Iran’s June 14 presidential election, only about a month and a half away, will get ample attention — and more than a dose of speculation — from everyone interested in the big picture items: whether there will be an actual choice of candidates, whether the result will have an [...]]]>
Iran’s June 14 presidential election, only about a month and a half away, will get ample attention — and more than a dose of speculation — from everyone interested in the big picture items: whether there will be an actual choice of candidates, whether the result will have an impact on the way the nuclear file will be approached, whether Mahmoud Ahmadinejad will go out quietly, and so on. But smaller, parallel events are fascinating because they reveal the kind of dilemmas the country’s political class faces as it tries to manage the strange institutional hybrid that it oversees.
Let’s take the case of the Guardian Council, which is in charge of vetting candidates for the presidency. This body of six clerics appointed by Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and 6 lay jurists suggested by the Judiciary head (himself appointed by the Leader) and approved by the Majles, effectively has complete leeway in deciding who can run and considers its task to be a closed affair. It doesn’t explain the reasoning behind why a particular candidate is disqualified because it doesn’t have to. As such, it’s justifiably accused of disqualifying candidates with points of view that differ from those held by its current conservative members.
This year, however, the Council may face a dilemma in vetting candidates simply because of the large number of conservative candidates who will likely apply. I would love to be a fly on the wall and listen to the reasoning behind choosing one candidate over another when they are essentially clones of each other. This was less of a problem in previous elections because there weren’t that many candidates with some sort of name recognition.
To be sure, a large number of candidates registering and even running is not new. In the Islamic Republic’s first election — when there was no vetting mechanism — 96 candidates ran. Frontrunner Abolhassan Bani Sadr won in the first round before he was booted out of office and the country in a year and a half.
In the 2005 election, the last time there was no sitting president running for reelection, the number of registered candidates topped one thousand! The Guardian Council disqualified all but 6, presumably because the overwhelming majority of them did not meet the constitutional requirement of being among the “political and religious elite” endowed with “managerial capability and prudence”; “a good past-record”; “trustworthiness and piety”; and a “convinced belief in the fundamental principles of the Islamic Republic.” Later, upon the Leader’s prodding, the Council re-qualified two Reformist candidates it had rejected. One candidate eventually dropped out and the contest among the seven candidates went to a second round among the top two candidates — a first in the Islamic Republic. In the 2001 election, ten candidates were qualified out of over 800 registrants, but a popular president, Mohammad Khatami, was re-elected overwhelmingly in the first round.
The large number of past government officials announcing their intent to run makes this election a bit different. The competition is promising as many as 20 conservative or centrist registrants with some sort of ministerial or parliamentary background, hence qualifying them as among the elite or prominent personalities, and few political reasons for disqualifications. The parliament did try to bring some order to this unwieldy process by introducing age limits and educational requirements to the eligibility criteria. But the Guardian Council, in wanting to maintain full control over the qualification process, declared the parliamentary legislation unconstitutional.
Despite this, the Council does seem concerned. Its spokesperson Abbasali Kadkhodai said it’s in the process of developing internal guidelines regarding qualifications. Another council member, Hosseinali Amiri, said the Council is trying to clarify the exact meaning of “political elite” in terms of past experience. For instance, can a minister who has been impeached by the parliament be qualified? What level of government service is representative of sufficient managerial experience (minister? deputy minister? lower?) It’s not yet clear if any of these clarifications will be made public to set precedent for future elections.
Kadkhodai also said the Council is mulling the idea of interviewing potential candidates for their plan of action or presidency program. This is totally new and if it happens, one could call it a direct result of the “Ahmadinejad effect.” The question of whether the Council members are themselves qualified or astute enough to assess through interviews a candidate’s preparedness for running the country — it took the Iranian political class about 8 years of Ahmadinejad’s presidency to reach a consensus about his lack of competence — was not addressed by Kadkhodai.
Less new is the Council’s decision of requiring more than mere acceptance of Iran’s constitution for assessing a candidate’s commitment to the Islamic Republic. According to Kadkhodai, it’s not sufficient for a president to say that he will implement the constitution because it is the law of the land. He must also be “attached” to it and “deeply believe” in it. Kadkhodai did not elaborate on how hard it may be to figure out someone’s true beliefs and feelings in a country where pretending to be a deeply pious believer is a requirement of all government jobs. Based on this criterion, everyone is suspect.
Of course, the Guardian Council can continue to maintain the tradition of only disqualifying candidates with politics it does not approve of and qualifying everyone else with the hope that the majority will drop out in favor of candidates who are more likely to be successful. Or it can decide to live with the risk of another second run election. But as of now, it appears to be scratching its head while trying to figure out new ways to disqualify even committed believers of the Islamic Republic.
As usual, improvisation remains the name of the game in trying to manage the conflicting impulses of a system that seeks to be both Islamic and a Republic, at least in appearance.
]]>via IPS News
Amid growing and increasingly harsh criticism of his handling of the economy, talk of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s removal has regained momentum in Iran in recent weeks.
But, according to most observers, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is unlikely to back any move to shorten Ahmadinejad’s term, [...]]]>
via IPS News
Amid growing and increasingly harsh criticism of his handling of the economy, talk of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s removal has regained momentum in Iran in recent weeks.
But, according to most observers, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is unlikely to back any move to shorten Ahmadinejad’s term, which runs out in mid-2013, for fear that impeaching him will only wreak greater havoc on a political environment that is already highly polarised and contentious.
Over 100 members of the parliament, or Majlis, have signed on to a demand that the president be summoned to answer questions about the recent drastic devaluation of the currency. Runaway inflation, combined with rising unemployment, has rattled many MPs concerned with the devaluation’s impact both on the price of key imports and the cost of operating factories and agricultural enterprises.
If the president either refuses to appear or fails to explain his policies to parliament’s satisfaction, the issue may eventually be referred to the judiciary, which, would, in turn, clear the way to his removal before the presidential election scheduled to take place next June.
But even the MPs who have called for Ahmadinejad to testify are not optimistic that such a scenario is realistic. “Neither MPs have hope that such questioning will lead anywhere, nor the representatives of the government are trying to stop the process,” according to Etemaad Daily.
Calls for Ahamdinejad’s removal are not new. In mid-summer there were reports that two former members of Ahmadinejad’s cabinet – former foreign minister Manouchehr Mottaki and former interior minister Mostafa Pourmohammadi – had written a letter to Khamenei calling for the president’s removal.
Khamenei, however, has proved reluctant to criticise the president or acknowledge the severe economic woes the country faces. In the two weeks of intense volatility in the currency market, he even denied during a provincial visit the existence of an economic crisis.
He acknowledged that problems such as unemployment and inflation exist “like everywhere else”, but insisted that these problems can be overcome. “Nothing exists that the nation and officials cannot solve,” he said.
Khamenei’s positive take on the state of the Iranian economy is received with quite a lot of scepticism among the population. Many people see Khamenei as oblivious to the crushing burden of economic difficulties that increasingly dominate conversations at dinner tables, in cafes, and in the street.
Khamenei’s continued support for Ahmadinejad is also much discussed. Some prominent politicians, such as Deputy Speaker Mohammadreza Bahaonar, have publicly said that the Leader wants the government to finish its legal terms. “The cost of removing the president is more than us doing nothing for another year,” he said recently.
This is not a view shared by Ahmad Tavakoli, another prominent MP from Tehran. “Ahmadinejad’s period is over, and the continuation of his presidency is not positive,” he said this week, suggesting that he disagrees with Khamenei’s decision to tolerate Ahmadinejad until the end of his term.
There are other theories why Khamenei will continue to support Ahmadinejad. According to Ali, a journalist who asked only that his first name be used, Khamenei cannot back down from the support because he is unable to explain the costs his support of Ahmadinejad in the disputed 2009 election have imposed on the people and the country. “Khamenei prefers the current situation to acknowledging that he made a mistake,” Ali insists.
Reza, a 58-year-old political activist, sees fear as the explanation for Khamenei’s support for Ahmadinejad. He believes that Ahmadineajd’s penchant for creating “corruption dossiers” on key political actors “will eventually be directed at Khamenei’s family whose financial record is not without blemish.”
According to Reza, if pushed, “Ahmadinejad will reveal the information he has and this scares the Ayatollah. Through his support Khamenei is in effect paying for Ahamdinejad’s silence.”
In reality, Khamenei faces a complex situation. On the one hand, he must deal with the more public and harsher criticism of Ahmadinejad’s economic policies, and, on the other, the potentially destabilising impact of the president’s removal.
So far, Khamenei’s approach in balancing these two concerns seeks a third path, which, according to one political commentator, is “to take effective control of executive affairs and transform Ahmadinejad into a show president whose time is spent traveling abroad.”
The result can be seen in Khamenei’s conduct in the past few years. Until recently, Khamenei was always considered to be a “sitting Leader” whose annual trips to a designated province or public appearances were mostly limited to official events, such as the anniversary of the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Islamic Republic’s founder.
Since the end of the post- 2009 election protests, however, Khamenei has taken many more short trips. Earlier this year, for example, he comforted the family of an assassinated nuclear scientist at their home. He also took a quick trip to East Azerbaijan after the August earthquake while the president was in Saudi Arabia.
More significantly, he has been meeting with economic actors and their representatives in the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, eliciting their views and promising redress. One recently elected MP who did not want to be identified told IPS, “I send requests regarding my district’s needs directly to the Leader and not the president.”
A University of Tehran professor says that the roots of Khamenei’s increased activism can be found in Ahmadinejad’s extensive use of executive privilege and extra-legal powers to circumvent and marginalise other branches of the government, particularly the parliament.
According to the professor, however, Khamenei may also be engaged in unconstitutional conduct by interfering in the affairs of the executive branch. “Khamenei is as blameworthy as Ahmadinejad in weakening the rule of law and preventing other institutions from performing their supervisory task in relation to the executive branch,” he says.
Khamenei rejects these criticisms and said in April 2011, after he prevented Ahmadinejad from firing the intelligence minister, Heydar Moslehi, that “the office of the Leader has no intention of interfering in the decisions and activities of the government, unless it feels that an interest of the state has been ignored.”
These days, however, his words are received with scepticism. Maryam, a retired teacher, sees in Khamenei’s performance a desire to centralise power in his office. “He wants a weak president so that he can be in control and be in charge, and now he is in charge of everything. Why should he change the situation?”
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