by Emile Nakhleh
Bahrain’s national election planned for this Saturday portends no change in the al-Khalifa regime’s anti-Shi’a stance and is yet another futile exercise in sham democracy. Even the mainstream al-Wefaq Shi’a opposition party has decided to boycott the election because of perceived bias in the recently gerrymandered electoral districts.
Most observers view the election as another public relations ploy by the minority Sunni regime to convince the outside world, especially Western countries, that all is well in the tiny kingdom. The regime is betting, perhaps correctly, that the West would not criticize its game of superficial electoral politics because of Bahrain’s participation in the US-led anti-ISIS coalition and Saudi Arabia’s influence in the process.
The regime’s sectarian repression of the Shi’a majority is deeply grounded in the same radical Sunni ideology espoused by Islamic State (ISIS or IS). In fact, extremist Sunni rhetoric has been tolerated in Bahrain in the name of fighting the Shi’a opposition and Iran.
IS enjoys significant backing in Bahrain among some pro-regime Sunni factions. Such ideological support, which is widely spread out among certain Sunni groups in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, is a key driver of IS in Iraq and Syria. This also explains why many IS jihadists come from the family-ruled Gulf states.
Promoting extremist Sunni ideology at home while ostensibly fighting IS in the Levant is a cynical ploy by the Khalifas’ to justify their continued suppression of Shi’a rights and policy of turning a blind eye to the poor living conditions in Shi’a villages and towns. Sitra, a tiny Shi’a island just south of the capital city of Manama, is indeed a world apart from the glitzy Khalifa strongholds in other parts of the island country.
Stoking sectarianism might be a winning strategy in the short term; it is certainly a losing proposition in the long run. It’s equally foolish for the Bahraini regime to believe that Western support, which is currently driven by the war against IS, would be sufficient to save them from the wrath of their people should a radical Shi’a uprising erupt.
Wefaq and the Election
The regime, and US policymakers for that matter, should take Wefaq’s boycott of the election very seriously. As a mainstream opposition political party, Wefaq has been willing to cooperate with the Sunni regime under the umbrella of the Khalifas as long as genuine reform is implemented.
For the party, meaningful reform includes free elections; reinstating the 1973 constitution; government accountability (particularly at the level of the prime minister); ending economic, political, and employment discrimination, especially in security and defense; and halting illegal arrests, trials, and convictions.
In fact, Wefaq supported the reform initiative of then-Emir Hamad in 2001-02 and endorsed the so-called National Charter believing that Hamad was committed to genuine reform. Several opposition figures came back from exile to cooperate with the new initiative.
Unfortunately, however, the only “reform” that resulted from Hamad’s initiative was changing the name of the country to the “Kingdom of Bahrain” and replacing his title of “Emir” with “King.” The reform initiative stalled because of opposition from Prime Minister Khalifa and the “Khawalids” in the office of the emir in Gulf countries, and defense, and judicial branches of government.
Overturning the Bahraini regime’s unconstitutional step of stripping Shi’a citizens of their citizenship has become a key reform demand for Wefaq. Despite the constitutional prohibition, a total of 40 Bahrainis have been stripped of their citizenship in the past two years—31 in November 2012 and nine in August 2014.
Article 17 of the Bahraini constitution states that a Bahraini citizen “cannot be stripped of his nationality except in case of treason. It is prohibited to banish a citizen from Bahrain or prevent him from returning to it.” Article 18 states, “People are equal in human dignity, and citizens are equal before the law in public rights and duties.”
Wefaq is the largest, most prominent and pragmatic opposition political party in the country. Its 18 members resigned from parliament three years ago to protest the draconian measures the ruling family has adopted against the opposition, particularly the Shi’a community.
Wefaq believes the regime will use the skewed election results to justify its massive human rights violations and continued campaign of harassment, arrests, and illegal detentions. Wefaq and other opposition groups—including Wa’d, al-Tajjamu,’ and al-Ikha’—decided to boycott the election, refusing to take part in what some of them call a pseudo-democratic political charade.
Jamil Kathim, who heads Wefaq’s Shura Council, said the election “does not represent the popular will and will not provide security for the country.” Matar Ibrahim Matar, a former Wefaq Member of Parliament who is currently living in Washington, DC, called on the government to postpone the election “until a national path forward has been agreed on.”
The opposition groups also urged King Hamad to “seek a national consensus to resolve the serious national issues that have bedeviled the nation since 2011 before holding elections.”
The mainstream opposition includes several leading figures with whom the regime could work with if it’s seriously interested in becoming more inclusive. These include Ali Salman, Secretary General of Al-Wifaq, Jamil Kathim, Abd al-Jalil al-Khalil, Ali al-Marzook, Matar Ibrahim Matar, Jasim Hussain, Mansoor al-Jamri, Nabil Rajab, Lamis Dhaif, Maryam al-Khawaja, Ali al-Ikri, and several others.
The regime, in defiance, has gone all out to publicize the elections based on Crown Prince Salman’s so-called “Common Ground” framework. In addition to “Electoral Districts,” the other four parts of the framework include “Legislative Authority,” “Cabinet Formation,” “Judicial Reform,” and “Security.”
Is There a Way Forward?
The regime is pressing ahead with the election while ignoring the pragmatic demands of the opposition. Human rights Watch and Human Rights First have frequently identified the egregious human rights violations committed by the regime against innocent civilians and political activists.
But Bahrain has waged a fierce public relations campaign to dissuade Western governments from raising the human rights issue in the country. The Khalifa regime has used an army of “access” academics, former diplomats, retired senior military officers, corporate executive think-tankers, and pliant media influential figures to act as informal advisers to “lobby” policymakers in Western capitals on behalf of the Bahraini regime.
What we are seeing now is a minority Sunni regime refusing to share the political process with the country’s Shi’a majority on the basis of fairness, equity, and justice. If the United States believes continued tensions in Bahrain and in the wider Gulf are harmful to its strategic regional interests, it cannot remain oblivious to these violations and to the possibility of radicalization in Bahrain.
Due to the Khalifas’ refusal to seriously act on the concerns of the country’s Shi’a majority, the elections on Saturday will not move the reconciliation process forward. Washington may be hoping to stabilize its relations with Iran through an agreement on the nuclear issue and to understand the regional factors that led to the rise of IS to speed up its defeat, but the growing chance of vicious sectarianism in Bahrain could undermine its search for regional stability.
]]>Bahraini, Arab, and international media have assessed the dialogue meetings Crown Prince Salman held with opposition representatives Jan. 15 positively and expressed cautious optimism about his ability to bring about genuine civic peace in that embattled country.
In a Jan. 15 column in al-Wasat newspaper, Mansoor al-Jamri hailed the meetings as a [...]]]>
Bahraini, Arab, and international media have assessed the dialogue meetings Crown Prince Salman held with opposition representatives Jan. 15 positively and expressed cautious optimism about his ability to bring about genuine civic peace in that embattled country.
In a Jan. 15 column in al-Wasat newspaper, Mansoor al-Jamri hailed the meetings as a very important event in the annals of modern Bahrain. He cautioned, however, that only time will tell whether the Crown Prince’s efforts would resolve the current “suffocating” political crisis in Bahrain. Such a resolution will have to based on “respecting human rights for all, full citizenship, social justice, and equality before the law,” he added.
American, British, and French diplomats in Bahrain praised the initiative and urged the Bahraini government to open participation in the dialogue to representatives from all segments of society.
The Crown Prince’s meeting with the two representatives from al-Wefaq offered an intriguing photo-op. Here you have the future King of Bahrain meeting with Khalil al-Marzooq, who is awaiting his sentence, and Sheikh Ali Salman, who is banned from traveling out of the country, discussing the future of a peaceful, inclusive Bahrain. While sitting in Salman’s palatial office and enjoying his hospitality, these two interlocutors were only recently accused by the government of inciting “hatred against the King” and promoting “terrorism.”
The Bahrain Mirror news site addressed the Crown Prince in an editorial stating, “It is not sufficient for you to pursue dialogue by yourself.” To drive this point home, the international ail organization Human Rights First (HRF) called on the United States Government “to urge the government of Bahrain to include in the meetings the principal leaders who are still in jail.” HRF added, “No settlement between the government and the opposition will succeed unless the government stops human rights violations, releases political prisoners, and accepts accountability of previous violations.”
Cause for Optimism
According to media reports, the Crown Prince promised to raise the level of government participation in the dialogue and to discuss some of the core demands of the opposition. It’s interesting to note that the minister of interior Rashid bin Abdallah Al Khalifa, and former minister of labor, Dr. Majid al-Alawi, were present at the meeting.
Following Salman’s meeting with al-Wefaq leaders, the five opposition groups (Wa’d, al-Minbar, al-Ikha’, al-Tajammu’, and al-Wefaq) described the atmosphere as one of “candor and complete transparency.” But they cautioned, “a positive outcome of the meetings would depend on whether there is a genuine partnership” with the people.
According to Bahraini government spokesperson Samira Rajab, the Crown Prince identified five key agenda items for dialogue. In addition to raising the level of official representation, the items would include the legislature, the judiciary, the executive branch, electoral districts, and security for all the people. The Crown Prince also promised that the forthcoming discussions would be “serious, transparent, and truthful.”
Cause for Caution
Despite the optimistic reaction to Salman’s Jan. 15 meeting with al-Wefaq leaders, several factors could dampen and perhaps torpedo the dialogue process.
First, the Crown Prince identified fewer items than what he raised in his 2011 initiative. Also, he did not elaborate on how he and his government would approach each item.
Second, Salman’s agenda items fall short of what the opposition groups had demanded in the October 2011 “Manama Document” to which they remain committed. Among other things, they have called for a nationally elected unicameral legislature with full legislative powers, a representative and accountable government, a just electoral system, and a trustworthy judiciary.
Third, it would be difficult for the proposed dialogue to move forward while illegal arrests, sham trials, and harsh imprisonment of mostly Shia men, women, and youth continues unabated. Sectarian discrimination and massive human rights violations in the midst of the purported granting of “political” citizenship to Sunni foreigners, from Pakistan, Jordan, and elsewhere, create a toxic environment for dialogue.
The “sixty four million dollar” question revolves around how much leeway the hardliners within the ruling family will give the Crown Prince as he pursues serious dialogue with the opposition. Will King Hamad go out on a limb in support of his son’s initiative?
Where do the Prime Minister and his supporters among the “Khawalids” stand on his great nephew’s initiative and will they tolerate seeing jailed opposition leaders, who only very recently were accused of crimes against the state and of spreading sedition or fitna, be set free? To repeat the words of Mansoor al-Jamri, “The coming days, weeks, and months will tell.”
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