As former top State Department intelligence specialist Wayne White points out for Lobe Log, in the absence of a tenable ceasefire agreement, the quagmire that is the Syrian civil war will likely intensify, thereby only worsening post-Assad scenarios.

“The bottom line is that a sort of Catch-22 situation is [...]]]> via Lobe Log

As former top State Department intelligence specialist Wayne White points out for Lobe Log, in the absence of a tenable ceasefire agreement, the quagmire that is the Syrian civil war will likely intensify, thereby only worsening post-Assad scenarios.

“The bottom line is that a sort of Catch-22 situation is continuing on the diplomatic front,” wrote White last week. “[T]he side that believes it has the upper hand and will eventually prevail militarily (currently the opposition) is unlikely to accept a truce because a ceasefire would interfere with its ability to sustain intense military pressure on the other side.”

Anyone hoping for even a temporary cessation to the deadly violence would have been shattered by Bashar al-Assad’s rare speech in Damascus on Sunday, where he thanked his base for showing “the whole world that Syria is impervious to collapse and the Syrian people impervious to humiliation.” The defiant president refused to step down while claiming he was ready to talk with the opposition. But as White noted, Assad did so while urging his supporters to continue fighting against the “bunch of criminals” who oppose him.

This political gridlock makes creative diplomacy appear all the more important in bringing an end to the ongoing carnage that’s ravaging the country. Asked if the Iranians should be included in diplomatic efforts, former top CIA analyst Paul Pillar told Lobe Log that ”Any multilateral diplomatic initiative has a better chance of success if all the parties with leverage to exert are included.”

Pillar is well aware of the fact that this may be easier said than done. UN and Arab League mediator Lahkdar Brahimi remains in between a rock and a hard place — expected to please everyone while not being able to please anyone. The brutal force that the government deployed to crush what were initially peaceful protests seems to have pushed both sides beyond the point of no return. Presently, the opposition’s recent disgust with Brahimi’s choice of Russia as the venue for his recent truce initiative has been overshadowed by the regime’s accusations of Brahimi’s “bias toward sides known for conspiring against Syria and the Syrian people.”

It was in this atmosphere of hopelessness that news surfaced Wednesday of over 2,130 Syrian prisoners being released by the regime in exchange for 48 Iranians abducted during what they claimed to be a religious pilgrimage in August. (The opposition had said that the Iranians were members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, which Tehran adamantly denied.) The massive exchange again raises the question of whether Iran has a role to play in bringing an end to the Syrian crisis.

This question may be more difficult to answer now than it was when the fighting first broke out over a year ago. On the one hand, the prisoner swap supports the argument that Iran holds considerable influence over Assad’s government and could help shift events toward a “peace process”. Throughout last year, Iran tried to inject itself into diplomatic processes taking place over Syria by, for example, supporting a failed United Nations-Arab League peace plan and making is own proposal in December.

“On Syria, Iran is pursuing a dual track policy of support for the Syrian Government as it faces internal instability, while pressing Damascus to take measures to reduce tensions, open the grounds for negotiations with the opposition and find a path towards national unity and conciliation,” said Ambassador Seyed Hossein Mousavian, the former spokesperson for Iran’s nuclear negotiating team (2003 to 2005) and now a visiting scholar at Princeton University.

“Iran can play a major constructive role on the Syrian crisis,” he said.

That Iran reportedly included Syria in its five-point proposal presented during nuclear talks in Moscow last June could be an indication that it would be willing to bargain away its support for the regime — if it was provided with enough incentive. (Recall how the government of Mohammad Khatami reportedly offered to end Iran’s material support to Palestinian groups opposing Israel in a March 2003 proposal for “broad dialogue” with the US that was rejected by the Bush administration.)

On the other hand, this prisoner swap, which amounts to about 44 Syrians for every 1 Iranian, displays the extent to which Iran is tied to Assad’s repression. If the war in Syria is really about the major powers that are backing each side (Russia, Iran and China for the regime, and Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Western countries for the opposition), and since the fall of Assad would indeed be a “major blow” to the Iranians, can Tehran really be expected to help its foes?

For now, talks with Iran over its nuclear program are expected to resume shortly, even if they’re already off to a bad start. But as the fighting in Syria produces ongoing suffering while the Israeli-led campaign against Iran’s nuclear program continues to involve the potential of a costly military conflict, considering all options on the Syrian diplomatic table be more important now than ever.

“If the Iranians are excluded from a joint effort to do something helpful, they are only more likely to do something unhelpful, said Pillar, who advocates a more flexible US negotiating posture with Iran.

“Engagement with Iran over Syria also can reap secondary benefits in other areas, such as the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, by expanding channels of communication and bargaining space,” he said.

Photo: Feb. 23, 2012. A Free Syrian Army member prepares to fight with a tank whose crew defected from government forces in al-Qsair. Freedom House photo/Creative Commons/Flickr.  

The UN High Commission for Human Rights now believes 60,000 Syrians have been killed since March 2011 (far more than claimed by the Syrian opposition) and that death rates have been rising more sharply of late. Given the situation on the ground and the continuing failure of diplomacy, the bloody human [...]]]> via Lobe Log

The UN High Commission for Human Rights now believes 60,000 Syrians have been killed since March 2011 (far more than claimed by the Syrian opposition) and that death rates have been rising more sharply of late. Given the situation on the ground and the continuing failure of diplomacy, the bloody human toll in Syria — along with far broader suffering and privation – will probably increase before the grueling tug of war between the regime and the opposition draws to a conclusion in one way or another.

The last weekend of 2012 saw an especially severe spike in casualties with government forces counterattacking in the Damascus area, Homs/Hama in central Syria, and Aleppo in the north. Even heavier regime airpower was brought to bear. This contrasted with vigorous opposition advances in recent weeks. It appears that after weeks of sustained offensive operations, some important rebel units ran short of munitions, despite earlier captures of improved weapons and ammunition from government military facilities. Sensing a slackening of pressure, the regime evidently sought to take advantage of the situation by launching a desperate effort to reclaim a few pieces of lost ground and perhaps even wrest some of the initiative from the rebels.

Yet, given the continuing toll on the regime’s own military assets and its inability to replenish its troop losses as readily as those of the rebels, any government gains are likely to be short-lived, especially as rebel forces regroup and resupply themselves once again. Indeed, even as airstrikes have been pounding rebel positions around Damascus in particular, opposition fighters have been closing in on two Syrian air bases farther north. The regime’s growing international isolation and shortages of basic supplies to satisfy the needs of the population (even within the government’s shrunken holdings) suggests it remains at an overall disadvantage regardless.

It should come as no surprise for backers of UN and Arab League representative Lahkdar Brahimi’s most recent initiative that his truce offer has been spurned by the opposition (and not unexpectedly encouraged by an increasingly beleaguered Assad regime). In fact, the choice of Moscow as a venue for talks was especially off-putting for the rebels because, as has been seen, the opposition views Russia as one of the two premier supporters of the Assad regime.

The bottom line is that a sort of Catch-22 situation is continuing on the diplomatic front: the side that believes it has the upper hand and will eventually prevail militarily (currently the opposition) is unlikely to accept a truce because a ceasefire would interfere with its ability to sustain intense military pressure on the other side. Only a prolonged, costly stalemate — not seen in quite a while — might interest both sides in calling at least a temporary halt to the bloodletting.

Meanwhile, failing the defection of substantial army units to the rebels, the fighting is likely to remain fierce — even desperate. From time to time, the rebels capture government caches of better weapons, and that will continue, giving them a somewhat more even playing field against regime forces. Those Syrians (most Alawites, many Christians, as well as a minority of Sunni Arabs who have benefited from the regime) will fight bitterly, fearing a rebel (or even militant Islamic) victory would overturn their world as they know it, perhaps even endangering their own families or entire sectarian communities. And, the longer the bloodletting continues in terms of time, sheer violence, atrocities, and total casualties, the more the amount of retribution — both authorized and spontaneous — will mount for those who have chosen, essentially, to fight for the regime right up, or close, to the bitter end.

Photo: Wojtek Ogrodowczyk/Flickr

This week’s decision by the Bahraini court of appeals to uphold the prison terms against Bahraini opposition activists is a travesty of justice and an indication that Bahraini repression continues unabated.

Bahraini officials, when confronted with angry world reaction to the court’s decision, cynically hid behind the claim they would [...]]]> via IPS News

This week’s decision by the Bahraini court of appeals to uphold the prison terms against Bahraini opposition activists is a travesty of justice and an indication that Bahraini repression continues unabated.

Bahraini officials, when confronted with angry world reaction to the court’s decision, cynically hid behind the claim they would not interfere in the proceedings of their “independent judiciary”.

Despite the threat to U.S. national interests and the security of U.S. citizens in Bahrain and elsewhere in the Gulf, Washington remains oblivious to the ruling family’s violent crackdown against peaceful protesters in the name of fighting “foreign elements”. Pro-democracy Bahrainis are wondering what we are waiting for.

Because of our muted reaction to what’s happening in Bahrain, the ruling family and their Saudi benefactors have not taken seriously Western support for democratic transitions in the Middle East.

The United States and Britain maintain deep economic and security relations with these states but also enjoy strong leverage, including the U.S. Navy’s Bahrain-based Fifth Fleet, which they must revisit in the face of continued egregious violations of basic human rights by some of these regimes. Bahraini civil rights organisations and activists are expecting the United States to use its leverage to end regime repression.

Despite their pro-Western stance, there is nothing exceptional about the autocratic Gulf Arab regimes. And they should no longer be given a pass on the importance of democratic reform.

Staying in power will require Bahrain’s Al Khalifas and other Gulf tribal family rulers to do more than push a vicious sectarian policy and employ slick public relations firms. Their cynical and deadly game might buy them some time, but, in the end, they will not be able to escape their peoples’ wrath.

In the absence of genuine reforms in the next three years, the Gulf’s autocratic regimes will be swept aside by their peoples. The “people power” that emerged from the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and now Syria, cannot be kept out of these tribal states. In reality, they all have been touched by peoples’ demands for dignity and justice.

While Iran might be exploiting the protest movement to discredit these regimes, the pro-democracy movement in Bahrain goes back to the 1960s and 1970s – way before the Islamic Republic came on the scene.

Even more troubling for U.S. national security are the continued efforts by Al Khalifa to whip up anti-American attitudes among Bahrain’s more rabidly anti-Shia and xenophobic Sunnis. Bahrain and some of their Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) allies perceive the growing rapprochement between the U.S. and the new Islamic democrats, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Tunisia, as a sign of tacit opposition to Gulf autocrats.

They believe the U.S will throw them under the bus if their peoples rise up against them. They also worry that if the nuclear issue in Iran is resolved, a possible U.S. rapprochement with Tehran would embolden their Shia communities in their struggle for equality and justice.

For 40 years, Prime Minister Khalifa has been the key opponent to reform in Bahrain. In recent ears, however, a new generation within the ruling family, known as the “Khawalids,” has taken up the anti-Shia, anti-reform, and anti-American cry.

They have used pro-government newspapers, blogs, and social media to vilify the Shia, the United States, and the pro-democracy movement. With tacit government encouragement, they frequently describe elements of the opposition as “diseased cells” that must be removed from society.

In the process, they have encouraged extremist Salafi and other Sunni groups to spread their message of divisiveness, sectarianism, and hate.

What Bahrain and the other Gulf sheikhdoms fail to realise is that when they encourage extremist groups to fight the “enemies” of the regime, a time will come when radical Salafi “jihadists” will turn against the regime. The Saudi experience in Afghanistan and Iraq should offer them a sobering lesson. This dangerous game does not bode well for their survival.

As domestic challenges also grow in Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom’s interest in Bahraini domestic policy will diminish. Recent estimates indicate Saudi oil exports over the next decade and a half will shrink significantly because of growing domestic needs for energy to generate power and desalinate seawater.

When this happens, Al Khalifa will have to face their people on their own.

- Emile Nakhleh is the former director of the CIA’s Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program and author of “A Necessary Engagement: Reinventing America’s Relations with the Muslim World”.

Emile Nakhleh is a retired Senior Intelligence Service Officer, a Research Professor at the University of New Mexico and a National Intelligence Council associate. Since retiring from the United States Government in 2006, he has been consulting with different US government entities and departments on national security issues, particularly Islamic radicalization, [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Emile Nakhleh is a retired Senior Intelligence Service Officer, a Research Professor at the University of New Mexico and a National Intelligence Council associate. Since retiring from the United States Government in 2006, he has been consulting with different US government entities and departments on national security issues, particularly Islamic radicalization, terrorism, and the Arab states of the Middle East. At the CIA, Nakhleh was a senior analyst and director of the Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program and of regional analysis in the Middle East. During that time he and his analysts briefed policymakers on how Bashar al-Assad used repression to maintain stability.

In February, Nakhleh wrote in the Financial Times that intervention in Syria was “only a matter of time” and that Realpolitik should not guide the West’s approach to the humanitarian crisis that was unfolding. Seven months later, the fighting and divisions within Syria continue to worsen. An estimated 8,000 to 20,000 people have been killed and tens of thousands of Syrians have fled their homes into neighboring countries. The Obama administration has been reluctant to become directly involved in the conflict, but according to Nakhleh, a diplomatic solution is no longer possible and the longer the West waits to assist the rebels with NATO and Turkey’s lead, the bloodier the conflict will become. This following interview was conducted in Washington, DC and a shortened version was published in IPS News.

Q: What is your current assessment of the situation in Syria?

A: I wrote an article about Syria in the Financial Times in February and some of the things I wrote about then are happening now. Namely, there’s more talk about a security zone. The regime is basically fraying and is going to fall and the question is how it’s going to fall and what kind of chaos and instability will follow. I’m not that concerned about these fears of instability and Islamic extremist groups. These fears are being pushed by the regime to scare people. The regime is saying: we are providing security and stability and the alternative is insecurity and instability. There are some Jihadist and Al Qaeda elements, but the fact is that those were also in Libya and some of them were in Tunisia.

Q: Why then is the United States saying that one of the reasons it’s not directly supporting the rebels is because it’s unsure who they are?

A: That is a legitimate excuse. In fact, that argument was one of the reasons that delayed our recognition of even the Libyan rebels in Ben Ghazi and our action there. It was the same argument in Egypt, though not in Tunisia so much because we weren’t actually involved at all in Tunisia. But we used the same argument in Egypt and we kept hearing the word “leaderless”. Well, they are leaderless, we don’t know what leaders to deal with, and therefore we delay action. But I suggest that assistance now from the US and its NATO allies, especially Turkey, are very crucial and I’m not saying necessarily direct military participation but I consider the Syrian regime, as one Syrian expert recently said, as a Mafia. There’s no negotiating with them. They’re going to go down fighting and in the process destroy Syria and kill so many more.

Q: So what should support to the rebels look like?

A: My suggestion now, the regime is strong in air and tanks so the rebels, through Turkey perhaps, need to have RPGs against tanks and stringer missiles against planes. They need to even the playing field in those two areas. That is where now the opposition is frustrated. And they need ammunition.

We could recognize a geographic area, something like a safe haven contiguous to Turkey, and then we can deal with this unclear leadership a bit later. We can deal with something now; we can deal with the military, the Free Syrian Army, the political opposition in Turkey. But my point is once we recognize that, then through Turkey we can send humanitarian assistance, medical aid, and other logistical assistance. I say Turkey because then we can go around the Security Council by saying that this is a NATO thing. We are members of NATO and so is Turkey, which could argue it feels threatened by the growing insecurity on its border.

Turkey can act, but we should be wary a bit of Saudi and Qatari support.

Q: Why?

A: Because there is already suppression of the Saudi opposition in that country. They don’t have a clean record and we should not be aligned openly and strongly with a country that is already suppressing its own people and indirectly contributing to the spread of radical Salafism.

Q: But we already are, aren’t we?

A: We are, but to say that Saudi Arabia is supporting the march of democracy and freedom is a bit disingenuous.

Q: But aren’t Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar already assisting the rebels with Turkish logistical assistance and Gulf funds? Does Turkey have the capacity to take over that role or are the Gulf countries necessary financially?

A: No, Turkey can do it. Turkey can accept money from Saudi Arabia but the assistance for and management of the safety security zone should be by Turkey as a NATO member.

Q: What is everyone waiting for then?

A: They are waiting because the West is not pushing and the Russian and Chinese are strenuously objecting to any perceived military action against the Assad regime.

Q: So Turkey is waiting for an okay from the US?

A: Yes, but I’m not going to speak for anyone. But that’s why Turkey initially went to NATO as well and I think NATO’s role can be increased. I don’t mean flying there or doing a no-fly zone and protecting the people through NATO planes as they did in Libya. They’re not going to do that but what they can do is arm the opposition with anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons and the opposition can do the job. That’s an important distinction – it also will keep the Western and NATO powers more free to act.

Q: What about those who argue that best time to do what you suggest has already passed and arming the opposition now will only result in the government cracking down even harder?

A: That argument too is passé. That argument would have been acceptable before the regime began to employ heavy weapons. But the regime now is bombing cities and civilian neighborhoods haphazardly using heavy weapons, tanks, and airplanes.

Q: So a diplomatic resolution is no longer possible?

A: That too has passed because the regime is not interested in negotiating with the opposition. If you listen to their propaganda, the opposition is labeled as foreign terrorists, and yet, what about these thousands of people that have been killed? Most of them are Syrians, they’re not foreigners. Those who are still talking about diplomacy are using it as a delay tactic while providing their own form of assistance. But now it’s time to fully assist the rebels without necessarily putting boots on the ground.

Q: Would you agree that one of the reasons why the Libyan model is not being applied to Syria is because in Libya the assessment was that the intervention would be clean and that the government had close to no support, whereas the situation differs in Syria?

A: No, the Libyan model is not working because of Russian and Chinese opposition in the Security Council. Western powers, including Turkey, can’t get the Security Council to act in Syria. That’s the only reason. The Russians and the Chinese believe they were duped by the Security Council about Libya. They supported the UNSC resolution on Libya because in their view it was meant to protect civilians and then they found out that no, it was about regime change.

Another factor driving Russia’s objection to any action against the Assad regime is that Syria is the only foothold that Russia has in the Eastern Mediterranean. They have a naval base in Tartus. But the time will come when the Russians will decide to flush Assad down the drain. They will eventually realize that the regime has lost credibility among its people. They have lost legitimacy amongst most Arab countries.

What to do? First recognize a safe zone or security zone. Then, two, provide specific military gear, equipment, and appropriate weapons through Turkey, which could include anti-aircraft and tank weaponry.

Q: But just to be clear, what should the US’s role be in all this?

A: Encouragement and logistical and communications support. According to media reports, the US already has contacts with the opposition and is perhaps already providing covert support in the areas of control, command, intelligence, and communications. But basically I don’t expect the US, as we are heading toward the presidential election, to play a major open military role in Syria. Necessary weapons could be provided by Turkey, with NATO’s approval, to help the opposition save their own towns and save lives.

I was never really in favor of direct and massive military action in Syria. I have argued elsewhere that military action should develop gradually. The opposition already controls a safe zone and other geographic areas in rural and urban Syria. When I wrote the FT column, there were no geographic areas that were under the control of the opposition. Now there are areas that the regime does not control. The fact is, well, I don’t know if it’s exaggerated, but take the statement made by the Prime Minister who recently defected, speaking in Jordan, who said the regime now controls 30%. That’s difficult to verify, but most observers agree that there are areas that the regime doesn’t control, next to Turkey, and elsewhere. If that’s true, the opposition obviously controls these areas. So then we can recognize that territory, deal with the opposition that’s there on the ground—civilians and military leadership. We can engage Syrian politicians in Turkey or somewhere else and the Syrian National Council, and then start providing needed support—humanitarian, medical, food, fuel, munitions, etc. in order for the Syrian opposition to be able to defend their own people.

Q: But what about the fact that Syrians themselves are arguing that the politicians who are based in other countries are too disconnected from the uprising on the ground? If this is the case, whom should we deal with?

A: We can speak with opposition elements on the ground, including the Free Syrian Army, army officers who have defected and who are fighting, civilian fighters, including Islamist groups. We shouldn’t hesitate to engage different groups in the opposition because they all share the same goal namely to get rid of the regime. We should be able to have access to opposition groups through the territory they control.

Q: And a goal is to keep the military in tact?

A: Well, keeping the Syrian military in tact after the collapse of the regime is critical. We don’t want a repeat of what happened in Iraq. Two other goals include keeping national civil society institutions functioning and avoid draconian de-Ba’thification measures. In addition, the US can openly work with current and potential high-level defectors through Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.

Q: If the regime does fall, what will happen to groups that were aligned with the Alawite leadership?

A: The Christians have already moved away. It’s like what the Palestinians did with the Arab Spring. The Palestinians would not want to repeat what Arafat did in 1990 with supporting Saddam, which resulted in Kuwait kicking out almost half a million Palestinians. But the Christians have been very quiet and to me the change occurred when Aleppo exploded. In Aleppo, many of the business class tend to be Christians, Armenians, and Sunnis. Aleppo was safe for quite a while as far as the regime was concerned. After Assad’s fall, the new government, which presumably will be dominated by Sunni Muslims, should reach out and include representatives of the religious and ethnic minorities in governance. Inclusion in decision-making at the highest level will guarantee success in Syria, a country known for its cultural, ethnic, and religious mosaic.

Q: What about the Shia?

A: The Shia is a very small minority; I am afraid the major backlash will be against the Alawites. Not necessarily the poor Alawites, but the wealthy ones who have been the security and financial backbone of the regime. The backlash will also be directed against the ruling family. If the regime persists in its bloody crackdown, its fate will be similar to what happened to the Hashemites in Iraq in 1958. Leaders of the Hashemite monarchy were killed and dragged down the streets because of their perceived suppression of their people. The Assad family runs the country like a Mafia organization through repression, fear, corruption, patronage, and the security apparatus, much like what Saleh did in Yemen. So there will be violence after the regime collapses, including forced population flight and even ethnic cleansing, especially in rural areas.

Q: Will the push come after the US presidential election?

A: Possibly; I don’t think much will be done before the Presidential election until the administration receives information about movement or the use of chemical and biological weapons by the regime or agents of the regime. As the President indicated recently, he would use the military option against the regime should Assad become desperate and use chemical and biological weapons against his people. I don’t know how long the regime will last. I have always thought it won’t survive beyond the end of 2012.

Q: Where could they go though? Won’t Assad fight to the death?

A: There are very few places available to them unless it’s part of a deal. It’s not just one person. It’s a whole family. His brother – is the butcher of Damascus – cousins, in-laws, etc. the more besieged they feel, the more violently they act. But I don’t think Assad is going anywhere. His wife can go to the UK because she’s a UK citizen, but I don’t think he will go anywhere.

Q: So the rebels don’t have a chance unless they get a no-fly zone and more arms?

A: Well, the no-fly zone could have been a step in arming the rebels with weapons. So once the opposition is able to neutralize the regime’s massive force machine, they would be able to fight without overt outside help. This way you would be able to avoid the legal issues involved in officially declaring a no-fly zone. The assistance would then come from NATO, not the UN Security Council, which would sideline through Russian and Chinese objections.

Q: You say the regime won’t last beyond 2012, do you consider the high-level defections a main indicator of that?

A: I do. The regime is losing territory, legitimacy and even security. To see bombs explode in the heart of the security structure in Damascus is a clear sign the regime is losing control. It is being attacked and penetrated. Not even Syrians buy the regime argument that this is a foreign, terrorist-backed struggle. There may be foreign terrorists, but they didn’t start the struggle and they are not the ones who are keeping it going.

Q: If more is not done to assist the rebels do you think they will turn to those forces?

A: As a matter of fact, some rebels are already making this argument, namely that if they don’t get weapons from the West, they would accept them from any source, including terrorist groups. The point is that this regime is creating an environment that is conducive to terrorists and bringing in the Jihadists. And the Saudis are doing the same thing they did in Afghanistan in the 80s and in Iraq and Bahrain more recently. The Saudi and Bahraini governments are looking the other way when some of their own Salafis go to Syria. The head of a Bahraini Salafi group recently met with Syrian opposition in Syria. It’s a dangerous game that the Saudis are playing.

But the fact is, as Rami Khouri argued in a column last week in the Daily Star, Syrians have a civil society, they are educated, sophisticated people who have state structures, civil society structures. It’s not tribal like Libya, so they will be able to restructure after the fall.

The issue is really with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. However, to run a government, they would have to play a role like the Egyptian or Tunisian Muslim Brotherhoods. Other centers of power in Syrian society, and the Syrian MB will have to compete. I’m not really worried about this. Raising fears of Islamists and similar issues is more of an excuse not to act. That doesn’t mean there are no Salafis or Al Qaeda types in Syria. Unfortunately, the Saudis and other Gulfies have encouraged radical Sunni groups to enter Syria in the name of fighting Shia, Alawites, Iran, and Hezbollah.

A: But I’m still unclear as to why the US is even staying away from giving a go-ahead to Turkey.

Q: The US wants to have international legal legitimacy and that comes through the UN Security Council; they’ve tried time and again only to have resolutions vetoed by the Russians and Chinese. That’s why Ambassador Susan Rice gets so irritated in her comments against the Russians.

A: What can the US do to convince Russia to stop striking down those resolutions?

Q: Until Russia reaches a point where it’s convinced that Assad is finished, it’s not going to abandon him. It’s like when we were convinced that Mubarak was finished, we abandoned him. Russia hasn’t reached that point yet. And that’s a misreading of the situation because I am convinced that the regime is finished.

Q: Should Iran be involved with a solution for Syria?

A: I think the fall of Assad will produce the consequence of the breakdown of what I call the trilateral axis of resistance – Iran, Syria and Hezbollah. Iran shouldn’t necessarily be involved because it’s already not a neutral partner – it’s a major ally of the Syrian regime. And, it’s no longer about politics and negotiations; it’s about the precipitous fall of the regime. So what role could Iran play? They are propping up the regime, they’re not going to assist its fall.

Q: There was an article in the Washington Post last week arguing that sanctions against Syria were “hindering the opposition”. What’s your take on that?

A: Sanctions are only effective against individuals and it’s interesting how quickly the Syrian Prime Minister’s name was taken off the sanctions list after he defected. So that’s a weapon to encourage some of the top people to defect. But sanctions are not hindering the opposition. They are not getting financing through banking and so on. But if the regime is intent on continuing its current method of survival, sanctions aren’t going to affect the regime either way.

This past week a couple of articles have been published that hint at the central incoherence of the United States’ Iran policy. The arguments are not necessarily new, but they show in concrete terms how the stated objective of US sanctions, which is to change the calculations and behavior of Iran’s [...]]]> via Lobe Log

This past week a couple of articles have been published that hint at the central incoherence of the United States’ Iran policy. The arguments are not necessarily new, but they show in concrete terms how the stated objective of US sanctions, which is to change the calculations and behavior of Iran’s leaders, is undermined by the same sanctions that end up weakening – at times even endangering – the domestic forces presumably required to leverage the sanctions’ power and result in a change of behavior.

Virginia Tech economist Djavad Salehi-Isfahani explains how the sanctions regime is threatening Iran’s bond to the global economy, not only through the straight-jacketing of the middle class and private sector, which is the promoter of that bond, but also hindering the point of view that is supportive of that bond. In other words, instead of helping to promote a developmental state whose behavior is moderated by the multi-faceted links created, the sanctions regime strives to sever those links based on the claim that severing those links will eventually make the Islamic Republic a better global citizen!

James Ball’s article in the Washington Post is even more damning. The domestic actors striving to change the behavior of the Iranian state, it turns out, do not merely constitute unfortunate collateral damage. They are the direct recipients of policies that deny them protective tools, leaving them vulnerable to significantly more powerful entities which always find ways to get around sanctions and access the instruments of repression that they need to carry out their objectives.

These arguments are slightly different from the suggestion that sanctions are a form of collective punishment with the Iranian population ending up as the victims of Iranian leaders and foreign powers locking horns. The sanctions policy is assessed in the way that all policies should be assessed: What is the policy intended to do, who is supposed to benefit from it or be harmed by it, and are the policy instruments aligned with the policy objectives. In this case, the evidence offered suggests they are not.

There are, however, other ways of addressing the question of inconsistency between instruments and objectives. One way is to ignore the inconsistency while giving rhetorical lip service to the sublime cause of the Iranian people freeing themselves from the yoke of dictatorship. The objective of this policy, it is said, is to change the behavior of the Iranian government. External pressure will also eventually payoff on its own. No need to worry about what sanctions will do to Iran’s social fabric, economy, and the private sector in the meanwhile. Sanctions are both feasible and effective given American muscularity and the Iranian historical tendency to give in to overwhelming pressure eventually. This formulation is apparently based on a joke Iranians make about themselves: “Iranians never give in to pressure unless it is lots of pressure.” As for those freedom-loving Iranians, they’ll find a way to foment change in Iran and aim it in a favorable direction even in spite of us making their path more difficult because of their incredible desire and energy to be free.

The problem with this argument lies first in giving a lofty role to desire (as opposed to instruments for fulfilling that desire) and second, in refusing to acknowledge that in no country is there “a people” with a collective desire. Iran, like elsewhere, is a country consisting of a multiplicity of interests, desires, power centers, and a differentiated population with vastly different means of access to resources. Democracy, like elsewhere, will not arise out of Iranian collective desire but out of negotiations and accommodations among these multiple interests. This very basic point is not rocket science – especially given the US’ own experience with democracy. The refusal to understand this point reveals either the shallowness of the commitment to any kind of democratic project in Iran or a naïve hope that external pressure will delegitimize the regime and open a path for a more democratic Iran.

But perhaps I am searching for coherence in the wrong places. The US’ Iran policy is not that incoherent if the objective is not aimed at changing the calculus of the Iranian government and rather intended to simply harass, isolate, or even destabilize Iran. In fact, one can argue that the Obama Administration, unlike the Bush Administration, has found a perfect formula for this intent, which is also a good fit for the way the American bureaucratic structure works.

Rather than confronting Iran with an all-out sanctions regime, the US has settled on an escalating sanctions regime. Every couple of month or so, it announces a new set of sanctions to keep the Islamic Republic off balance and in search of new ways to get around sanctions. Of course, this is partly necessitated by the reality of the oil market. The complete shut off of Iran’s oil exports would have had a drastic effect on oil prices. But in any case, an escalating sanctions regime is a much better tool for harassment – or what some in Iran call psychological and economic warfare – than an all-out sanctions regime.

The Iraqi sanctions regime is a good example of why going for an all-out sanctions regime is not a good instrument; after a while, the sting wears off and ways are found around it. Even Donald Rumsfeld, by July 2001, was suggesting that one US policy option was to “publicly acknowledge that sanctions don’t work over extended periods and stop the pretense of having a policy that is keeping Saddam in the box when we know he has crawled a good distance out of the box”.

An escalating sanctions regime, on the other hand, assures that the initiative remains in US hands and the Islamic Republic – and by implication the people who live and work in the Islamic Republic – are kept off balance. It also has the added value of making a whole lot of people in various bureaucracies work hard for their paycheck.

The folks at the Treasury Department strive hard to find new ways and new entities to sanction; folks in the State Department work hard to get exemptions for allies (and even non-allies) who presumably have done well in reducing their oil imports from Iran exactly at the same time that the Treasury is tightening the noose in some other areas. Folks in the Department of Energy also work hard to determine exactly how much of Iranian oil can be kept off the market before prices rise.

And the game continues.  Just watch to see what happens after the six-month exemption period is up for Japan, South Korea, and…

The US’ Iran policy cannot be considered incoherent if the policy objectives and the instruments have become the same. It can still be considered immoral for trying to add to the economic woes of a good part of the Iranian population – irrespective of the fact that the Iranian government is most responsible for those economic woes – particularly at a time when so many people in the world are already suffering from unemployment and economic downturn. But it is not incoherent. It is intended to harass and it is doing so in a calculated and now rather routine, bureaucratic way. Weaning from routines and habits will be hard.

Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi’s statement yesterday that the Islamic Republic is prepared to host talks between Bashar Al Assad’s government and the opposition should be regarded as an indication of Tehran’s inability to influence events in Syria. His public declaration was more like a futile public relations [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi’s statement yesterday that the Islamic Republic is prepared to host talks between Bashar Al Assad’s government and the opposition should be regarded as an indication of Tehran’s inability to influence events in Syria. His public declaration was more like a futile public relations effort to sell Iran’s potential as a constructive regional player than a plan offered with any hope of its acceptance.

It is worth remembering that Salehi’s words come after calls from Russia and Kofi Annan for Iran to be included in Syrian crisis resolution efforts, followed by the Obama Administration’s categorical rejection of such an inclusion. Iran is apparently part of the problem and hence cannot be part of the solution. Susan Rice, the US ambassador to the United Nations, said yesterday that Iran “is supporting, aiding and abetting the Assad regime materially and in many other ways” and that “it has shown no readiness to contribute constructively.”

Exactly why Iran is distinguished from Russia regarding the distribution of material aid to the Syrian regime is not clear. One reason for the singling out of Iran could be because it is not a member of the UN Security Council. Or, it may be that the regional and international struggle over the fate of Syria is not geared towards delinking that country from Russia but rather about breaking its alliance with Iran. Iran cannot be permitted to take part in a process wherein the intention of several participants is to weaken its regional position.

But does Iran have an independent and coherent strategy for changing the calculations of the US and regional players like Saudi Arabia and Turkey? Or, for that matter, does Iran have a strategy to deal with the deteriorating situation in Syria? Not really!

Recent statements and slight shifts from Tehran suggest that Iran is towing the Russian line. In fact, Salehi’s offer of facilitating dialogue comes just a few days after Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov once again called on the Syrian government and all of the opposition groups to embark on a dialogue.

Iran also seems to have absorbed Moscow’s interpretation of the June 30^th Geneva agreement regarding a Syrian political transition based on “mutual consent.” While for the Syrian National Council and Washington the first step of such a transition requires Assad’s departure, Tehran, like Moscow, wants Assad’s fate to be on the negotiating table. This implies that if there is a Russian decision to lean on Assad more forcefully, regardless of whether it will work or not, Tehran will follow.

Like other countries with a stake in Syria’s future, Iran is now faced with an ally that’s essentially in the throes of what will likely be a long, drawn out and worsening civil war. Various voices are warning about what could lie head. The prospect of Syria repeating the gruesome Algerian civil war of the 1990s has been raised, while for Mohammad Ali Sobhani, Iran’s former ambassador to Lebanon, the fear is more about Syria’s disintegration along the lines of the former Yugoslavia. Others worry about a spill over into and further destabilization of Iraq, particularly into the adjacent Iraqi provinces of Anbar and Ninewa. But expressions of fear do not make up for the lack of a visionary policy.

The Iranian government is undoubtedly aware that Syria is in a mess. But in the coming months expect Iran’s response to be more reactive than proactive despite proclamations and posturing that suggest otherwise.