The end of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) summit in Tehran has been an occasion for pundits on all sides to engage in post-game spin. In Iran, the spin began right in the middle of the summit when Iranian television mistranslated — read lied about — Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi’s words to present his position on Syria as not that different from Iran’s. Once the summit was over Hossein Shariatmadari of Kayhan, whose editorials usually give a lesson to hardliners regarding how to frame an argument, didn’t repeat the lie regarding Syria. But he put new words in Morsi’s mouth and attempted to convince his readers that Morsi’s stance regarding Syria so contradict his positions on Palestine, Egypt’s ability to be a “strategic ally” to Iran, and “the necessity to combat Israel and support the resistance axis”, that Morsi will soon change his mind. “In the Tehran summit, Mr. Morsi announced Egypt’s new identity and this new announced identity is not in line with support for the opposition in Syria [particularly] alongside America, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. For sure Morsi’s position will change in the future,” Shariatmadari ended his column confidently.
Outside Iran, the urge to frame the summit has taken a different form. Iran’s relationship to the West is after all a win-or-lose game not only in the current Iranian leadership’s mind. So Morsi’s support for the Syrian opposition, Ban Ki-moon’s criticism of Iran’s non-compliance with UN Security Council resolutions regarding its nuclear program, and its human records, are interpreted as a defeating blow to Iran’s efforts to showcase itself as a country that it is not isolated. Even though Morsi had already called for Syrian regime change at the meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in Jeddah two weeks earlier (where Iran cast the only vote against Syria’s expulsion), somehow his stating of an already stated position in support of Syria’s opposition — with no mention of Iranian, Russian, or Chinese support for Bashar Assad — turns into the “slamming” of Iran and even more ambitiously, a diplomatic disaster as far as the whole summit goes, thereby underlining Iran’s isolation.
What few are willing to acknowledge is that post-event spin is usually geared towards different audiences. Even more likely is the fact that such spin is geared towards the already converted. Those expecting failure got one. Those hoping for a statement regarding Iran’s non-isolation also received a decent amount from global participants and more importantly, from their point of view, a fairly strong statement of support by NAM for Iran’s nuclear program.
For those of us less interested in keeping score, the summit nevertheless provided a few interesting highlights and/or revealing points regarding Iran’s external relations and domestic politics. Let me mention three.
- 1. Given Iran’s geographic location and resources, it is simply not good business for many countries in the neighborhood to isolate Iran. And at least from the looks of things, the sanctions regime imposed by the West is being perceived as an opportunity by some countries. Nothing illustrates this better than Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Tehran. Tellingly, he and the large contingent who came with him were met at the airport by Iran’s Economy Minister, Shamseddin Hosseini. And before embarking on his 4-day visit, his staff made clear that bilateral economic relations were on his mind.
Iran and India currently have about $15 billion worth of trade with each other but the balance is heavily in favor of Iran to the tune of more than 4 to 1 and that has turned into a real issue because of sanctions imposed by the United States and European Union on financial transactions between the two countries. Getting paid in Rupees for 45 percent of its exports to India has been a partial solution but India is hoping to increase its export of agricultural goods as well as machinery as another alternative. In other words, both countries continue to work hard to find ways to get around sanctions because it’s worth it. This does not mean that sanctions are not bad for Iran or that they are not constraining Iran’s optimal use of its resources. The current opportunity costs of the sanctions regime are huge for Iran. But Iran’s location and resources are countervailing forces that cannot be ignored. Furthermore, there are quite a few countries that see the sanctions regime as an opportunity. This dynamic will likely continue to inspire US efforts to openly attempt to impose new ways of restricting Iran’s international trade while other countries openly collude with Iran to find ways to get around those attempts.
2. International engagement is good for Iran. As far as I am concerned, the most important lesson of Ki-Moon and Morsi’s visit lies in the value of engaging Iran directly. Many of those who are now touting Ki-moon’s and Morsi’s words of wisdom in Tehran should remind themselves that they tried hard to prevent these folks from going there. That their words and actions have created a conversation in Iran is a good thing made possible by the Iranian desire not to appear, nor be, isolated. Ki-moon in no uncertain terms identified his purpose in his speech at the Foreign Ministry’s School of International Relations, “to highlight the cost of Iran’s current trajectory, both at home and in the international arena.” He also made the case that ‟Any country at odds with the international community is one that denies itself much-needed investment and finds itself isolated from the thrust of common progress.” Ki-moon’s skillful focus on the basic contradiction in Iran’s foreign policy — wanting to be a respected member of the international community while loudly and unskillfully challenging some of the established codes of conduct of that same international community — is a lesson for all.
3. The NAM summit was a showcase for the outside world with really no domestic implications, but it did tell us something about the current shape of Iranian politics. It told us that the Leader Ayatollah Khamenei now sees himself in charge of even implementing Iran’s foreign policy and not just setting the “general direction of the country” and letting the president engage in the task of executing these general directives as delineated by the Islamic Republic’s Constitution.
Even the appearances were awkward. Khamenei entered the summit room first followed by former president and current chair of the Expediency Council, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who is also an unelected official. Iran’s current president followed next and was mostly treated as a non-person by the Iranian media. Comparing this to the last major international meeting in Iran, which was the meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in December 1997, is telling. Fresh from being popularly elected, Mohammad Khatami took charge of the meeting and Khamenei had almost no presence. Furthermore, as a popularly elected president, Khatami had no need for underlings to shower him with accolades regarding how incredibly insightful and important he is. There was no need to have someone like former foreign minister and current senior advisor Ali Akbar Velayati to lie to the Iranian audience that Ki-moon, in a private meeting with Khamenei, identified him not only as the leader of Iran but also as “the leader of the Islamic world.” How incredibly ironic that the man who routinely speaks in the name of the inalienable rights of the Iranian people in the face of Western hostility now has to rely on ingratiating promoters who try to elevate his international role with the hope of enhancing his domestic standing.
It must be considered pure fortuity for the Islamic Republic of Iran that the decision to hold the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) summit in Tehran was made three years ago in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt. Although the previous NAM summit took place shortly after Iran’s contested 2009 presidential election, it’s unlikely that anyone [...]]]>
It must be considered pure fortuity for the Islamic Republic of Iran that the decision to hold the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) summit in Tehran was made three years ago in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt. Although the previous NAM summit took place shortly after Iran’s contested 2009 presidential election, it’s unlikely that anyone could have predicted the significance that the next summit would have for Iran in light of the Obama’s administration’s systematic effort to tighten the sanctions regime and the changes in the region.
The extraordinary effort put into the summit – it will include 5 days of holiday for government workers in Tehran along with 30 extra liters of rationed gasoline, perhaps as an encouragement for people to take a vacation away from the capital city – is intended to showcase Iran’s global role and offer concrete evidence that the United States-led initiative to isolate Iran has failed.
This is not my interpretation. It is a point loudly made by various officials in Iran. For instance, Ezatollah Zarghami, the head of Iran’s radio and television, called the summit “a maneuver against arrogance… giving the message that the nation of Iran can play a role in global equations irrespective of the power of global arrogance.”
The summit is being used to make a visually forceful case that it is not the “global community” that has problems with the Islamic Republic, as repeatedly asserted by US officials, but only a US-led and pressured coalition of countries. And, ironically, the Obama administration is conceding that point by identifying Tehran as a “strange and inappropriate choice” for the summit while trying to dissuade various leaders from attending the meeting.
According to Ali Saeedlou, Iran’s vice president and chair of the secretariat for the summit, 150 delegations, including from 20 international organizations, will participate. Saeedlou said Tehran is prepared to host 7,000 delegates with plans for them to visit “industrial plans, and cultural and historical venues.” India’s delegation alone will include 250 people and will be led by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.
To be sure, whether this showcasing of Iran’s non-isolation will strengthen Iran’s hand and actually have an impact in denting the escalating US-imposed sanctions regime is an entirely different matter. NAM has already issued several statements in support of Iran’s peaceful nuclear program and there is not much else that it can or will do in Tehran beyond confirming its past positions.
There is potential for a degree of unpleasantness regarding Syria, which will have representation in the summit. According to IRNA, a news agency close to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, there is even debate in Iran about whether President Bashar al-Assad should attend. But Assad’s attendance is highly unlikely and chances are that a rather bland statement calling for regional cooperation on resolving the Syrian imbroglio will satisfy the attendees. IRNA has already conceded that inclusion of support for Syria’s sovereignty as a member of NAM in the Summit’s final statement is unlikely.
Probably the most important aspect of the summit is Egyptian president Mohammad Morsi’s decision to attend. But this decision is more about Egypt’s new foreign policy direction than Iran’s non-isolation. The Egyptian president is the current secretary general of the Nonaligned Movement and had he not gone to Iran to hand over NAM’s rotating leadership, his move would have been seen as an insult to NAM as well as a continuation of Egypt’s US-dependent foreign policy under the ousted Hosni Mubarak.
And, if Egypt and Iran do eventually decide to re-establish full diplomatic relations, that decision will not be based on what happens at the summit; it will result after the time and desire for resuming diplomatic ties has finally come in both countries. In Iran, the desire and concerted effort to elevate relations with Egypt has existed since Mohammad Khatami’s presidency and the last vestiges of opposition have vanished with the political change in Egypt. Meanwhile, the exchange of ambassadors between the two countries is effectively the least expensive way for Egypt to announce its new independent foreign policy. Not having ambassadorial relations with Iran when every other Arab country including Saudi Arabia does, simply doesn’t make sense anymore and even the US must understand this.
Ambassadorial-level relations do not necessarily mean friendly relations – as the current state of Iran-Saudi relations show. And the extent to which Cairo will be willing to deepen relations with Tehran will depend on, and in all likelihood be limited by, the balance of power in Egypt’s domestic politics as well as the country’s relations with the US and other regional powers.
Still, depending on how well organized the summit turns out to be, Tehran will try to garner as much publicity as possible for a show staged essentially for an audience that resides outside of Iran.
As to the audience inside Iran, once the summit is over, it will continue to be divided and weighed down with the reality of severe economic challenges and a broken and paranoid political system that still does not know what to do with a large number of disaffected citizens and cannot offer an explanation for why a former prime minister (and his spouse) and a former speaker of the Parliament continue to be incarcerated without charge.
The good news for this audience though is the persistence of its wry sense of humor. Making fun of the five-day holiday that the government is giving Tehranis, a joke is going around that during the past weekend 30 people have drowned in the Caspian Sea and 90 people died in car crashes. The punch line? “If Israel waits, a whole bunch of us will just pass away during the summit holidays.”
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