by Wayne White
As 2014 draws to a close, there is no shortage of alternative suggestions about how to defeat the Islamic State (ISIS or IS). Most of them involve US escalation, driven by exaggerated notions of IS capabilities. Retaking IS’s extensive holdings will, however, take some time. All do acknowledge that regional coalition members are not pulling their weight.
Dismayed by the early December debate in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in which many Senators sought to limit President Barack Obama’s military options, Senator Marco Rubio said Dec. 12 that it was “alarming” that IS “now reaches from North Africa…the Middle East, Pakistan, South Asia, and Southeast Asia.” Dismissing administration efforts as “half-measures,” Rubio also demanded that defeating IS include ousting Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad from power.
Retired Marine Corps Colonel Gary Anderson of George Washington University argued Dec. 22 that a mainly American “large scale punitive expedition” should swiftly crush the Islamic State. Georgetown University’s Anthony Cordesman pointed out, however, that US “airpower cannot resolve the religious, ethnic, political, and governance issues…at the core of Iraqi and Syrian…conflict.” Although Anderson believes a huge foreign ground offensive would clear the way for follow-on solutions, Cordesman, while critical of the inadequacies of the air campaign, warned against major escalation and said realistic endgames could be elusive.
Senator John McCain visited Iraq Dec. 26 and said the training of some 4,000 anti-IS Sunni Arab tribesmen allied to the Iraqi government should take no more than 6 weeks to 2 months and that retaking the IS-held northern Iraqi city of Mosul should be the first Iraqi goal in driving IS from Iraq. He praised Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi for “success in unifying the Iraqi factions.”
There also has been a burst of December peace and ceasefire proposals or feelers put forward by the UN, Russia, and some individual countries. Unfortunately, the motives behind Moscow’s initiative are highly suspect, and none would appeal to all combatants or be properly monitored.
Mission Creep à la Obama
Unfortunately, the Obama administration, whether spooked by hawkish critics or pressured by the US military brass, has steadily ramped up US military involvement. The Pentagon is seeking a contractor to deploy jet fuel and gasoline to the al-Asad Airbase in western Iraq (far behind IS lines) by mid-January. One thousand troops from the US 101st Airborne Division also are scheduled to deploy to Iraq in January to train, advise and assist Iraqi and Kurdish forces.
If US aircraft begin using al-Asad, aircraft and US personnel would become a prime IS objective. When the US based aircraft inside South Vietnam, the need to deploy sizeable American ground forces to protect them was quickly generated. Furthermore, nearly 200 US troops sent to al-Asad in November may have fought IS forces in that area earlier this month; if this proves true, it would be the first such encounter between supposedly non-combat US troops sent to Iraq and IS forces.
The State of the Islamic State
Despite the jitters many have concerning the sweep of Islamic State forces, the view from the IS capital of Raqqa is hardly rosy. Still stalled in front of embattled Kobani, IS could not stop a sweeping Iraqi Kurdish, Yazidi, and Iraqi Army drive across northern Iraq to take Sinjar Mountain (again rescuing Yazidi refugees) and wrest from IS much of the town of Sinjar by December 21. Back in mid-December, the Pentagon also confirmed that an air strike killed Haji Mutazz, a deputy to IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, as well as the IS military operations chief for Iraq, and the IS “governor” of Mosul. Meanwhile, daily coalition air strikes grind away at various targets within IS’s “caliphate” (now increasingly wracked by shortages).
Senator Rubio’s notion of IS extending from North Africa to Southeast Asia is an exaggeration. It merely refers to a scattering of mostly small groups here and there—already extremists—simply declaring allegiance to or praise for IS.
The situation of IS forces beyond Kobani in Syria is meanwhile somewhat muddled. In the northwest Aleppo area, largely Islamic extremist elements like IS and the al-Qaeda affiliated al-Nusra Front (plus a few mainstream groups) formed a “Shamiyya Front” alliance Dec. 25 to resist recent advances by Syrian government forces. In the south, seventeen mainly non-extremist rebel groups united in early December. Making slow gains against regime forces near Damascus, this grouping has received some moderate Arab aid. Rumors of a grand alliance between IS and al-Nusra, which still fight here and there, were premature.
The desire of some US politicians (and Turkey) for the US-led coalition to also take on the Assad regime is very risky. The fall of or severe weakening of the regime in the near-term would create a vacuum in western Syria and IS and Nusra would be best positioned to fill it. Both groups already encroach on the holdings of moderate rebels there. To block extremist exploitation of regime implosion, a large force of effective combat troops would have to be committed. No coalition member seems ready to do so. Finally, crafting endgames for Syria—now a chaotic, shattered land flush with raging ethno-sectarian hatreds—is an incredibly daunting task.
Iraqi Government Challenges
Despite Senator McCain’s claims, Abadi has not “unified Iraqi factions.” McCain probably got the “canned” tour limited to government successes. On Dec. 18, Abadi did expand press freedom, dropping predecessor Nouri al-Maliki’s official lawsuits against journalists and publications. Yet little else, particularly relating to the military front, is going well.
Only a relatively limited number of Sunni Arab tribes and former “Awakening” cadres continue to fight alongside the government. Worse still, the Iraqi Army has not even rebounded enough to replace Shi’a militias fighting on the front lines against IS in many areas where they devastate recaptured Sunni Arab towns. And Abadi has offered no sweeping initiative to guarantee Sunni Arab inclusion and rights. Meanwhile, IS has been busily weakening Sunni Arab tribal structure by playing on intra-tribal clan rivalries to make major tribal desertions to Baghdad more difficult.
Moreover, four thousand pro-government Sunni tribesmen is a paltry number stacked against many tens of thousands currently in IS’s pocket or under its sway. Opening an offensive against IS in Iraq by assaulting the vast Mosul area would also likely further grind up and demoralize recently trained Iraqi and other forces than empower them or result in victory. Finally, Baghdad is still preoccupied with simply trying to hold onto several key pieces of real estate behind IS lines, repeatedly under attack and poorly supplied.
Abadi appealed to his Turkish counterpart Ahmet Davutoglu for greater support in battling IS. Davutoglu declared, “We are open to any idea,” but specifically noted only continuing to train Iraqi Kurds. Aside from intelligence cooperation and training, Ankara may well avoid most meaningful commitments to Baghdad, just as it has rebuffed other coalition members—including its NATO allies.
Long War Ahead
Short of a severe weakening of IS from the inside, the struggle against the group probably will be prolonged. The problem is not merely the limited Western forces willing to participate, but paltry support from the nearest coalition members.
Turkey, sharing a vast border with IS, is the worst offender. Nonetheless, the extreme reluctance of a nervous Jordan and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to become heavily involved is also a major drawback. Unless these reluctant allies enter the fray more forcefully on the military and economic fronts, and Baghdad grasps the need for a genuinely diverse future for Iraq, the fight is likely to be a hard slog. And the more the US does militarily further reduces the incentive for regional players to do their part.
Photo: President Barack Obama, with Vice President Joe Biden, convenes a meeting regarding Iraq in the Situation Room of the White House, June 12, 2014. Credit: Official White House Photo by Pete Souza
]]>Hyping the Islamic State (ISIS or IS) threat risks generating flawed policies. The White House probably is a source of frustration, as its critics claim, but others seem too eager to commit US combat troops. Meanwhile, the administration, under constant pressure regarding the US effort, has not done enough to energize the anti-IS coalition that President Obama worked so hard to assemble. This inclines allies to believe Washington will do the heavy lifting for them. Although addressing IS full-bore (and unilaterally) might seem appealing to some, this urge undermines the patience needed for more sensible courses of action.
The Hagel Affair
The resignation of Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel last month resulted in criticism that the White House is unreceptive to outside views, such as expanding the US military effort against IS. Excessive micromanagement of military related issues by the White House (including the phone line to commanders in Afghanistan that bypassed Hagel) has also been cited.
Past Presidents have done likewise. In overseas crises, many presidents created their own channels, giving White House officials more power than cabinet secretaries. Franklin Roosevelt often relied on Harry Hopkins over Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Richard Nixon used Henry Kissinger in lieu of William Rogers, and Colin Powell found himself outside the Bush administration’s inner circle. Perhaps the most extreme example of presidential micromanagement was Lyndon Johnson’s handling of the Vietnam War.
The Obama White House has long had dicey relations with the Pentagon. This has been, according to the Pentagon’s side of the argument, the source of delays and confusing policy directions on several issues, with the White House accused of falling into “group think.” For his part, Hagel had complained in the early fall to National Security Advisor Susan Rice in a memo about a lack of cohesion in US policy toward IS.
Nonetheless, White House micromanagement or Pentagon-White House difficulties aside, Obama’s reluctance to ramp up the US military effort against IS excessively seems well founded. Of course, Hagel’s position is not entirely clear, but escalation had been advocated by Hagel’s two predecessors: Robert Gates and Leon Panetta.
Costs of US Escalation
IS appears ready to endure lopsided casualties to inflict some on American combat troops. And IS could follow through on this hope. Not only are its combatants fanatics, the radical Sunni militia also employs deadly suicide bombings against foes in close-up urban combat (as we’ve seen in Kobani). Additionally, IS likely hopes to get a hold of at least a few US military prisoners for filmed beheadings. So why hand IS exactly what it wants?
With large urban areas to be cleared just in Iraq—from Fallujah to Mosul—US combat troops would also likely incur casualties in excess of those suffered in 2003-08 against somewhat less fanatical Sunni Arab insurgents and Shi’a militias during the war.
American military difficulties could be further magnified by reduced interest on the part of Iraq’s Shi’a-dominated government in making the political concessions needed to split Sunni Arab tribes and other secular elements away from IS and marshal its own forces more swiftly. After all, why should Baghdad go the extra mile if the US seems willing to take care of Baghdad’s IS problem militarily?
Recently, despite lost ground in and around Ramadi west of Baghdad, Iraqi and Kurdish forces have made gains between Baghdad and Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) territory to the north. Moving up Iraq’s central line of communications, Iraqi forces have driven IS from some important territory. The siege of the vital Baiji refinery complex has been lifted, and gains have been made in the demographically mixed Diyala Governate northeast of Baghdad.
Meanwhile, Iraqi Kurds continue to push IS slowly westward. Baghdad and the KRG reached a temporary oil agreement yesterday that should clear the way for greater cooperation elsewhere, like battling IS. Bitter quarrelling under former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki left Iraqi-KRG relations in shambles.
Struggling to rebound from severe reverses last summer, however, the Iraqi Army is in no position to mount a major offensive deep into IS holdings. However, successful Iraqi and Kurdish attacks demonstrate the vulnerability of IS’s vast perimeter. Strong IS forces cannot be everywhere at once to repel various challenges and adequately support ongoing attacks (such as its effort against Kobani).
In terms of a military threat, IS has been largely contained. It cannot advance northward against Turkey; isolated pro-IS sympathies exist in Jordan, but the highly professional Jordanian Army would be a tough nut to crack; and in Iraq, most all Shi’a and Kurdish areas lie outside IS control and are fighting hard to maintain this status. In Syria, IS could advance against weaker rebel forces like the Free Syrian Army, but it seems obsessed with seizing Kobani despite heavy losses.
Coalition and US Escalation
The anti-IS coalition the White House assembled is contributing relatively little to the overall military effort, despite Secretary of State John Kerry’s glowing rhetoric at today’s coalition conclave in Brussels. The air campaign is mainly an American show. Committing more US assets would make it easier for others already foot-dragging over contributions to continue dithering. Now is not the time to ramp up US military efforts, but rather to pressure allies to increase their own contributions.
The bulk of IS’s reinforcements in the form of foreign fighters flow through NATO ally Turkey. The CIA in September and the UN more recently sharply increased their estimate of the number of foreign fighters reaching the Islamic State. To date, Turkey has been more helpful to IS than the coalition because of its passivity. If it cannot be pressured to vigorously interdict incoming fighters, IS would be able to replace many lost fighters—although with less experienced cadres.
The White House (and other allies) must press Turkey harder. President Obama delayed air support for beleaguered Syrian Kurds for two weeks in deference to Turkish concerns (allowing IS to gain a foothold inside Kobani). Even today’s 60-nation gathering seems short on clear goals, let alone a robust military agenda on contributions.
Admittedly, although the Administration has done too little diplomatic spadework, its leverage overseas probably has been undermined by American politicians, pundits, and many in the media demanding an expanded US effort.
Bottom Line
IS remains a daunting foe, so it will not be defeated easily, soon, or completely. To Americans pressing urgently for quick solutions, this is difficult to accept. But comments like one yesterday by Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Chair of the House Foreign Relations Middle East and North Africa Sub-Committee, suggesting IS could damage everyone’s way of life are typical of exaggerations impeding objective policymaking.
Yet those claiming the air campaign has been ineffective are also naïve. IS has mostly ground to a halt. In some places, like Kobani, IS is hemorrhaging combat casualties. Meanwhile IS’s infrastructure, leadership, training camps, heavy weapons, oil refineries, and lines of communication have been hammered by the ongoing aerial bombardment. This week, assets in IS’s “capital” of Raqqa, Syria were also subjected to a wave of airstrikes.
Many want IS crushed quickly out of fear of IS attacks against the American homeland. Yet, as we saw in Afghanistan in 2001-02 with al-Qaeda, the combatants would not be completely rounded up should substantial US forces be sent in. Many hundreds at the very least would escape to find refuge elsewhere. In that scenario, IS would likely shift toward an international terrorist mode, posing an even greater threat to the United States. Therefore, a more collective effort—forcing IS to truly understand that it faces dozens of foes and not just a few—would be a wiser way forward. It is meanwhile imperative to strip IS of as many of its non-extremist Sunni Arab allies as possible, so they do not have to be dealt with militarily.
Photo: President Obama addresses reporters during a meeting with th anti-IS coalition on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly on Sept. 24, 2014
]]>by Wayne White
Forces of the Islamic State, formerly known as ISIS, have lunged toward two strategic dams earlier this month, one in the north and the other west of Baghdad. The northern offensive drove Kurdish forces from areas they had protected, showing how vulnerable Iraqi Kurds could be in the face [...]]]>
by Wayne White
Forces of the Islamic State, formerly known as ISIS, have lunged toward two strategic dams earlier this month, one in the north and the other west of Baghdad. The northern offensive drove Kurdish forces from areas they had protected, showing how vulnerable Iraqi Kurds could be in the face of more sweeping attacks. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s battle for political survival has delayed a more coherent, unified Iraqi response to the military threat posed by the Islamic State. Certain gains from this Sunni extremist group while Baghdad remains adrift politically would increase the potential for greater foreign military involvement.
The Islamic State has tried for weeks to get its hands on the Haditha Dam complex near Fallujah, Iraq’s second largest reservoir. To their credit, Iraqi troops have so far fought well in fending off the militants; Baghdad was able to reinforce its Haditha garrison at one point with 2,000 more troops. Nonetheless, the garrison is mostly isolated deep within Islamic State-held territory.
On Aug. 1, the Islamic State launched its heaviest attack to date toward Haditha. The assault almost broke through government lines. However, late in the fighting, Sunni Arab tribes from the area massed against the Islamic State to prevent the dam from falling to the group. These tribes depend on the dam, and they were not prepared to let go of such an important asset.
It is, however, doubtful that the Islamic State would simply destroy the dam (or one near Mosul that it may have seized). Blowing up the dams to spite downstream Shia would flood large Sunni Arab areas under Islamic State-control — hardly desirable as the group tries to win more Sunnis over to its side. The Islamic State may wish instead to manipulate dam power flows to benefit areas under its control, deny power to Shia areas, and, yes, occasionally alter water flows to damage government held areas downstream.
Challenging the Kurds
Seemingly in parallel, the Islamic State lunged for the Mosul Dam (Iraq’s largest) in the north on Aug. 3, which Iraq’s Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) occupied when it took control of extensive areas around the KRG’s perimeter to head off the militant threat. In addition, Islamic State fighters took Sinjar on Aug. 2, two smaller towns, and an oilfield. These locales were in Kurdish hands too, although isolated along the Syrian border far west of the KRG and hard to defend. Both sides claim to have the dam, but local residents told the AP on Aug. 7 that the Islamic State now holds it. The group also struck the other end of the KRG perimeter near the Iranian border, but was repulsed.
The Islamic State realizes KRG forces are spread thinly trying to cover a perimeter hundreds of miles long, so it can mass its forces at selected points to overwhelm local defenses. And the Islamic State’s re-conquest of mixed areas taken over by the Kurds in June could play well among Sunni Arabs concerned by KRG ambitions.
Excessive praise for the Peshmerga capabilities tends to be misplaced. The Peshmerga (literally, “those who face death”) mainly consists of militia-style light infantry against which the Islamic State can use heavy weapons seized from fleeing Iraqi forces when Mosul fell. In fact, the Peshmerga have an iffy track record against heavily equipped or fanatical opponents.
In 1991, after crushing much of a Shia rebellion in the south, Saddam Hussein’s well-equipped forces easily pushed aside Peshmerga units, driving over 2 million Kurds into Turkey and Iran. Then, in 2002, prior to the US invasion of Iraq, the Peshmerga twice tried to dislodge a small pocket of Ansar al-Islam (extremist Kurds and some al-Qaeda fighters who had eluded US forces in Afghanistan). In both instances, large Peshmerga assault forces were stopped cold by small numbers of less well-armed fanatics. Lastly, the Kurds faced little of the Sunni Arab insurgency’s wrath during 2003-08, so Kurdish Peshmerga saw little recent combat from which it could have drawn much needed military experience.
The KRG did seize large quantities of heavy weapons including tanks, other armored vehicles, and artillery from Saddam’s demobilized army after the US invasion in 2003. Little was done to incorporate them into Peshmerga units. Worse still, one of the two dominant Kurdish factions, the Popular Union of Kurdistan (PUK), sold a large quantity of this equipment to the Iranians.
The Secretary General of the KRG ministry overseeing the Peshmerga, Jabbar Yawar, declared on Aug. 6 that the Peshmerga would switch from defense to offense; Islamic State positions were attacked that day. The KRG is now receiving some limited air support from Baghdad and fighters from the Syrian Kurdish community, which has had considerable success in fending off the Islamic State. Nonetheless, KRG forces remain dangerously overstretched, and it lost more towns to the Islamic State in predominantly Christian areas under Kurdish protection on Aug. 7.
Yazidi Humanitarian Crisis
Iraq’s latest humanitarian crisis is associated with the fall of Sinjar, where Iraq’s small Yazidi community lives. Yazidis are members of an obscure sect often incorrectly labeled “Devil worshippers.” The Islamic State sees them as infidels, and there have been reports of executions.
Most Yazidis from Sinjar have taken refuge in mountains around the town, but the Islamic State has been trying to secure the heights to seize them. In an Aug. 5 Iraqi parliamentary session, a Yazidi deputy made an impassioned plea to save her people from genocide. Fortunately, some of the Yazidis from Sinjar were reportedly rescued over the past 24 hours.
Political Uncertainty in Baghdad
Maliki has remained adamant that he will not step down as a prime ministerial candidate despite opposition from key ally Iran, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Sunni Arabs, Kurds, and even some former Shia supporters. Despite his reduced chances of prevailing, Maliki clearly does not care that his stand has postponed fielding a fresh new crisis government to marshal Iraqi forces against the Islamic State.
Last week, US officials began meeting in Erbil with Sunni Arab officials and leaders from Islamic State-occupied areas to help fashion a Sunni Arab alliance against the group. US officials admitted, however, that the American strategy would not make much headway as long as Maliki remains prime minister.
Constitutionally, Maliki is on solid ground. As the head of the parliamentary list that garnered the most votes in elections earlier this year, he should be given first crack at forming a government.
The deadline for giving the go-ahead to someone is only days away. So, Iraq’s new president, Fouad Massoum, might as well ask Maliki to try and form a government (even if Maliki fails). Although time consuming, this move appears to be the only way to force Maliki to step aside. That might happen in a parliamentary session today.
Fragile Military Situation
Although it has so far been largely checked farther south, now that the Islamic State has shown interest in hitting Iraq’s Kurds in the north, it will probably make additional gains up there. And until there is a new government in Baghdad, Iraq will remain unable to mobilize its full potential to check or drive the Islamic State back.
Should the Islamic State concentrate its scattered forces for a major, focused offensive, it could jeopardize all Kurdish holdings outside the KRG (including Kirkuk), or even thrust into the KRG to throw Kurdish forces off balance. It might overwhelm isolated Iraqi government garrisons in Haditha, the refinery complex in Taiji, or Samarra with its highly sensitive Shia mosque/shrine. Similarly, the failure of most of the surrounded Yazidis to avoid capture followed by a massive Islamic State-atrocity against them would generate a huge wave of international outrage. Even additional territory in the vicinity of Baghdad could fall to an especially robust assault by the Islamic State.
The worst-case scenarios noted above would place Turkey, Iran and the US in particular under more intense pressure to take direct military action against the Islamic State. For example, would Tehran allow Samarra to fall to the group after Iranian senior officers have been sent to help organize its defense?
]]>The Kurdish flag is flying high in the wind from the rooftop of an old brick house inside Kirkuk’s millennia-old citadel, as Rashid – a stern-looking man sitting behind a machine gun – monitors the surroundings.
Rashid commands a small unit of a dozen fighters, members of the Kurdish armed forces [...]]]>
The Kurdish flag is flying high in the wind from the rooftop of an old brick house inside Kirkuk’s millennia-old citadel, as Rashid – a stern-looking man sitting behind a machine gun – monitors the surroundings.
Rashid commands a small unit of a dozen fighters, members of the Kurdish armed forces – known as the Peshmerga – deployed to the oil-rich province since June 13.
On June 12, the Iraqi army evacuated its positions in Kirkuk province after its troops had earlier conceded control of the country’s second largest city, Mosul, in the face of advancing Sunni militant groups led by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS).
“Since we have been deployed here things have changed,” says Rashid, a Peshmerga for 25 years, with a sense of pride. “It’s safer now and people can go out and do their daily business.”
However, although the deployment of thousands of Peshmerga troops has in fact brought relative calm to the city so far, trouble appears to be brewing.
Rich in natural resources such as oil and home to a mixed population of Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen and Christians, Kirkuk is no stranger to conflict. It has been at the heart of decades of armed and political struggles between the Kurds and successive Iraqi governments.
Since the Kurdish takeover there, armed Shia groups have been flexing their muscles, a move that has infuriated the considerable Sunni Arab population in the province and could be a potentially destabilising factor, while insurgent activity by Sunni militants continues in some parts of the province and has left tens of casualties behind so far.
The local office of the influential Shia cleric Muqtada Sadr organised a military parade on June 21 in which hundreds of armed Shia men walked through the streets in downtown Kirkuk.
“The parade was meant to send a couple of messages. One was a message of reassurance to all Iraqis that there are soldiers to defend all segments of the people,” says Sheikh Raad al-Sakhri, the local representative of Sadr, sitting on the floor of his well-protected Khazal al-Tamimi mosque. “And the other was a message to terrorists that there is another army ready to fight for the sake of the country if the [official] military [forces] fall short of their duties.”
Al-Sakhri might claim his men will protect everyone, but the Sunni Arabs here are not convinced.
At the peak of Iraq’s sectarian strife in 2006 and 2007, Sadr’s Mahdi Army was seen as responsible for summary execution of thousands of Sunnis in the capital Baghdad and other areas.
“A question for the local government [in Kirkuk] is will it allow Sunni Arabs to carry out a similar (military) parade,” says Massoud Zangana, a former human rights activist turned businessman, who alleges he has been threatened with death by Shia armed groups. “The number of Sunni Arabs is more than the Shia in this city.”
Zangana owns a television channel called Taghyir – Arabic for ‘Change’ – that broadcasts from Amman, Jordan, which some Iraqis refer to as the “Revolution Channel” for its steady coverage of Sunni protests two years ago and of the current fight between Sunni militants and the Iraqi army.
Local media are also buzzing with reports that the central government in Baghdad has delivered a couple of arms’ shipments via the city’s airport to Shia militiamen here.
Officials in Kirkuk or Baghdad have not confirmed those reports.
“Giving weapons to official security forces is okay but providing arms to one side to fight the others is wrong,” says Mohammed Khalil Joburi, a Sunni Arab member of the Kirkuk Provincial Council, wishing that the news of arm deliveries is not true.
The local government in Kirkuk is run by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), a major Kurdish party that has close relationship with Iran. Many in the local media speculate that the PUK-controlled administration in Kirkuk had possibly agreed to the military display by Shia groups under pressure from Iraq’s powerful eastern neighbour, Iran.
Despite the appearance of relative calm, tensions are high in Kirkuk and security forces are visible throughout the city.
By appearing to favour Shia armed elements, Kurds might risk alienating the local Sunni Arabs and potentially push them toward cooperation with ISIS and other militant Sunni factions.
In Bashir, a village in southern Kirkuk populated by Shia Turkmen, local Shia militias and Kurdish Peshmerga forces have clashed with ISIS and other Sunni militant groups.
In the western part of the province around Hawija district, the Kurdish Peshmerga have repeatedly fought against ISIS and its local allies.
Kirkuk has not been spared suicide attacks, a trademark of ISIS and jihadist groups.
On June 25, a suicide attack killed at least five people and injured around two dozen others.
The challenge before Kurds who effectively rule most parts of the province is to prevent a spillover of violence and sectarian divisions in other parts of the country into Kirkuk.
Kurds view Kirkuk as part of their homeland, Kurdistan, and hope they can maintain their current military and political dominance in the city.
In the latest Iraqi parliamentary elections in April, Kurds won eight out of the 12 parliamentary seats allocated to the province.
Kirkuk’s vast oil fields have the capacity to produce around half a million barrels of oil per day and Kurds consider Kirkuk central to their aspirations to build an independent state.
Massoud Barzani, President of the Kurdistan Region, recently said that he will deploy as many forces as needed to maintain Kurdish control of the contested province.
On June 30, Barzani asked the head of United Nations Mission to Iraq to organise a referendum in which Kirkuk’s residents can decide whether they want to be part of the Kurdistan Region.
The official territory of the Kurdistan Region includes Erbil, Sulaimaniya and Dohuk provinces.
But after the Iraqi military’s recent defeat at the hand of ISIS-led Sunni militant groups, Kurds have expanded their control over large parts of the neighbouring Kirkuk, Nineveh, Diyala and Salahaddin provinces.
Now in charge of Kirkuk, the challenge for Kurds is walking a fine line between Shia and Sunni, Arab and Turkmen populations to maintain order in the medium and long term.
In a deeply-divided city facing the threat of jihadists close by, Kirkuk’s Shia and Sunni leaders who spoke to IPS appeared to have no objection to Peshmerga’s control of Kirkuk, at least in the short term.
In the heart of the city’s historic citadel, Rashid and his young men are well aware of the difficult task lying ahead. “We are here to protect all groups … We don’t wish to fight but this area is surrounded by ISIS and all sorts of other groups,” says Rashid.
“We don’t know what their goal is, but we are on alert here.”
*This article was first published by IPS News and was reprinted here with permission.
Photo: Kurdish Peshmerga fighters Credit: Kurdistan4All/public domain
]]>by Wayne White
Coverage of the Iraqi crisis from the media to Capitol Hill has been characterized by scary worst-case scenarios and exaggerations of the military capabilities of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Yet this Islamic extremist group has probably already seized most of the important Iraqi real estate it [...]]]>
by Wayne White
Coverage of the Iraqi crisis from the media to Capitol Hill has been characterized by scary worst-case scenarios and exaggerations of the military capabilities of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Yet this Islamic extremist group has probably already seized most of the important Iraqi real estate it is going to get. It is vital for the US to avoid simply doing Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s sectarian dirty work for him and returning Iraq to its previously miserably unbalanced status quo. Under the circumstances, however, avoiding that misstep poses daunting challenges.
The successes of ISIS in Iraq do represent a dicey problem for Iraqi authorities in Baghdad and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in the north. ISIS now commands the majority of Iraq’s Sunni Arab heartland as well as a large swathe of mixed ethno-sectarian areas, albeit those with substantial Sunni Arab populations. However, very little territory remains outside ISIS’ current holdings where a Sunni Arab extremist movement would be received with open arms or even passive resignation.
Collapse of dysfunctional army units
Admittedly, the performance of Iraqi Army units assigned to Sunni Arab areas like Mosul has been dismal. Retreating in the face of a few thousand lightly armed militants largely without a fight would have been bad enough. However, the loss of all cohesion, mass desertion, and the abandonment of valuable armaments, ammunition, and equipment compounded the collapse and gave additional advantages to ISIS.
These events revealed just how badly crippling internal problems have undermined the Iraqi Army. This has been especially so since Iraq’s dominant Shia establishment made it effectively impossible for American military advisors and trainers to remain in Iraq beyond the US withdrawal in 2011.
Throughout the ranks, the army has suffered from a high degree of politicized, sectarian, or bribe-generated appointments and promotions, debilitating corruption, and a severe lack of intelligence concerning Sunni Arab areas of the country. Its political favoritism and corruption appear to exceed what prevailed during the Saddam Hussein era. The units that collapsed apparently had no clue ISIS was about to attack Mosul. There have also been suggestions that self-serving unit commanders were more concerned about their personal safety than rallying their troops.
Tamping down the panic
As I noted on June 11, Maliki and his cronies woefully underestimated Sunni Arab tolerance for and potential pushback against years of exclusion and abuse. Now, however, a stunned and reeling Iraqi government probably is overestimating ISIS. Correspondingly, in the wake of its run of unexpectedly easy successes, ISIS might well be returning the favor by underestimating Iraqi Army units and militias in Baghdad.
In any upcoming fighting in Baghdad and the south, ISIS would be far more vastly outnumbered than it was in Mosul and likely to encounter armed Shia elements mustering quite a bit of fanaticism of their own. Only one portion of the army was routed in the north; a city many times the size of Mosul would be a huge mouthful for so small a force of ISIS fighters; and Iranian combatants could very well join the fight.
Moreover, despite Senator Lindsey Graham’s comment yesterday that the US “should have discussions with Iran” about the Iraq crisis, this may be irrelevant. Whether talks occur or not, Tehran, already closely aligned with the present Iraqi government, will likely act as it sees fit in Iraq to serve Iranian interests — regardless of US views on the matter.
Finally, if, as expected, the US commences air strikes, ISIS’ task of moving farther south would be that much more daunting. Near the top of the target list of those anticipated US air (and drone) strikes should be major pieces of military equipment seized by ISIS in the north. That would prevent ISIS from deploying them over the border into Syria (already in progress) or putting them to use in its upcoming clashes with Iraqi government forces.
Homeland imperiled by ISIS gains?
Those harping on ISIS’ “threat to the Homeland” are exaggerating that aspect of the problem. Since adopting the ISIS moniker in April 2013, and during operations by its antecedents since January 2012 in Syria (and going back 10 years in Iraq), ISIS has posed little threat to US interests outside Syria and Iraq.
Of late, its efforts have been consumed by its struggle to overthrow the Assad regime in Syria, combat moderate and other Islamist rebel rivals in Syria, and recently moving against the Iraqi government. There is a threat to the US to consider, but that is likely to emerge further down the line (but, ironically, could be heightened by US air strikes against ISIS in defense of Maliki & Co.)
One potential direct threat to the US that has also existed as part of the Syrian rebellion since 2012 is that of numerous US and other Western European citizens fighting with ISIS and the extremist al-Nusra Front. The prospect of those militants entering the US at some point (US visa requirements are typically waived for Western Europeans) does pose a threat. That threat is magnified by the difficulty Western intelligence and law enforcement agencies have had in gathering precise data on the identities of such individuals.
Trying to harness the Maliki government
Extracting substantial change in the Iraqi government’s abusive behavior toward its Sunni Arab community poses an extremely tough challenge for US policymakers. Holding back US air and other military support to secure this agreement could render getting assurances the easiest part of this endeavor.
If substantial portions of Sunni Arab Iraq were recovered from ISIS, it is difficult to envision how Iraqi government compliance with a more tolerant policy could be monitored reliably. And accountability is critical; Maliki has broken such pledges before. In fact, it would be best all-round if Maliki could be dumped as prime minister in the ongoing negotiations to form Iraq’s post-election government, but there are no indications that his Shia backers would cooperate.
Further complicating this crucial issue, the upcoming mainly sectarian face-off will inevitably result in atrocities on both sides. Already, ISIS has claimed and videoed its execution of large numbers of captured Iraqi soldiers, inflaming the atmosphere. The recruitment of Shia volunteers (with many hardened Shia militiamen undoubtedly among them) along with the possible employment of elite Quds Force cadres from Iran has also been reducing Baghdad’s control over the behavior of its own combatants.
Atrocities will undermine the ability of even a well-intentioned government in fielding a policy of communal toleration. Even worse, instead of a fast-paced government campaign to drive ISIS out of most of its Iraqi holdings, portions of the coming fight might resemble the more prolonged and grueling 2003-08 US-Iraqi struggle against the Sunni Arab insurgency and ruthless Shia militias.
Sorting out a workable way to thread this complex needle toward a new Iraqi national sectarian compact should be as high a priority for the Obama administration as military measures meant to defeat ISIS. The international community could perhaps be drawn into the task of monitoring Baghdad’s compliance in the coming years. Still, preventing a return to pre-crisis sectarian hostility is likely to be as difficult as the immediate military task of containing and rolling back ISIS — if not more.
This article was first published by LobeLog and was reprinted here with permission.
Photo: Carry weapons and waving Iraqi flags, volunteers join the Iraqi army to fight militants from the radical Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in eastern Baghdad June 15, 2014.
]]>by Wayne White
The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or ISIS) has stunned Baghdad by overrunning most of Iraq’s second largest city in the north, Mosul. Yet, the Sunni Arab extremist group – in its zeal for a quick victory — may have overplayed its hand, sharply increasing the possibility of other [...]]]>
by Wayne White
The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or ISIS) has stunned Baghdad by overrunning most of Iraq’s second largest city in the north, Mosul. Yet, the Sunni Arab extremist group – in its zeal for a quick victory — may have overplayed its hand, sharply increasing the possibility of other parties entering the fray against it.
Reacting to the ongoing successes of Sunni Arab jihadists in Iraq, many wonder how the situation could have gotten this bad. By contrast, for several years now, I’ve been asking: “Why has it taken so long for Sunni Arabs to go on the warpath again?” Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, ruthlessly serving his narrow sectarian agenda, has made clear that Iraq’s Sunni Arab community has little stake in his Shi’a dominated Iraq. His policies have made Sunni Arab push-back (in essence a revival of the post-2003 war insurgency) inevitable. Although a way out of this crisis is unclear, Maliki is not part of the solution.
The rising ISIL threat
Since ISIL wrested Fallujah and parts of Ramadi from Iraqi government control in early January, Maliki’s security forces have failed to eliminate or even contain the militants. With its expansive attacks into other areas of Iraq’s Sunni Arab heartland, ISIL is now in a position to menace the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) enclave to the east, as well as locales farther south along Iraq’s central lines of communication, such as Samarra, Tikrit, and the key oil refining center of Baiji.
This dangerous challenge mounted by ISIL and some allied Sunni Arab tribal elements is not surprising. ISIL’s fortunes have waned in Syria in the face of Assad regime counterattacks and intense clashes with more moderate Syrian rebels. That’s why ISIL is pursuing potentially more fruitful opportunities across the border in a broad sweep of the predominantly Sunni Arab Iraqi territory adjoining Syria. The Sunni Arab minority there has grown steadily more embittered over its treatment by Maliki & his governments. Indeed, for over two years now, violent Sunni Arab resistance in Iraq (much of it having little to do with ISIL) has rebounded alarmingly, with nearly 9,000 Iraqis killed, mostly in violence ascribed to attacks by such militants, in 2013.
Maliki the enabler
Maliki and his hardline Shi’a cohorts prepared the ground for ISIL and other Sunni Arab jihadists. Even with Iraq on the brink of civil war and with sectarian cleansing tearing greater Baghdad apart in 2006-07, Maliki vigorously opposed the US deal with most Sunni Arab insurgents that took them out of the fight against the Coalition and turned them into allies against al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). This was the so-called “Sunni Arab Awakening”.
Worse still, in late 2008, Maliki actually tried to destroy an Awakening unit working with US forces west of Baghdad by sending Iraqi troops to attack them. US troops blocked the attack by placing themselves between their new Sunni Arab allies and Iraqi troops. On another occasion, Maliki arrested relatives of an Awakening leader in an attempt to force the latter’s surrender. Eventually, Maliki did agree, albeit reluctantly and only partially, to pay Awakening cadres and incorporate a limited number of them into the Iraqi security forces.
Maliki would later fall short of even those limited commitments, reneging on commitments to Awakening personnel and using special Iraqi security units operating under his own personal orders to arrest or assassinate Awakening leaders. Quite a few of those Sunni Arab prisoners subsequently disappeared into extrajudicial prisons run by Maliki and his cronies (just one of the abuses of power in which Maliki has engaged in recent years).
Maliki’s refusal to capitalize on Sunni Arab assistance brokered by the US was a missed opportunity of vast importance. Back in 2007-08, most Sunni Arabs were profoundly war weary after several years of bruising combat with US forces. As a result, a community previously determined to resist US forces and a government dominated by Iraqi Shi’a and Kurds, reluctantly accepted new realities. In exchange for ending their resistance and helping to battle AQI, Sunni Arabs expected a fair share of Iraq’s political pie, more government employment, and an appropriate slice of the country’s revenues. This, however, was not to be.
Securing a freer hand to deal with Iraq’s Sunni Arabs more harshly appears to have been one reason Maliki and his Iraqi allies backed away from the immunity agreement needed to allow a limited US military presence to remain behind after the American withdrawal. Both the Bush and Obama administrations tried and failed to secure this. Then, within 48 hours of the departure of the last US troops in mid-December 2011, Maliki had an arrest warrant issued against Iraq’s most senior Sunni Arab official, Deputy Prime Minister Tariq al-Hashemi, charging him with alleged involvement in “terrorism.”
Sunni Arab advantages
Following ISIL’s startling triumph in Mosul, many are asking why US training of Iraq’s security forces was not more effective. Yet, Maliki’s government cut short the hands-on, in-country work on the part of US advisors intended to complete that training — a major factor in the disappointing performance of government forces in Mosul. Another reason for the panic among Iraqi police and soldiers is rather sobering: in early fighting against ISIL and other jihadists by the Syrian Army, even elite, experienced Syrian units buckled in the face of such fanatical combatants.
Maliki also woefully underestimated Iraq’s Sunni Arabs (the same mistake made by the Bush administration in 2003 when it cast aside the Sunni Arab establishment and initially downplayed the insurgency). The challenge facing Iraqi government forces now is extremely dangerous: in heavy fighting during 2003-06, even US forces could not crush the post-invasion Sunni Arab insurgency.
The Sunni Arab minority had held sway over Iraq, politically and militarily, not only since independence in 1932 until Saddam Hussein’s fall, but far earlier during Iraq’s time as a province of the Sunni Ottoman Empire. So until Saddam was ousted, Sunni Arabs comprised most of the Iraqi officer corps and the army’s most elite formations. More broadly, as a ruling class, enhanced Sunni Arab access to wealth and education enabled them to dominate key professional fields and governance. Although out of power now, this community still represents a potent force, especially with its back to the wall in the face of grievances and exclusion.
Maliki needs to go
After years of spurning Sunni Arab cooperation, hounding Sunni Arabs out of governance, and turning Sunni Arabs into 2nd class citizens, Maliki is part of the problem, not the solution. Various pundits are urging that he make an “Awakening” like deal with Sunni Arab tribes, but his longstanding hostility toward the Sunni Arab community has left him badly discredited.
In the April 30 Iraqi parliamentary elections, Maliki made a strong showing, so a 3rd term as prime minister seems certain. Yet he was over 70 seats short of a majority, and has not yet succeeded in pulling together a coalition government.
In the current crisis, the largely Shi’a parties Maliki has partnered with in the past may rally around him instinctively. There is also, ironically, a misperception among many within Iraq’s majority Shi’a community that Maliki is the only reliable bulwark against Sunni Arab violence (despite his leading role in feeding it). By contrast, in recent years more savvy Kurdish leaders became increasingly concerned over Maliki’s polarizing policies — including problems with the Kurds over oil exports and territory.
Enter Iran?
The burning question now is: what can be done to take back ISIL’s gains. In response to ISIL’s seizure of Fallujah, the Obama administration provided drones, Hellfire air-to-ground missiles, stepped up delivery of combat aircraft, and additional intelligence. Clearly, that was not nearly enough. What is needed most at this point, with the Iraq Army sagging, are additional and more reliable “boots on the ground.” This, however, appears unlikely to happen in terms of the US or its most capable allies.
There is another possibility: Iranian intervention. Maliki’s government and the two dominant Kurdish militias in the KRG have close ties to Iran. While the US and other Western states have been concerned about Iranian influence in Iraq, ISIL’s gains have now alarmed Tehran. Just today, Iranian officials reflected this deep concern and called for the international community to address the crisis. The foreign ministry also indicated Iran’s willingness to assist Iraq in confronting “terrorism.”
In 1996, one Kurdish militia requested and received robust Iranian Revolutionary Guard intervention to help repel its leading rival. If ISIL and affiliated Sunni Arab combatants move against the KRG, or continue their advance south toward Baghdad advance, the KRG, Maliki, or both might feel compelled to request the commitment of Iranian ground forces.
This article was first published by LobeLog.
Photo: An undated image posted on a militant website in January shows fighters from the extremist Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIL, marching in Raqqa, Syria.