by Omid Memarian
Traditionally, a few months before a presidential election in Iran, the government opens the public sphere, giving more freedom to the press, more space for activists to speak out and even loosening social restrictions like the one on women’s clothing and hijab. But less than two months before [...]]]>
by Omid Memarian
Traditionally, a few months before a presidential election in Iran, the government opens the public sphere, giving more freedom to the press, more space for activists to speak out and even loosening social restrictions like the one on women’s clothing and hijab. But less than two months before Iran’s June 14 election, the situation feels very different in Tehran. In fact, the opposite is happening.
In mid-January, Iranian intelligence forces arrested more than 16 journalists and questioned many more. All of them were released after a few weeks. Iranian intelligence also summoned the managing editors of major publications and warned them against criticizing the government during the election season.
A number of political activists linked to the reformists’ camp, including former MP Hossein Loghmanian, have also been arrested in the last few weeks. And just months before the election, instead of experiencing more freedom, three major publications — Mehrnameh, Aseman and Panjareh — have shut down voluntarily to avoid likely censure and official closure. A reporter from one of these publications told me, “We all thought we were going to have a similar environment like in the past, and that the government would be more tolerant regarding the media’s performance, but the monitoring and censorship imposed by the intelligence is intensifying day by day.”
It’s not just about the media or activists anymore either. On April 30, Reuters reported that Bagher Asadi, a prominent Iranian diplomat — well-known and respected in UN diplomatic circles — had been arrested in mid-March. The government kept the arrest quiet for more than six weeks, but once the family leaked the news to the media, they confirmed it.
Former diplomat Mohammad Reza Heydari told me on Thursday that he believes the arrest occurred because Asadi was critical of Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy and challenged the government’s performance on a number of occasions — something Tehran does not tolerate, especially when it comes from Iranians.
These are just a few examples of how the Iranian government is getting ready for June. Remembering the aftermath of the 2009 presidential election, the widespread protests in the streets and the massive number of arrests, the government has chosen to preempt any possible challenge to the regime’s narrative on a wide range of issues, from the government’s policies, to the candidates’ qualifications, to the ongoing crackdown on dissidents.
By now, two presidential candidates in the last election, Mehdi Karroubi and Mir Hossein Mousavi, as well as Mousavi’s wife Zahra Rahnavard, have spent well over two years under house arrest. These two were beloved politicians in the eyes of Islamic Republic founder Ayatollah Khomeini. Even so, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei can’t tolerate them. Meanwhile, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whom Khamenei supported unconditionally in his first term, now won’t pass up any opportunity to criticize the establishment.
So if the regime can’t trust a former prime minister and a former head of parliament, or even it’s current president, then whom can they, or rather, the Supreme Leader, trust? The answer is basically no one. And if you don’t trust anyone, from veteran revolutionaries to the younger generation of political figures, then what do you do with a presidential election?
The regime’s extreme sense of suspicion and distrust, and the level of squabbling amongst the political parties, who, regardless of ideology or revolutionary ideals, are all greedy for a piece of the pie, point to an unsettling future for Iran’s political sphere in the months to come. The Supreme Leader will do whatever it takes to make sure one of his loyalists ends up in office.
As Khamenei strives to keep his stranglehold on power, we should expect intensifying censorship and control over the media, civil society and political activists in the coming months. No matter who is nominated for Iran’s presidential election in the coming days, the regime is ready to avoid any surprises, regardless of the cost.
]]>Writes Omid Memarian in Inter Press Service:
The pressure on parliament to approve the posting appeared to be immense. At the Aug. 3 confidence vote, which ended 216-22 with seven abstentions, [...]]]>
Writes Omid Memarian in Inter Press Service:
The pressure on parliament to approve the posting appeared to be immense. At the Aug. 3 confidence vote, which ended 216-22 with seven abstentions, Rostam Ghassemi’s appointment was vocally opposed by only a single conservative member, Ali Mottahari.
“Appointing a military commander as the oil minister would cause a union of political power and economic power and this could lead to corruption,” he cautioned.
Mottahari recalled the period 1989 to 1997, under Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s presidency, when Iran’s intelligence ministry was allowed to engage in economic activities. During that period it became clear that the ministry’s operatives were directly involved in the murders of dissident Iranian intellectuals and writers.
Mottahari added that parliamentary oversight of the oil ministry would become much harder with an IRGC commander at the helm, and said that asking questions of the minister or putting him up for a vote of confidence would be difficult.
A U.S. State Department official told IPS in an email that:
Iran is tarnishing OPEC’s prestige by naming a minister linked to both [nuclear] proliferation activities and human rights abuses as the head of Iran’s oil ministry, when Iran holds the OPEC [Organisation of the Petroleum-Exporting Countries] presidency.
IRGC General Rostam Qasemi has been sanctioned by the U.S. and EU for his nuclear proliferation activities as head of Khatam-ol-Anbia, the construction and business arm of the IRGC and currently the largest contractor of government projects in Iran. His appointment shows the expanding influence of the IRGC in Iran’s economy.
Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been attempting to build alliances in the Revolutionary Guards since the beginning of his official political career in the 1980s. It has been his steadfast determination to concentrate power in his hands by getting the backing of Iran’s armed elite forces that has landed him in the position he is in today — isolated and under growing threat of impeachment.
According to Memarian, Ghassemi was reportedly not Ahmadinejad’s first choice for the post but “by choosing an IRGC commander who is less influential within the leadership, the president could improve his fractious relationship with the parliament and the IRGC, while also having an oil minister he is better able to control.”
]]>Memarian’s piece draws on Iranian sources to describe the political context of, and gauge reactions to, Mottaki’s firing and his interim replacement by Ali Akbar Salehi, until now [...]]]>
Memarian’s piece draws on Iranian sources to describe the political context of, and gauge reactions to, Mottaki’s firing and his interim replacement by Ali Akbar Salehi, until now the head of Iran’s nuclear agency.
Down at the end, Memarian speaks to the Carnegie Endowment’s Karim Sadjadpour, who says the move is unlikely to affect Iran’s ongoing diplomacy with the West:
Analysts believe Ahmadinejad’s surprise move is very unlikely to affect the negotiations, as Mottaki had little say in the country’s major foreign policy positions over the past five years.
“Mottaki’s firing will have little substantive impact on Iranian foreign policy,” Karim Sadjadpour, an Iran analyst at the Carnegie Endowment in Washington, told IPS. “The Iranian foreign minister doesn’t formulate policy. It’s the equivalent of the State Department spokesperson being replaced.”
“Salehi is much smarter and smoother than Mottaki and may prove more effective at creating divisions in the international community,” Sadjadpour added. “The Iranian foreign minister’s job these days is akin to putting lipstick on a pig. It’s ugly no matter how you try and sell it.”
I covered some other reactions yesterday — mostly speculative at this point, and unlikely to become any more certain before the upcoming round of negotiations in Istanbul next month.
]]>