by Derek Davison
A week of increasing tension between Ukraine and Russia was given a terrible cap on July 17 when Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 (MH17), a Boeing 777 bound for Kuala Lumpur from Amsterdam, was apparently shot down over eastern Ukraine, killing all 298 people on board. The tragedy was [...]]]>
by Derek Davison
A week of increasing tension between Ukraine and Russia was given a terrible cap on July 17 when Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 (MH17), a Boeing 777 bound for Kuala Lumpur from Amsterdam, was apparently shot down over eastern Ukraine, killing all 298 people on board. The tragedy was another blow to Malaysia Airlines, whose flight MH370 disappeared, probably somewhere in the Indian Ocean, on March 8, but the larger concern with respect to the downing of MH17 has been the impact it will have on the crisis in Ukraine.
Immediate efforts were made to identify how the aircraft was shot down and who was behind the attack. US and Ukrainian officials were quick to claim that a surface to air missile had caused the crash, and on this point “independent aviation experts” seem to agree. Suspicion has centered on the theory that a Russian/Soviet-made SA-11 Buk mobile anti-aircraft missile was responsible for bringing the plane down. Prior to this, the only publicly known anti-aircraft weapons that had been used in this conflict were handheld units with much lower effective ceilings, which may help to explain why MH17 was flying over eastern Ukraine despite the ongoing fighting; it was at an altitude thought to be above any hypothetical threat.
Who’s Responsible?
But identifying exactly who shot the plane down is a bigger challenge, especially since all three of the most obvious suspects — the Ukrainian military, the Russian military, and the pro-Russia Donbas separatists — have all denied any responsibility for the incident. Russian media is heavily pushing the theory that the plane was shot down by the Ukrainians, either by a Ukrainian fighter plane that it claims was flying close to MH17 at the time of the incident or by one of a number of Buk batteries that it claims the Ukrainian military was operating in the area at the time of the incident. The latter theory has also been advanced by American reporter Robert Parry.
Assuming that NATO is correct in claiming that it has evidence of a renewed Russian military buildup along its Ukrainian border, there is a possibility that a Russian-operated Buk battery mistook MH17 for a Ukrainian military aircraft and shot it down. However, US officials seem to be convinced that it was the separatists who shot down the craft — Secretary of State John Kerry told CNN that the evidence “obviously points a very clear finger at the separatists.” That evidence includes satellite imagery that may show the path of the missile, recordings of what Kiev claims are phone calls involving top separatist leaders, and intercepts from Russian social media that suggest the rebels acknowledged shooting down what they believed was another military transport in the area where MH17 went down.
If it was the rebels who shot down the plane, it raises questions as to how they obtained the Buk battery in the first place. The separatists have taken small arms (including shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles) and vehicles from Ukrainian military outposts since the conflict began in March, and there is evidence that other weapons and equipment have been trafficked into eastern Ukraine from Russia. But the Buk system is considerably more powerful and advanced than anything the rebels were known to have in their possession. They may have seized a battery from the Ukrainian military, but Russian media reported in late June that Ukrainian separatists “took” a Buk system under Russian control, which could suggest either that they stole the battery or that it was supplied to them, and videos have surfaced online that claim to show a Buk battery or batteries in the rebel-held towns of Torez and Snizhne around the time that MH17 crashed, which reportedly conforms with what US satellite imagery has shown.
Worsening Crisis
The already difficult task of investigating the crash has been made almost impossible by the situation in eastern Ukraine. Under international aviation regulations Ukrainian authorities should take the lead in the investigation, but the Ukrainian government simply doesn’t control the part of the country where the aircraft’s wreckage now lies. For several days after the crash, separatists refused to allow investigators unfettered access to the crash site and to MH17’s data recorders without a ceasefire agreement from Kiev, which drew ire from a number of world leaders. Rebels were even observed loading bodies from the crash site onto trains and taking them away. On July 21, President Barack Obama called on Putin to compel the separatists to comply with the investigation, and the UN Security Council unanimously (including Russia) adopted a resolution demanding full access to the crash site. Malaysia’s Prime Minister Najib Razak later announced that the separatists had agreed to turn over the bodies and the data recorders to Dutch and Malaysian representatives, and that the investigators would henceforth have full access to the crash site.
The MH17 disaster was only the latest in a string of provocations that have raised the stakes in the area over the past week. On July 13, Russian authorities warned of “irreversible consequences” after the Russian village of Donetsk (which has the same name as the Ukrainian city that is one of the hubs of that country’s separatist rebellion) was struck by what Russia claimed was a Ukrainian artillery shell, killing one and injuring two. The following day, in an attack that foreshadowed the MH17 tragedy, a Ukrainian AN-26 military cargo plane was shot down near the Russian border. Ukrainian authorities claimed that the AN-26, like MH17, was flying too high to have been hit by portable anti-aircraft missiles, which has been disputed by analysts but which, if true, would again suggest the involvement of Russia or Russian weapons in the attack. Then, on July 15, an airstrike hit an apartment building in Snizhne, killing 11, with Kiev again accusing Moscow of perpetrating the attack even as the rebels pointed the finger at Kiev. Ukrainian forces reportedly took control of the Donetsk airport on July 21, suggesting that a major offensive was underway against one of the few remaining rebel strongholds.
If it can be proven that the separatists did shoot down MH17, especially if there is evidence that they did it with Russian support, it could lead to a significant increase in the amount of economic pressure that the US and EU are prepared to bring to bear against Moscow. Obama’s July 21 statement promised that there would be “costs” to Russia’s continued support of the separatists, on top of the new sanctions that the US levied on Russian banks, energy companies, and defense contractors on July 16, the day before MH17 was shot down. The fact that MH17 originated in Amsterdam and that most of its passengers were European could also spur stronger European sanctions than we’ve seen to date.
Photo: A memorial at the Amsterdam Schiphol Airport for the victims of the Malaysian Airlines flight MH17, which was reportedly show down while flying over Ukraine on 17 July 2014, killing all 298 people on board.
]]>by Mark N. Katz
How will the crisis in Ukraine turn out? Nobody knows for sure, but a role-playing game that I ran in my undergraduate government and politics of Russia course at George Mason University yesterday offers some insights.
My 79 students (most of whom were present) were divided into thirteen [...]]]>
by Mark N. Katz
How will the crisis in Ukraine turn out? Nobody knows for sure, but a role-playing game that I ran in my undergraduate government and politics of Russia course at George Mason University yesterday offers some insights.
My 79 students (most of whom were present) were divided into thirteen teams of varying size: the United States, Russia, the Ukrainian government, the Ukrainian separatists, Poland, the three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), Germany, Britain, France, Belarus, and China. Our starting point was the present situation in Ukraine, recapped as: following Russia’s successful annexation of Crimea, pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine are seizing government buildings in other eastern Ukrainian cities and calling for Russia to intervene on their behalf. The Ukrainian government in Kiev is meanwhile trying to seize back what the separatists have taken, but is encountering difficulties.
After each team stated its initial position on the situation, they were freed to fashion their policies and make deals with other teams.
The Ukrainian government team decided to press ahead with its efforts to take back territory in the eastern part of the country from the separatists as well as to seek commitments from Western governments to help Kiev. The American team in particular talked about increasing sanctions, but the German team wasn’t sure about taking this step. The French team offered to sell weapons, but no Western team was willing to send their own troops to Ukraine.
In the meantime, the Ukrainian separatist team continued to seize buildings (one student had even brought signs with Russian flags to slap on various pieces of furniture in the classroom) while urging the Russian team to intervene on their behalf. The U.S. team attempted to dissuade the Russian team from taking this step. After some delay, though, the Russian team decided to intervene in eastern Ukraine in order to protect Russian citizens there. Tension in the room suddenly increased.
The Ukrainian government team desperately sought Western support. It even seemed to think that this would be forthcoming, but it turned out that there had been an unfortunate misunderstanding on its part. The German team, though, did agree to impose much harsher economic sanctions. The United States and other NATO countries reiterated their commitment to NATO members in Eastern Europe and the Baltic states.
One surprise development was that the Belarusian team asked for U.S. and NATO help in case Russia turned on it. The American team, though, turned down their request since Belarus is not a member of NATO.
The Russian team responded to the increased Western sanctions by turning to the Chinese team. The latter agreed to buy more Russian oil and gas — though at a discount. Otherwise, the Chinese team kept out of the situation.
The Russian team then announced that Moscow had no intention of intervening any further afield than eastern Ukraine. The U.S. team in particular was relieved to hear this. The American and Western European teams indicated that they could live with this situation. The Polish and Baltic teams were disgusted, but could do nothing.
A spokesperson for the Ukrainian government team denounced NATO for its unwillingness to protect it against Russia, and declared that the Ukrainians would continue to fight. With only a little time left in the class period, I ended the game so that we could discuss what had transpired.
There seemed to be general agreement that if indeed Russia intervenes in eastern Ukraine, but declares that it will not go any further, the West will respond with tacit acceptance. NATO would not be willing to get involved in Ukraine. The West, though, would impose stronger economic sanctions on Russia, though some countries would do this quite reluctantly. If the Ukrainian government does decide to fight on, it will do so largely on its own. However, while the West may not do much for Ukraine, it will no longer regard Russia as a normal state, but as a threat. The big unanswered question is whether Russia would in fact honor any pledge not to intervene beyond eastern Ukraine — especially since it is unclear where eastern Ukraine ends and the rest of Ukraine begins.
Was the outcome of this role-playing game realistic? We may well find out soon.
A pro-Russian protestor yells at Ukrainian riot police outside the regional administration building in the eastern Ukrainian city of Donetsk on March 22, 2014. Credit: Zack Baddorf/IPS.
]]>by Derek Davison
If you’re looking for a one sentence indicator about the state of post-Euromaidan Ukrainian politics, consider this: the man who is expected to win next month’s presidential election (assuming it actually takes place) is a billionaire chocolatier named Petro Poroshenko, who served as foreign minister under [...]]]>
by Derek Davison
If you’re looking for a one sentence indicator about the state of post-Euromaidan Ukrainian politics, consider this: the man who is expected to win next month’s presidential election (assuming it actually takes place) is a billionaire chocolatier named Petro Poroshenko, who served as foreign minister under former Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, and then as minister of trade and economic development for a government allied with Yushchenko’s rival and successor, Viktor Yanukovych, before becoming one of the leaders of the protest movement that forced Yanukovych from office in February.
Ukraine’s national politics since Leonid Kuchma’s presidency (1994-2005) have been dominated by the rivalry between two men: Yushckenko, who served as Kuchma’s prime minister from 1998-2001 before going into opposition, and then as Ukraine’s president from 2005-2010, and Yanukovych, who twice served as prime minister (under Kuchma from 2002-05 and then under Yushchenko from 2006-07) before being elected as president in 2010 and serving until Euromaidan removed him. Yushchenko was aligned with a broadly pro-EU, anti-Russia faction, while Yanukovych had closer ties to Moscow.
Both men are now out of Ukrainian politics. Yanukovych has the distinction of having twice been removed from the Ukrainian presidency by popular uprising. He was declared the winner of the 2004 presidential election, but allegations of fraud inspired the Orange Revolution, led by Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko. The uprising forced a re-vote, which Yushchenko won. Yushchenko went on to suffer perhaps the worst electoral defeat for an incumbent president in modern history in 2010; he barely cleared 5% of the vote and was kept out of the run-off, in which Yanukovych defeated Tymoshenko. The third figure in this dysfunctional triumvirate, Tymoshenko, voted in 2009 with Yanukovych’s party to strip her erstwhile ally Yushchenko of his presidential powers, and then joined Yanukovych’s pro-Russian faction. After Yanukovych became president, he tried and convicted Tymoshenko (with the aid of Yushchenko’s testimony) on corruption charges in 2011. Since her release from prison, Tymoshenko seems to have appointed herself as one of the leaders of the anti-Russian (and anti-Yanukovych) movement.
In other words, if it’s consistency you’re after, Ukrainian politics probably aren’t for you. Frequent shifts in personal loyalty and party ideology, the ongoing tug of war between pro-European and pro-Russian factions, and high turnover in government (no fewer than eight different cabinets have been formed since Yanukovych’s first stint as prime minister began in 2002), have kept Ukraine from enjoying any semblance of political stability.
With Yanukovych and his Russian sympathies out of favor, the new divide in Ukrainian politics seems to be between neoliberalism and hard-right nationalism or even neo-fascism. A significant proportion of the Euromaidan movement consists of far-right Ukrainian nationalists led by the Svoboda Party, which has been given important posts in the interim Ukrainian cabinet. More troubling still is the degree to which the protests were escalated by neo-Nazi militias like “Right Sector.” It bears repeating that the first law passed by the Ukrainian parliament after Yanukovych was removed from office was an ultra-nationalistic repeal (which was not signed into law by interim President Oleksandr Turchynov) of a 2012 law giving semi-official status to languages deemed regionally important. For reasons that should be obvious by now, the presence of these far-right elements in the government only serves to divide Ukrainians and ethnic Russians in the east from the government in Kiev.
The rest of the Euromaidan leadership is largely neoliberal. The common thread binding Ukraine’s neoliberals is Kuchma. His administration implemented a number of neoliberal economic “reforms,” including rapid privatization and austerity measures intended to balance Ukraine’s budget. This was done in close cooperation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in order to secure billions in IMF loans and to prepare Ukraine for membership in the EU. Coming at the height of the economic crisis that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, these “reforms” closely resembled the kind of radical “disaster capitalism” that will be familiar to readers of Naomi Klein’s book, The Shock Doctrine.
Yushchenko followed much the same set of neoliberal policies when he was elected president, and while his administration did preside over a growing Ukrainian economy, it also left Ukraine especially vulnerable to the 2008 global economic crisis, which wiped out most of the gains that had been made in previous years and led to Yushchenko’s historic defeat in 2010. Yanukovych, struggling to maintain closer ties to Moscow without abandoning the neoliberal IMF/EU agenda, failed to repair the damage, and the pro-EU Euromaidan movement began in response to the continued economic struggles.
While it’s too soon to speculate what Poroshenko’s economic policy would be, his past as a close Yushchenko ally hints at his neoliberal sympathies. The current interim government is dominated by figures from Tymoshenko’s Batkivshchyna Party, including Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, a favorite of Victoria Nuland, the US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, who has ties to prominent neoconservatives. Nuland favors the kind of shock capitalism that is practiced by the IMF and that guided the economic policy of the Kuchma and Yushchenko administrations. Yatsenyuk has referred to the cabinet he heads as a “kamikaze” government because of the “extremely unpopular” financial policies it plans to implement, and has promised to follow IMF-dictated austerity measures. Considering the impact of these policies on Greece, it’s remarkable that Yatsenyuk has embraced them so whole-heartedly and unquestioningly.
Ukraine faces immense challenges. The threat of pro-Russian separatism in the east is the most immediate concern, closely followed by the related risk of hostile Russian action, be it military in nature, economic (e.g., shutting off natural gas exports), or both. But the economic crisis that brought down Yushchenko and helped to bring down Yanukovych has not been abated, and it will be impossible to stabilize potential breakaway regions if the Ukrainian economy continues to struggle. Ukraine desperately needs competent, stable governance right now, but based on its recent political history and on the choices it now faces between destructive ultra-nationalism and failed neoliberalism, there’s little reason for optimism on this front.
Photo: Demonstrators march and carry an EU flag during a protest in Kyiv, Ukraine, Nov. 24, 2013.
]]>by Derek Davison
Iran and the P5+1 (the US, Britain, France, China and Russia plus Germany) are meeting for a third round of negotiations on April 8-9 in Vienna as part of an attempt to reach a final nuclear deal by their self-set July deadline. LobeLog has been
by Derek Davison
Iran and the P5+1 (the US, Britain, France, China and Russia plus Germany) are meeting for a third round of negotiations on April 8-9 in Vienna as part of an attempt to reach a final nuclear deal by their self-set July deadline. LobeLog has been charting these talks extensively, especially since the start of talks that led to the November 24, 2013 Joint Plan of Action, but for those who are just beginning to follow this issue or need a refresher, let’s examine some of the details around Iran’s nuclear program and the ongoing international efforts to reach an agreement over its future size and scope.
What are the current talks about?
At stake is the future of Iran’s nuclear program within international nonproliferation safeguards, and the easing or total removal of economic sanctions that have been levied against Iran by the United States, European Union and the United Nations.
Who are the main players?
You can’t spell “Iranian nuclear program” without “Iran,” so we should probably start with them. Iran’s negotiating team is led by Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, who reports to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani. The final say on foreign policy decisions rests with Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and both Rouhani and Zarif must ensure that any deal will be met with Khamenei’s approval.
The Iranians are negotiating with a coalition of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the US, UK, France, Russia, China) and Germany, which is typically called the P5+1, but is sometimes also called the E3+3 (the three EU members plus the US, Russia, China). The P5+1’s point person for the talks is Catherine Ashton, the EU High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, but the foreign secretaries of the six nations will also have to sign-off on a final deal. The internal cohesion of the P5+1 has been crucial in maintaining sanctions against Iran, and will be tested given the tensions that now exist between Russia and the US/EU over Russia’s recent annexation of Crimea.
Other key players that are not directly involved in the talks include Israel, which claims it’s deeply concerned about the possibility of Iran developing nuclear weapons, and Saudi Arabia, which considers a sanctions-free Iran to be a potential rival for regional hegemony, and is worried about what it sees as a major shift in US foreign policy away from Saudi interests.
When did the talks start?
Iran has been negotiating on and off with the European Union (specifically the UK, France, and Germany) and on related but separate issues with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since 2003 under then Presidents Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-13). In 2006, the talks were widened to include the US, Russia, and China, though the US refused to fully participate until Iran met certain pre-conditions like an indefinite halt to its uranium enrichment program.
The current round of talks began after Rouhani’s election as president in June 2013; he had run promising to increase the transparency of Iran’s nuclear program in order to convince the P5+1 to draw down its sanctions regime. Iran and the P5+1 met in Geneva in early November, and an interim agreement (with a term of 6 months plus the possibility of renewal), the Joint Plan of Action (JPA), was announced on November 24. Under the terms of the JPA, Iran agreed to substantially slow down its nuclear activity in exchange for partial sanctions relief, and a plan was made for future talks toward a long-term resolution. The JPA went into effect on January 20 of this year, and the first round of talks on a long-term deal between the principal negotiators took place in Vienna from February 18-20, with the second round taking place from March 17-20. See this timeline of diplomatic efforts related to Iran’s nuclear program for more details.
What are the key issues to be negotiated?
Brookings Institution arms control expert Robert Einhorn, who served as Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control to former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, recently issued a report outlining the remaining challenges in the talks, and highlighting the two biggest. First and most important is the level of uranium enrichment that Iran will be allowed to undertake. “Light water” nuclear reactors (which use water as coolant and to mediate the nuclear reaction) for civilian use need to be fueled with low enriched uranium (LEU), which is uranium that has been modified via centrifuge so that around 5% of its weight is made up of the more radioactive Uranium-235 isotope (less than 1% of naturally occurring uranium is U-235, the rest is the less radioactive U-238). Nuclear weapons require highly enriched uranium, where 85% or more of the uranium is U-235 (uranium enriched below 20% is considered LEU, anything above that is HEU). In order to reduce Iran’s ability to produce HEU, Einhorn says a deal must limit Iran to 2000-6000 centrifuges, which is far below the 10,000 it currently operates and even farther below the 19,000 Iran says it plans to operate once all its centrifuges are in place. The ideal solution from a non-proliferation standpoint would be for Iran to completely give up its enrichment program, but the Iranians have been consistent in saying that they will not do so under any circumstances, and the US has conceded that Iran will continue to enrich uranium under a comprehensive deal.
The other major challenge is the status of a proposed “heavy water” reactor at Arak (around 150 miles southwest of Tehran), which uses deuterium oxide as coolant and mediator rather than water. Iran claims that it plans to use Arak to produce medical isotopes, but because heavy water reactors produce large amounts of plutonium (an alternative to HEU for weapons making) as byproduct, there are fears that Arak could be used to produce fuel for weapons (though Iran denies this and has pledged not to build the kind of facilities that would be necessary to reprocess that plutonium for weapons use). There are ways to modify Arak’s design to produce substantially less plutonium, and some kind of modification will likely be necessary in a final deal.
How did Iran come to have a nuclear program in the first place?
Iran began developing a nuclear program in the 1950s with American assistance, under President Dwight Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” program. This was an effort to head off the possibility of nuclear proliferation by offering American research, infrastructure, and expertise to countries that were interested in developing nuclear programs for peaceful use. Iran signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, which obliges it not to pursue nuclear weapons. After Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, an American ally, was removed from power by the 1979 Islamic Revolution, all cooperation between Iran and the United States on nuclear power was halted. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who became Iran’s new leader after the revolution, showed little interest in the nuclear program, but it did continue. Today, Iran’s primary nuclear facilities include a civilian power plant at Bushehr, four medical reactors at Isfahan, a research reactor at Tehran, and uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow. See this timeline of the Iranian nuclear program for additional details.
So the Iranians are trying to develop nuclear weapons, right?
Well, not so fast. In the 1970s, American intelligence agencies believed that the Shah was interested in developing nuclear weapons, but the revolution interrupted those plans and limited Iran’s access to foreign expertise and material. Iran restarted its nuclear program with the help of a Pakistani scientist named Abdul Qadeer Khan, who sold uranium enrichment technology to several countries in the late 1980s. The consensus of the American intelligence community seems to be that Iran stopped any direct nuclear weapons program in 2003. Since then, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei (Khomeini’s successor) has issued a religious declaration (fatwa) saying that the manufacture and use of nuclear weapons is forbidden under Islam. The former chief of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, has also repeatedly said there is “no credible evidence” that Iran has resumed pursuing nuclear weapons and the US intelligence community continues to rule that while Iran is moving towards developing a nuclear weapons capability, it has not yet decided to do so, which is why diplomacy, which can impact Iran’s decision-making process, is so important.
I notice that you didn’t just say “no” there.
Okay, you got me there. Former director ElBaradei’s statements notwithstanding, the IAEA has also consistently said that it does not have enough evidence to rule out the possibility that Iran has been pursuing a weapon. Additionally, while Ayatollah Khamenei has repeatedly denied that Iran seeks a nuclear weapon, he has also said that, should it choose to pursue one, “no power could stop us.” Ultimately, though, what the P5+1 are worried about is Iran’s “breakout capacity,” which is the time it would take Iran to build a weapon if it decided to pursue one. Elements of a final deal that put limits on Iran’s ability to enrich uranium and permit intrusive inspections of Iranian nuclear sites would ideally leave Iran with a breakout capacity of at least 6 months, preferably closer to 12.
What are the chances that the talks will succeed?
Any of the remaining obstacles to a comprehensive deal could prove insurmountable, particularly over the issue of how much uranium enrichment Iran will carry out. Khamenei and US President Barack Obama have both previously expressed pessimistic sentiments about the potential for success. However, both Iranian and American officials have recently sounded more optimistic.
Why are the talks important?
A negotiated settlement that allows Iran a limited enrichment capacity with significant inspections and verification requirements is, as Einhorn writes, “not ideal, but better than the alternatives.” If these talks fail, there will be a push for tougher sanctions on Iran, but it is unclear how much more pressure sanctions can bring to bear, and it is even less clear that the P5+1 will hold together to implement tougher sanctions. If harsher sanctions don’t, or can’t, work then limited military action against Iran’s nuclear sites could follow, though experts have explained why that’s the least favorable option. Such an act would end all possibility of negotiations and likely push the Iranians to kick nuclear inspectors out of the country and race toward building a weapon. Even if limited strikes could temporarily slow Iran’s progress toward a weapon in the event that it actually chose to make one, they cannot eliminate the related technical knowledge and expertise that Iran has developed.
These talks will also have longer term implications, particularly in terms of setting a precedent for future such agreements and in terms of Iran’s ability to incorporate itself into the wider international community.
*This post was revised on April 10 to correct presidential terms.
Representatives of Iran and the P5+1 are photographed at the signing ceremony of the Joint Plan of Action, the interim nuclear agreement that was reached in Geneva, Switzerland on November 24, 2013. Credit: Credit: ISNA/Mona Hoobehfekr
]]>by Derek Davison
Russia moved to annex Crimea this week, as Ukraine evacuated most of its soldiers from the peninsula. Tensions in eastern Ukraine seem to have reached a tense equilibrium, even as reports of a Russian military build-up along its Ukrainian border raised the possibility of another incursion.
Recent [...]]]>
by Derek Davison
Russia moved to annex Crimea this week, as Ukraine evacuated most of its soldiers from the peninsula. Tensions in eastern Ukraine seem to have reached a tense equilibrium, even as reports of a Russian military build-up along its Ukrainian border raised the possibility of another incursion.
Recent events
Moving quickly on the heels of last week’s referendum on Crimean independence, in which Crimean voters nearly unanimously voted to secede from Ukraine and become part of Russia, Russian President Vladimir Putin on Friday signed into law a bill to formally annex the peninsula. On Thursday, one day before a temporary truce between Ukrainian and Russian forces in Crimea was set to expire, the Ukrainian defense ministry announced that plans were “well underway” to evacuate and resettle the roughly 25,000 Ukrainian soldiers currently stationed in Crimea to other parts of Ukraine. Pro-Russian forces stormed the Belbek airbase near Sevastopol, wounding one Ukrainian soldier and taking the base commander prisoner. The interim Crimean government issued an order for Crimea’s Tatar population to vacate part of the land on which it is currently settled, but insisted that it will allocate other land for Tatar settlement and that Tatars will be “well represented” in the Crimean government moving forward.
The New York Times characterized the situation in the eastern part of mainland Ukraine as “an uneasy calm” between “entrenched pro-Russian and pro-Western camps that scarcely existed before [the uprisings in Kiev].” Pro-secession fervor there is at a high level, particularly in large cities that tend to have higher proportions of Russians and Russian-speakers than the surrounding countryside. Friday’s announcement that the Ukrainian government had signed an association agreement with the European Union, a deal that will bring the two parties into “closer economic and political cooperation,” raised fears that tensions in the more pro-Russian east could rise still higher.
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe announced that it would deploy civilian observers to Ukraine (not including Crimea), after Russia dropped its objections to such a move. However, NATO officials continued to express concern over an alleged Russian troop buildup along its Ukrainian border, suggesting that the units could be used either to invade mainland Ukraine or to cross Ukraine and seize control of the breakaway Moldovan region of Transnistria, whose leaders requested that Russia annex it earlier this week. The Russian government claimed that any troop movements were part of routine military exercises and that there were no plans to cross the border into Ukraine. Ukraine’s acting foreign minister, Andrii Deshchytsia, told American media that the chance of a Russian-Ukrainian war was “becoming higher.”
The United States and the EU levied further sanctions against top Russian officials and allies of President Putin on Friday. The new list of American targets includes Putin’s chief of staff as well as key figures in Russia’s energy and banking sectors. The EU list includes several figures who had been named in the initial round of US sanctions on Monday. A Kremlin spokesman said that the Russian government was “bewildered” by the new sanctions and promised that it would retaliate, which it then did by placing travel bans on several American political figures, including Senators Harry Reid and John McCain and Speaker of the House John Boehner.
There are two disputed narratives that are fueling the ongoing conflict:
Was the Crimean referendum legitimate?
Although the Ukrainian government appears to have no intention of contesting Russia’s annexation of Crimea on the ground, it, along with the US and EU, has insisted that last week’s referendum is illegal under both international and Ukrainian law. Russia has argued that the referendum was consistent with international law, specifically Article 1 of the UN Charter (which mentions “respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” as one of the UN’s guiding principles), and Putin has specifically cited Kosovo’s secession from Serbia (which Russia opposed) as having set the precedent for this similar act by Crimea.
International law does not take a firm position on the question of self-determination versus national sovereignty. Without a clear declaration by a body like the UN Security Council there is no “law” that deals conclusively with Crimea’s decision to leave Ukraine and join Russia. Kosovo is a problematic case to use as precedent, given that its secession was the product of a war in which Serbians committed war crimes against Kosovar Albanians (though in fairness the Albanian rebels committed war crimes of their own). There is evidence of some mistreatment of Ukraine’s Russians, but a UN report (which Russia rejects) found no systematic abuses. However, the fact that the first act of the interim Ukrainian government was an aborted attempt to repeal the country’s law governing the use of official minority languages was cause for alarm among Ukrainian Russian-speakers.
Under Ukrainian law there is no question that the referendum is illegal, since Article 73 of the Ukrainian constitution requires that any changes to Ukraine’s territory be approved in an “All-Ukrainian referendum.” Last week’s Crimean vote was regional, and therefore does not meet this requirement. However, given that the Crimean and Russian governments do not recognize the authority of the interim Ukrainian government, they presumably reject its invocation of the constitution as well.
Is the Ukrainian government legitimate?
The Ukrainian government obviously thinks so, and so do the US and EU. But there is no disputing the fact that Viktor Yanukovych was the legally elected president of Ukraine before his ouster, and Russia’s official position has been that it still recognizes him as Ukraine’s rightful president, though it has not pushed for his restoration. Russia has characterized the Euromaidan protest movement that removed Yanukovych from office as an “armed fascist coup,” engineered with considerable American support. Far-right Ukrainian parties did play a large part in the protest movement, as evidenced by the sizable role that they have been given in the interim Ukrainian government. Moreover, a recording of a January phone call between Assistant US Secretary of State Victoria Nuland and US Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt shows that American officials were at least discussing ways to assist the protest movement and what a post-Yanukovych government might look like. Russia also accuses the EU of having spurred the protests by forcing the Ukrainian government to choose between Russia and the EU rather than allowing it to have strong ties with both, an accusation that EU officials have denied.
On the other hand, the US supported a February 21st agreement that would have kept Yanukovych in office but restored Ukraine’s 2004 constitution (which reduced the power of the presidency relative to parliament). That deal collapsed when protesters (including the far-right elements of the movement) rejected it, despite the fact that several protest leaders had already signed off on it. Further, while the Nuland phone call is evidence that the US government supported the protesters, it is not in itself evidence of the level of that support, let alone of the idea that the US was actually behind the movement. The Obama administration contends that Yanukovych forfeited his authority when he fled the country after the February 21 agreement collapsed. Yanukovych, who also recorded a statement resigning his office, which he later retracted, was impeached and removed from office by the Ukrainian parliament. Nevertheless, there are serious questions as to the constitutionality of that impeachment vote and the manner in which Yanukovych’s successor was determined.
Photo: Crowds waving Crimean and Russian flags in Simferopol in Crimea after the referendum. Credit: Alexey Yakushechkin/IPS
]]>by Derek Davison
Crimeans voted “overwhelmingly” to secede from Ukraine and join Russia in a March 16 referendum. The Obama administration declared shortly after that “the international community will not recognize the results of a poll administered under threats of violence and intimidation from a Russian military intervention that violates [...]]]>
by Derek Davison
Crimeans voted “overwhelmingly” to secede from Ukraine and join Russia in a March 16 referendum. The Obama administration declared shortly after that “the international community will not recognize the results of a poll administered under threats of violence and intimidation from a Russian military intervention that violates international law.”
Crimean secession proceeds
Exit polls taken during Sunday’s referendum suggested that around 93% of voters supported the option to secede from Ukraine and become part of Russia over the option to assert Crimean sovereignty under the terms of the 1992 Crimean constitution. There was no option in the referendum to maintain the peninsula’s status quo with respect to Ukraine. Crimea’s Tatar community planned to boycott the vote, though recent Russian efforts to reach out to the Crimean Tatars, through representatives of Russia’s related Volga Tatar community, may be easing the concerns that Crimea’s Tatars have around union with Russia. Large pro-Russian crowds reportedly gathered in the Crimean cities of Sevastopol and Simferopol to celebrate the results of the vote.
Diplomatic condemnation of the referendum from the United States and Europe was swift. On Saturday, before the referendum, the United Nations Security Council considered a resolution declaring Crimea’s referendum illegal, which was vetoed by Russia after China abstained and every other Security Council member voted in favor. On Sunday, President Barack Obama spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin by phone, and according to the White House read-out of the call, “[h]e emphasized that Russia’s actions were in violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and that, in coordination with our European partners, [the United States is] prepared to impose additional costs on Russia for its actions.” Top Obama advisor Dan Pfeffer told reporters that the US is preparing to impose sanctions against Russian officials, including asset freezes and visa bans. The European Union seems prepared to consider similar actions, and EU foreign ministers are scheduled to meet in Brussels later this month to discuss next steps. Putin countered that the legal framework for Crimea’s secession was established by Kosovo’s secession from Serbia in 2008, and reportedly insisted to Merkel that the referendum was “in full compliance with international law.”
What happens now?
Amid concerns that the referendum’s outcome would quickly lead to a military confrontation between Russian and Ukrainian forces, it seems a temporary pause may have been achieved. According to Reuters, Ukraine’s acting defense minister told reporters on Sunday that “[a]n agreement has been reached with (Russia’s) Black Sea Fleet and the Russian Defence Ministry on a truce in Crimea until March 21.” It’s unclear what a “truce” means in this situation, when there have yet been no sustained acts of violence between Russian and Ukrainian forces, and when the Russian government officially continues to deny the presence of any Russian troops in Crimea beyond those stationed at its Black Sea naval base in Sevastopol.
Russia has yet to formally agree to annex Crimea, and leading Russian politicians have given verbal support to Crimean independence, but Putin has previously said that Russia has “no plans” to annex the peninsula. A decision to annex Crimea would bring with it an immediate crisis, given that the peninsula is almost entirely dependent upon the Ukrainian mainland for its electricity, fuel, and fresh water. If Russia does elect to annex the region, it may have no choice but to engage in negotiations with the new Ukrainian government, whose legitimacy it has thus far refused to recognize, over maintaining those services in Crimea until Russia can build the infrastructure to provide them instead.
Russia may also attempt to seize other parts of Ukraine outside of Crimea, which could render Crimea’s utility vulnerabilities moot. On Saturday, for example, Russian forces seized a Ukrainian natural gas terminal just north of Crimea, and Ukrainian forces reportedly surrounded the terminal in response. Russian media declared that Crimean “self-defense forces” had seized the terminal in response to the Ukrainian government cutting off the supply of gas to parts of Crimea. Pro-Russian demonstrators clashed with Ukrainian security forces in the eastern Ukrainian city of Donetsk, and two eastern Ukrainian cities carried out informal referendums similar to the one in Crimea; these events raised the possibility that Russian intervention could spread from Crimea to the eastern part of mainland Ukraine. Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city and another eastern region with a large number of Russians, has also seen demonstrations in favor of closer ties to Moscow. Russian troops are reported to be massing along its Ukrainian border, and the Ukrainian government has taken steps to form a National Guard and to mobilize military reserves, veterans, and volunteers.
On Monday, the Obama administration announced sanctions (travel bans and asset freezes) against 11 individuals, “to impose costs on named individuals who wield influence in the Russian government and those responsible for the deteriorating situation in Ukraine.” Included in this first round of sanctions are Dimitry Rogozin, Russia’s deputy prime minister for defense issues; Valentina Matviyenko, head of the upper house of Russia’s parliament; Crimean Prime Minister Sergey Aksyonov; and former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych. The EU announced sanctions targeting 21 individuals, including Aksyonov, Rogozin, and Matviyenko, but the full list was not immediately available.
Western governments continue to threaten Russia with further sanctions against its interests, but European fears that Russia will cut off its supply of natural gas to Europe in response to draconian actions have complicated the situation. Natural gas exports from the United States are seen as one possible way for Europe to wean itself from Russian gas, but it is very unlikely that US exports could do much to alleviate the pain of a Russian shut-off, at least in the immediate future. On the other hand, analysts are pointing to the fact that Russia depends to a large degree on its oil and gas sales to Europe, and to the fact that Russian businesses have considerable ties to Western banks, to suggest that Russia’s vulnerability to sanctions may be higher, and its ability to punish those sanctions more limited, than has previously been assumed.
Western governments have also promised that financial and possibly military assistance will be provided to Ukraine. The US has pledged at least $1 billion in aid to Ukraine to help stabilize the government, but the measure authorizing those funds has been caught up in Congressional wrangling for several days and will be reconsidered when Congress returns to session on March 24.
Photo: US Secretary of State John Kerry addresses reporters before meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in London on March 14, 2014
]]>This is the second in a series of primers on the fast-moving situation in Ukraine, and covers events from March 2 through March 9. For more background on the situation, please see part 1.
Summary of Recent Events
This week saw sporadic military activity on the Crimean peninsula, in [...]]]>
This is the second in a series of primers on the fast-moving situation in Ukraine, and covers events from March 2 through March 9. For more background on the situation, please see part 1.
Summary of Recent Events
This week saw sporadic military activity on the Crimean peninsula, in particular a reported attack by pro-Russian gunmen on a Ukrainian air force base in Sevastopol that ended when the gunmen retreated. Diplomatic efforts seem to have stalled, as Russia refused to speak directly with the new Ukrainian government, which it regards as illegitimate, and threatened that any sanctions against Russia would “boomerang” against the United States. The week’s biggest development was that Crimea’s parliament has voted to begin the process of seceding from Ukraine and joining Russia, a vote that the governments of Ukraine, the United States, and the European Union all termed “illegal.”
Secession movement
On March 6 the Crimean parliament voted to secede from Ukraine and become part of Russia, pending the approval of the Russian government and the results of a referendum now scheduled for March 16. Although Russian President Vladimir Putin had said earlier in the week that he “did not foresee” Russia annexing Crimea, the leaders of both houses of Russia’s parliament publicly welcomed the Crimean assembly’s vote and pledged to honor the wishes of the Crimean people as expressed in the referendum. The draft referendum, which Kyiv Post revealed, offers two options: “joining Crimea with the Russian Federation” or “restoration of 1992 Crimean Constitution” (which declared Crimean independence, then was amended to declare its autonomy within Ukraine).
Ukraine’s interim Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk criticized the Crimean vote as “illegitimate,” and its interim President, Oleksandr V. Turchynov, termed the vote “a farce.” Leaders of Crimea’s sizable Tatar minority also expressed opposition to the vote. Their sentiments were echoed by American and European leaders. US President Barack Obama characterized the vote as illegal under both the Ukrainian constitution and international law, and the EU envoy to Ukraine, Jan Tombinski, argued that a referendum on secession that was restricted to Crimea would violate Ukrainian law.
Attack on Ukrainian base, questions about the Russian forces
On Monday Ukrainian military sources reported that the commander of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, based in Sevastopol, had given Ukrainian forces in Crimea until early Tuesday morning to surrender or face an attack. Russian officials denied that any such ultimatum had been issued, and the deadline passed without incident. On Friday, however, armed pro-Russian forces stormed a Ukrainian air force base in Sevastopol and occupied parts of it for several hours as they demanded the surrender of the Ukrainian soldiers inside. When the Ukrainian soldiers refused to surrender, the gunmen withdrew; thus far, both Ukrainian and Russian forces have not fired on one another. Russia continued to deny that the pro-Russian forces in Crimea were Russian military, insisting that they are local “self-defense units,” but considerable evidence has been found suggesting that they are, in fact, Russian military forces. The Ukrainian border guard service contended that roughly 30,000 Russian troops are now on the peninsula, and photographs allegedly taken near the southern Ukrainian city of Chonhar appear to show a freshly dug minefield along the approach from the Ukrainian mainland to Crimea. Deputy Crimean Prime Minister Rustam Temirgaliev stated that Russian troops are the only legal soldiers in Crimea, suggesting that Ukrainian soldiers still on their bases are considered illegal by the Crimean government. On Saturday, March 8, a bus carrying international observers from the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) attempted to enter Crimea, but it turned back at the northern Crimean city of Armyansk when “warning shots” were fired at it.
Diplomacy sputters amid looming threat of sanctions from both sides
President Vladimir Putin gave a press conference on Tuesday that appeared to “hit pause” on the Crimea situation, though this characterization was obviously premature given events later in the week. Putin described the events that forced Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych from office as “an anti-constitutional coup” and claimed that Russian intervention was necessary to safeguard the ethnic Russians who are concentrated in Crimea and in major cities in the eastern part of Ukraine, though he reiterated the official Russian position that there has not been an invasion. US Secretary of State John Kerry traveled to Kiev to offer the interim government $1 billion in loan guarantees, and while there he, in remarks that were echoed by Obama, accused Putin of “hiding behind falsehoods” to justify Russia’s actions, and called on him to return Russian forces to their barracks. Kerry failed in his efforts to arrange a meeting between Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and his Ukrainian counterpart, with Lavrov refusing to recognize the legitimacy of the Kiev government, but on Saturday one of Russia’s deputy foreign ministers did meet with the Ukrainian ambassador to Russia in Moscow.
Sanctions both by and against Russia were already being imposed by week’s end. On Thursday, President Obama ordered the imposition of sanctions against “individuals and entities” that were involved in Russia’s move into Crimea, which followed an earlier decision to suspend all US military cooperation with Russia. European Union leaders suspended talks with Russia on economic and travel issues but did not yet appear to be prepared to go any further. European leaders expressed concern that a Russian response could damage economies across Europe, and Lavrov warned that sanctions could “boomerang” against the United States and Europe. Russia announced that it was considering pulling out of arms control treaties with the US and the OSCE in response to American actions. More urgently, the Russian firm Gazprom hinted Friday that it may suspend gas shipments to Ukraine (and thus, potentially, through Ukraine and on to the rest of Europe) due to Kiev’s outstanding debt, which Gazprom estimates to be $1.89 billion.
Questions over legitimacy
Earlier this week Obama stressed that “[a]ny discussion about the future of Ukraine must include the legitimate government of Ukraine,” but the standoff is being driven in part by a disagreement over what the “legitimate” government of Ukraine actually is. Russia still recognizes Viktor Yanukovych as the legitimate president of Ukraine, and claims that Yanukovych asked for Russian military assistance when he was ousted. The United States, on the other hand, has recognized the interim government in Kiev and says that Yanukovych’s actions in office “undermined” his claim to authority despite the fact that he was a democratically-elected leader. Russia’s continued refusal to deal directly with Kiev is couched in terms of the new government’s illegitimacy, at least in Russia’s view. Aid from the United States and from Europe is being offered to help stabilize the government in Kiev.
]]>by Derek Davison
On February 27 gunmen seized control of government buildings in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in Ukraine and raised a Russian flag over the headquarters of the Crimean Parliament in the regional capital Simferopol. This began a series of events that has resulted in Crimea under Russian control and [...]]]>
by Derek Davison
On February 27 gunmen seized control of government buildings in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in Ukraine and raised a Russian flag over the headquarters of the Crimean Parliament in the regional capital Simferopol. This began a series of events that has resulted in Crimea under Russian control and furious diplomatic efforts underway between Ukraine, the European Union, the United Nations, NATO, Russia, and the United States. This primer will offer some background to the (rapidly changing) events currently taking place in Ukraine and some idea as to where things may proceed from here.
What is Crimea and why is it important to Russia?
Crimea is a peninsula that extends from the southern part of Ukraine into the Black Sea. Formerly controlled by the Crimean Khanate (whose Tatar subjects were forcibly relocated out of the peninsula by Josef Stalin in 1944), it was annexed into the Russian Empire in 1783 and immediately became home to Russia’s Black Sea naval fleet, based in the southern city of Sevastopol. The fleet was sunk during the Crimean War (1853-1856) when Sevastopol was besieged by a combined French, British, and Ottoman army, but was rebuilt after the war. In 1921 Crimea became the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, but in 1954, it became part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to streamline post-WWII reconstruction. Crimea briefly declared self-government when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1992, but agreed to remain part of the newly independent Ukraine.
Ukraine, including Crimea to the south (Credit: CIA World Factbook)
All of Ukraine has value to Russia, but Crimea is especially important. Crimea has only been part of an independent Ukraine for 20 years, a fraction of the time it was part of Russia, and ethnic Russians are actually almost 60% of the peninsula’s population, according to the most recent census (2001). More crucially, the Russian Black Sea Fleet is based at Sevastopol, part of a post-Soviet deal between the two countries to divide the former Soviet fleet and to lease part of the base to Russia, and so Russia has military/strategic reasons to ensure that it retains access to that base.
Why did Russian forces invade Crimea now?
Beginning in late-November 2013, a series of protests, known as Euromaidan, began in the Ukrainian capital, Kiev, against the government of then-President Viktor Yanukovych, a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Dueling pro- and anti-government protests, and clashes with security forces, continued through January 2014, when the Yanukovych government announced new draconian anti-protest laws. What had been an occasionally violent protest movement turned into a full-blown revolution, culminating in a series of clashes on February 18-20. Casualty reports vary, but as many as 100 people may have been killed in the violence.
On February 21, Yanukovych reached a deal with opposition leaders to end the violence, but the protesters refused to accept it, and the following day Yanukovych fled Kiev. Yanukovych has been impeached and removed from office by the Ukrainian Parliament, an act that he rejects, and is considered a fugitive for his role in the deadly February violence. After Yanukovych was impeached, officials in Putin’s government suggested that the Russian military could intervene in Ukraine if it was deemed necessary in order to “protect” Crimea. On March 1, the Federation Council, the upper house of the Russian Parliament, voted unanimously to give Putin authority to deploy Russian troops into Ukraine, and the Russian military seized near-total control of Crimea.
What were the Ukrainian protests about?
Ukraine’s economy has been in crisis for some time. Many Ukrainians supported the adoption of an Association Agreement with the European Union as a way to boost the economy, but Yanukovych’s government suspended talks over the proposed agreement and instead pursued entry into the Eurasian Customs Union, alongside Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Polls indicated that a slim plurality of Ukrainians favored the EU deal over the customs union. The name of the protest movement, “Euromaidan,” reflects its initial demand (closer integration with Europe) and the fact that it began in Maidan Nezalezhnosti (“Independence Square”) in downtown Kiev.
The dispute over whether to gravitate toward Europe or back toward Russia exacerbated an already existing ethnic and linguistic split between the largely Ukrainian, pro-Europe western half of the country and the more Russian-oriented eastern half. But this division has been overemphasized as a “cause” of the protests, when the principal causes were Ukraine’s weak economy and Yanukovych’s decisions to reject the EU and then try to violently suppress the initial protests. Even in the eastern, “pro-Russian” part of Ukraine, the majority of the population is ethnic Ukrainian and, according to a 2011 poll, a majority in every province (even Crimea) sees Ukraine as its mother country.
Does Russia have designs on the rest of Ukraine?
The Federation Council resolution authorizing Russian military intervention in Ukraine pointedly allows deployment anywhere in Ukraine, not just Crimea. There are several reasons why Russia wants to retain influence in all of Ukraine, if not to outright control it. Russian history and national pride is inextricably tied to Ukraine, since Russians trace their origins to the 9th-13th century Rus’ people, whose capital and principle city was Kiev. Economically, it would be a blow to Russia if Ukraine were to choose EU membership over joining the Eurasian Customs Union, and Russia also depends on Ukrainian pipelines to ship its natural gas to the rest of Europe. Pro-Russian protests have taken place in eastern Ukrainian cities outside of Crimea, with Russian flags also being raised in several places there.
On the other hand, Russia continues to deny that it has even sent troops into Crimea, let alone the rest of Ukraine, since the fighters who have taken control of Crimea appear to be Russian private paramilitaries rather than official Russian soldiers.
Do the Crimeans want (or need) Russian “protection”?
It does seem that Crimean Russians, worried that the new government in Kiev might be hostile to them, have welcomed the arrival of Russian troops. New Crimean Prime Minister Sergey Aksyonov refused to recognize Yanukovych’s removal from office and asked Putin to send Russian forces to help him “ensure peace” in Crimea. It is worth noting that one of the first acts of the new Ukrainian government was to abolish a 2012 law allowing Russian to be used as a second official language in some parts of the country, and it is also true that the Euromaidan movement included some far-right Ukrainian nationalist groups. However, Crimea is also home to large populations of ethnic Ukrainians and Tatars (who started returning to Crimea after the fall of the USSR), and these groups do not support the Russian invasion.
How have Ukraine and the rest of the world responded to Russia’s invasion?
The Ukrainian government has mobilized its military, though it seems to be on a purely defensive posture. At the UN Security Council, the United States and Ukraine accused Russia of violating Ukraine’s sovereignty, in particular the 1994 Budapest Memorandum in which the US, UK, and Russia pledged to honor Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Russia has countered that American and European involvement in Euromaidan (an accusation for which it has yet to produce any evidence) was itself a violation of Budapest and made Russian intervention necessary. Presidents Barack Obama and Putin held a “testy” phone conversation in which Putin asserted Russia’s right to defend ethnic Russians in Ukraine, while Obama called on Putin to draw his forces back. There are diplomatic levers that the US and the EU can push, including sanctions against Russia and Russian politicians, but there is likely nothing powerful enough to force Putin to withdraw. Kiev has options it can pursue as well; Crimea is, for example, dependent on the mainland for its water and electricity, and while Ukraine relies on Russia for its natural gas, Russia also relies on Ukrainian pipelines to get that gas to European markets, so Putin cannot punish Kiev by just turning the gas off. Still, these options are unlikely to force Russia to withdraw.
Russia may simply order its forces out of Crimea after extracting concessions from Kiev, something akin to the outcome of the Russia-Georgia War in 2008, but it is possible that Putin will attempt to carve eastern Ukraine and Crimea off into a new state, which could lead to a military confrontation.
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