A recent incident reminded me of the strong emotions that underlie thinking about Iran by some officials and ex-officials in the United States and parts of Europe.

In this instance, an academic who had questionedwhether Iran’s safeguards agreement gives the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) a right to demand that Iran [...]]]> via Lobe Log

A recent incident reminded me of the strong emotions that underlie thinking about Iran by some officials and ex-officials in the United States and parts of Europe.

In this instance, an academic who had questionedwhether Iran’s safeguards agreement gives the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) a right to demand that Iran account for activities not involving nuclear material (a valid question, in my view) was accused of being “the Ayatollah’s lawyer.”

I have come across other instances in which experts declining to assume the worst of Iran’s nuclear intentions have been labelled “apologists” and accused of giving comfort to the enemy.

These incidents and experiences when I was still in active service, suggest to me the existence of a faction that considers Iran a hostile state and sees Iran’s nuclear activities as a threat to national defense.

Is it reasonable to perceive Iran’s nuclear activities as a threat to national defense? Since the end of 2007, the US intelligence community has told us that we cannot assume that Iran’s leaders are determined to acquire nuclear weapons. Other intelligence communities, including Israel’s, appear to have come around to the same view.

Iran’s nuclear research has allowed them to master a technology – enrichment – that can be used for both civil and military purposes, and they possess enough nuclear material to make dozens of nuclear weapons. But one cannot infer from this that they intend to acquire nuclear weapons and are therefore a threat. One can only infer that they have the potential to acquire weapons and are therefore a potential threat – in a world full of potential threats.

Is it reasonable to perceive Iran as hostile to the US and Europe? Iran’s interests and views diverge from ours at many points. Iran believes it was a mistake to tolerate the creation of an exclusively Jewish state in the Levant; we do not. Iran supports the right of Lebanese Shi’a to resort to force in self-defense; we consider Hezbollah terrorists. Iran has longstanding ties to the Syrian government; our sympathies are with the Syrian opposition. Iran is at odds with Saudi Arabia in Iraq and the Yemen; the Saudis are our friends. And so on.

But to be on opposite sides of a dispute taking place on neutral ground, so to speak, is not the same thing as being in a state of hostility. Nations can have conflicting interests and opposing views without being enemies. It happens all the time.

Iran’s official security doctrines imply a defensive, not an offensive orientation. Contacts with Iranian officials suggest that Iran’s leaders find political advantage in demonizing certain Western countries but are not bent on attacking them. If Western intelligence agencies are aware of Iranian plans to start a war against the US, Europe or Israel, it is surprising that this intelligence has not been leaked.

So perhaps one can legitimately say that the case for seeing Iran as an enemy and as a threat to our homelands is unproven.

So what? Perhaps it is unreasonable to see Iran in these terms, but does that matter? Yes, because it colors the Western approach to the nuclear problem. It leads us to place undue weight on the application of pressure to induce Iran to submit to our wishes; to misrepresent evidence to justify additional pressure; and to advance contentious interpretations of Iran’s safeguards agreement, the IAEA Statute, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the UN Charter, to prejudice the international community against Iran and justify measures that harm Iran.

Pressure can of course play a useful role in dispute resolution. It can be necessary. But the dose has to be right. Too much pressure can be counter-productive, stimulating defiance and a determination to concede nothing. Over-reliance on pressure can turn policy into a one-trick pony.

Misrepresenting evidence has been a recurrent feature of the last ten years. In 2002, for instance, we claimed that Iran had no intention of declaring the Natanz enrichment plant because no declaration had been made before construction began; yet at that time Iran was only obliged to declare plants 180 days before the introduction of nuclear material. Last year, we claimed the IAEA had found evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapons programme; yet the evidence, still unconfirmed, was of research into how to make nuclear weapons, not of the construction of weapons.

As for contentious interpretations, they are too numerous to list. One of the most egregious, though, is the claim that Iran may not enrich because it is in non-compliance with the NPT. Not only would an impartial court (if such existed) be challenged to determine that Iran has been in NPT non-compliance since its pre-2004 safeguards failures were corrected; but the NPT is without provision for the forfeiting of rights, and in the 2003-5 period the Europeans fully accepted that Iran’s suspension of enrichment was a voluntary confidence-building measure, not an obligation, as did the IAEA Board of Governors.

A more dispassionate approach would allow us to see the Iranian nuclear problem more clearly, as an instance of past non-compliance with NPT safeguards obligations that has generated distrust in Iran’s nuclear intentions. The problem can be resolved by giving Iran an opportunity to rebuild confidence in its intentions, particularly in its future resolve to respect the NPT.

If the US and parts of Europe cannot bring themselves to take a dispassionate view, they should step aside and allow the lead to pass to states which can be dispassionate. NPT compliance is the business of all 189 states that are NPT parties; it ought not to be the preserve of a handful of states that have axes to grind, still less of a state – Israel – that is not even a party to the NPT.

The Arms Control Association’s Greg Thielmann notes that there was a decrease in Iran’s stockpile of 20 percent-enriched uranium, as indicated by the latest International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) report about Iran’s nuclear program, but did you know that? The P5+1 has heavily focused on Iran’s highly-enriched stockpile [...]]]> via Lobe Log

The Arms Control Association’s Greg Thielmann notes that there was a decrease in Iran’s stockpile of 20 percent-enriched uranium, as indicated by the latest International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) report about Iran’s nuclear program, but did you know that? The P5+1 has heavily focused on Iran’s highly-enriched stockpile because it poses “a much more rapid “breakout” option for Iran” and yet the reduction, as well as “the absence of evident progress by Iran on expanding the number of its advanced centrifuges in operation”, says Thielmann, has been under-reported in mainstream press:

The IAEA confirmed in January that Iran had begun producing 20 percent enriched uranium at the deep underground (and less vulnerable) facility at Fordow. Former IAEA Safeguards Department chief Olli Heinonen noted then that: “At current production rates, Iran can expect to have a stock of 20 percent enriched uranium of around 250 kg by the end of 2012…”

Yet, the IAEA’s latest report counted only 91.4 kg in the UF₆ stockpile at this level, lower than the 101 kg reported by the agency in May. This decrease is explained by Iran’s continuing withdrawal of 20 percent enriched UF₆ for conversion into U₃O₈ in the form of metallic fuel plates for use in the ageing Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), which makes medical isotopes.

In spite of the growth in the gross amount of 20% enriched uranium produced during the latest quarter, Iran was no closer to being able to achieve sufficient weapons grade uranium for a bomb. Importantly, uranium in the form of fuel plates cannot easily be converted back into the gaseous form required for further enrichment. Even though still enriched to 20 percent, it is essentially no longer available for diversion into a military program.

An equally important detail from the IAEA report is the absence of evident progress by Iran on expanding the number of its advanced centrifuges in operation. More advanced centrifuges could enrich much more efficiently than the older IR-1 model now installed at both the underground fuel enrichment facilities at Fordow and Natanz. The more advanced IR-2 and IR-4 centrifuges are still limited to the three cascades that have been in operation for some time at the above-ground Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz.

During this 1-hour discussion on bloggingheads.tv, author Robert Wright goes through many of the most controversial issues about Iran with the best-selling Iranian-American author, Hooman Majd.

The founder of the Arms Control Law blog, Dan Joyner, provides a favorable examination of a proposal for ending the impasse over Iran’s nuclear program that was made by former lead Iranian negotiator Hossain Mousavian to David Ignatius this week:

This proposal includes some elements that I hadn’t heard of [...]]]> via Lobe Log

The founder of the Arms Control Law blog, Dan Joyner, provides a favorable examination of a proposal for ending the impasse over Iran’s nuclear program that was made by former lead Iranian negotiator Hossain Mousavian to David Ignatius this week:

This proposal includes some elements that I hadn’t heard of before, in particular the “zero stockpile” idea. Obviously, implementation of this idea would be complicated and certainly imperfect. But in principle it does seem to address some of the core concerns voiced by the P5+1, about Iran’s potential ability to “break out” into nuclear weapons manufacture.

It seems to me that this proposal essentially meets all of the reasonable interests and expressed desires of both sides. Under the proposal, Iran would get to keep its nuclear fuel cycle capability, and have its legal right to do so recognized. The P5+1 would get pretty much the maximum reasonable accountability and transparency of Iran’s fissile material stores, with a cap on enrichment at 5%, and the export out of Iran of all uranium enriched higher than 5%, as well as all excess 5% enriched uranium.  I think this is exactly the kind of proposal that should be seen as meeting the reasonable interests and requirements of both sides, and that provides a realistic and face-saving way for both sides to claim victory through compromise.

I think that if P5+1 negotiators are smart, they will see this kind of proposal as the best solution they are realistically likely to get to this impasse, and that they will embrace it as providing a way out of the crisis that avoids war.

I’m well aware that Israel, under its current leadership, is unlikely to be satisfied with such a resolution. But that should not stop the P5+1 from being reasonable and pragmatic, and therefore supporting such a resolution, in the interests of international peace and security.

via the Federation of American Scientists

I have been less than a week in the medium-sized city of Neishabour, Iran, visiting relatives, and I can see no sign of a country hunkering for intensifying sanctions and looming difficult times. Sidewalks are full of shoppers and people seem to go [...]]]> By Djavad Salehi-Isfahani

via the Federation of American Scientists

But all is not well, not by a long shot. The dollar has gone through the roof, food prices have skyrocketed, industrial production is down, and unemployment is rising. The oil embargo has cut into Iran’s oil revenues and financial sanctions have limited the country’s access to the global economy. Spot shortages and sharp price increases for key food items are already being felt across Iran. This provincial city was rocked on July 23 when hundreds marched down its main street protesting the shortage of chicken at the official price. There is no doubt that ordinary Iranians will pay a heavy price as sanctions intensify; the big question is how sanctions will influence Iran’s behavior in the international stage.

When sanctions were “smart” and aimed to make life difficult for Iran’s leaders, ordinary Iranians acted as disinterested bystanders. But now that sanctions aim to make life difficult for them, they will have to take sides. Or so goes the theory: put pressure on the people — “economic warfare,” as one conservative commentator told the New York Times — so they get their government to compromise.

Since this theory is about to be put to an extremely costly test, it is important to consider a few things before we commit to this path.

First, international sanctions only work when the population they are imposed on identifies with the objective of the sanctions. This is the big difference between the sanctions to end apartheid in South Africa and those to force Iran to abandon nuclear enrichment. Most Iranians are not all that invested in nuclear enrichment, one way or the other, but few would see stopping Iran’s enrichment as their cause.

Furthermore, history shows that, when threatened by sanctions, Iranians are unlikely to rise up against their own government. In 1952, a Western-imposed embargo on Iranian oil devastated Iran’s economy, but people tolerated the pain and stood with their government. It took a US-sponsored coup a year and a half later to topple the nationalist government and help Western powers achieve their objectives.

True, Iranians are more polarized today, especially after the rise of the Green movement following the controversial election of 2009. But it is a misreading of Iran’s political scene to believe that sanctions will revise or strengthen the protest movement. The opposite may be true. The Green movement was built on economic growth and an expanding middle class. Thanks to economic growth fueled by rising oil revenues, 40percent of Iranians have joined the middle class and the lower 40 percent aspire to the same. The economy has not been doing well lately, the average Iranian still enjoys a decent standard of living, has access to basic services, health, and education. Significantly, last year’s Human Development Report that ranks countries based on income, health, and education placed Iran above Turkey, which is the best performing country in the region.

Sanctions are slowly transforming Iran from a country with an expanding middle class and a rising private sector into a country with a shrinking middle class and private sector. Financial sanctions have placed private firms at a disadvantage relative to government-owned firms in making global transactions. Where the private sector withdraws, the state is often ready to move in.

More severe sanctions will go beyond hurting the private sector and threaten the living standards of the middle class. As basic services deteriorate, and the shortages and long lines that were common sights during the Iran-Iraq war reappear, the government will once again become not the source but the remedy to their problems.

The sanctions will do much to undermine the belief among Iranians about the benefits of the global economy. Such beliefs are what distinguish India from Pakistan. If there is hope for Egypt and Tunisia after the Arab Spring to become stable societies it is the belief in the benefits to their citizens of remaining connected to the global economy. The short-term gains from nuclear gamesmanship must balance the long-term cost of alienating the Iranian middle class.

Spreading faith in global cooperation used to be the White Man’s Burden, but no longer. Leaders in Brazil, China, India and Turkey have done a lot to persuade their people that working within the global economy is not a threat but an opportunity. Many leaders of the Islamic Republic have pushed a similar view. The year President Ahmadinejad took office, in 2005, the Fourth Development Plan he inherited was subtitled “In Conformity with the Global Economy.” These leaders believed in the Islamic Republic as a development state. They built infrastructure and schools and promoted family planning. Naturally, they do not want to gamble all they have achieved in a high stakes nuclear game. If by chance they are contemplating to revive the Islamic Republic as a development state, the world should help them succeed, not undermine their effort.

The 92nd Street Y and the Clarion Fund are having trouble getting the big names attached to their Iran war mongering panelon Nov. 7. First, New York Times Jerusalem Bureau Chief Ethan Bronner canceled his appearance on the panel after ThinkProgress called attention to Clarion’s history of [...]]]> Reposted by arrangement with Think Progress

The 92nd Street Y and the Clarion Fund are having trouble getting the big names attached to their Iran war mongering panelon Nov. 7. First, New York Times Jerusalem Bureau Chief Ethan Bronner canceled his appearance on the panel after ThinkProgress called attention to Clarion’s history of promoting anti-Muslim documentaries and the upcoming panel discussion’s role in promoting the organization’s bomb-Iran documentary,Iranium. ThinkProgress can now report that former U.N. Ambassador John Bolton, an outspoken proponent of militaryaction against Iran, has dropped off the panel as well.

But Bolton, who even appears in the film to warn about the existential threat of an Iranian nuclear weapon, was more concerned with his appearance fee than Clarion Fund’s track record of hyping Islamophobia. A spokesperson at the 92nd St. Y told ThinkProgress:

There were not the funds we originally thought there were to bring John Bolton up. We were very sorry that he couldn’t but that’s what happened.

A source close to John Bolton confirmed that Bolton was not attending the event because of the 92nd St. Y’s inability to pay for his appearance.

Obviously Bolton is free to charge a speaking fee, but given his dire warnings about Iran’s nuclear program and his prominent role in Iranium, it’s interesting that he would only appear at the event if his speaking fee was paid. In Iranium Bolton warns:

I think Iran has as a long-term objective dominance within the Islamic world and dominance in the Middle East as well as becoming a great power internationally. [...]

All American administrations have consistently said that they find [that] Iran pursuing nuclear weapons is unacceptable. But unfortunately, unacceptable turns out to really mean unacceptable. Since the various U.S. governments have not taken adequate steps to prevent Iran from achieving that unacceptable result.

Watch a Clarion Fund compilation of Bolton’s comments in Iranium:

Given Bolton’s prominent role in the film and his regular calls for harsher policies to confront Iran, it’s surprising that the matter of an appearance fee has led him to cancel an opportunity to promote Iranium and warn the country — the event will be simulcast in over 20 locations across the U.S. — about what he believes to be an existential threat. But apparently for Bolton, a notorious proponent of military action and use of force, the lack of a satisfactory speaking fee trumps the importance of warning the country about the threat of a nuclear Iran.

Los Angeles Times: Middle East analyst Trita Parsi warns us about the dangers of current U.S. policy towards Iran while explaining how an “accidental clash” in the Persian Gulf could take place in the meantime. According to Parsi, a desperate, weakened Iran [...]]]> News and views relevant to U.S.-Iran relations for Sept. 29-Oct. 3

Los Angeles Times: Middle East analyst Trita Parsi warns us about the dangers of current U.S. policy towards Iran while explaining how an “accidental clash” in the Persian Gulf could take place in the meantime. According to Parsi, a desperate, weakened Iran can be more dangerous than an emboldened one:

When the strength of a state declines, its desperation increases. Its statements grow more aggressive and fear — more than calculation — guides its actions. Much indicates that the Islamic Republic is experiencing this right now, partly because of regional developments but mainly due to the state’s internal weaknesses following the 2009 elections.

Wall Street Journal: Jay Solomon reports that “Iranian leaders have rebuffed” the idea of a direct military hotline between the U.S. and Iran to prevent accidental war between the two countries in the Persian Gulf. He adds that the “snubbing of the U.S. idea by Iranian naval and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps commanders” appears to “further undercut the political position of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.”

But there was never any direct proposal, was there? So can we really consider this a formal rejection? When both countries are talking at the air rather than to each other, what are we supposed to believe? The Islamic Republic is puffing up its chest, yes, but that’s not uncommon for a defiant country when it’s on the defensive. When some of the highest ranking members of the U.S. military are suggesting opening channels of communication, shouldn’t more effort be made to do so? As Reza Marashi argues, it’s time to “Turn Rhetoric Into Results.”

Jerusalem Post: A short article in the JPost has a big headline: “Israel fears Iran will copy its policy of nuclear ambiguity.” Nothing is stated about Israel’s secret nuclear arsenal, but the following statement is made about Iran’s nuclear enrichment capabilities even though it’s highly contested and certainly not a proven fact:

Iran has mastered the fuel enrichment stage of its nuclear program and has proven its ability to enrich uranium to as high as 20 percent. General assessments are that if it so decides, it would take Iran just a number of months for it to enrich a sufficient quantity of uranium to over the 90% that would be required for one nuclear device.

The few “months” time frame is a favorite for hawkish analysts, but that’s the lowest end of an estimate that reaches years. We are then informed that Israel guesses that Iran intends to “manufacture a number of nuclear devices” without any evidence provided other than a quote by an unnamed Israeli “senior official.”

Washington Post: Ernesto Londoño provides a fair assessment of Iran’s hosting of Taliban members at a Tehran conference in September:

“Iran considers itself a regional player with a legitimate stake in Afghanistan, and it doesn’t want to see progress that runs contrary to its political interests,” said Michael Semple, who has decades of experience in Afghanistan as a diplomat and a scholar. “If the price of Iran having a role in the next step is dealing with the Taliban, then they are prepared to do it.”

The State Department did not comment on the conference but Londoño importantly notes that

Administration officials have said that Iran has a legitimate interest in Afghanistan and a role to play in promoting regional stability. As part of its own efforts to promote Taliban reconciliation, the Obama administration has sent senior emissaries to all of the countries bordering Afghanistan, except Iran.