own survey earlier this year.

The survey, which was conducted in late May and early June, also found strong resistance by the public to becoming more deeply involved – especially militarily – in the Middle East, despite the perception by seven in 10 respondents that the region is more threatening to U.S. security than any other.

For the first time since 9/11, majorities said they opposed the retention or establishment of long-term U.S. military bases in Iraq or Afghanistan.

At the same time, 70 percent of respondents said they opposed a unilateral U.S. strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities; and almost as many (59 percent) said the U.S. should not ally itself militarily with Israel if the Jewish state attacks Iran.

The survey, which was released on the eve of the 11th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks on New York City and Pentagon, suggested that the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, combined with the continuing hardships of the 2008 global financial crisis, have soured much of the public on foreign intervention, especially military intervention.

“Ten years after 9/11, we see that Americans are in the process of recalibrating their views on international engagement and searching for less costly ways to project positive U.S. influence and protect American interests around the world,” said Marshall Bouton, CCFR’s long-time president.

“Now, with a strong sense that the wars have over-stretched our military and strained our economic resources, they prefer to avoid the use of military force if at all possible,” he noted.

Indeed, the survey found that a record 67 percent of the public now believes the war in Iraq was “not worth it”, while seven of 10 respondents agreed that “the experience of the Iraq war should make nations more cautious about using military force.”

Sixty-nine percent said the war in Afghanistan either made “no difference” to U.S. security (51 percent) or that it made the country “less safe” (18 percent).

The degree of disillusion with foreign affairs in light of the past decade was perhaps most starkly illustrated by the answers to the binary question of whether respondents thought it best for the U.S. to “take an active part in world affairs” or “stay out of world affairs”.

Led by the Millenials (52 percent), 38 percent of all respondents opted for the latter – the highest percentage since just after World War II and seven points higher than in 2010, according to the Council’s analysis. A majority of 61 percent said Washington should take an “active part” – the smallest majority since 1998.

Nearly eight in 10 respondents (78 percent) said they believe the U.S. is playing the role of world policeman more than it should – a figure that has been constant since 2004, a year after the Iraq invasion.

“While they see leadership as desirable,” according to the Council analysis, “Americans clearly reject the role of the United States as a hyperpower and want to take a more cooperative stance.”

Indeed 56 percent now agree with the proposition that Washington should be “more willing to make decisions within the United Nations” even if such decisions are not its first choice. That is a marked increase from a historic low of 50 percent in 2010.

Most respondents said they were not concerned about the growing influence of emerging nations in Asia and elsewhere. Asked for their reaction to increased foreign policy independence of countries like Turkey and Brazil, nearly seven in 10 respondents (69 percent) agreed that it was “mostly good” because of their reduced reliance on the U.S. rather than that it was “mostly bad because then they are likely to do things the U.S. does not support”.

The survey found persistent support for a large military – 53 percent said they believed “maintaining superior military power” is a “very important” foreign policy goal. But that was down from 67 percent in 2002, shortly after 9/11.

Contrary to Republican demands that the defence budget should be increased, two-thirds of respondents said it should be cut, and half of those said it should be cut the same or more than other government programmes.

And while Republicans continue to attack Obama for “leading from behind” during last year’s intervention in Libya, Bouton said his survey results found that the public was quite comfortable with the low-key role.

Only seven percent said Washington should have taken the “leading role” in the military campaign; 72 percent said it should have taken “a minor role” (31 percent) or “a major but not leading role” (41 percent). Nineteen percent said the U.S. should not have participated at all.

Republican politicans have also mocked Obama for offering to negotiate directly with hostile states. But more than two-thirds of respondents said Washington should be ready to hold talks with the leaders of Cuba (73 percent), North Korea (69 percent) and Iran (67 percent).

The survey found that self-described Republicans generally see the world as more hostile and threatening than Democrats.

The most striking differences between members of the two parties were found over immigration, climate change, and the Middle East, particularly on Israel-related issues, with Republicans siding much more strongly with Israel on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and in the event of an Israeli attack on Iran.

After [...]]]> The Atlantic‘s Jeffrey Goldberg appears to have come through on his long-awaited cover story outlining the “red lines” for an Israeli military strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. Judging by Goldberg’s extensive experience with pushing the U.S. into invading Iraq, it’s worth taking a very hard look at his arguments and predictions.

After reading through the Haaretz summary of Goldberg’s article, it appears more likely that he is part of a campaign to push the Obama administration into authorizing a U.S. military strike rather than having any particularly believable scoops about an impending Israeli attack.

The article, which thus far has only been obtained by Haaretz‘s Natasha Mozgovaya, reportedly lays out the scenario in which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would give the go-ahead for a massive air strike on suspected Iranian nuclear sites.

Goldberg comes to the conclusion that there is a greater than 50 percent chance that Israel will go forward with such a strike and might not even ask for a “green light” from the United States.

Mozgovaya quotes Goldberg as writing:

“…one day next spring, the Israeli national-security adviser, Uzi Arad, and the Israeli defense minister, Ehud Barak, will simultaneously telephone their counterparts at the White House and the Pentagon, to inform them that their prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has just ordered roughly one hundred F-15Es, F-16Is, F-16Cs, and other aircraft of the Israeli air force to fly east toward Iran – possibly by crossing Saudi Arabia, possibly by threading the border between Syria and Turkey, and possibly by traveling directly through Iraq’s airspace, though it is crowded with American aircraft….”

Goldberg claims that Israeli officials are very clear that the end of December is Netanyahu’s deadline to evaluate the effectiveness of “non-military methods to stop Iran.”

Mozgovaya writes:

And while Rahm Emanuel, the White House chief of staff, reminded Goldberg that “the expression ‘All options are on the table’ means that all options are on the table,” - the Israeli interviewees repeatedly questioned Obama’s resolve to actually do it. Some even asked Goldberg if he thought the American president was actually an anti-Semite, forcing the reporter to explain that Obama is probably “the first Jewish President” – but not necessarily Likud’s idea of a Jew.

But the reply he got from one official was, “This is the problem. If he is a J Street Jew, we are in trouble.”

And

According to Goldberg, all the Arab officials he spoke to didn’t think that the U.S. administration truly understood Iran’s ambitions. “The best way to avoid striking Iran is to make Iran think that the U.S. is about to strike Iran. We have to know the president’s intentions on this matter. We are his allies,” one Arab minister told Goldberg.

If one takes a moment to look through all the blustering about the potential for a massive Israeli military strike against Iran, it seems fair to ask, “What exactly is being accomplished with these overblown threats?”

A consensus appears to be forming in neoconservative circles that the best way to force the Obama administration to launch a military attack on Iran’s alleged nuclear facilities is to convince the White House that Israel is prepared to attack with or without a green-light from Washington. Of course to make this threat work, hawks need to convince the White House and the U.S. public that the Israelis just might be foolhardy enough to attack unilaterally.

Mozgovaya writes:

The results might be dire: It’s likely that the Israeli air force won’t have much time to waste in Iran, as Hezbollah will probably retaliate against Israel in the North and the fighter jets will be needed there. The unilateral operation might throw relations between Jerusalem and Washington into an unprecedented crisis, and might even unleash full-scale regional war with possible economic repercussions for the whole world, not to mention the cost of human lives.

Jeffrey Goldberg, a Corporal in the Israeli Defense Forces during the first Intifada, would seem like a useful messenger for those seeking to put pressure on Obama to either ramp up sanctions or, ultimately, commit the United States to a potentially disastrous military attack.

Indeed this strategy has been employed in recent months by The Wall Street Journal‘s Bret Stephens who, in his most recent column on Israel’s willingness to go-it-alone on Iran, warns that an Israeli attack is such a disastrous scenario that Obama should reconsider his own military options towards Iran.

Judging from Mozgovaya’s reporting, it looks like Goldberg’s upcoming piece will be  spearheading a campaign to convince the White House, Congress and the U.S. public that Israeli determination to stop Iran’s alleged nuclear program is unstoppable. The likes of Stephens and Goldberg will claim that the only way around a unilateral Israeli military strike on Iran is if the United States and its allies act first.

While their campaign might seem transparent, Goldberg has an impressive track-record of pushing the United States toward wars of choice under false pretenses.

Investigative journalist Ken Silverstein wrote in 2006:

In urging war on Iraq, Goldberg took highly dubious assertions — for example, that Saddam was an irrational madman in control of vast quantities of WMDs and that Iraq and Al Qaeda were deeply in bed together — and essentially asserted them as fact. From these unproven allegations, he demonstrated that an invasion of Iraq was the only rational policy.

I look forward to reading Goldberg’s piece in full to see what further evidence he offers of the “greater than 50-percent chance” of an Israeli military strike in the new year.

(Ali discussed the increasingly hawkish rhetoric coming out of the Council on Foreign Relations [...]]]> Patrick Disney, the former Assistant Policy Director for the National Iranian American Council, has written a great piece responding to Ray Takeyh and Steven Simon’s Washington Post op-ed, which Tony Karon described as “a ‘how-to-bomb Iran’ manual.”

(Ali discussed the increasingly hawkish rhetoric coming out of the Council on Foreign Relations in his blog post Monday.)

Disney’s critical analysis of Takeyh and Simon’s article concludes that a bombing campaign of the type proposed by the CFR scholars would have disastrous effects.

Disney writes:

First, there is no military option short of a full-blown invasion and occupation. Even if all of Iran’s nuclear facilities can be located, and even if they can all be destroyed with surgical air strikes, the ruling hardliners will just rebuild them — only this time without the contraints of the IAEA.

Indeed, no proposed air strike would permanently destroy Iran’s alleged nuclear ambitions and would probably exacerbate already tense U.S.-Iran and Iran-Israel relations.

He continues:

Secondly, and most disappointingly, Takeyh and Simon’s analysis totally ignores the devastating impact an attack would have on the long-term prospect of democracy in Iran. Iranians last summer took to the streets in the most passionate outbreak of popular dissatisfaction since the 1979 revolution. Those who know their history viewed the events of last year as the latest step in Iran’s democratic evolution — a process that began over 100 years ago with the constitutional revolution of 1906. Although the street protests have died down and the democracy movement is in some disarray, it is clearly still a factor in Iran. Unfortunately, dropping bombs on Iran now is the surest way to uproot any hope for peaceful democratic change in the country. The hardliners will most likely use an act of foreign aggression as justification for a brutal crackdown, and the focus of political discourse will shift away from questions of internal reforms and regime legitimacy toward external threats and the need to rally the nation’s defenses.

While Takeyh and Simon may have the luxury of discussing their hypothetical best-case scenarios for bombing Iran, Disney draws a believably dismal picture of what a U.S. or Israeli military strike on Iranian nuclear facilities might bring.

An Iranian regime which has quit the IAEA, crushed its domestic opposition and turned its nuclear program into a symbol of avenging the countless deaths from an Israeli or American air strike is a frightening thought, but one which — no thanks to alarmists such as Takeyh and Simon — could become a reality.

Disney concludes:

With the anti-Iran rhetoric at a fever pitch in Washington, it’s easy to forget sometimes just how remote of a threat Iran’s nuclear program actually is. According to numerous unclassified assessments by the U.S. Intelligence Community, Iran has not yet decided to pursue a nuclear bomb, and the US and international community still has time to convince them not to. The three to five years an attack would gain now will most certainly not be worth the cost it would incur: a non-democratic Iran with an overt nuclear weapons program and a vendetta against Western powers who attacked it.