by Mohammad Ali Shabani
Most headlines on Iran’s launch of uranium-related sites on April 9th — its National Day of Nuclear Technology — linked it to the diplomatic deadlock in Kazakhstan. Tehran was regarded as pursuing escalation, perhaps in frustration with the situation. But was this really the case?
To answer [...]]]>
by Mohammad Ali Shabani
Most headlines on Iran’s launch of uranium-related sites on April 9th — its National Day of Nuclear Technology — linked it to the diplomatic deadlock in Kazakhstan. Tehran was regarded as pursuing escalation, perhaps in frustration with the situation. But was this really the case?
To answer this question, one needs to consider what Iran has previously done on this anniversary, the significance of the Islamic Republic’s new sites and its escalatory options.
The government of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad launched the National Day of Nuclear Technology in 2006. This was part of the push for a harder stance on the nuclear issue after the breakdown of talks with European powers, during which Iran voluntarily agreed to freeze enrichment-related activities.
As part of the first festivities in 2006, Iran announced that it would — in defiance of a UN Security Council warning — enrich uranium on an industrial scale. A total of 164 centrifuges at Natanz started to spin, churning out uranium enriched below 5%.
During the past seven years, the Islamic Republic has largely used its Nuclear Technology day to unveil new achievements, both for domestic and foreign audiences. As the occasion has repeatedly coincided with nuclear diplomatic developments, it has often been used to signal Iranian attitudes.
In 2007, Iran used the anniversary to announce that it had crossed the Western red line of 3,000 operational centrifuges. Back then, David Albright, head of the Institute for Science and International Security, asserted that “Ahmadinejad is trying to demonstrate facts on the ground and negotiate from a stronger position.”
The year after, Iran used the occasion to announce that it would begin installing 6,000 centrifuges and alluded to the testing of a new generation of centrifuges. Then in 2009, Ahmadinejad inaugurated the country’s first Fuel Manufacturing Plant in the central city of Isfahan. The Islamic Republic also said its number of centrifuges had increased to 7,000.
In 2010, as the UN Security Council convened to discuss fresh sanctions, Iran unveiled new “third-generation” centrifuges, said to have separation power six times that of first-generation centrifuges. Iran also declared that “considerable” uranium reserves had been found in Yazd province. That year, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iran had 8,610 centrifuges installed, of which 3,772 were operating.
In 2011, after dialogue over Iran’s production of 19.75%-enriched uranium had broken down, it opted to simply praise past achievements. Apart from this, it announced the resumption of fuel reloading at the Bushehr power plant. And last year, after the escalation of Western sanctions, Iran announced that local scientists had produced fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor containing uranium enriched to 19.75%.
This year, Iran announced on the anniversary that it had opened two uranium mines and a yellowcake processing plant named after an assassinated nuclear scientist. What’s the significance of these sites?
In terms of capacity, the yellowcake facility is insignificant. Its stated output of 60 tons a year is less than one third of what’s needed to fuel the Bushehr atomic power plant. Moreover, the discovery of the uranium deposits, which are now being extracted, was first announced years ago. Along the same line, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran had announced in February 2012 that the mines would be operational in about a year, that is, right around this time.
The most important fact to keep in mind, however, is that Iran has for a long time been projected to be close to exhausting its limited supply of yellowcake. Without feedstock to inject into its centrifuges at Natanz (in gaseous form), Iran’s uranium enrichment — at least to 3.5% — would grind to a halt.
In short, the new sites unveiled on April 9th are designed to ensure the status quo.
There are other factors which also signify Iran’s pursuit of the status quo rather than escalation. For example, considering the many powerful escalatory options in its possession — wider use of new-generation centrifuges, expansion of operations at Fordow, increases in enrichment levels and construction of long-promised, new enrichment sites — the announcements this year seem geared towards signaling restraint to a foreign audience without appearing empty-handed in front of a domestic public facing unprecedented sanctions.
Indeed, the Islamic Republic has little interest in escalating the situation at this point, especially as it faces its first presidential election since the disputed vote in 2009. The idea that Iran prefers to quietly kick the can down the road until it gets its house in order was also recently expressed by former top US non-proliferation official, Gary Samore.
Meanwhile, it could also be argued that the United States – or at least its Congress — is pursuing escalation.
Following the deadlock in Kazakhstan, US lawmakers have been pushing for fresh sanctions that would constitute something akin to an Oil-for-Food Program 2.0. The draft Senate bill states that the proposed embargo won’t be lifted until Iran releases political prisoners, respects the rights of women and minorities and moves toward “a free and democratically elected government.”
Moreover, last week, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) — a front for the until recently terror-listed Mujahideen-e-Khalq Organization (MEK) — opened an official office one block away from the White House. The group was put on the State Department’s terror list by the Clinton Administration. In the past, the MEK was behind a series of killings and bombings in Iran — one of which led to the permanent paralysis of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s right arm. The MEK, which sided with Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war, was also reportedly involved in the assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists. Among these men is Darioush Rezaeinejad, whom the new yellowcake facility is named after.
The signal that’s being sent to decision-makers in Tehran, regardless of whether the Obama Administration approves of the MEK’s new office, is that the sanctions have little to do with their nuclear program. Combined with the wording of the proposed embargo, the situation ominously fits into Ayatollah Khamenei’s narrative that even a nuclear deal won’t be enough to roll back American pressure.
All things considered, one should be careful about linking Iran’s latest announcements about its nuclear achievements to the continued deadlock in talks with the 6 world powers, or viewing Iran’s actions as deserving of the escalation pursued by at least one of these powers.
It is becoming ever clearer that both Iran and the United States need to get their houses in order before they can move in the right direction. More than ever, cool heads need to prevail.
]]>The following quote from this Washington Post article on last week’s nuclear talks with Iran stood out despite it being a regurgitation of past statements:
“I don’t want to overpromise, but we’re encouraged,” said the official, speaking to reporters accompanying Secretary of State John [...]]]>
The following quote from this Washington Post article on last week’s nuclear talks with Iran stood out despite it being a regurgitation of past statements:
“I don’t want to overpromise, but we’re encouraged,” said the official, speaking to reporters accompanying Secretary of State John F. Kerry during a visit to Europe. “Our people who were there felt the sanctions have gotten Iran’s attention,” said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe diplomatically sensitive negotiations.
Sanctions are working, says the Obama administration, repeatedly, for one reason or another. Yet practically everyone else — including those who initially pushed for and/or continue to tout sanctions on Iran — appear to disagree, while Iran hasn’t budged from its previous negotiating stance.
Sanctions probably won’t work, argues Clifford May, president of the neoconservative Foundation for the Defense of Democracies — possibly the most effective DC-based advocate of “crippling sanctions” on Iran — while pushing for ongoing sanctions. (This is also a great example of the supporting logic used by hardline sanctions advocates):
[Sanctions on Iran] are unlikely to succeed — if success is defined as stopping the regime’s rulers from developing nuclear weapons — yet they are an essential component of any serious and strategic policy mix.
And why are sanctions on Iran “essential”, according to May?
Sanctions may be most useful after a strike against Iran’s nuclear-weapons facilities. At that point, American and other Western diplomats will need all the leverage they can get. Their job will be to insist that Iran’s rulers verifiably end the nuclear-weapons program, halt terrorism sponsorship, and ease domestic oppression. In return: no further damage and the sanctions lifted. If such an agreement can be reached, the conflict will be over, cooperation can begin, and the people of Iran will soon be more free and prosperous, while Iran’s neighbors will sleep more soundly. If such an agreement cannot be reached, continuing and even tightening sanctions will make it more difficult for Iran to replace facilities destroyed after a military option has been exercised.
Now on to Israel’s former foreign minister, Shlomo Ben Ami, who notes that the kind of sanctions that Iran is currently enduring will likely only harden its leaders’ alleged nuclear drive:
Yes, a harsh sanctions regime might still gain additional supporters, but an Iran with its back against the wall would probably be even more obstinate in its nuclear drive. After all, Iraq was an easy target in the first Gulf War precisely because it had abandoned its nuclear program, and possessed no weapons of mass destruction. Similarly, Libya’s Muammar el-Qaddafi exposed himself to a NATO onslaught by relinquishing his WMDs.
Virginia tech economist and Lobe Log contributor Djavad Salehi-Isfahani argued in October 2012 that the current sanctions regime — and the Ahmadinejad government’s response to it — could harm Iran’s middle/upper classes (otherwise natural allies of the West), and judging by recent reports, he’s probably right.
The counterproductive effects of sanctions have compelled several experts to point out that the so-called “tool” can only be effective if it’s accompanied with the very real possibility of significant relief. Paul Pillar’s thoughts on Congress’ apparently unquenchable thirst for sanctioning Iran back in December 2012 still apply today, a week after members of the Senate and House introduced more legislation that’s unlikely to positively impact the diplomatic process with Iran:
It should be clear from the history of the past couple of years, as well as a little thought about incentives for Iranian policymakers, that simply piling on still more sanctions without more Western flexibility at the negotiating table will not attain the U.S. objective. The sanctions are hurting Iran and are a major reason Iran wants to negotiate a deal. But the Iranians have dismissed the only sanctions relief that has been offered so far as peanuts, which it is. They have no reason to make significant concessions if they don’t think they will be getting anything significant in return. If members of Congress were really interested in inducing changes in Iran’s policy and behavior, they would be devoting as much time and energy to asking why the powers negotiating with Iran evidently do not intend to depart much from their failed negotiating formulas of the past as they would in trying to find some new sanction to impose.
(On Friday Pillar elaborated on how elements of the Israel lobby in the US and Congress are sustaining Iran’s alleged nuclear drive.)
An here’s the essence of a major report on the effects and results of sanctions on Iran released by the International Crisis Group last week:
…rather than adjusting its nuclear policy to remove the sanctions, the [Iranian] regime likely will continue to adjust its economic policy to adapt to them. While important regime constituencies have been harmed by international penalties, not all of them have been harmed equally, and some not at all. Evidence suggests that groups with superior contacts to the state have been able to circumvent sanctions and minimise damage to their interests. Average citizens, by contrast, suffer the effects: reports of widespread shortages, notably of specialised medicines, abound.
Moreover, sanctions as a tool of coercive diplomacy are only as effective as the prospect of relieving them in exchange for policy shifts is real. Yet, sanctions on Iran have become so extensive and so intricately woven that it will be hard to offer significant, concrete relief short of a major – and improbable – turnaround in major aspects of the Islamic Republic’s domestic and foreign policies. That, in addition to considerable mutual mistrust, leaves as the best case outcome for now a time-limited (albeit renewable) suspension or waiver of some sanctions by the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) in exchange for time-limited (albeit renewable) Iranian steps providing reassurance as to the program’s peaceful intent.
All this seems to suggest that a) sanctions aren’t working if the goal is to persuade Iran to agree to Western demands on its nuclear program; and b) the Obama administration’s Iran policy is incoherent.
Not necessarily, argued Iran scholar Farideh Farhi, here on Lobe Log last year:
The US’ Iran policy cannot be considered incoherent if the policy objectives and the instruments have become the same. It can still be considered immoral for trying to add to the economic woes of a good part of the Iranian population – irrespective of the fact that the Iranian government is most responsible for those economic woes – particularly at a time when so many people in the world are already suffering from unemployment and economic downturn. But it is not incoherent. It is intended to harass and it is doing so in a calculated and now rather routine, bureaucratic way. Weaning from routines and habits will be hard.
Iranian and Western officials expressed cautious optimism after talks with Iran concluded in Almaty, Kazakhstan last week with reports of moderate sanctions relief being offered by the 6 world-powers P5+1 negotiating team. But only moderate sanctions relief is unlikely to get the Iranians — who will reportedly respond to the offer during the next two months — to budge significantly. Mohammad Ali Shabani, an Oxford University PhD student with a solid understanding of the Iranian perspective, explained why in Al-Monitor on February 28. His conclusion is pertinent ahead of the March/April meetings:
Considering the lack of reciprocity, the upcoming Iranian presidential elections and the mere fact that Jalili’s team only listened in Kazakhstan, it would be wise to refrain from expecting a breakthrough in the near future. What would be wise is to appreciate the consensual desire to turn the talks from events into a real diplomatic process, as well as the time needed to bridge the wide gulf between Iran and the P5+1’s positions. Most importantly, it is crucial that all sides show the political will to move forward — and recognize that more than one party may be pursuing a dual-track policy.
Photo: The 19 September 2012 meeting of EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton and Dr. Saeed Jalili, the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, in Istanbul, Turkey. (Credit: European External Action Service – EEAS)
]]>After the nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 (the United States, Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany) in Moscow last June, dialogue at the senior political level was put on ice due to the American presidential vote. Eighty-five days have passed since the re-election of Barack Obama, and high-level talks [...]]]>
After the nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 (the United States, Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany) in Moscow last June, dialogue at the senior political level was put on ice due to the American presidential vote. Eighty-five days have passed since the re-election of Barack Obama, and high-level talks between Iran and the P5+1 have yet to resume. There are many reasons for this.
On the Iranian side, there are four main, mutually reinforcing factors behind Tehran’s cautious approach to fresh talks. First, certain figures within the political system, the nezaam, are in favor of waiting for Obama to finalize changes to his cabinet, including his national security team. These figures are by no measure dominant. Indeed, the prevailing narrative in Tehran is that a change of personalities won’t make any difference and that the American nezaam has certain engrained interests and institutions as well — among them, enmity with the Islamic Republic.
Meanwhile, more influential Iranian figures are pushing for Western positions to be clarified in more detail before the resumption of talks. The reason behind this maneuver is to maximize readiness for potential damage control; Iran does not want to be blamed for any diplomatic failure.
Inherent in the latter aspect of the situation is an Iranian desire to not be seen as being dragged to the negotiating table by sanctions. While Iran does seek sanctions relief, it wants such measures to be put forward in a serious manner.
The majority of the most punishing Western oil and financial penalties were imposed after the beginning of Iranian enrichment of uranium to 19.75% purity in 2010. In exchange for movement on this level of enrichment, Tehran would need some removal of the post-2010 sanctions, which include the EU oil embargo, shipping & insurance penalties, as well as US sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran.
The most important factor affecting Iranian behavior, however, is how it has entered its election cycle. Tehran is filled with debate and rumors about likely presidential candidates and what they’ll be able to do after assuming office. Western policymakers would be wise to recognize that all politics is local and show an understanding for how the Iranian presidential elections may slow down dialogue. The Iranian leadership’s main preoccupation until June is to maintain maximum stability. In this context, a nuclear deal that cannot be sold at home is not necessarily better than no deal and more sanctions.
While the Supreme Leader has final say on the nuclear issue, the next president would at least initially be able to enter the scene with some fresh ideas — both his own and from higher circles — and have room for maneuvering. The exact amount of political space, of course, depends on which candidate will win.
There are two main reasons for this: first, a new president would be better suited to pursue an opening with blessing from above, as failure can easily be deflected on him before domestic public opinion. Second, whoever the next president will be, it is unlikely that he will at least initially be as divisive as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Less tension at home will give Iran a stronger negotiating stance, along with improved Western acceptance of an Iranian ability to deliver.
This line has been echoed by influential officials such as former envoy Sadeq Kharrazi, who has argued that “lively elections” will empower the government and bring “wise people to power” with a consequent greater Iranian capacity to extract concessions from the United States. Kharrazi also said that he didn’t believe relations between Iran and the US would be normalized during Obama’s second term prior to Obama’s re-election and has indicated that the real window for diplomacy on the nuclear issue will be after Iran’s presidential election. Kharrazi argues that this is because the Americans have never been and never will be willing to negotiate with Ahmadinejad’s government.
The writing between the lines is that many figures within Iran are not going to let any negotiations with the US be successful as long as Ahmadinejad is in power.
In sum, while Iran’s bottom line on the nuclear issue won’t change (i.e. enrichment on Iranian soil), the next Iranian president would at least initially be able to pursue an opening. Moreover, a new president would give the United States in particular a badly needed new “face” to deal with.
Ultimately, power to change the US-Iran relationship is equally in the hands of Barack Obama. A day after Obama’s first Nowruz message in 2009, at the end of a damning speech, Iran’s Supreme Leader responded that “if you change your attitude, we will change our attitude.” Most likely, that offer still stands.
Until then, a mutual desire to keep things from spiraling out of control will in all probability result in both sides kicking the can down the road until after this summer.
- Mohammad Ali Shabani is a doctoral researcher at the School of Oriental & African Studies, University of London and the Editor of Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs.
]]>Zbigniew Brzezinski, Iran should be key topic at hearings: The former National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter urges the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to include a discussion about the implications of a “self-generated” war with Iran during its upcoming hearing. Key paragraph:
It follows that a failure to reach a satisfactory negotiated solution with Iran [...]]]>
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Iran should be key topic at hearings: The former National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter urges the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to include a discussion about the implications of a “self-generated” war with Iran during its upcoming hearing. Key paragraph:
It follows that a failure to reach a satisfactory negotiated solution with Iran should not be viewed as the trigger for a new U.S.-initiated war that is not likely to be confined just to Iran. A more prudent and productive course for the United States would be to continue the painful sanctions against Iran while formally adopting for the Middle East the same policy that for decades successfully protected America’s European and Asian allies against the much more dangerous threats emanating from Stalinist Russia and lately from nuclear-armed North Korea. An Iranian military threat aimed at Israel or any other U.S. friend in the Middle East would be treated as if directed at the United States itself and would precipitate a commensurate U.S. response.
Seyed Hossein Mousavian and Mohammad Ali Shabani, How to Talk to Iran: The Iranian perspective provided by a former lead Iranian negotiator (now at Princeton) and a SOAS doctorale candidate. Any deal with Iran needs to offer Iran a face-saving way out, they argue:
While Tehran views a deal on its nuclear program as being in its self-interest, Western leaders need to grasp that it would be devastating for Iran’s aberu to take the first step solely in exchange for promises. The dominant discourse in Tehran portrays the 2004 decision by the former Iranian president Mohammad Khatami to suspend uranium enrichment on a voluntary, temporary basis as a failure because it resulted only in humiliating calls by the West for an indefinite suspension. The moral of this narrative is that placing maslahat above aberu, even temporarily, leads to nothing good.
Trita Parsi, Is A Deal With Iran In The Offing?: The Iran expert, whose book, A Single Roll of the Dice – Obama’s Diplomacy with Iran topped Foreign Affairs’ Best Books of 2012 on the Middle East list, describes the motivation behind the US-led Iran sanctions regime in his analysis of whether a deal is possible this year:
…the deal must not just prevent a nuclear weapon in Iran, it must also put Iran “back into its place” within the regional pecking order. While acceptance of limited enrichment in Iran opens the way for a nuclear deal, strangulating sanctions are deemed necessary to remind Tehran and other regional powers who is the de facto hegemon in the region—and who isn’t.
Reza Marashi, Step by Step with Iran: The former Iran desk state department staffer and analyst argues that a step-by-step process based on reciprocity provides a framework for the least bad option for both sides of the Iranian nuclear spectrum:
Tehran would stop enriching to the 20 percent level; ship out its stockpile of corresponding uranium to a mutually agreed-upon third-party country; shut down its Fordow facility; and reduce its existing stockpile of low-enriched uranium below the level needed for any possibility of weaponization. In turn, Washington would suspend key banking sanctions, back a suspension of the EU oil embargo, and freeze new sanctions initiatives. Under this arrangement, both sides are trading an equal number of concessions, which in turn builds trust, buys time for negotiations to continue, and helps disarm spoilers in Washington, Tehran, Tel Aviv, Brussels and Riyadh.
Joe Klein, Obama’s Next Foreign Policy Battle: The TIME political columnist sums up how the battle over Chuck Hagel’s nomination as Secretary of Defense factors in to the tug-of-war between Israel lobby groups in the US and the President and his allies:
And then there’s Iran. A nuclear deal may be negotiated this year. The Iranians are suffering economically; there are indications that they are ready to talk. But any such deal will be vehemently opposed by Netanyahu and the neoconservatives. The Hagel nomination, if it comes, will be the warm-up act for those battles. It is a fight that would send an important message about the President’s intentions–to Iran, to Israel and to the out-of-touch leaders of the American Jewish community.
Eskandar Sadeghi-Boroujerdi, Former Supreme National Security Chief: Crass talk is not foreign policy: The title says it all. A key quote from a former Chief of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council:
“It is not clear whether the actions that have been undertaken in these last couple of years were engagement or confrontation. If we want to have a role in global decision making, we must in reality choose engagement…Let’s define “offensive”; “offensive” means an action we undertake which doesn’t allow the enemy to implement his plan against us or a conspiracy he wants to commit against us, and we move one step”.
David Axe, Iran Unveils Copycat Arsenal: The Danger Room’s military correspondent provides a rundown of Iran’s makeshift though still potentially dangerous weapons arsenal:
]]>But that doesn’t mean all of Tehran’s weapons suck. Far from it. While some of the sillier Iranian gear is obviously meant mostly for fleeting propaganda purposes, the main hardware is grounded in experience and hardship. Driven by desperation and shaped by the isolation that comes with widening external sanctions, Tehran’s copycat arsenal could contain a few nasty surprises for the U.S. and its allies in the unlikely event that tensions over Iran’s nuclear program come to blows.