Erbil—After a period of frostiness, Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Turkey seem intent on mending the ties, as each of the parties show signs of needing the other.
But the Kurds appear more cautious this time around, leery of moving too close to Ankara lest they alienate the new Iraqi government in Baghdad with which they signed a breakthrough oil deal Tuesday.
The agreement, which will give Baghdad greater control over oil produced in Kurdistan and Kurdish-occupied Kirkuk in exchange for the KRG’s receipt of a bigger share of the central government’s budget, may signal an effort to reduce Erbil’s heavy reliance on Turkey.
The warmth between Iraqi Kurds and Turkey was a rather strange affair to begin with. It emerged unexpectedly and evolved dramatically since the 2003 US invasion of Iraq.
Whereas Turkey is a major player in the Middle East and Eurasia regions, Iraqi Kurdistan is not even an independent state. The imbalance of power between the two parties made their development of a “strategic” relationship particularly remarkable.
Given the deep historical animosity in Ankara towards all things Kurdish, the change of heart on its leaders’ part also seemed almost miraculous, even if highly lucrative to Turkish construction companies in particular.
But those ties suffered a major blow in August when the forces of the Islamic State (ISIS or IS) marched toward Kurdish-held territories in Iraq.
With IS threatening Kurdistan’s capital city, Erbil, Turkey did little to assist the Kurds. Many in Kurdistan and beyond were baffled; it was a case of “a friend in need is a friend indeed” gone wrong.
The overwhelming sense in Erbil was that Turkey had abandoned Iraqi Kurds in the middle of a life-and-death crisis. KRG President Masoud Barzani, Ankara’s closest ally, felt moved to publicly thank Iran, Turkey’s regional rival, for rushing arms and other supplies to Kurdish peshmerga fighters in their hour of need.
In their efforts to simultaneously develop an understanding and save face, some senior KRG officials defended Ankara, insisting that its hands were tied by the fact that more than 40 staff members in its consulate in the Iraqi city of Mosul, including the consul, had been taken hostage by IS. Other officials were more critical, slamming Ankara for not having acted decisively in KRG’s support.
The that the country was experiencing elections where the ambitious then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was running for the newly enhanced office of president was also invoked as a reason for his reluctance to enter into war with such a ruthless group.
It also appeared to observers here that Erdogan did not want to do anything that could strengthen his archenemy, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, even if that meant effectively siding with the Sunni jihadists.
But last month’s visit to Iraq by Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu appears to have helped repair the relationship with the Kurds in the north. Davutoglu turned on his personal charm to reassure his hosts, even visiting a mountainous area where Turkish special forces are now training members of the Kurdish peshmerga.
The question of how long it takes for the relationship to bounce back to the point where it was six months ago is anyone’s guess.
It’s clear, however, that despite the recent slide in relations, both sides need each other.
As a land-locked territory, Kurds will be looking for an alternative that they can use to counter pressure from the central Iraqi government.
Focused on laying the foundation for a high degree of economic and political autonomy—if not independence—from Baghdad, the Kurds’ strategic ambition is to be able to control and ideally sell their oil and gas to international clients. And geography also dictates that the most obvious and economically efficient route runs through Turkey, with or without Baghdad’s blessing.
As for Ankara, Iraqi Kurdistan is now its only friend in an otherwise hostile region.
Once upon a time, not long ago, politicians in Ankara boasted of the success of their “zero-problems-with-neighbors” policy that had reshuffled regional politics and turned some of Turkey’s long-standing foes in the region, including Syria, into friends. But that era is now gone.
Ankara has come to see Iraqi Kurdistan as a potential major supplier of its own energy needs and has generally sided with the KRG in its disputes with Baghdad.
Kurdish leaders have been criticized for putting most of their eggs in Ankara’s basket.
The last time Kurds invested so much of their trust in a neighboring country was during the 1960s and 1970s when they were supported by the Shah of Iran who used them to exert pressure on Baghdad. This produced disastrous results when the Shah abruptly abandoned Kurds in return for territorial concessions by the Iraqi government in the Shatt al-Arab River separating southern Iran from Iraq.
Turkey’s indifference and passivity in August when all of Iraqi Kurdistan came under existential threat by the IS jihadists reminded many here of the consequences of placing too much trust in their neighbors. The hoary proverb that “Kurds have no friends but the mountains” suddenly regained its currency.
IS’s siege of the Syrian Kurdish town of Kobani—just one kilometre from the Turkish frontier—compounded that distrust, not only for Iraqi Kurds, but for Kurds throughout the region, including in Turkey itself.
Indeed, Turkey’s refusal to assist Kurdish fighters against IS’s brutal onslaught has made it harder for the KRG to initiate a reconciliation.
Although Ankara has now changed its position—under heavy US pressure—and is now permitting peshmerga forces to provide limited assistance and re-inforcements for Kobani’s defenders, the process of mending fences is still moving rather slowly.
While that process has now begun, it remains unclear how far both sides will go.
Will it be again a case of Ankara and Erbil jointly versus Baghdad, or will Erbil play the game differently this time, aiming for balance between the two capitals?
Indeed, the much-lauded oil deal struck Tuesday between Baghdad and the KRG may indicate a preference for the latter strategy, particularly in light of their mutual interest in both confronting the IS and compensating for losses in revenue resulting from the steep plunge in oil prices.
Still, given the history of deals sealed and then broken that have long characterized relations between the Kurds and Baghdad, nothing can be taken for granted.
Photo: KRG President Masoud Barzani at the official opening of the Erbil International Airport and Turkish Consulate in 2011. Credit: Official KRG Photo
Mohammed A. Salih is a journalist based in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan. He has written for almost a decade about Kurdish and Iraqi affairs for local and international media.
]]>by Wayne White
Once again American observers are outbidding each other over how serious a threat the Islamic State (ISIS or IS) poses. Recent IS gains in Iraq heightened Washington’s concern, causing President Obama to huddle with coalition defense ministers. In this air of heightened crisis, the option of deploying US combat troops has been revived. Yet this supposed fix (even just talk of it) involves a host of likely problems.
The 19th Century politician, diplomat and writer Don Piatt once said, “A man’s greatness can be measured by his enemies.” If applied to the Islamic State, IS falls short in terms of the ground conflict. The radical Sunni group’s foes consist of the demoralized, ill-led Iraqi Army; Iraq’s sectarian, dysfunctional government; the better, but potentially shaky, Iraqi Kurds; the paltry forces of the rebel Free Syrian Army; and the fierce-fighting but under-armed and ill-supplied Syrian Kurds. Naturally, IS has scored successes against such weak opponents. But that does not make it the irresistible force portrayed by many.
Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has been virtually useless since replacing the discredited Nouri al-Maliki. Surrounded by much the same hyper-sectarian Shia politicians, Abadi has not made an earnest, good faith effort to weaken IS by wooing away many of its Sunni Arab tribal and military supporters. This is, by far, the most critical factor in Iraq on the ground. Far more pressure from the US and perhaps mediation by regional actors must be considered.
Without a Sunni Arab game change against IS, isolated western Iraqi garrisons in towns and bases have been falling. The al-Asad Airbase complex near the city of Hit may be next. Largely government-held Ramadi remains out of IS hands, but only because surrounding tribes oppose the group. And even with Baghdad at its back, the Iraqi Army’s performance has been marked by repeated failures.
Meanwhile, the Free Syrian Army has received little of the military support for which it has begged for three years. Plagued by inferior weaponry and ammunition shortages, and comprised of a welter of semi-autonomous local militias, it poses little danger to IS.
Though more determined and coherent than the Iraqi Army, Iraqi Kurdish fighters, the Peshmerga, typically advance behind heavy US air support or in relatively weakly held IS areas. Despite a few exceptions, they are generally reluctant to advance very far—and hold ground—much beyond their own borders.
Meanwhile, the US ignored heroic resistance by tougher Syrian Kurds until recently. They represent the only major contingent of highly motivated anti-ISIS boots on the ground. Probably in response to Turkish wishes, the US largely withheld air support for nearly two weeks.
Yet since declaring Kobani a humanitarian disaster on Oct. 14, the US has hammered IS positions at Kobani with waves of airstrikes, after strikes last week proved too few. Intelligence sharing between the US and the defenders of Kobani has made the strikes more effective. Had strikes this powerful been launched two weeks earlier, Kobani itself would not have become a battlefield.
Providing no military assistance whatsoever, Turkey has blocked thousands of Turkish Kurdish reinforcements from reaching Kobani. Fighters and doctors on the scene report numerous border closures and wounded combatants dying just inside Syria awaiting treatment in Turkey. Other fighters from Kobani have been arrested at the border, including some wounded.
Still, all around the Islamic State’s current holdings are countries with powerful militaries capable of dealing serious blows to IS regardless of the group’s fanaticism. Turkey to the north, Iran to the east, and Jordan to the south represent dangerous potential IS enemies if attacked. Just beyond Damascus and northwestern Jordan lies perhaps the most formidable local foe: Israel. Much of Iraq’s Shia south would become a graveyard for IS forces attempting to seize sizeable portions of this hostile area, in part because Iran would not let this area and Shia Islam’s holiest shrines fall.
The Anti-IS Front
Turkish cooperation with NATO against IS would vastly boost anti-IS operations. Air support could be based much closer to targets, Syrian and Iraqi Kurds could receive assistance, and the Islamic State’s smuggling of goods and recruits could be curbed. A Turkish volte-face might also salvage its peace process with the Kurds. Turkey has been holding its support hostage to demands such as coalition airstrikes against the Syrian regime. The coalition must keep pushing back; compliance would dissipate the air war against IS.
Other coalition partners, including NATO states like Germany, have also remained on the sidelines or provided little. This too needs to change to impose further pressure on IS.
If Kobani is an example of solid boots on the ground, Iraqi troops fighting west of Baghdad represent the opposite (despite heightened air support and attacks by US Apache helicopter gunships). In Kobani, Kurds have responded to strikes by attacking to clear IS fighters from some areas lost earlier. Heavier strikes near Baghdad barely shore up wavering defense lines.
Instead of responding to lackluster ground forces by boosting air strikes, it should be made clear that forces willing to fight hard to capitalize on air strikes will receive priority. Otherwise under-motivated forces may do even less, hoping air power would do their jobs for them—a losing proposition.
Is such a policy risky? Yes, but so is pouring in US combat troops in the numbers being discussed. Iraqi forces—with Baghdad at stake—must be forced by circumstance to stand their ground. And if densely populated Shia neighborhoods in Baghdad are threatened, they probably would.
Some have downplayed the impact of airstrikes against IS. They maintain strikes must be complimented by decent ground troops–correct where IS goes for more territory. However, a month of pounding undoubtedly has had an overall impact on IS even if that is not yet evident in some frontline fighting. The air campaign also is a long-term affair, with adjustments, mounting contributions, and accumulated impact. One plus is the Islamic State’s fanaticism, driving it to continue exposing its military assets to airstrikes along frontlines where heavy damage could be inflicted.
Committing US combat troops to battle around Baghdad would signal to Iraqi ground troops that they need not take most of the responsibility for the capital’s defense. Americans concerned that sending combat troops would escalate demand for more (“mission creep”) are correct. Reliance on US troops also would regenerate an unhealthy dependency.
More US advisors instead of line combat troops would be wiser, but competence is not the main problem; Iraqi soldiers must see they have no choice but to fight it out with IS. That goes beyond advice, and some advisors caught up in rapid, haphazard Iraqi retreats could be killed or captured by IS. Although advisors are also valuable in coordinating frontline aerial targeting, Americans would have to be prepared for losses. Some of those might well involve the ritual execution of captured US soldiers—perhaps the biggest risk involved in committing large forces.
]]>by Wayne White
An old military dictum still applies: no determined enemy can be stopped by air power alone. Much will depend on whether the Kurdish Peshmerga militia proves willing to make a stand against the forces of the Islamic State (formerly known as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant). [...]]]>
by Wayne White
An old military dictum still applies: no determined enemy can be stopped by air power alone. Much will depend on whether the Kurdish Peshmerga militia proves willing to make a stand against the forces of the Islamic State (formerly known as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant). Meanwhile, Washington has little choice but to remain cautious about committing itself to more than tightly focused airstrikes linked to narrow contingencies. Ironically, more extensive US air support might be made available if the Kurds show they are ready to make a strong stand.
The track record of Peshmerga fighting capabilities so far in this crisis is worrisome. After the Iraqi Army abandoned large areas all around the boundaries of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) over a month ago, Peshmerga units were quick to move in to fill the void, in part because most of these territories were mixed demographically, in dispute with Baghdad, and coveted by the KRG. When, however, challenged by Islamic State forces as of last weekend, the Kurds showed little desire to face off with the Sunni Arab extremist group in order to defend them.
Kurdish leaders argue that they lack sufficient weapons with which to face Islamic State forces. However, the Peshmerga probably outnumber the forces facing them, and most Islamic State fighters are no better equipped than the Kurds. The rugged terrain of much of Iraqi Kurdistan also provides defensive advantages. Finally, the Peshmerga do possess weapons such as heavy machine guns, rocket propelled grenades (RPG’s), light mortars, and formidable light anti-aircraft guns for use against opposing ground forces. Dug in properly using towns and mountainous terrain features as obstacles, with this array of weaponry the Peshmerga could inflict very heavy casualties on the Islamic State.
Such losses could give the Islamic State some real pause as its forces have yet to suffer high casualty rates in Iraq. Its ugly reputation has generally sufficed until now to frighten potential opponents into abandoning the field. This is what the Islamic State is counting on again to defeat the Kurds.
Furthermore, it would be very dangerous if the KRG is deluding itself into thinking US air strikes can stop the Islamic State. Without robust Kurdish resistance, ISIS would be capable of overrunning much of Iraqi Kurdistan, driving millions of Kurds and other refugees sheltered by them into Turkey and Iran. Aside from the obvious humanitarian disaster this would represent, billions of dollars of Kurdish real estate and infrastructure investment over the past 11 years for the creation of a prosperous new Kurdish region would fall to the Islamic State and be demolished or heavily looted.
If the Kurdish leaders and the Peshmerga do, however, muster sufficient willpower to stand their ground and confront the Islamic State, Washington might well reconsider its tightly limited aerial support role. With Kurds fiercely defending along identifiable lines, more US airpower could be usefully employed to take out the Islamic State’s heavy weaponry in a way that would level the military playing field for the Peshmerga.
Most of the heavy weapons the Islamic State is capable of putting into the fight would stand out rather starkly for American military pilots on the rolling terrain of northern Iraq. This would present the US with a real opportunity to take out large quantities of the US equipment the Islamic State captured in the wake of the Iraqi Army’s retreat some weeks ago.
The next few days will be defining: Washington will find out whether it has a partner in northern Iraq with which it can work in putting the brakes on the Islamic State’ advance on that front. So far I suspect the White House has wisely kept some cards well hidden. Nonetheless, it would be difficult to believe that if the Kurds stand their ground, give the Islamic State a bloody nose, but need help here and there to hold on, Washington would not be willing to increase the tempo of its air strikes in support of the Peshmerga.
Such a scenario also could be a lesson for Baghdad. Firm US backing for a determined KRG government and Peshmerga might provide a political boost for those Iraqi leaders pressing for what President Obama again called for last night: an inclusive Iraqi government that would provide Washington — and other governments — with a reliable partner in the struggle against the Islamic State throughout all of Iraq. Such a government inevitably would merit more additional US and international support than has been the case with the dysfunctional mess prevailing in Baghdad in recent months.
Photo: President Barack Obama meets with his national security advisors in the Situation Room of the White House, Aug. 7, 2014. Credit: Official White House photo by Pete Souza
]]>by Wayne White
Forces of the Islamic State, formerly known as ISIS, have lunged toward two strategic dams earlier this month, one in the north and the other west of Baghdad. The northern offensive drove Kurdish forces from areas they had protected, showing how vulnerable Iraqi Kurds could be in the face [...]]]>
by Wayne White
Forces of the Islamic State, formerly known as ISIS, have lunged toward two strategic dams earlier this month, one in the north and the other west of Baghdad. The northern offensive drove Kurdish forces from areas they had protected, showing how vulnerable Iraqi Kurds could be in the face of more sweeping attacks. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s battle for political survival has delayed a more coherent, unified Iraqi response to the military threat posed by the Islamic State. Certain gains from this Sunni extremist group while Baghdad remains adrift politically would increase the potential for greater foreign military involvement.
The Islamic State has tried for weeks to get its hands on the Haditha Dam complex near Fallujah, Iraq’s second largest reservoir. To their credit, Iraqi troops have so far fought well in fending off the militants; Baghdad was able to reinforce its Haditha garrison at one point with 2,000 more troops. Nonetheless, the garrison is mostly isolated deep within Islamic State-held territory.
On Aug. 1, the Islamic State launched its heaviest attack to date toward Haditha. The assault almost broke through government lines. However, late in the fighting, Sunni Arab tribes from the area massed against the Islamic State to prevent the dam from falling to the group. These tribes depend on the dam, and they were not prepared to let go of such an important asset.
It is, however, doubtful that the Islamic State would simply destroy the dam (or one near Mosul that it may have seized). Blowing up the dams to spite downstream Shia would flood large Sunni Arab areas under Islamic State-control — hardly desirable as the group tries to win more Sunnis over to its side. The Islamic State may wish instead to manipulate dam power flows to benefit areas under its control, deny power to Shia areas, and, yes, occasionally alter water flows to damage government held areas downstream.
Challenging the Kurds
Seemingly in parallel, the Islamic State lunged for the Mosul Dam (Iraq’s largest) in the north on Aug. 3, which Iraq’s Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) occupied when it took control of extensive areas around the KRG’s perimeter to head off the militant threat. In addition, Islamic State fighters took Sinjar on Aug. 2, two smaller towns, and an oilfield. These locales were in Kurdish hands too, although isolated along the Syrian border far west of the KRG and hard to defend. Both sides claim to have the dam, but local residents told the AP on Aug. 7 that the Islamic State now holds it. The group also struck the other end of the KRG perimeter near the Iranian border, but was repulsed.
The Islamic State realizes KRG forces are spread thinly trying to cover a perimeter hundreds of miles long, so it can mass its forces at selected points to overwhelm local defenses. And the Islamic State’s re-conquest of mixed areas taken over by the Kurds in June could play well among Sunni Arabs concerned by KRG ambitions.
Excessive praise for the Peshmerga capabilities tends to be misplaced. The Peshmerga (literally, “those who face death”) mainly consists of militia-style light infantry against which the Islamic State can use heavy weapons seized from fleeing Iraqi forces when Mosul fell. In fact, the Peshmerga have an iffy track record against heavily equipped or fanatical opponents.
In 1991, after crushing much of a Shia rebellion in the south, Saddam Hussein’s well-equipped forces easily pushed aside Peshmerga units, driving over 2 million Kurds into Turkey and Iran. Then, in 2002, prior to the US invasion of Iraq, the Peshmerga twice tried to dislodge a small pocket of Ansar al-Islam (extremist Kurds and some al-Qaeda fighters who had eluded US forces in Afghanistan). In both instances, large Peshmerga assault forces were stopped cold by small numbers of less well-armed fanatics. Lastly, the Kurds faced little of the Sunni Arab insurgency’s wrath during 2003-08, so Kurdish Peshmerga saw little recent combat from which it could have drawn much needed military experience.
The KRG did seize large quantities of heavy weapons including tanks, other armored vehicles, and artillery from Saddam’s demobilized army after the US invasion in 2003. Little was done to incorporate them into Peshmerga units. Worse still, one of the two dominant Kurdish factions, the Popular Union of Kurdistan (PUK), sold a large quantity of this equipment to the Iranians.
The Secretary General of the KRG ministry overseeing the Peshmerga, Jabbar Yawar, declared on Aug. 6 that the Peshmerga would switch from defense to offense; Islamic State positions were attacked that day. The KRG is now receiving some limited air support from Baghdad and fighters from the Syrian Kurdish community, which has had considerable success in fending off the Islamic State. Nonetheless, KRG forces remain dangerously overstretched, and it lost more towns to the Islamic State in predominantly Christian areas under Kurdish protection on Aug. 7.
Yazidi Humanitarian Crisis
Iraq’s latest humanitarian crisis is associated with the fall of Sinjar, where Iraq’s small Yazidi community lives. Yazidis are members of an obscure sect often incorrectly labeled “Devil worshippers.” The Islamic State sees them as infidels, and there have been reports of executions.
Most Yazidis from Sinjar have taken refuge in mountains around the town, but the Islamic State has been trying to secure the heights to seize them. In an Aug. 5 Iraqi parliamentary session, a Yazidi deputy made an impassioned plea to save her people from genocide. Fortunately, some of the Yazidis from Sinjar were reportedly rescued over the past 24 hours.
Political Uncertainty in Baghdad
Maliki has remained adamant that he will not step down as a prime ministerial candidate despite opposition from key ally Iran, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Sunni Arabs, Kurds, and even some former Shia supporters. Despite his reduced chances of prevailing, Maliki clearly does not care that his stand has postponed fielding a fresh new crisis government to marshal Iraqi forces against the Islamic State.
Last week, US officials began meeting in Erbil with Sunni Arab officials and leaders from Islamic State-occupied areas to help fashion a Sunni Arab alliance against the group. US officials admitted, however, that the American strategy would not make much headway as long as Maliki remains prime minister.
Constitutionally, Maliki is on solid ground. As the head of the parliamentary list that garnered the most votes in elections earlier this year, he should be given first crack at forming a government.
The deadline for giving the go-ahead to someone is only days away. So, Iraq’s new president, Fouad Massoum, might as well ask Maliki to try and form a government (even if Maliki fails). Although time consuming, this move appears to be the only way to force Maliki to step aside. That might happen in a parliamentary session today.
Fragile Military Situation
Although it has so far been largely checked farther south, now that the Islamic State has shown interest in hitting Iraq’s Kurds in the north, it will probably make additional gains up there. And until there is a new government in Baghdad, Iraq will remain unable to mobilize its full potential to check or drive the Islamic State back.
Should the Islamic State concentrate its scattered forces for a major, focused offensive, it could jeopardize all Kurdish holdings outside the KRG (including Kirkuk), or even thrust into the KRG to throw Kurdish forces off balance. It might overwhelm isolated Iraqi government garrisons in Haditha, the refinery complex in Taiji, or Samarra with its highly sensitive Shia mosque/shrine. Similarly, the failure of most of the surrounded Yazidis to avoid capture followed by a massive Islamic State-atrocity against them would generate a huge wave of international outrage. Even additional territory in the vicinity of Baghdad could fall to an especially robust assault by the Islamic State.
The worst-case scenarios noted above would place Turkey, Iran and the US in particular under more intense pressure to take direct military action against the Islamic State. For example, would Tehran allow Samarra to fall to the group after Iranian senior officers have been sent to help organize its defense?
]]>by Mohammed A. Salih
Ebril — The Iraqi Kurdish media and public are these days buzzing with heated discussions about independence. The reason is simple: never before has there been such a promising opportunity for Kurds to establish their own state.
Even prior to the recent crisis in Iraq, the situation was not [...]]]>
by Mohammed A. Salih
Ebril — The Iraqi Kurdish media and public are these days buzzing with heated discussions about independence. The reason is simple: never before has there been such a promising opportunity for Kurds to establish their own state.
Even prior to the recent crisis in Iraq, the situation was not promising for Kurds. In addition to the ongoing political bickering between the politicians in Baghdad and the Kurdish capital, Erbil, the Iraqi government’s decision to cut off the Kurdish region’s share of the national budget meant that average people in Kurdistan were seriously affected.
Since the Baghdad government halted the Kurdish region’s budget in February, the Kurdish government has struggled to pay the hundreds of thousands of people on its payroll on time. With the government being the largest employer in this region of nearly 5 million people, the local economy has considerably slowed down. Moreover, there are now serious security threats posed by the Islamic State (IS) to the west and south of the Kurdish borders. Public services such as electricity, fuel and roads were always the cause of many complaints in Kurdistan even before this crisis. Now with the territory under the direct control of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) expanded by over 30 percent, power and fuel shortages have become even more frequent.
Against this backdrop, pro-independence sentiments are rising among Kurds. With Iraq stumbling from one major crisis into another with no end in sight, the vast majority of Kurds have lost whatever faith they might have had in the idea of a functioning Iraq. Baghdad’s regression in the last couple of years to strong-arm policies of the past, such as using overt and covert military threats to cut the budget that so many people here desperately rely on have also worsened the situation.
With Baghdad now mired in conflict against the IS-led Sunni Arab militants, and Kurdistan’s border with the Iraqi government reduced to around 15 km from the over 1,000 km just before June 10, many in Kurdistan believe it’s time to break away from Iraq.
A major factor inspiring pro-independence feelings — in addition to the lack of trust in the Baghdad government and the desire to avoid the bloody conflict between Sunni rebels and the Iraqi army — are the opportunities that the idea of an independent Kurdish nation promises. With Kurdistan sitting on top of around 50 billion barrels of oil, an independent Kurdish state enjoying a reasonable level of regional and international recognition could experience unprecedented levels of prosperity and strength. If the Kurdish government can achieve its stated production target of one million barrels per day some time next year, it could achieve an income of around $35 to $40 billion per year. That figure is about triple the amount the KRG received from Baghdad last year.
Many Kurdish officials appear to be encouraged by the mix of relatively suitable conditions for secession and the prospects in store.
“We as Kurds are tired with what is going on in Baghdad,” Hemin Hewrami, a senior KDP official told me in early July after a session of the Kurdish Parliament when the President of the Kurdistan Region, Massoud Barzani, called on lawmakers to set in motion a process expected to result in a referendum on independence. He was quick to point out that there will be “no rolling back.”
Baghdad appears unable to react. Despite pronouncing their opposition to the idea of a Kurdish state, many here believe Turkey and much of the western world will eventually come to terms with an independent Kurdistan. Iran is the only country that has expressed strong sentiments against Kurdish independence. It fears that Iraq’s central government will be further weakened without Kurdish involvement, and worries that Kurdistan’s independence might stir up stronger nationalist sentiment among its own sizable Kurdish population. Meanwhile, much of the Arab world has remained silent on the matter, which has been perceived here as a covert sign of consent.
A major impediment to independence appears to be internal as the two most powerful Kurdish parties –- the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) — don’t see eye to eye over the push for independence.
While Barzani’s KDP has been very vocally supportive of the push at this time, the PUK (led by Iraq’s ailing President Jalal Talabani) seems to be divided over the matter.
However, if the referendum does take place, the people will ultimately make the decision and the consensus seems to be that they will vote overwhelmingly for independence.
Even if Kurdistan doesn’t achieve independence any time soon, many believe the nature of the relationship between the Kurds and the Iraqi government will change forever as a result of the current crisis. Kurdish leaders are already saying that if Kurds don’t declare independence, they will accept nothing less than a confederational arrangement where Kurdistan will further upgrade its autonomy from Baghdad.
“Our party has called for either independence or confederation,” Rizgar Ali, a senior PUK official told me in his office in Erbil last week. “There are no binders between Kurds and Iraq now…and Kurds cannot be a spectator forever.”
Talking to people here in Erbil, it’s hard to find someone who wants the old arrangement to persist.
Photo: Kurdish Peshmerga Keep Fragile Peace In Kirkuk. Credit: Spencer Platt/Getty Images
– Mohammed A. Salih is a journalist based in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan. He has written for almost a decade about Kurdish and Iraqi affairs for local and international media.
]]>The Kurdish flag is flying high in the wind from the rooftop of an old brick house inside Kirkuk’s millennia-old citadel, as Rashid – a stern-looking man sitting behind a machine gun – monitors the surroundings.
Rashid commands a small unit of a dozen fighters, members of the Kurdish armed forces [...]]]>
The Kurdish flag is flying high in the wind from the rooftop of an old brick house inside Kirkuk’s millennia-old citadel, as Rashid – a stern-looking man sitting behind a machine gun – monitors the surroundings.
Rashid commands a small unit of a dozen fighters, members of the Kurdish armed forces – known as the Peshmerga – deployed to the oil-rich province since June 13.
On June 12, the Iraqi army evacuated its positions in Kirkuk province after its troops had earlier conceded control of the country’s second largest city, Mosul, in the face of advancing Sunni militant groups led by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS).
“Since we have been deployed here things have changed,” says Rashid, a Peshmerga for 25 years, with a sense of pride. “It’s safer now and people can go out and do their daily business.”
However, although the deployment of thousands of Peshmerga troops has in fact brought relative calm to the city so far, trouble appears to be brewing.
Rich in natural resources such as oil and home to a mixed population of Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen and Christians, Kirkuk is no stranger to conflict. It has been at the heart of decades of armed and political struggles between the Kurds and successive Iraqi governments.
Since the Kurdish takeover there, armed Shia groups have been flexing their muscles, a move that has infuriated the considerable Sunni Arab population in the province and could be a potentially destabilising factor, while insurgent activity by Sunni militants continues in some parts of the province and has left tens of casualties behind so far.
The local office of the influential Shia cleric Muqtada Sadr organised a military parade on June 21 in which hundreds of armed Shia men walked through the streets in downtown Kirkuk.
“The parade was meant to send a couple of messages. One was a message of reassurance to all Iraqis that there are soldiers to defend all segments of the people,” says Sheikh Raad al-Sakhri, the local representative of Sadr, sitting on the floor of his well-protected Khazal al-Tamimi mosque. “And the other was a message to terrorists that there is another army ready to fight for the sake of the country if the [official] military [forces] fall short of their duties.”
Al-Sakhri might claim his men will protect everyone, but the Sunni Arabs here are not convinced.
At the peak of Iraq’s sectarian strife in 2006 and 2007, Sadr’s Mahdi Army was seen as responsible for summary execution of thousands of Sunnis in the capital Baghdad and other areas.
“A question for the local government [in Kirkuk] is will it allow Sunni Arabs to carry out a similar (military) parade,” says Massoud Zangana, a former human rights activist turned businessman, who alleges he has been threatened with death by Shia armed groups. “The number of Sunni Arabs is more than the Shia in this city.”
Zangana owns a television channel called Taghyir – Arabic for ‘Change’ – that broadcasts from Amman, Jordan, which some Iraqis refer to as the “Revolution Channel” for its steady coverage of Sunni protests two years ago and of the current fight between Sunni militants and the Iraqi army.
Local media are also buzzing with reports that the central government in Baghdad has delivered a couple of arms’ shipments via the city’s airport to Shia militiamen here.
Officials in Kirkuk or Baghdad have not confirmed those reports.
“Giving weapons to official security forces is okay but providing arms to one side to fight the others is wrong,” says Mohammed Khalil Joburi, a Sunni Arab member of the Kirkuk Provincial Council, wishing that the news of arm deliveries is not true.
The local government in Kirkuk is run by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), a major Kurdish party that has close relationship with Iran. Many in the local media speculate that the PUK-controlled administration in Kirkuk had possibly agreed to the military display by Shia groups under pressure from Iraq’s powerful eastern neighbour, Iran.
Despite the appearance of relative calm, tensions are high in Kirkuk and security forces are visible throughout the city.
By appearing to favour Shia armed elements, Kurds might risk alienating the local Sunni Arabs and potentially push them toward cooperation with ISIS and other militant Sunni factions.
In Bashir, a village in southern Kirkuk populated by Shia Turkmen, local Shia militias and Kurdish Peshmerga forces have clashed with ISIS and other Sunni militant groups.
In the western part of the province around Hawija district, the Kurdish Peshmerga have repeatedly fought against ISIS and its local allies.
Kirkuk has not been spared suicide attacks, a trademark of ISIS and jihadist groups.
On June 25, a suicide attack killed at least five people and injured around two dozen others.
The challenge before Kurds who effectively rule most parts of the province is to prevent a spillover of violence and sectarian divisions in other parts of the country into Kirkuk.
Kurds view Kirkuk as part of their homeland, Kurdistan, and hope they can maintain their current military and political dominance in the city.
In the latest Iraqi parliamentary elections in April, Kurds won eight out of the 12 parliamentary seats allocated to the province.
Kirkuk’s vast oil fields have the capacity to produce around half a million barrels of oil per day and Kurds consider Kirkuk central to their aspirations to build an independent state.
Massoud Barzani, President of the Kurdistan Region, recently said that he will deploy as many forces as needed to maintain Kurdish control of the contested province.
On June 30, Barzani asked the head of United Nations Mission to Iraq to organise a referendum in which Kirkuk’s residents can decide whether they want to be part of the Kurdistan Region.
The official territory of the Kurdistan Region includes Erbil, Sulaimaniya and Dohuk provinces.
But after the Iraqi military’s recent defeat at the hand of ISIS-led Sunni militant groups, Kurds have expanded their control over large parts of the neighbouring Kirkuk, Nineveh, Diyala and Salahaddin provinces.
Now in charge of Kirkuk, the challenge for Kurds is walking a fine line between Shia and Sunni, Arab and Turkmen populations to maintain order in the medium and long term.
In a deeply-divided city facing the threat of jihadists close by, Kirkuk’s Shia and Sunni leaders who spoke to IPS appeared to have no objection to Peshmerga’s control of Kirkuk, at least in the short term.
In the heart of the city’s historic citadel, Rashid and his young men are well aware of the difficult task lying ahead. “We are here to protect all groups … We don’t wish to fight but this area is surrounded by ISIS and all sorts of other groups,” says Rashid.
“We don’t know what their goal is, but we are on alert here.”
*This article was first published by IPS News and was reprinted here with permission.
Photo: Kurdish Peshmerga fighters Credit: Kurdistan4All/public domain
]]>