by Henry Precht
Rare is the Middle East scholar or diplomat who departs from his customary groove in analyzing events in that region. Alas, I am — or was — one of the latter. Now, however, there come two books that just may cause a minor swerve from the usual rut [...]]]>
by Henry Precht
Rare is the Middle East scholar or diplomat who departs from his customary groove in analyzing events in that region. Alas, I am — or was — one of the latter. Now, however, there come two books that just may cause a minor swerve from the usual rut of thinking about Iran, especially by Iranians. Nothing revolutionary to be sure — that’s out of style — but prompting reflection.
The first volume is a biography of Mohammed Mossadegh, Patriot of Persia, by Christopher de Bellaigue, a British journalist resident in Tehran for the past 10 years where he has spent a fair amount of time in archives and interviews with figures from the fifties. The product is like a novel of the upper classes, rich with small stories and psychological quirks that lead us from the ancient land that was Iran in the 19th century to the state struggling against imperialism and trying awkwardly to become modern in the mid-20th century.
The focus, of course, is on the nationalization of Iran’s oil controlled by the British, which excited American Cold War fears of communism and produced the coup of August 19, 1953. The multiple lessons lead to one judgment: it didn’t have to end that way. The principal culprit was Mossadegh himself. A patriot, he loved his country more than its people and realities. A democrat, he ruled autocratically when it suited him. An old man encrusted with the past, he overplayed his physical condition and the drama of his situation. In three words, he was a man of rectitude and ineptitude. He picked poor advisers, poorly maintained alliances, was a terrible administrator and allowed his emotions to govern his decisions. He thought he could rely on Washington to help him with London. He underestimated the conflicting egos of his local allies that led them to abandon him. But he was a true patriot and his people loved him.
The British and then the Americans were lucky in this maladroit antagonist, but they were clueless in understanding what was happening in Iran and the nationalism they were facing. No matter, they knew how to spread their money around. They knew how to concentrate their efforts, pick competent men to work for them and influence bits of public opinion in their favor. All with nary a thought for what their work might lead to. (I suppose they would say that 25 years of imperial rule was a pretty good bargain, ignoring the succeeding longer period of bad times.)
The chief lesson I draw for outsiders is the obvious one: try, try harder, to understand Iran, its seeming weaknesses, but also its hard points. Be patient when they stumble, be persistent in trying to reach them. Think much farther ahead than the next election.
The second book is not about Iran, but it warns against what that country is up against in the attitude of its principal antagonist Israel. Fortress Israel: The Inside Story of the Military Elite Who Run the Country — and Why They Can’t Make Peace by Patrick Tyler, an ace American ex-journalist, who helps us understand what Iran and the rest of the concerned world face when Israel threatens military action. The principal source of the militarism that grips the state and its people is the legacy of David Ben Gurion who cultivated a clique of constant warriors led by Moshe Dayan and Ariel Sharron. They created a culture that emphasized harsh overreaction and preemption and that effectively eliminated from the leadership those dreamers (e.g. Moshe Sharett) who early on sought negotiations and accommodation with the Arabs.
Like the CIA agents in Iran, Ben Gurion and his friends knew how to manipulate the fears and convictions of their public — as well as America’s. His heirs — soldiers become politicians — have known how to resist and overcome external pressure and prosper. Obama’s failure on settlements as Netanyahu stood up to him was instructive for the president — a lesson all preceding presidents learned in their time. We can only hope that Obama’s course of instruction came with a body and courage building plan.
If our president is not up to the struggle — as Eisenhower, Carter and the first Bush were in varying degrees — disaster impends. Iran seems to have learned a little about avoiding provocative rhetoric; they might take further lessons in treading softly and reflecting on Mossadegh’s fate. The danger is real.
Photo: US President Harry S. Truman meets Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh on 23 October 1951.
]]>George Santayana wisely said: “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” Oblivious to history and its lessons, the United States and its Western allies are repeating their actions from the 1950’s–that of imposing an oil embargo on Iran. The US-led alliance has forgotten [...]]]>
George Santayana wisely said: “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” Oblivious to history and its lessons, the United States and its Western allies are repeating their actions from the 1950’s–that of imposing an oil embargo on Iran. The US-led alliance has forgotten the past.
Iran remembers.
When under the leadership of the nationalist Dr. Mossadegh, Iran opted to nationalize its oil industry, the British Royal Navy blocked Iran’s oil exports to forcefully prevent if from nationalizing its oil. In retaliation to Iran’s nationalistic ambitions, and to punish Iran for pursuing its national interests, the British instigated a worldwide boycott of Iranian oil.
In the 1950’s, Iran did not have the military might to retaliate against the oil embargo and the naval blockade was aimed at crushing the economy in order to bring about regime change. The subsequent events are described in a New York Times[i]article as a “lesson in the heavy cost that must be paid” when an oil-rich Third World nation “goes berserk with fanatical nationalism.” Iran learnt that sovereignty and nationalism necessitate tactical/military strength and determination.
Not heeding the aftermath of the 1950’s, the American-led Western allies have once again imposed an oil embargo on Iran. In retaliation, Iran has drafted a bill to stop the flow of oil through its territorial waters–the Strait of Hormuz, to countries that have imposed sanctions against it. This bill is not without merit and contrary to the previous oil embargo, it would appear that Tehran has the upper hand and the heavy cost associated with the embargo will not be borne by Iran alone.
Iran’s Legal Standing
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea stipulates that vessels can exercise the right of innocent passage and coastal states should not impede their passage. Although Iran has signed the Treaty, the Treaty was not ratified and as such it has no legal standing. However, even if one overlooks the non-binding signature, under the UNCLOS framework of international law, a coastal state can block ships from entering its territorial waters if the passage of the ships harm “peace, good order or security” of said state, as the passage of such ships would no longer be deemed “innocent”[ii].
Even if Iran simply chooses to merely delay the passage of tankers by exercising its right to inspect every oil-tanker that passes through the Strait of Hormuz, these inspections and subsequent delays would maintain or contribute to higher oil prices. While higher oil prices would benefit Iran and other oil-producing countries, they would further destabilize the European economy which is already in crisis.
The Military Option
Although US-led Western allies are flexing their muscles by sending battle ships to the Persian Gulf, Washington’s own war game exercise, the Millennium Challenge 2002 (with a price tag of $250 million), underscored its inability to defeat Iran. Oblivious to the lesson of its own making, by sending more warships to the Persian Gulf the US is inching towards a full-scale conflict. The inherent danger from a naval buildup is that unlike the Cuban Missile Crisis, the forces in the Persian Gulf are not confined to two leaders who would be able to communicate to stop a run-away situation. Nor would the consequences of such a potential conflict be limited to the region.
Given that 17 million barrels of oil a day, or 35% of the world’s seaborne oil exports go through the Strait of Hormuz, incidents in the Strait would be fatal for the world economy. While only 1.1 millions barrels per day go to the US, a significant amount of this oil is destined for Europe. One must ask why the US demands that its “European allies” act contrary to their own national interest, pay a higher price for oil by boycotting Iran’s exports and increase the risk of Iran blocking the passage of other oil-tankers destined for them.
Again, history has a straight answer. Contrary to conventional wisdom about oil producing-countries, it is the US that has used oil as a weapon. Some examples include the pressure Washington put on Britain in the 1920s to share its oil concessions in the Middle East with US companies. Post World War II, the US violated the terms of the 1928 Red Line Agreement freezing the British and the French out of the Agreement.
In 1956, the US made it clear to Britain and France that no oil would be sent to Western Europe unless the two countries agreed to a rapid withdrawal from Egypt. The US was not opposed to the overthrow of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, but President Dwight. D. Eisenhower said: “Had they done it quickly, we would have accepted it”[iii].
It is possible that the leaders of Western European countries are beholden to special interest groups such as pro-Israel lobbies, as the US is. Or they may believe that Iran will not call their bluff by ratifying the bill passed by the Majlis and that oil will be delivered unhindered. Perhaps both instances hold. Either way, they are committing financial suicide and may well suffer serious consequences before Iran’s resolve is shaken.
–Soraya Sepahpour-Ulrich is a Public Diplomacy Scholar, independent researcher and blogger with a focus on US foreign policy and the role of lobby groups.
[i]“THE IRANIAN ACCORD”, The New York Times, Aug 6,1954, cited by S. Shalom
[ii] Martin Wahlisch, The Yale Journal of International Law, March 2012, citing UNCLOS, supra note 12, , art. 19, para1, and art. 25, para1.
[iii] Stephen Shalom; The Iran-Iraq War citing Kennett Love, Suez: the Twice-Fought War, New York: McGraw Hill, 1969, p. 651
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