by Jasmin Ramsey
We proudly featured some indispensable analysis here at LobeLog in the run-up to Iran’s 2013 election, including scholar Farideh Farhi’s discussion of the centrists’ and reformists’ role this time around and economist Djavad Salehi-Isfahani’s informed take on the lack of economic policy debate among the candidates.
Some other articles [...]]]>
by Jasmin Ramsey
We proudly featured some indispensable analysis here at LobeLog in the run-up to Iran’s 2013 election, including scholar Farideh Farhi’s discussion of the centrists’ and reformists’ role this time around and economist Djavad Salehi-Isfahani’s informed take on the lack of economic policy debate among the candidates.
Some other articles of interest include Reza Aslan’s unique discussion of outgoing President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s legacy, a former political prisoner’s spotlighting of the Iranian peoples’ struggle and what the international community should and shouldn’t do about it, and arguably the most thoughtful essay written on Iran’s 11th election since its 1979 revolution, Farhi’s “Should Iran’s Election Really be Discounted?“.
For live election updates in English, consider following the New York Time’s generally excellent Lede Blog, this Tumblr site, and on-the-ground tweeters Najmeh Bozorghmehr, Thomas Erdbrink, and Tehran Bureau, which tweets messages from its Iranian sources regularly. Some other perceptive Tweeters include Golnaz Esfandiari, Arash Karami, Abas Aslani, Scott Peterson, Reza Marashi, Hooman Majd, Laura Rozen, Meir Javedanfar, Muftah and Barbara Slavin.
I’m sure I’ve accidentally left out a lot of other excellent resources, but it’s hard enough keeping up with my own Twitter feed at this point! For now, everyone is anxiously awaiting the results (extended voter times are just about to end) as much as they are hoping for the votes to be counted fairly…
]]>Talking to ordinary people in Neishabour and Tehran about Iran’s June 14 presidential election, economic issues seem foremost on their minds. But whom they will vote for is based on vague promises to pull the economy out of its deep crisis rather than well-defined economic programs.
Significant differences on economic philosophy divide [...]]]>
Talking to ordinary people in Neishabour and Tehran about Iran’s June 14 presidential election, economic issues seem foremost on their minds. But whom they will vote for is based on vague promises to pull the economy out of its deep crisis rather than well-defined economic programs.
Significant differences on economic philosophy divide a confused public about how to end economic stagnation and high inflation.
In the last three decades of the Islamic Republic’s history, Iranians have experienced both market-based economic growth and populist redistribution.
This election cycle would have been a good time to debate which of these two economic development strategies should be used in moving forward.
However, the decision by the Guardian Council to eliminate two important candidates, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, from the list of those eligible to run has sharply limited the value of this election as a space for vibrant public debate about the issues that are of greatest daily concern to most Iranians.
These two politicians could have represented the contrasting economic strategies and turned the election into a referendum on the past eight years of populist economics practiced by the Ahmadinejad administration.
Mr. Rafsanjani, the former two-time president, is well known for his preference for market-based economic growth as a solution to poverty and equity issues.
Early on in Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s tenure, Mr. Rafsanjani rejected Mr. Ahmadinejad’s populist policy of cash distribution as “fostering beggars.”
His elimination from this election has deprived voters of a critical assessment of Mr. Ahmadinejad’s populist program that has inflicted serious damage on Iran’s economy.
A further blow to a meaningful debate on populism came from the elimination of Mr. Mashaei, who was Mr. Ahmadinejad’s close associate and in-law.
It would have been highly interesting, if not very informative, to watch him debate Mr. Rafsanajani on such important issues as the record of the government’s three ambitious populist programs — low-interest loans to small and medium producers, low-cost housing and cash transfers.
What this election should be about is how to achieve a key promise of the Islamic Revolution.
More than three decades ago, a vast majority of Iranians supported the revolution, expecting that it would divide Iran’s oil wealth more equitably.
Early on, Ayatollah Khomeini, the revolution’s leader, tried to limit these expectations by famously saying that “economics is for donkeys.”
But the failure by two previous administrations (Mr. Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, each serving for eight years as president) to reduce inequality has kept the issue of income and wealth distribution at the forefront in recent elections.
Mr. Ahmadinejad came to power in 2005 promising to take the “oil money to peoples’ dinner table,” which he tried to do.
The last two years for which we have survey data, 2010 and 2011, show falling poverty and inequality, but the economy is in shambles.
Prices rose by 40% last year according to official figures, and the same surveys show unemployment at about 15% overall and twice as high for youth.
It would have been valuable for the public to learn if Mr. Ahmadinejad’s redistribution policies are responsible for the current economic mess, or something else, like incompetence in execution or international sanctions.
What the candidates have said in the short time they have had to campaign is that they will do something different. What and how is not clear.
The four front-runners, Saeed Jalili, Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf, Hassan Rowhani, and Ali Akbar Velayati, have expressed their differences on how to deal with sanctions.
Sanctions loom large in voter minds, but few believe that whoever is elected will be able to influence Iran’s nuclear policy, which is being tightly directed by the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
What seems to distinguish these candidates most clearly at this point is social rather than economic issues.
They all promise to reduce inflation, increase employment and run a less corrupt and more efficient administration. The differences exist in emphasis rather than specifics.
Mr. Jalili is the most conservative candidate in the race and closest to Mr. Ahmadinejad in economic philosophy but has also been careful to neither defend nor criticize the latter’s policies.
He has defended Iran’s stance in the nuclear negotiations with the P5+1 group (the U.S., Britain, France, China, and Russia plus Germany), which he led in recent years, with the usual anti-Western rhetoric.
By saying the least of any candidate about the economy, he has clearly indicated that economic issues are not his top priority.
In the televised debates, Mr. Jalili made it clear that a more effective enforcement of cultural values was the right way to solve the country’s economic problems.
More specifically, he seemed to reject compromising with the West over Iran’s nuclear program in order to lessen the pain of Western sanctions on ordinary Iranians.
If Mr. Jalili is Mr. Ahmadinejad’s favorite candidate, Mr. Ahmadinejad has not said anything.
He has not made any public statement regarding the candidates so far, except to request time on national television to respond to their criticisms, which was denied.
Word on the street in Tehran is that Mr. Ahmadinejad secretly roots for Mr. Jalili because he believes a President Jalili would be the most likely to make him look good, not by defending his policies, but by taking the economy further into the deep end.
Mr. Rowhani, the only cleric in the race, is the most moderate candidate among the four front-runners.
In the eyes of liberal voters, following this week’s departure of reformist candidate Mohammad-Reza Aref (after an explicit request from the popular former president, Mohammad Khatami), Mr. Rowhani has inherited the reformist mantle of Mr. Khatami as well as Mr. Rafsanjani’s pro-business legacy.
Mr. Rowhani energized Iran’s young voters after the second televised debate in which he criticized the heavy hand of security forces in social affairs.
He appears to have gained the same lift that former presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi achieved four years ago upon declaring he would end police enforcement of public chastity.
However, like Mr. Mousavi, Mr. Rowhani has not offered clear economic policies to address the youth’s more serious problems of unemployment and family formation.
A formidable challenge to Mr. Rowhani comes from Mr. Qalibaf, the current mayor of Tehran and a moderate conservative.
During a recent televised debate, they clashed over how the police should treat student protests, but they have not tried to distinguish themselves on how they would help university graduates get jobs.
If the election goes to a second round run-off between these two candidates, which now seems likely, there is a chance that voters will hear more about their approach to revive the economy.
But then the candidates may find it easier to appeal to voters’ emotions than to their pocketbooks.
Photo: The campaign headquarters of presidential hopeful Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf in the Iranian city of Neishabour. Credit: Djavad Salehi-Isfahani
]]>by Farideh Farhi
It is fair to say that since Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s disqualification, a good section of the Iranian pubic has been in a state of shock and silence. A friend who is also a keen observer of Iranian politics described the mood not only in Tehran but also the [...]]]>
by Farideh Farhi
It is fair to say that since Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s disqualification, a good section of the Iranian pubic has been in a state of shock and silence. A friend who is also a keen observer of Iranian politics described the mood not only in Tehran but also the capital of a province she visits often as eerie silence.
The excitement that was generated by Hashemi Rafsanjani’s candidacy was unexpected, perhaps even to him. In all likelihood, it was also the reason for his disqualification. Iran’s conservative establishment would have preferred yet another Rafsanjani defeat at the polls as in 2005. But the potential for voter mobilization along the lines of 2009 made that route too risky.
So now the question of what to do must be on the minds of people who identify with the reformists and centrists. Their two key leaders — former presidents Mohammad Khatami and Hahsemi Rafsanjani — have been silent on this since the disqualification.
Voter silence may eventually transform into a turning of the back against the electoral process. It will not be an organized boycott but an effective lowering of the participation rate, particularly in large cities, to which the conservative establishment will probably respond by announcing “a higher than expected” turnout rate along the lines of the “epic” event so desired by Iran’s Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. This is what happened in the rather lackluster 2012 parliamentary election when a participation rate of 66.4 percent was announced to a skeptical and yet indifferent electorate at least in Tehran.
And it is precisely this possibility that compels the reformist and centrist political leaders to mull alternatives. After all, low participation rates have never posed a challenge to the conservative political establishment. Given the solid support from a committed base, lower participation rates can even ensure a conservative victory without ballot box-tampering if the conservatives can agree on a candidate — which as I will discuss hasn’t been the case so far — forcing them to face some decisions of their own in the next two weeks.
But going back to the self-identified reformist and centrist organizations and individuals, in the coming two weeks the two former presidents must decide whether to let the scenario that played out in the 2012 parliamentary election — involving essentially a competition between hardliners and traditional conservatives — to reoccur, or gamble on the energy that was generated for Hashemi Rafsanjani’s candidacy in support of one of the two non-conservative candidates: former nuclear negotiator Hassan Rowhani and former first vice president Mohammadreza Aref. Given their lack of name recognition throughout the country everyone knows that for either of these candidates to have any chance one probably has to withdraw in favor of the other and then receive the public backing of the two former presidents.
In other words, the silence that has followed Hashemi Rafsanjani’s disqualification is underwritten by a turn of the eye towards what these two politicians will call upon their supporters to do.
A call for a boycott is out of the question for Hashemi Rafsanjani who is still the chair of the Expediency Council. It is also highly unlikely for Khatami who knows that such a move would become an occasion for the further purging of reformist parties and organizations from the political system.
The two former presidents can tell their supporters to follow their conscience and vote for anyone they wish or actively try to use their clout in an attempt to shape the election’s outcome. After all, Khatami had already corralled the reformist support behind the centrist Hashemi Rafsanjani. Couldn’t the two former presidents do the same for either Rowhani or Aref — both of whom have performed well in their television appearances so far and staked positions on the economy and foreign policy that are similar to Hashemi Rafsanjani’s while being highly critical of the direction Iran has taken in the past eight years?
Uncertainty in response to this question is the reason for hesitance. Convincing supporters — as well as themselves — that the conservative establishment, which was willing to disqualify one of the fathers of the revolution, will not use other schemes to ensure a conservative presidency will be difficult. The only argument against this deep skepticism is yes, the other side might cheat, but non-participation may ensure its victory without cheating or any challenges.
Electoral mobilization has been the centrists’ and reformists’ only successful instrument against the conservative establishment over the years. True, the last successful mobilization turned into a disaster when post-election protests led to repression and the further securitization of Iran’s political environment. The tired and economically pressured Iranian population certainly has no stomach for a repeat. But throwing away the only instrument that societal forces who have been calling for change have to display their existence — and yes, potential power with — in fear of a repeat of a previous experiment’s consequences is tantamount to prematurely surrendering to authoritarian powers who are perfectly happy if voters mostly stay home.
This argument, while persuasive to me, will nevertheless have a hard time countering legitimate worries that electoral participation in support of either of these two candidates will be pocketed by the conservative establishment as a vote of confidence in the Islamic Republic without giving the centrists and reformists a fair chance.
Still, the decision by both Hashemi Rafsanjani and Khatami — to either not support anyone or clearly back one candidate — is yet to come. There is no reason for them to rush either. In the next two weeks of campaigning getting double air-time for two candidates with similar views that are not generally shown on state television is better than getting air time for only one. But in a week or so the pressure on them will increase to make their move. Already, the reformist Shargh Daily is reporting on a plan by the former presidents’ “advisors” to give support to a slate that has one of the two candidates at the top and the other campaigning as his first vice president in case of a win. The challenge of figuring out who should be at the top, the argument goes, will be resolved by the extent of support each can garner after his performance in the three television debates among the eight candidates that will begin this Friday and end next Friday.
There are two reasons why these former presidents and their supporters have not yet fully abandoned strategizing for a possible reformist/centrist victory. I already mentioned the first reason and it’s related to uncertainty about the length to which the conservative establishment will go to ensure a conservative victory. The argument that the system needs a “clean” election to erase the memory of the botched 2009 election works in favor of trying to mobilize the voters in order to force or impose an election day win.
But there is also a second reason that’s related to the disarray within the conservative camp itself. As I previously mentioned, the conservatives have been unable to consolidate support behind a single candidate. In fact, as of today two of their candidates — Saeed Jalili and Ali Akbar Velayati — have received organizational support from the two polls of the conservative spectrum. Jalili was formally endorsed by the hardline Steadfastness Front (Jebheye Paydari, which is sometimes translated as the Constancy Front) while Velayati was formally endorsed by the Followers of the Imam and Leadership Line Front, which consists of 14 traditionally conservative organizations and parties.
At this point, despite Jalili’s assiduous efforts to portray himself as such — because believe it or not, trying to convince people that one has the Leader’s support in Iran is an art that is practiced by quite a few people in order to push one’s self ahead — it is not clear which one of these two candidates will by Election Day be the favorite of the “system”, called nezam in Iran, or more accurately, Khamenei’s favorite. If the 2012 parliamentary election is any guide — and parliamentary elections occurring before the presidential race with no running sitting president have been good guides in the past — the candidate of the traditional conservatives should do better or become the favorite. But so far this decision doesn’t appear to have been made.
In any case, the interesting aspect of this election may be that for these two candidates even becoming the favorite may not ensure a win if there is no substantial fraud on Election Day. The so-called mashin-e entekhabat (electoral machine), an army of loyalists the system can mobilize in support of a particular candidate even at the last minute, is at most 6 to 7 million people. This is not sufficient for a win even if only 50 to 55 percent — a historical low only recorded for elections in which either a sitting president was seeking reelection (as in 1985 or 1993) or the victory of a specific candidate was assured like in 1989 — of the announced 50 million eligible voters participate. To be sure, both Velayati and Jalili can try to woo votes beyond the machine. But they do not have much in the way of independent organization and given their lack of personal charisma, and the fact that neither of them has held positions related to domestic policy making, the chances of their success is low. (Again, if the assumption is that the Interior Ministry, which is in charge of conducting the election, will inflate the participation rate, it’s unlikely to substantially tamper with votes in favor of one candidate or another).
The only conservative candidate who can add the machine vote to his own personal following is the more popular Tehran mayor Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, who has so far garnered no support from conservative organizations and parties. But Qalibaf has been organizing in almost every city and even quite a few villages throughout the country; he has been practically planning and running for the presidency for the past 8 years.
Yet his basic problem remains with the electoral machine vote, which in the 2005 election shifted in the last minute and favored Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, leaving him with only 4 million votes — and fourth position — out of the 28 million votes cast. A decision made to shift the machine towards Qalibaf will probably be dependent on the assessment of how well the reformist/centrist might do. If the election ends up going to the second round with no one mustering 50 percent plus one vote, then Qalibaf is probably the strongest candidate against the reformist/centrist choice — again provided the absence of a systemic will to ensure a conservative win at any cost either in the first round or by pitting two conservative candidates against each other in the second round.
At this point, all I can say is that betting on the win of any given candidate — or point of view — seems premature. It is true that some candidates such as former IRGC commander Mohsen Rezaie, former minister Mohammad Gharazi, or even former speaker of the parliament Haddad Adel have no chance, but some of the other candidates and their supporters will still have to make choices and react to the choices made by others. The reformist and centrist leaders’ choice to become more aggressive players at the immediate political and tactical level and risk the possibility that the electorate will not follow is a gamble that, if successful, will again force the multitude of conservative constituencies and candidates to revisit their calculations, formulate new tactics and tricks, and even re-arrange their alliances.
]]>via IPS News
With the disqualification of former president and current chair of the Expediency Council Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani by a vetting body, the Guardian Council, Iran’s presidential campaign is opening with many in the country in a state of shock.
Although the eight qualified candidates offer [...]]]>
via IPS News
With the disqualification of former president and current chair of the Expediency Council Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani by a vetting body, the Guardian Council, Iran’s presidential campaign is opening with many in the country in a state of shock.
Although the eight qualified candidates offer somewhat of a choice given their different approaches to the economy and foreign policy, the disqualification of Rafsanjani has once again raised the spectre that the conservative establishment intends to manipulate the electoral process in such a way that only a conservative candidate will win when voters cast their ballots Jun. 14.
Rafsanjan’s candidacy, which received solid support from former reformist president Mohammad Khatami, had created hope among a section of the Iranian population — unhappy with the policies of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad — that a real contest over the direction of the country was possible.
His stature and name recognition had immediately catapulted him as the most formidable candidate against the conservative establishment.
The possibility that the Guardian Council would disqualify a man who is the appointed chair of the Expediency Council and an elected member of the Clerical Council of Experts was deemed unfathomable by many.
In the words of conservative MP Ali Mottahari, who had pleaded with Rafsanjani to register as a candidate, “if Hashemi is disqualified, the foundations of the revolution and the whole system of the Islamic Republic will be questioned.”
Rafsanjani’s unexpected disqualification poses a challenge for his supporters, who include centrists, reformists and even some middle-of-the-road conservatives such as Mottahari: who, if anyone, will they now support in the election?
The slate of approved candidates includes two individuals — former nuclear negotiator Hassan Rowhani and former first vice president Mohammadreza Aref — who hold mostly similar views to Rafsanjani.
In fact, both had said that they would withdraw if Rafsanjani’s candidacy was approved. But neither is as well known as the former president and they will now have to compete against each other in attracting likeminded voters.
Rowhani has chosen to run as an independent, while Aref is running as a reformist. While Rafsanjani’s candidacy had energised and unified the reformists and centrists, the campaign of these two lesser known candidates may be cause for disunity and/or voter apathy.
A third candidate, Mohammad Gharazi — who may also have centrist tendencies — is even less known throughout the country.
He served first as the minister of petroleum and then post, telegraph, and telephone in the cabinet of then-prime minister Mir Hossein Mussavi — now under house arrest after his 2009 presidential bid — and then in Rafsanjani’s cabinet when he served as president.
But since 1997, Ghazari has not held public office. Furthermore, no one really knows his views or why he was qualified when several other ministers with more recent experience were not.
Reformist supporters, already distraught over the previous contested election and continued incarceration of candidates they voted for in 2009, may see Rafsanjani’s disqualification as yet another sign that their vote will not count.
Apathy or abstention in protest among supporters is now a real issue for the centrists and reformists. This challenge may — and only may — be overcome if one of the candidates agrees to withdraw in favour of the other and the popular former reformist president Khatami throws his support behind the unified candidate in the same way he did with the candidacy of Rafsanjani.
But even this may not be enough. The reality is that the low name recognition of both candidates limits the impact of such political manoeuvring and coalition-building by the reformists, especially if the conservative-controlled security establishment makes campaigning and the spread of information difficult. Already Aftab News, a website affiliated with Rowhani, has been blocked.
This leaves the competition among the other five candidates who come from the conservative bloc. One, former presidential candidate, Mohsen Rezaee, is also running as an independent and is both the most likely to last until Election Day and the least likely to garner many votes.
It is the competition among the other four conservative candidates — Tehran mayor Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, former foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati, former Parliamentary Speaker Gholamali Haddad Adel, and current nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili — that will in all likelihood determine the fate of the election.
If Rafsanjani had been qualified, there would have been an urge for unity among these candidates since, without such unity, the former president could have received the 50 percent plus one necessary to win in the first round.
Now, however, the same forces that had prevented the conservative candidates from rallying behind one candidate remain in play.
Polls published by various Iranian news agencies, although not very reliable, uniformly suggest that Qalibaf is the most popular conservative candidate because of his management of the Tehran megapolis and the vast improvement in the delivery of services he has overseen there.
But Qalibaf’s relative popularity has not yet been sufficient to convince other candidates to unite behind him. This may eventually happen after televised presidential debates if he does well in them and if Velayati and Haddad Adel drop out in his favour since, from the beginning, the three of them had agreed that eventually the most popular should stand on Election Day.
But there is no guarantee that this will happen. Velayati in particular has ambitions of his own and has implied that Leader Ali Khameni’s preference should be given at least as much weight as polls, giving rise to speculation that he is the Leader’s preferred candidate despite clear signs that he has not been able to create much excitement even among conservative voters.
Convincing the hard-line candidate Jalili to drop out in favour of Qalibaf will be even harder.
In fact, from now until Election Day there will probably be as much pressure on Qalibaf to drop out in favour of Jalili as the other way around in the hope that a unified conservative candidate can win in the first round, avoiding the risk of either Rowhani or Aref making it to the second round where the top two candidates will have to compete on Jun. 21.
Jalili is the least experienced — and well known — of all the conservative candidates and, in a campaign in which economy is the number one issue by far, there are real concerns regarding whether he is experienced enough to manage Iran’s deep economic problems.
But his late entry in the presidential race, minutes after Rafsanjani entered it, has also given rise to speculation that he, instead of Velayati, may be the Leader’s preferred choice.
What is not a subject of speculation is the fact that Jalili takes the hardest line of all the candidates.
His campaign slogan of “hope, justice, and resistance” suggests that he is the most likely to continue current policies, although perhaps with less bombast and populist flair than the current president.
As such, Jalili stands apart from the other seven candidates who will campaign on the need for both change and competent leadership.
Jalili jumped into the race at the last minute as a hard-line counter to Rafsanjani’s call for moderation. Ironically, with the latter’s disqualification, he now stands alone as the candidate whom others will try to mobilise voters against.
]]>