by Mark N. Katz
What a difference a few months make. During much of 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin was riding high. Russia seized Crimea from Ukraine quickly and relatively bloodlessly. Putin was also able to help pro-Russian forces in eastern Ukraine effectively secede from the rest of the country and prevent the Ukrainian government from retaking these areas. Western governments howled in protest and even imposed economic sanctions on Russia, but were unable to force Putin to back down. Putin’s unsettling actions also seemed to help keep the price of oil high, which Russia benefited from as a leading petroleum exporter. And while the West was highly critical of him, many governments elsewhere—most notably in Asia—seemed indifferent or even sympathetic toward Putin’s actions in Ukraine.
At present, though, things look very different for the Russian president. Western sanctions, which initially seemed quite weak, now appear to be having an increasingly negative effect on the Russian economy. More importantly, the dramatic decrease in the price of oil over the past few months has contributed to a sharp drop in Russia’s export income as well as to the value of the ruble. Eastern Ukraine has meanwhile become an increasingly costly venture for Moscow—not least because of the mounting deaths of Russian soldiers engaged in the fighting there. Absorbing Crimea is also proving costly for an increasingly cash-strapped Moscow. As Western disapproval and even fear of Russia have grown, the ranks of European political and economic leaders calling for accommodating Moscow and cooperating with Putin have thinned. Finally, those non-Western governments that earlier seemed indifferent or sympathetic to Putin’s policy toward Ukraine now seem either indifferent or eager to take advantage of Russia’s increasing economic difficulties.
Putin, in short, now seems to be facing something of a dilemma. Continuing his current policies toward eastern Ukraine will probably not bring about an end to what is becoming a quagmire there for Moscow, and will mean that Western economic sanctions on Russia remain in place or even worsen. Yet withdrawing from Ukraine could weaken Putin domestically since the Russian public has supported his forward policy on Ukraine and would not be happy to see it reversed.
So what will Putin do now? Many fear that he will lash out at the West by supporting Russian secessionists in the Baltics or elsewhere. Putin himself has contributed to this fear by talking about how a cornered rat will attack its pursuers. But despite the deteriorating situation that he now faces, the Russian president need not become that rat in the corner. Indeed, he can be expected to ensure that he does not.
This is because Putin is basically a pragmatist. While he can support Russian secessionists in the Baltics, Belarus, northern Kazakhstan, or elsewhere in Ukraine—as he did with those in Crimea and eastern Ukraine—Putin cannot now be certain that he can gain control over these territories quickly and easily like he did with Crimea. Instead, supporting such groups or intervening directly may only result in more drawn-out conflicts such as the one now taking place in eastern Ukraine. If it is increasingly costly for Russia to be involved in just one such conflict, it will be even costlier still for it to become involved in more of them. If he thought he could replicate what happened in Crimea, Putin might be tempted to do this. Indeed, his quick victory in Crimea may have persuaded him that he could also win in eastern Ukraine. But now that eastern Ukraine has proven to be so problematic, Putin must be aware that similar adventures elsewhere could prove similarly risky—and that Russian forces could only get more thinly spread if they become involved in more such conflicts.
Some fear that Putin might lash out in some other manner by, for example, ending Russian support for the ongoing negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program. But this also seems unlikely because: 1) Russia does not want Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, either and 2) the United States and its Western allies could still reach an agreement with Tehran on this matter without Russian help—which would only serve to demonstrate Russian impotence.
Russia stepping up its support for the Assad regime in Syria is another possibility. Doing so, though, would make Russia more of a target for Islamic State (ISIS or IS). Nor does it seem plausible that Putin would want Russia to become more involved in Syria when Moscow is far more concerned about what is happening in Ukraine and other former Soviet states.
Some fear, though, that reported Russian submarine deployments in Swedish waters, military overflights over several countries, and claims in the Arctic are all signs that Putin is preparing something even worse. However, while hardly reassuring, these moves seem aimed more at showing the Russian public how strong Putin is than as precursors to Russian initiation of conflict.
What all this suggests is that while Putin is aggressive, he is not reckless, and he demonstrated this during a Dec. 18 press conference. Indeed, while insisting that any Russian troops in eastern Ukraine are “volunteers,” he seemed also to hold open the door to cooperation with Kiev—and with Georgia, too (which Russia won a brief war against in 2008).
Returning to the rodentine analogy that Putin himself has used: if a cornered rat lashes out, one that is not cornered is more likely to find a safe place to run to instead. What this means for the West is that while it should assist Ukraine in resisting Russian incursions, it should reassure Putin that if he compromises on Ukraine, the West will not use this as an opportunity to rout him altogether. By continuing to cooperate with Russia on problems of common concern (such as Afghanistan, the Iranian nuclear issue, and terrorism) and by reiterating how Western sanctions would be lifted if Russia modifies its policy toward Ukraine, we can help Putin achieve his own goal of not ending up in a corner.
]]>During his first Press Conference today following his successful second-term campaign, President Barak Obama emphasized that the United States wants to peacefully resolve the tense dispute over the Islamic Republic’s controversial nuclear program (the US is reportedly considering a more-for-more negotiating strategy) but denied that talks are “imminent”. Importantly, he didn’t reject [...]]]>
During his first Press Conference today following his successful second-term campaign, President Barak Obama emphasized that the United States wants to peacefully resolve the tense dispute over the Islamic Republic’s controversial nuclear program (the US is reportedly considering a more-for-more negotiating strategy) but denied that talks are “imminent”. Importantly, he didn’t reject the notion of direct talks either:
PRESIDENT OBAMA: With respect to Iran, I very much want to see a diplomatic resolution to the problem. I was very clear before the campaign, I was clear during the campaign and I’m now clear after the campaign — we’re not going to let Iran get a nuclear weapon. But I think there is still a window of time for us to resolve this diplomatically. We’ve imposed the toughest sanctions in history. It is having an impact on Iran’s economy.
There should be a way in which they can enjoy peaceful nuclear power while still meeting their international obligations and providing clear assurances to the international community that they’re not pursuing a nuclear weapon. And so yes, I will try to make a push in the coming months to see if we can open up a dialogue between Iran and not just us but the international community, to see if we can get this thing resolved. I can’t promise that Iran will walk through the door that they need to walk though, but that would be very much the preferable option.
Q: And the — (inaudible) — conversation picked up?
PRESIDENT OBAMA: I won’t talk about the details of negotiations, but I think it’s fair to say that we want to get this resolved and we’re not going to be constrained by diplomatic niceties or protocols. If Iran is serious about wanting to resolve this, they’ll be in a position to resolve it.
Q: At one point just prior to the election, there was talk that talks might be imminent —
PRESIDENT OBAMA: That was — that was not true, and it’s not — it’s not true as — as of today, OK?
Obama essentially read from the US’ official Iran script, apart from his last comment about moving the process along regardless of “diplomatic niceties or protocols” if Iran wants to sincerely engage. This sounds like a hint to the Iranians that he means business and wants them to put something tangible forward — presumably so he can bring it home to the chorus of anti-diplomacy factions in Congress.
How the Iranians will respond to Obama’s hint is the question, especially considering their own domestic political considerations. Writing in Al-Monitor, Banafsheh Keynoush argues that Iran’s hardliners are ready to engage, but won’t submit without serious incentives. Indeed, as Iran scholar Farideh Farhi points out, the key to moving the diplomatic process forward and avoiding a military conflict is flexibility on both sides:
]]>Unless Khamenei and company are given a way out of the mess they have taken Iran into (with some help from the US and company), chances are that we are heading into a war in the same way we headed to war in Iraq. A recent Foreign Affairs article by Ralf Ekeus, the former executive chairman of the UN special Commission on Iraq, and Malfrid-Braut hegghammer, is a good primer on how this could happen.
The reality is that the current sanctions regime does not constitute a stable situation. First, the instability (and instability is different from regime change as we are sadly learning in Syria) it might beget is a constant force for policy re-evaluation on all sides (other members of the P5+1 included). Second, maintaining sanctions require vigilance while egging on the sanctioned regime to become more risk-taking in trying to get around them. This is a formula for war and it will happen if a real effort at compromise is not made. Inflexibility will beget inflexibility.
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta’s trip to the Middle East last week included reassuring Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in person, that the U.S. was committed to preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon — the U.S.’s “red line” on Iran. Panetta reiterated the U.S.’s position, essentially point by point, at [...]]]>
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta’s trip to the Middle East last week included reassuring Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in person, that the U.S. was committed to preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon — the U.S.’s “red line” on Iran. Panetta reiterated the U.S.’s position, essentially point by point, at a Pentagon Joint Press Conference with the Japanese Minister of Defense on August 3: “Bottom line is that we have common cause with them with regards to Iran. Our positions are similar. We will not allow Iran to develop a nuclear weapon,” he said in response to a question about the likelihood of an Israeli attack against Iran.
When Panetta says that the U.S. and Israeli positions are “similar”, he is acknowledging that they’re not the same, a significant detail considering the growing pressure from Israel and various U.S.-based hawkish Israel advocacy groups and pundits aimed at reforming the U.S.’s policy.
The Israeli “red line” on Iran, at least according to public Israeli statements, is Iran’s acquirement of nuclear weapon building “capability” or Iran crossing into a so-called “zone of immunity” where it can create a nuclear weapon at Fordow, the underground uranium enrichment facility that’s impenetrable by Israeli air strikes. (The Israeli position is confusing according to Colin Kahl and other experts who argue that you can’t bomb knowledge and the Iranians already have nuclear weapon know-how.) Importantly, as the Iranians themselves insist — and U.S. and Israeli defense and intelligence as well as the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) reports confirm — the Iranians have not yet made a decision to build a weapon.
Israeli frustration and impatience with the U.S.’s persistent Iran policy may explain why some “Israeli officials” are allowing their press to report statements that hardly seem diplomatic (one might even say appear antagonistic) about their important ally. Just yesterday the English version of Ynetnews reported that
Senior officials on Sunday leveled severe criticism against the US, declaring that the American position on a date for a military strike against Iran was a “wretched red line.”
“The US’ stance is pushing the Iranians to become a country at the brink (of nuclear capability),” explained sources well versed in the nuclear issue. “The Americans are de facto allowing the Iranians to continue to enrich uranium and become a country at the brink. We are not prepared to allow that (to happen).”
Meanwhile, according to an August 3 Haaretz post, Netanyahu is getting very agitated over public scrutiny regarding his plans for Iran — chest-thumping, table-banging mad. But that may be part of a ploy:
Others present at the meeting, however, pointed out that Netanyahu’s comments seemed to be part of the “psychological warfare” campaign that Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak are conducting, in order to pressure the U.S. into attacking Iran itself.
At one point during the meeting, a participant asked Netanyahu what he thinks could possibly happen the day after an Israeli strike on Iran. According to one of the meeting’s participants, the question angered Netanyahu. “If an investigative committee is formed, I’ll go and say that I, I am responsible,” said Netanyahu, as he pounded the table, and his chest, with his fist.
The fuming Netanyahu didn’t stop there. “I’ve had enough of this atmosphere,” he said. “It’s also felt in other discussions [on Iran], people keep showing me presentations prepared as if for an investigative committee. I’ve told them to stop with these presentations, stop speaking on protocol, and get to the point,” said Netanyahu.
]]>Netanyahu made it clear to those present that he prefers that the U.S. “do the work,” though he admits that the U.S. is not prepared to pursue a military option at this point.