by Robert E. Hunter
Viewed from the aerie of the Oval Office, US policy in the Middle East is much more pluses than minuses, and there is much to commend that view. President Barack Obama has successfully navigated the Ship of State past the Scylla and Charybdis of Iraq and Afghanistan. He [...]]]>
by Robert E. Hunter
Viewed from the aerie of the Oval Office, US policy in the Middle East is much more pluses than minuses, and there is much to commend that view. President Barack Obama has successfully navigated the Ship of State past the Scylla and Charybdis of Iraq and Afghanistan. He has completed US troop withdrawals from the former and managed a process of buildup and then builddown in the latter, to the point that the American people have largely moved beyond the Afghanistan war — even though the same can’t be said for Afghanis or US war veterans.
Obama has also kept at bay the baying from many quarters, domestic and foreign (the latter primarily Saudi Arabia and Israel) for a military attack on Iran. He was lucky in last year’s Iranian elections, which brought to the presidency someone who, to borrow a phrase from Margaret Thatcher about Mikhail Gorbachev, is “a man we can do business with.” That judgment depends on the will of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, but so far he has been complaisant.
Despite the best efforts of the enemies of a workable agreement with Iran on its nuclear program, the talks with the so-called P5+1 (the U.S., Britain, France, China, and Russia plus Germany) appear to have a better than even chance to succeed in keeping Iran from getting the bomb. One thing does seem clear: Obama is determined not to go to war with Iran, unless the Islamic Republic initiates hostilities; and at least so long as there are decent prospects for diplomacy, he will flash a bright red light to Israel to refrain from its own military strikes.
Thus has Obama managed to repair much of the regional damage and difficulty to US interests that he inherited. He has prevailed despite a cacophony of domestic opposition, including from people who should know better about the best interests of the United States. That is a pretty good record.
But there are also “known unknowns,” to quote former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, in areas that are serious but — let us hope — less consequential. The US continues to use drones to counter both Al Qaeda and affiliates and the Taliban, especially in Pakistan. Despite outcries against this policy, which has led to civilian deaths, Obama has obviously judged that these risks and moral costs beat putting American “boots on the ground” or doing nothing while terrorists regroup.
Syria continues to fester, with major human suffering. But it is hard to see what the US can do without potentially making matters worse in the region (more on this below). It is also hard to say much positive about the talks between Israel and the Palestinians, on which Secretary of State John Kerry has invested so much time and effort.
It may be that mutual accusations and “unilateral acts” by Israel and the Palestine Authority are simply the inevitable part of Arab-Israeli negotiations before deals are struck. Or perhaps the talks will just break down (unlikely) or be stretched out, once again, into never-never land. But is that so bad — measured not by what would help the US in the region, but by what disasters might really ensue if serious results are not reached soon? We have been through this litany time and again.
Further, the Egyptian government is brutally unpalatable in treating its opponents. But it is standing firm on the 1979 linchpin treaty with Israel and cooperating with it in countering terrorists/insurgents in the Sinai Peninsula. From the point of view of realpolitik (the dominant if unworthy optic in the Middle East for almost a century), the Egyptian generals’ bad behavior can be tolerated by Washington.
But while President Obama can grade his regional record as positive — or at least acceptable — in terms of “what really matters” to the US, it is still full of those “unknown unknowns.” The Syrian situation, for one, is bedeviled by the fact that the Obama administration has yet to reveal a plan for Syria in the event that President Bashar Al-Assad is indeed deposed. During his recent visit to Riyadh, Obama reportedly promised Saudi King Abdullah that the US will increase support for non-terrorist rebels. That suits the Saudi objective of toppling a Shi’a (Alawite) minority regime in Syria and replacing it by one dominated by Sunnis. But the US does not appear to have assessed how to forestall continuing humanitarian calamity in post-Assad Syria, plus a spreading regional civil war between Sunnis and Shi’as, with further gains for Islamists terrorists. (There was no public indication that Obama told Abdullah, in respectful but “no uncertain terms” that Saudi Arabia must finally squelch support for terrorism in Syria and elsewhere that emanates from elements in the Kingdom.)
Meanwhile, Secretary Kerry’s heavy investment in brokering an Israel-Palestine agreement by this April 29th raised expectations about US influence. Particularly daunting is that the US has been asking Israel to negotiate on Palestine while Jerusalem worries about a possible Iranian “existential threat.” The Obama administration asking Israel to take fundamental decisions about Palestine at the same time as trusting the US on Iran is almost surely Mission Impossible.
One striking thing is that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s efforts to shape American domestic opinion on both the Iranian and Palestinian issues are being challenged in the United States more than ever before. A striking example was a manifesto issued this week by several prominent former US officials. It puts most responsibility — read “blame — on Israel for putting roadblocks in the way of the (never-ending) “peace process.”
The bottom line is that President Obama has got some of the truly big regional issues moving in a direction amenable to basic US interests — Iraq, Afghanistan, counter-terrorism, even Iran. That is a good 5-plus years’ work. But there are undercurrents and lacunae. First, the Arab Spring still has a long way to go before — if ever — it yields lasting positive results for the average person in the Arab world. These undercurrents are also impacting negatively on Turkey’s domestic and regional future. Second, there is the Syria conundrum, without a viable US game-plan for the future. Third, there is not enough interconnecting strategic tissue that will help the US avoid further difficulties and potential strife in the region, possibly sooner rather than later — e.g., in Pakistan and post-withdrawal Afghanistan. Fourth, US planning for long-term regional security, along with the necessary enlisting of support by European allies, is still falling short. This includes preparing for the possibility, however remote that may now seem, of Iran’s positive reintegration into the region.
Regrettably, “strategic thinking” on the region in Washington is at a premium. The Obama administration needs to understand that, while hopping from one Middle East/North Africa/Southwest Asia crisis to the next can provide some successes, that’s no long-term solution for enduring US interests in the region or for America’s reputation for competence and sense of purpose. And such reputation, extrapolated around the world, is a major component of US national power and influence.
Photo: US President Barack Obama meets with Saudi King Abdullah at Rawdat Khuraim, Saudi Arabia, Friday, March 28, 2014. Credit: AP/Pablo Martinez Monsivais
]]>by Charles Naas
Not even a month in office, Secretary of State John Kerry took his first official trip to the troubled Middle East and immediately felt first-hand the pressures and metamorphosing power relationships in the region. He began his visit with a meeting in Rome with countries that provide assistance to [...]]]>
by Charles Naas
Not even a month in office, Secretary of State John Kerry took his first official trip to the troubled Middle East and immediately felt first-hand the pressures and metamorphosing power relationships in the region. He began his visit with a meeting in Rome with countries that provide assistance to the various resistance forces in Syria. He pledged $60 million in aid for civilian purposes — to be administered by the United Nations — to help the millions of refugees who have been uprooted by the conflict. The Syrian tragedy hung like a pall over the session and Kerry was berated by representatives of the militias for the size of the offer and the continued policy of not sending modern arms. Nevertheless, the US has now taken one more small step toward greater participation with the anti-Assad groups, something the Administration has maneuvered to avoid.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a prickly fellow at any time, was openly rude about a few minute wait for Kerry and took the opportunity to lambaste Israel and Zionism while knowing full well how Kerry would react. He continued to pressure the US to become more involved in the Syrian situation and stressed that Turkey has accepted thousand of refugees and has been struck by errant munitions in the fighting near the border. Was Erdogan’s rudeness of great importance? Not really, but symbolically, yes. Meanwhile in Saudi Arabia, the assault on the Secretary regarding Syria was also in full force.
In Egypt, a number of the leaders of the democratic-secular opposition parties refused to meet with Kerry — or at least to meet him without publicity — and some got together privately. Of great importance? Again, no, but of symbolic significance, yes. Kerry released some aid for Egypt that had been held up but lectured President Mohamed Morsi on some matters. Auntie US can’t seem to refrain from telling others how to run their country.
In Almaty, Kazakhstan last week the nuclear talks with Iran continued after a nine month recess. The P5+1 nations (the US, England, France, Russia, China and Germany) for the first time eased ever so slightly their previous proposal. It was relatively “well received” by Iran. Tehran is torn internally about its relationship — or the absence of one — with the US but has persevered undeterred by the threats of bombing and the economic sanctions. It’s likely that Iran is following the old Russian KGB tactic of good guy versus bad guy by having mid-level officials speak openly about the desire for an improvement of ties with the US, followed by intransigence in the talks, refusing to meet directly with the head of our delegation and speeches by conservative religious leaders filled with condemnation for the West. Thus, the importance of the “well received” aspect of all this will not be known until the next full meeting in April. The key question is: will Iran reply with some movement of its own, particularly about the buried uranium enrichment plant in Fordow, or “pocket” the proposal and remain obdurate. The Iranian decision could determine whether future talks continue.
Just how or why has this willingness to defy the US come about? Not long ago in the twilight of the Cold War the United States’ position in the Middle East seemed unassailable. We had “lost” Iran but the Soviets had been unable to bring peace and control to Afghanistan . For a couple of decades Musharraf in Pakistan, the Shah in Iran, Sadat and Mubarak in Egypt and various conservative monarchies in Jordan and Saudi Arabia as well as in neighbouring countries in the Persian Gulf stood with us in the struggle to dominate an area with much of the world’s petroleum,vast wealth potential and strategic positioning location wise. There were of course disputes among these nations over clear differences in perceived national interest, but we were able to adjust to such matters.
The changes we are witnessing now have thus been percolating for more than a decade.The end of the Cold War finally permitted the Middle East to reassess what was important to it. The Arabs, Persians and many ethnic and sectarian groups within these populaces have lived through the Ottoman, French and British Empires, as well as through the clash of the Soviet and American pseudo empires.
A number of powerful indigenous forces have accordingly had the opportunity to express themselves. First, there has been nationalism, historical pride and an insistence on mutual respect, which has been inextricably interwoven with religion. Over a billion people from Indonesia to Morocco are involved in one way or another in the search for what Islam means to them and the glory of its past. Who would have thought the Muslim Brotherhood would be governing Egypt prior to the Arab Spring, which sent shockwaves through the world? Pakistan is being destroyed by the fight over Islam’s true meaning. Second, there’s sheer exuberance over the fact that at last the populaces of these countries can govern themselves and make their own mistakes. Finally, a bi-product of all this has been the freedom to attend to old divisive factors such as religious schisms of Sunni versus Shi’a and ethnic differences.
President Obama seems to have recognized that old truisms that previously worked in the US’ favor no longer apply to America’s future relations with the Middle East. Early on he pledged to implement US withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan. His deep reluctance to get heavily involved in Libya and now in Syria also reflects his understanding of the complexity of these matters and his recognition of the weakness of our economy, the weariness of our military and his desire to pivot to the competition with China. Republican party leaders meanwhile object to any shift in US priorities and any hint that the golden days of American hegemony are over.
But in the Middle East and South Asia, political leaders are largely dedicated to their own problems and finding ways to resolve the serious issues that divide their populace and make governing onerous. They are sensitive to nagging and direction from outsiders. It is within this greatly changed political atmosphere that US diplomacy must operate. It will not be easy, particularly by a nation as seriously divided as our own — not to mention our unflinching support for Israel. But if ever there was a time for Obama to take on this daunting task, it’s during his final term as President.
Photo: Demonstrators in Cairo’s Tahrir Square on the morning of 27 November 2012. Credit: Lilian Wagdy.
]]>This was one of the most memorable lines from Barack Obama’s 2008 acceptance speech at the Democratic National Convention: “the greatest risk we can take is to try the same, old politics with the same, old players and expect a different result.”
Those of us who took him at [...]]]>
This was one of the most memorable lines from Barack Obama’s 2008 acceptance speech at the Democratic National Convention: “the greatest risk we can take is to try the same, old politics with the same, old players and expect a different result.”
Those of us who took him at his word hoped that they would apply not only to domestic issues, but to foreign policy too. This author actually had the optimistic temerity to pen a piece imagining what the new president’s “new politics” toward Iran might look like, in an Alternet piece headlined, “What President Obama’s Letter to Iran Should Really Say.” Here is an excerpt from its conclusion:
Your interests and ours do not, and will not, always coincide, nor will we always view the challenges facing the world from the same perspective. Nonetheless, Iranians and Americans need to speak with one another, to share ideas, to work together on issues about which we already agree in principle, and to learn from one another on those with which we are in accord in practice. We can then, with mutual respect, build upon the relationship we have created to approach the more difficult issues — those that have locked our relationship into a confrontational dynamic for the past 30 years.
(An Iranian colleague informed me at the time that my letter, minus its byline, was e-mailed around Iran, sparking speculation as to whether or not Obama had written it himself!).
While my proposed Letter wasn’t exactly the same message that Obama transmitted to the Iranians during his 2009 Nowruz speech, there were sufficient resemblances between the two to offer, at least temporarily, some grounds for optimism:
We have serious differences that have grown over time. My administration is now committed to diplomacy that addresses the full range of issues before us, and to pursuing constructive ties among the United States, Iran and the international community. This process will not be advanced by threats. We seek instead engagement that is honest and grounded in mutual respect.
But the president’s Iran policy was soon channeled toward the “the same old politics with the same old players.” Robert Gates stayed on as Secretary of Defense, minimizing any meaningful change in rhetoric or policy from the previous Bush years. Veterans of the Clinton administration, such as Dennis Ross, were recycled and brought on board to deal with Iran policy. Sanctions continued to be equated with “diplomacy,” and cudgels confused with “carrots.”
Weeks before the 2012 US election, President Obama now finds himself in a situation where Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — who has made no secret of his hope that Obama’s Republican rival will be elected in his stead — is attempting to play Obama’s puppet master. Netanyahu’s ultimatum: either the US issues a “clear red line” for an American attack on Iran that is acceptable to Israel, or the Israelis will strike Iran on their own. And if the Israelis start a war, the US president will have no choice but to back Israel by getting involved. There remains the politically untenable option of Obama declaring openly that the US and Israel are not on the same page and that the US will not back an Israeli strike on Iran, but in the current political environment, that is highly unlikely.
Is there any way out for Obama? According to Akiva Eldar, a senior political correspondent for Haaretz, there is. Obama should buck the hysteria from the right-wing in the US and Israel and go to Iran as Richard Nixon went to China in 1972:
Obama lost the battle long ago for Netanyahu’s fans in the U.S. Jewish community and among the Christian right. If the Iran issue was critical to the U.S. presidential election then Obama should have already started packing. Instead of trying to bring the Iranians to their knees, he can offer them a way up toward restoration of their self-respect. What does Obama have to lose by flying to Tehran to begin a dialogue about ending the nuclear arms race and stopping Iran’s support for terror organizations and for the genocide in Syria?
Eldar, who served as Haaretz’s US Bureau Chief and Washington correspondent from 1993-96, was designated as one of the most prominent and influential commentators in the world in 2006. In 2007 he received the annual “Search for Common Ground” award for Middle East journalism. He regularly appears on major television and radio networks in Israel, the US, Canada, Australia, and Europe, and has appeared on Nightline, the Charlie Rose Show and on CNN and CBS news programs. So it is significant when a seasoned Israeli commentator like Eldar suggests Obama give a reconciliation speech in Tehran that says:
“No single nation should pick and choose which country holds nuclear weapons. And that’s why I strongly reaffirmed America’s commitment to seek a world in which no nations possess nuclear weapons. And any nation – including Iran – should have the right to access peaceful nuclear power if it complies with its responsibilities under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. That commitment is at the core of the treaty, and it must be kept for all who fully abide by it. And I’m hopeful that all countries in the region can share in this goal” (from Obama’s remarks in Cairo on June 4, 2009 ).
Such a move, Eldar suggests, would not just be good policy, it would also be good politics: “after his historic visit to China, Nixon was reelected.”
Eldar’s op-eds appear in The International Herald Tribune, The New York Times, The LA Times, The Philadelphia Inquirer and The New York Jewish Week. Will this one make its way into the American press? It’s a groundbreaking article that deserves more widespread attention than it has thus far received, epecially from President Obama, who really needs a game-changer on Iran to stave off disaster.
As candidate Obama said back in 2008, “the greatest risk we can take is to try the same, old politics with the same, old players and expect a different result.”
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