by Mark N. Katz
All the major actors in the Middle East oppose the rise of the extremist group that calls itself the Islamic State (ISIS). In fact, ISIS has managed to incur the enmity of a highly diverse set of actors who often oppose one another. These include several sets of antagonists such as the United States and the West on the one hand and Russia on the other; Iran and the Assad regime in Syria on the one hand and Sunni states like Saudi Arabia on the other; Israel on the one hand and Hezbollah on the other; and the Kurds on the one hand and Turkey (which fears Kurdish nationalism) on the other. Even al-Qaeda opposes ISIS.
The fact that all the important actors in the region oppose ISIS has given rise to the hope that this radical Sunni group can be defeated. The experience of the Bolsheviks nearly a century ago, however, shows that this might not occur. Indeed, the current situation is reminiscent of Russia after the Bolsheviks seized power there in late 1917. The harshness of their rule quickly resulted in numerous opposition groups rising up against them inside the country. External powers also recognized the Bolsheviks as a threat, and several supported their internal opponents or even directly intervened both in the final year of World War I and for a few years afterward. But even though many internal and external actors wanted to defeat the Bolsheviks, these actors ultimately worked at cross-purposes, which helped the Bolsheviks not only survive but also gain control over most of the former Tsarist Empire and pose a threat to many other nations for years.
Today, as with the threat posed by the Bolsheviks, the common threat posed by ISIS provides no guarantee that the groups who oppose it will put aside their differences and work together to defeat it. Indeed, while hopes for a grand alliance against ISIS have been expressed in many quarters, the achievement of this goal has so far proven elusive—and will likely remain so.
Many of the principal actors in the region are worried not only about ISIS, but also other threats, including one another. Iran and Russia in particular regard the Syrian government—a minority Alawite regime—as an ally and do not want to see it replaced by a Sunni majority regime that would be hostile toward them. Saudi Arabia and several other Sunni Arab states, in contrast, see Iran—along with its Shi’a allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen—as the principal threat and accordingly regard the replacement of the Assad regime as important for their security as the defeat of ISIS. Turkey, for its part, sees ISIS as a threat but apparently regards the possibility of Kurdish forces in Syria (and, as a result, in Turkey itself) growing stronger from ISIS’s defeat as an even greater one.
The Obama administration is pursuing three contradictory sets of goals in the Middle East. First, while Washington wants to preserve American relations with Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Arab states, it also wants to improve ties with Iran with which it hopes to achieve a nuclear accord. Secondly, while the US wants to preserve ties with a Turkish government that very much fears the growth of Kurdish separatism, Washington also sees Kurdish forces in Northern Iraq and in Syria as allies against ISIS. Finally, while the Obama administration genuinely wants to combat ISIS (and has, along with some of its Arab and European allies, launched airstrikes against ISIS positions in both Iraq and Syria), it also wants to do so without sending American ground forces back to Iraq. Yet it will be difficult for Washington to resolve any one of these contradictions—and may well be impossible to resolve all three.
Thus, while everyone wants to see ISIS defeated, the fact that so many of the actors in the region are working at cross-purposes could result in ISIS surviving and prospering despite universal opposition. Just this possibility should focus the minds of policymakers in different countries on how they can work together against the common threat before it grows even worse and becomes, like the Bolsheviks did almost a century ago, even more difficult to deal with.
]]>by Henry Precht
The recent telephone conversation between Presidents Obama and Rouhani — and their positive descriptions of the exchange – are precisely on target for bringing an end to the Iran-US Cold War.
Distrust has been the background noise for that conflict for more than 35 years. It need not have [...]]]>
by Henry Precht
The recent telephone conversation between Presidents Obama and Rouhani — and their positive descriptions of the exchange – are precisely on target for bringing an end to the Iran-US Cold War.
Distrust has been the background noise for that conflict for more than 35 years. It need not have been so.
During the 1960s and 1970s, the US observed a restriction on dealing with Iranians that was virtually unique in our diplomatic relations: we refused to have contact with the sovereign’s opponents. Even on American soil we declined to sit with anti-regime Iranian students. Once in the 1970s, an enterprising political officer in Tehran made an appointment to call on a prominent bazaar mullah. The Ministry of Court called Ambassador Richard Helms and said the visit would be unwise. The appointment was cancelled. In 1975, visiting Senator Charles Percy was briefed at the American and Israeli embassies. The latter told him that the mullahs were the regime’s greatest threat. Such an analysis was never heard from the Americans.
Come the revolution of 1978 and it soon became apparent that we were in touch with only one-half of Iranian politics — the losing half. Slowly, cautiously, Embassy political officers began to talk to oppositionist Mehdi Bazargan and his friends. In Washington, however, Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher forbade me as an Iranian desk officer to meet with Ibrahim Yazdi who was on his way to serve Ayatollah Khomeini in Paris.
That gentleman, leader of the revolution, remained off limits until about a month before the end game. Bill Sullivan, ambassador in Tehran, proposed that Washington send a representative to meet with the Ayatollah. President Jimmy Carter agreed. Retired Ambassador Ted Eliot was picked to do the job of explaining US policy towards the conflict and urging a more moderate approach for the revolutionaries. The Shah was informed and shrugged, “A great power must protect its interests.”
Carter and his advisor Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski left for the Guadeloupe summit of world leaders and returned with an altered perspective: the call on Khomeini was cancelled without explanation. Sullivan — on a secure phone line — cursed eloquently whoever made that “stupid decision.”
Would it have made a difference if there had been an American meeting and exchange with Khomeini? Might it have overcome the abiding conviction of the Iranian revolutionaries that we were unalterably committed to the Shah’s rule?
Perhaps not. Many on the wrong side of the barricades were convinced that Washington was determined to keep Iran as a subservient ally. But a meeting might — just might — have generated some reflection and questioning of customary wisdom. With follow-up meetings, talks could have led to a more moderate and balanced view of the American role in the region. As it was, in the months that followed, Iranian officials regularly scolded American embassy personnel for “not accepting the revolution.” Assurances to the contrary did not ring true when we refused even to talk to the revolution’s leader.
That was the backdrop for Washington’s efforts to construct a new and more normal relationship with Tehran. In the spring of 1979, Washington named a new ambassador, Walt Cutler, and Charge Charles Naas prepared to depart. Naas proposed that he seek a meeting with Khomeini to absorb the angry old man’s ire but leave the precedent of an exchange for Cutler’s benefit. Washington approved. Iran’s interim prime minister, Bazargan, was enthusiastic; here was evidence that the US was taking a new, fresh attitude towards the revolution. Perhaps a first step towards easing distrust? We hoped so, too.
But it was not to be. The Iranians executed a wealthy Jewish businessman and friend of the Shah, one of a series of judicial murders against the old regime. Led by Senator Jacob Javits, the US Senate quickly condemned revolutionary Iran in a resolution that was drafted without Executive Branch input.
Khomeini was furious at the perceived insult and interference in Iran’s affairs. He was also cautious. “Don’t break relations with them,” he told his associates. “But make them know they can’t treat us like the puppet Shah.” The agreement for Cutler as ambassador was nullified; the visit of Naas to Khomeini was cancelled.
Distrust blossomed. Washington had lost two openings to explain its policy toward Iran and gain a clearer insight as to where the country was headed. When the embassy was seized in November, we Americans had no established connection with the one man who might have ended the crisis. We could only shout at each other across an ocean.
Obviously, talking to an antagonist alone can’t fundamentally alter a relationship. But it can enhance understanding and cast doubt on dogma. Distrust breeds where one doesn’t hear, “on the other hand” or, “have you thought about the issue from this perspective?”
Not talking opens doors and windows to those who would further embitter a relationship out of ignorance, accident or design. The US-Iranian connection is replete with long periods of destructive silence.
If tensions between Tehran and Washington are to be eased, it is imperative that leaders in the two capitals keep up the flow of exchanges — at the most senior level and also between cadres of officials on both sides. Before too long, that would mean reopened embassies and revitalized exchange programs.
Iran is a land nurtured by poetry and rhetoric. Free speech is a prime American value. Relying on these aural talents, it is time for a continuous and growing exchange between the two nations.
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