by Wayne White
The reverberations of the desperate war inside Syria have increasingly radiated outward. In addition to the massive Syrian refugee exodus, Lebanon and Iraq in particular have been impacted adversely by heightened instability and violence. Yet actions associated with both have only increased their vulnerability. By contrast, the Turks [...]]]>
by Wayne White
The reverberations of the desperate war inside Syria have increasingly radiated outward. In addition to the massive Syrian refugee exodus, Lebanon and Iraq in particular have been impacted adversely by heightened instability and violence. Yet actions associated with both have only increased their vulnerability. By contrast, the Turks and Iraq’s northern Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) have boldly ramped up their mutual cooperation, in part to form a common front to counter an unwelcome rival Kurdish alliance taking shape inside Syria.
Despite rising violence in Lebanon, so far Iraq has been the most heavily affected overall of Syria’s neighbors. In addition to the almost daily backdrop of horrific bombings and attacks by gunmen on Shi’a and government-related targets (like those of Dec. 16 killing 65), there has been a surge in execution-style killings and beheadings, with bodies dumped in various locales (characteristic of the dark days of the 2006-2008 sectarian violence). Recently, Iranian workers on a gas pipeline in north central Iraq were also the objects of a massacre. Al-Qaeda associated elements have been the prime culprits, but Shi’a militias have become more active as well.
With more than 8,000 Iraqis already dead this year from extremist violence, Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari warned earlier this month of more danger from a jihadist “Islamic emirate” that could take hold in much of Syria. Yet, the Baghdad government’s own marginalization and persecution of Iraq’s Sunni Arab community under Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has been the leading cause for the powerful revival of Sunni Arab extremism in Iraq and its close linkage to the parallel phenomenon in Syria.
Meanwhile, hardline Grand Ayatollah Kazim al-Haeri (who has inspired Shi’a militias in Iraq for years) issued a fatwa on Dec. 15 pronouncing “fighting in Syria legitimate” and declaring those who die there “martyrs.” This fatwa probably will send many more Iraqi Shi’a into Syria to join over a thousand already believed to be fighting for the regime. But it also could intensify seething sectarian tensions within Iraq.
Other notable developments affecting Iraq, however, involve its northern Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). KRG President Masoud Barzani made his first visit to Turkey in any capacity since 1992 in mid-November. The obvious aim was to support Turkish President Erdogan’s peace efforts focused on the extremist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) as well as to help Ergodan secure more Kurdish favor in Turkey’s March 2014 municipal elections.
Such high-profile assistance from Iraq’s Kurds would seem odd but for two other pressing matters. First, both Turkey and the KRG were alarmed by the declaration before Barzani’s visit by Kurdish militias in northeastern Syria of an interim administration for an autonomous Kurdish region there. Although repressed in the pre-civil war era, these militias are believed to have made their move with the approval of the Syrian government, and to have received aid from Assad’s allies, Iran and the Maliki government (relationships both Erdogan and Barzani oppose). Moreover, the Iraqi Kurds and the Turks fear the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), with links to the radical PKK, is behind the recent unity move.
For Damascus, any such agreement probably represents a cynical wartime concession of iffy standing simply to harness the bulk of Syria’s 2 million Kurds against anti-regime Sunni Arab rebels. Support from the regime probably also made possible the only UN airlift of winter relief supplies for any area outside government control into this predominantly Kurdish region. The only other airlifts to rebel areas associated with the Syrian regime have involved bombs.
Syrian Kurdish militias have been battling various rebels for over a year. On Dec. 13, cadres of the al-Qaeda linked Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) reportedly seized 120 Syrian Kurdish hostages near the Turkish border north of Aleppo, the latest of a number of such kidnappings. There has also been heavy skirmishing between the ISIL and extremist al-Nusra Front rebels and Syrian Kurdish militias along the edges of the Kurdish-controlled zone.
The second key driver in Barzani’s and Erdogan’s warming ties is oil. For years, Maliki’s government has been at odds with Barzani’s KRG over the KRG’s efforts to award its own contracts for large-scale oil and gas exports. KRG patience may have run out. In late November, Turkey and the KRG apparently came close to finalizing a comprehensive oil and gas deal — the latest move in Ankara’s cooperation with the KRG that has angered Baghdad.
Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz assured Iraqi officials on Dec. 1 that “any exports must be with the approval of the Iraqi government.” But with Iraq still balking over fears of greater KRG autonomy, the Turks and the KRG are keeping the pressure up; on Dec. 13, test flows of limited amounts of KRG crude were sent through a new pipeline already completed to carry Iraqi Kurdish exports Turkey sorely needs to diversify its energy dependence and secure oil and gas at a likely discount.
Lebanon has been paying ever more dearly for the ongoing sectarian violence just across its lengthy Syrian border and Hezbollah’s military intervention in Syria. Indeed, given Lebanon’s own complex sectarian mosaic, overspill was inevitable, with an ongoing litany of clashes, killings, threats, and squaring off otherwise among Sunni, Alawite and Shi’a communities radiating out from the border.
Tensions and sectarian violence, however, also have been rising in core areas of Lebanon. In the northern city of Tripoli, with a majority Sunni Arab community, a Lebanese soldier died and 7 others were wounded in a Dec. 5 clash with extremists sympathetic to the Syrian rebels. More than 100 have died in Tripoli so far this year in gun battles and a bombing pitting Sunni militants against the army, the police, Tripoli’s minority Alawite community, or Lebanese Shi’a elements. As a result, Lebanon’s caretaker Prime Minister, Najib Mikati, recently turned security there over to the army for 6 months.
Probably most damaging for Lebanon has been Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria, sending thousands of seasoned fighters to reinforce those of the Assad regime. Hundreds of its combatants have been killed in action, and heavily Shi’a-populated areas of Beirut in particular (home to many Hezbollah fighters) have not simply remained a quiet “home front” away from Hezbollah’s war across the border.
Bombings like the one against the Iranian Embassy in Beirut and nearby buildings on Nov. 19, which killed two dozen, have hammered Shi’a neighborhoods. On Dec. 4, a Hezbollah commander back from the Syrian front, Hassan al-Liqqis, was gunned down in front of his residence. Hezbollah blamed the Israelis, but it is more likely he was another victim of rising home-grown violence. Today, Hezbollah claims it thwarted an attempted car bombing believed to have been aimed at one of its bases in the largely Hezbollah-controlled Bekaa Valley 20 miles east of Beirut.
Many assumed through the 1st year of the Syrian conflict that refugees would comprise the main burden faced by Syria’s neighbors, but the savagery and destruction wrought by the Syrian regime especially magnified even that challenge far beyond early worse-case scenarios. The virtual explosion of the rebel al-Qaeda factor, Hezbollah’s robust intervention, and the anti-rebel stance taken — or forced upon — most of Syria’s Kurds was not foreseen. All this further complicates ongoing efforts to find some path out of the Hellish Syrian maelstrom, be they Western efforts to oust Assad & Co. or the recently revived international efforts to bring the parties together for talks in Geneva. All things considered, the prospects for an effective way forward out of this crisis remain grim.
]]>by Mitchell Plitnick
Who is John Kerry trying to fool?
His repeated trips to the Middle East have produced no change in the status quo and prevented neither the resignation of the US’ golden boy in Palestine, Salam Fayyad, nor Turkish Prime Minister Trecip Erdogan’s planned visit to Gaza. But he [...]]]>
by Mitchell Plitnick
Who is John Kerry trying to fool?
His repeated trips to the Middle East have produced no change in the status quo and prevented neither the resignation of the US’ golden boy in Palestine, Salam Fayyad, nor Turkish Prime Minister Trecip Erdogan’s planned visit to Gaza. But he remains determined to bring peace to the Middle East. His urgent warning to Congress that the opportunity for a two-state solution has only one to two years of life left was meant to ignite a sense of urgency on Capitol Hill.
If this was some other Secretary of State, one might think he just needs to learn about the Israel-Palestine conflict (and he’s got a harsh lesson coming), but Kerry knows the dynamics of this issue very well. He spent 28 years in the Senate, including the last four as the Chair of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. He managed to rise to that position despite having been more vocal than most in Congress (though that’s a very low bar) in opposing settlements.
Kerry was visibly shaken when he returned from Gaza in 2009, and his attention to some of the excesses of the Israeli blockade, like the barring of pasta from the Strip (because we all know the terrifying dual uses that can be put to), helped rein some of them in. None of this made a huge difference in either the political situation or the daily lives of Palestinians, but it does reflect a US politician who is far from a novice in the Israel-Palestine conflict. That image is reinforced by the fact that despite these substantive acts, which could not have been greeted warmly in the offices of AIPAC and other parts of the Israel Lobby, Kerry’s nomination as Secretary of State met virtually no opposition, in stark contrast to his colleague, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel.
I’ve never spoken with John Kerry, but I got to know his staff on the Foreign Relations Committee pretty well. I was left with no doubt that Kerry had a pretty good grasp of the conflict, the Lobby and what was possible in the halls of power in Washington. Kerry is no fool and he’s neither ignorant about the Israel-Palestine conflict and its attendant politics nor is he naïve.
But it’s not easy to square those facts with his opening blitz on this issue. I spoke off the record with someone who knows Kerry and his thinking earlier this week and he told me Kerry is sincere about going all out to finally resolve this conflict. That certainly seems to be the case based on Kerry’s two trips to the region already and his plea for congressional backing at the hearing at the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations.
Which leads to the conclusion that the person John Kerry is really fooling is himself. With his experience, his solid working relationships — not only with regional leaders Benjamin Netanyahu and Mahmoud Abbas, but also with key figures in the Israel Lobby and the US Jewish community — and his long and consistent support for a two-state solution, he believes he can do, within a one to two year period, what all those before him have failed to accomplish.
The early returns, predictably enough, do not bear Kerry’s faith out. Almost immediately after Kerry left Israel, Netanyahu, mindful that he has lost significant support in Israel for his poor relationship with Barack Obama and not wanting to directly insult the Secretary of State, had one of his top aides anonymously tell the Israeli daily Ha’aretz that Israel was rejecting Kerry’s proposed framework for renewing talks with the Palestinians. Shortly thereafter, Abbas accepted the resignation of Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, a particularly pointed development since Kerry had stressed Palestinian economic development as the key step in bringing the two sides back to the table. Fayyad has long been the point man for building the Palestinian economy, but it remains propped up by international donations. The Palestinians, correctly reading Kerry’s proposal as an echo of Netanyahu’s plan for “economic peace,” made it clear that political progress is what is needed for economic growth, not the reverse.
It didn’t end there. Kerry hoped to build on Obama’s success in breaking the impasse between Israel and Turkey by convincing Turkish PM Erdogan to postpone his planned to trip to Gaza next month. Erdogan refused, and Kerry was criticized for trying to dictate to Turkey how it should handle its foreign relations. Finally, a quiet project aimed at producing a summit that would bring the US, Israel, the Palestinians and Jordan, with the possible participation of other Arab countries together in June, was rejected loudly and out of hand by Israel, forcing the US to deny it was even trying this.
In short, it has been business as usual in Israel-Palestine diplomacy. Kerry is surely as aware as anyone that re-unifying the Palestinian leadership is crucial to any hope of an agreement, but he is bound by US and Israeli policy that refuses to deal not only with Hamas but with any Palestinian government that Hamas is a player in. Turkey is aware of the same thing, but is not bound by it, and Erdogan wants to position himself as the man who can make something happen in this realm.
Israel’s new government is dominated by rejectionists and Netanyahu is not going to be conciliatory unless he can demonstrate that the United States is leaving him no choice; the Israel Lobby ensures that won’t happen. The Palestinians, for their part, cannot afford to return to talks without some signal that Israel will leave something to negotiate over, in other words, a settlement freeze and some gesture on Palestinian prisoners.
These circumstances aren’t changing, and they have already formed a brick wall that Kerry has run headlong into. His message to Congress was just empty air. He’s telling them that the US position is going to have to change in order for him to be able to do anything. Well, that has always been true, whether the Secretary of State was named Clinton, Rice, Powell, Albright or Christopher. Congress’ recent behavior gives no indication that they are willing to move far afield from the Lobby. Again, no change.
By the end of the year, will Kerry be willing to admit that the two-state solution is dead? Perhaps, and maybe that was what he was telling Congress: I’m not going to work on this for my whole term as Secretary. But if John Kerry truly believes that he’s going to be able to break this impasse with his skills and experience alone, he is in for as rude an awakening as his boss was when he tried to get Netanyahu to freeze settlements in his first term.
]]>McClatchy reports that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is warning the Syrian government that “we are not only not enthusiastic about war, we are also not far from war”:
One day after winning blanket authority [from the Turkish Parliament] to send forces into Syria, Turkey’s prime minister warned Friday that [...]]]>
McClatchy reports that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is warning the Syrian government that “we are not only not enthusiastic about war, we are also not far from war”:
One day after winning blanket authority [from the Turkish Parliament] to send forces into Syria, Turkey’s prime minister warned Friday that his country is “not far from war” and said that it would be a “deadly mistake” for the Syrian government to test Turkey’s will.
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan made the comments as the Turkish military fired shells into Syria for the third straight day – retaliation for a mortar shell that landed just inside Turkish territory in Hatay province, according to the provincial governor.
Though Turkey has allowed the “Free Syrian Army” — an umbrella command for dozens of militias — and other anti-regime groups to operate out of the country and has given shelter to tens of thousands of refugees, its government has been reluctant to take a more proactive role in the crisis.
As a NATO member, an attack on Turkey by Syria would be construed as an attack on NATO, and necessitate discussion of military operations, operations that NATO has so far said it does not envision itself undertaking in Syria as it did over Libya last year.
A White House spokesman recently stated that “[the] US stands behind Turkey as they take action because we believe that action is appropriate.” The UN and NATO have convened special sessions to discuss Turkey’s proposed course of action here on out.
The shelling is the most serious incident that has occurred between the two countries since a Turkish reconnaissance aircraft was apparently downed by Syrian AA fire. Turkish media reports that Assad has, in the wake of the shelling, ordered his forces to observe a demarcation line for themselves to avoid antagonizing the Turks further by violating the border.
Though the Turkish Parliament has approved the dispatch of Turkish forces into Syria, “thousands” of demonstrations marched in Istanbul in protest over the vote.
McClatchy also noted that developments with respect to Syria and Turkey’s Kurdish populations — namely, the paramilitary organizations among them seeking an autonomous Kurdistan — may further antagonize Ankara. These developments come as the Turkish Army undertakes a renewed campaign against anti-government PKK forces:
Mona Yacoubian of the Stimson Center, a Washington think tank, said the Kurdish dimension of the Syrian uprising “is going to gain in prominence” as Assad’s military loses control of territory. She said the assertion of control by Kurdish nationalists tied to the PKK, if it leads to more attacks against Turkish targets, would cross a Turkish “red line.”
With Erdogan’s new war powers, Turkey will “feel compelled to respond,” she said.
What accounts for the delay and the finalizing of the U.S. government’s wishy-washy [...]]]>
What accounts for the delay and the finalizing of the U.S. government’s wishy-washy position on Assad’s regime? Writes Inter Press Service Washington Bureau Chief, Jim Lobe:
- Until Thursday, however, they had declined to call explicitly for Assad to step down for a variety of reasons, including a combination of hopes that he would follow through on his many promises to carry out far-reaching reforms and of fears that his departure would set the stage for even greater bloodshed and possibly sectarian civil war.
Despite constant pressure from neo-conservatives and other pro-Israel hawks who have long had Assad in their gun sights due to his support for Hizbollah and Hamas and close ties to Iran, the administration also resisted taking a harder public line against Assad for fear that doing so would make it politically more difficult for other key powers, notably Russia, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, to move against him while making it easier for Assad to depict the opposition as being manipulated by Washington.
“There was legitimate hesitation about getting too far out in front lest regime change in Syria be seen as a specifically U.S. project, which would not be helpful to oppositionists inside Syria,” said Paul Pillar, a former top CIA Middle East analyst teaching at Georgetown University.
But recent statements by the leaders of all three countries expressing exasperation with the continuing repression apparently encouraged Obama to take the leap.
In particular, Saudi King Abdullah’s angry appeal ten days ago for Assad to “stop the killing machine” – as well as his recall, along with those of several other Gulf leaders, of his ambassador in Damascus – and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s comparison this week of Assad to Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi were cited by senior administration officials as key indicators of a sufficient international consensus to warrant the administration’s latest move.
Read the entire article here.
]]>The two countries have seen their relations deteriorate for years now, highlighted by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan’s dressing down of Israeli President Shimon Peres at the World [...]]]>
The two countries have seen their relations deteriorate for years now, highlighted by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan’s dressing down of Israeli President Shimon Peres at the World Economic Forum in 2009 and the confrontation over Israel’s killing of nine Turks on the Mavi Marmara, a ship trying to run the blockade of Gaza last year.
Analysts have a variety of opinions on the importance of each country to US interests in the region, but US diplomats certainly want to keep a strong relationship with both. Congress, pushed by domestic pressures, especially pro-Israel lobbying groups, has a different approach.
The potential for problems for US diplomacy was previewed in March, 2010. The House Foreign Affairs Committee, which had always been reserved on the matter of the Armenian Genocide (perpetrated by the Turks during and after World War I) issued a statement calling for American recognition of that crime. Turkey recalled its ambassador in response.
The matter went no further, but it illustrated the tensions between politics and diplomacy.
The pro-Israel lobby promoted the Armenian Genocide resolution. Now, however, they are supporting Netanyahu and potential rapprochement between Turkey and Israel. But that resolution was a signal that this could change, if Turkey’s relations with Israel degenerate further.
Israel and Turkey are at odds, but still technically allied. The Obama Administration wants to mend those fences, not tear them further asunder.
The immediate issue is Turkey’s demand for an apology for the Mavi Marmara killings. The UN will soon release a UN report, delayed now until August 20, which will state that Israel’s blockade in Gaza is legal, but that it used excessive force on the Mavi Marmara. If Israel apologizes before that report is released, it will blunt the effect of the latter conclusion.
Indications are that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is willing to issue some kind of apology, though doubtless it will be worded in such a way that Israel can continue to paint it as an unfortunate incident and that it was not really at fault. Such an apology could well be enough.
But Netanyahu, who has considerable support in his cabinet for this course, is concerned by the staunch opposition to it from his Foreign Ministry, which is in the hands of the radical right-wing party, Yisrael Beiteinu.
Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman and his deputy, Danny Ayalon have repeatedly tried to poison this relationship, well before the Mavi Marmara incident. This has never sat well either with the Prime Minister or in DC.
Lieberman has already blasted Netanyahu for even considering an apology to Turkey, despite the importance of that relationship to both Israel and the US. This is a continuation of Lieberman’s campaign to sunder the relationship with Turkey. He’s also using this to punish Netanyahu for his work against Yisrael Beiteinu’s anti-NGO bill last week.
The Israeli far right has been increasingly hostile toward Turkey ever since the current government came to power. They are generally opposed to anything that places diplomatic constraints on Israeli actions, which friendship with a Muslim state inevitably does.
That mistrust grew by leaps and bounds after Erdogan’s tirade against the occupation at Davos in ‘09. Turkey is also working to increase its leadership role in the region and to find a way to defuse the tensions between Iran and the West. All of this frightens the right and one suspects this is why the Foreign Ministry has worked to sour Israeli relations with Turkey.
Netanyahu, as well as key aides such as Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Deputy Prime Minister Dan Meridor, agrees with Obama that it is better to mend the relationship than let the split fester or worsen. But Lieberman can, potentially, bring down the Israeli government, and few in Israel really believe that they have anything to apologize for over the Mavi Marmara incident.
The UN decision to delay the release of the report was probably something the US, Israel and Turkey all agreed should happen. Obama, Erdogan and Netanyahu all want to work toward finding a way for Israel and Turkey to come to terms.
But will Lieberman let them?
For the US, it brings up a nightmare scenario. While the pro-Israel lobby supports Netanyahu’s desires, if Lieberman wins this tug of war, it will mean that Netanyahu’s public stance will change, and so, quite likely, will the lobby’s behavior.
A Congress hostile to Turkey will have plenty of fodder. Turkey wishes to maintain good relations with Syria and Iran, which can be a valuable asset for a US government that doesn’t often find it easy to talk to those two countries. But the potential for anti-Turkey propaganda there is obvious, and last year’s incident was an example of how easily, and disastrously, this situation can turn.
It will be very difficult for Obama Administration, or any other, to ignore that sort of force and pursue the US’ obvious interest in a strong relationship with Turkey.
They really can’t afford to let the dispute on this issue between Netanyahu and Lieberman remain an internal Israeli issue, mostly because the lobby will ensure it impacts US policy. The Administration seems to appreciate this. They’ll have to hope their effort pays dividends, or the price for the “special relationship” with Israel could escalate quite sharply.
]]>So it is with Elliott Abrams‘ latest [...]]]>
So it is with Elliott Abrams‘ latest op-ed on the Wall Street Journal’s editorial pages, entitled “Dictators, Democracies and Wikileaks” in which, among other things, he informs us that “dictators and authoritarians don’t tell their people the truths they tell us” and that “their public speeches are meant to manipulate, not to inform.”
“Their approach is striking: Tell the truth to foreigners but not to your own population,” [he goes on].
“So in Yemen, for example, we see President Ali Abdullah Saleh discussing action against al Qaeda and insisting, ‘We’ll continue to say the bombs are ours and not yours.”
This quotation, of course, is taken from the cable describing a meeting between Saleh and Gen. David Petraeus during which one of Saleh’s aides jokes that he had just lied to parliament about U.S. airstrikes against alleged al Qaeda targets in Yemeni territory. Abrams, now Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, goes on to contrast this kind of mendacity on the part of “dictators and authoritarians” with the honesty of democratic governments:
“Cables reporting on U.S.-German, U.S.-French, or U.S.-Canadian consultations are different — those governments say to their parliaments what they say to us.”
So, then, how would Abrams himself judge the Reagan administration — and, specifically, his own performance in it — when he applies this standard to the Iran-Contra affair?
Abrams, of course, was indicted by the special prosecutor for intentionally deceiving [i.e. lying to] Congress about the Reagan administration’s and his personal role in supporting the Nicaraguan Contras in violation of U.S. law. He eventually pleaded guilty to two lesser offenses (including withholding information from Congress) in order to avoid a trial and a possible prison term. As the prosecutor’s report makes clear, Abrams, who was assistant secretary of Inter-American Affairs at the time, lied throughout the hearings, insisting that he had no knowledge of the NSC and CIA programs to support the Contras when, in fact, he was one of the three principal members (with Oliver North and Alan Fiers) of the so-called Restricted Inter-Agency Group (RIG) that oversaw Central America policy during the Contra war and had been explicitly ordered by his boss, Secretary of State George Shultz, to closely monitor North’s activities. In his guilty plea, he also admitted that he withheld from Congress the fact that he had personally solicited $10 million in aid for the Contras from the Sultan of Brunei. In other words, like President Saleh and his jovial aide, Abrams told the Sultan — who would undoubtedly fall into the dictator/authoritarian category that he now pontificates about — what he refused to tell the United States Congress or his “own population.”
Of course, one could go on and on about Abrams’ mendacity during his service under Reagan; first as assistant secretary for international organizations (1981), then as assistant secretary of human rights and humanitarian affairs (1981-85), and finally as assistant secretary for Inter-American Affairs (1985-89). So low was his credibility with senators — on both sides of the aisle — that his biggest fans on the George W. Bush administration (notably Dick Cheney) knew from the outset that he could never be confirmed to any post. So they sent him to the National Security Council — first as Senior Director for Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations (2001-2002); then as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Near East and North African Affairs (2002-2009) and Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Adviser for Global Democracy Strategy (2005-2009) — where he would never be required to testify before Congress.
One other anomaly struck me about Abrams’ most recent op-ed, aside from his highly questionable assertion — presumably from his old friends in Battalion 316 whose atrocities he helped to cover up in the 1980′s — about the “Honduran people’s unified desire to throw out” ousted Honduran President Manuel Zelaya. I refer to his praise for former U.S. Ambassador James Jeffrey’s analysis of Turkey’s new foreign policy as “sharp and well-written.” That seems very strange, indeed, given what Abrams himself has written about the direction Turkey is taking under the AKP government and President Erdogan. Here’s Abrams in the Weekly Standard last June immediately after the flotilla incident:
“[I]t’s obvious that our formerly reliable NATO ally has become a staunch supporter of the radical camp [in the Middle East]. …Turkey’s U.N. Security Council vote against the newest round of sanctions this past week put it in Iran’s camp against Europe, the United States, Russia, and China. That’s quite a realignment for a NATO ally.
“…Turks may tire of Erdogan’s speeches and return a government that seeks a true balance between East and West rather than a headlong dive into alliances with Iran and Syria.”
Now here’s what Jeffrey wrote in his summary of Erdogan’s foreign policy a few months before:
“Does all this mean that [Turkey] is becoming more focused on the Islamist world and its Muslim tradition in its foreign policy? Absolutely. Does it mean that it is ‘abandoning’ or wants to abandon its traditional Western orientation and willingness to cooperate with us? Absolutely not.”
There seems to be a yawning gap between Abrams’ conviction that Turkey has joined the “radical camp” led by Iran and Jeffrey’s “sharp” analysis that such a charge is absolute nonsense.
That’s the thing with many neo-conservatives like Abrams: it’s hard to know when they are deliberately deceptive (call it takiya), when they are engaged in agitprop, or when they are doing serious analysis (of which many of them, including Abrams, are quite capable). It’s kind of like figuring out what “dictators and authoritarians” really mean when they talk to “us.”
]]>- Reuters: In a special report, Louis Charbonneau writes Turkey, among other U.S. allies, allows Iranian banks with links to Iran’s alleged nuclear program to do business within their borders. “The fact that Turkey is allowing itself to be used as a conduit for Iranian activity via Turkish banks and the Turkish lira is making it possible for Iranian funds in Turkish guise to make their way into Europe,” said an intelligence report provided to Reuters by “a diplomat.” Charbonneau acknowledges that “much of the trade is legitimate” but “if Turkey becomes a virtual safe haven for Iranian banking activities, it will be easier for Tehran to dodge sanctions, according to diplomats.” (Neoconservatives, such as Michael Rubin, have been quick to question Turkey’s commitment to sanctions. Dr. Serkan Zorba wrote on LobeLog yesterday about the misinformation surrounding claims that Turkish premier Recep Tayyip Erdoğan received $25 million from Iran.)
- McClatchy: James Rosen reports on comments made by Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) on Monday, when Graham said the U.S. must be prepared to use military force to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. “If you use military force against Iran, you’ve opened up Pandora’s box,” Graham told the neoconservative American Enterprise Institute in Washington. “If you allow Iran to get a nuclear weapon, you’ve emptied Pandora’s box. I’d rather open up Pandora’s box than empty it.” He continued, “From my point of view, if we engage in military operations as a last resort, the United States should have in mind the goal of changing the regime.” “Not by invading (Iran), but by launching a military strike by air and sea,” advised Graham.
- National Review: For the October 4 print edition of the right-wing magazine, former George W. Bush National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism, Juan Zarate, writes that sanctions against Iran are “biting, but it isn’t enough.” Zarate calls for further isolation to slow Iran’s nuclear program, support for internal dissent, and “build[ing] other forms of leverage.” The latter refers to the “military option.” Zarate supports his bullet-point recommendations by citing, in part, the neocon-written report Jim Lobe refers to as a “roadmap to war with Iran”: “Maintain a credible military option, as the Bipartisan Policy Center has recently recommended. This will keep the possibility of force in the mind of the Iranian regime and reassure our allies [...] — and perhaps ask the Israelis not to attack Iranian nuclear sites.”
- Weekly Standard: On the magazine’s blog, the Standard‘s co-founder and editor Bill Kristol reproduces in full remarks made around Washington by Michael Oren, Israeli ambassador to the United States. Kristol picks out “key passages” which focus on what Oren calls “radical, genocidal Iran.” When speaking at synagogues, Oren asks congregants to put themselves in the shoes of Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu in order to “stand with [Israel] as we resist Iran’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons,” and to “respect the decisions we take.” Kristol appears to interpret this as softening up a sympathetic U.S. audience for an Israeli attack on Iran: “It would seem that if President Obama does not act to stop Iran, Prime Minister Netanyahu will.”
The Daily Telegraph foreign editor and correspondent Con Coughlin wrote a piece on September 14, 2010, in the British newspaper alleging that the party of the Turkish premier Recep Tayyip Erdoğan received $25 million from [...]]]>
The Daily Telegraph foreign editor and correspondent Con Coughlin wrote a piece on September 14, 2010, in the British newspaper alleging that the party of the Turkish premier Recep Tayyip Erdoğan received $25 million from Iran. Coughlin provides no proof to support his claim, simply citing “Western diplomats” as his source, only once quoting an official described as a “senior Western diplomat.”
Furthermore, at the top of the article is a photo of smiling Erdoğan and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad shaking hands, with a caption that reads: “Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad shakes hand with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan.” The picture is undated, with no context given, and appears to imply the photo was taken at the occasion of the alleged $25 million donation.
Coughlin's headline, photo and caption
But a reader doesn’t need to guess about poorly captioned stock photos or worry that Tehran and Ankara might be trying to pull the wool over their eyes. They need only look at Coughlin’s past record.
Coming from a science background, I’m accustomed to meticulous “verification.” While the prevalence of anonymous sourcing makes this difficult in some types of journalism, one expects reporters to clearly demonstrate that a story has multiple reliable sources — not, seemingly, a single official.
And if the U.S. audience is to learn from its mistakes, they should be leery of poorly sourced claims linking supposedly hostile actors into a conspiracy. Part of the justification for the Iraq War, after all, was a result of the Bush administration trumpeting ties between Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and Osama Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda. Those dubious claims turned out to be based on poor or incomplete intelligence, but that did not stop the press at the time from repeating the bad information they had been given, often by unnamed officials.
In fact, one of the journalists who happened to pass on false claims to his readers during the Iraq war was none other than Con Coughlin of the Daily Telegraph. In that instance, he took the notorious “Habbush letter” and reported its contents – alleging direct links between Saddam, Al Qaeda, and the 9/11 plot — on the front page of the Telegraph. The piece was accompanied the same day by a longer item by Coughlin where he wrote of the letter’s origins:
While it is almost impossible to ascertain whether or not the document is legitimate or a clever fake, Iraqi officials working for the interim government are convinced of its authenticity, even though they decline to reveal where and how they obtained it. “It is not important how we found it,” said a senior Iraqi security official. “The important thing is that we did find it and the information it contains.”
That interim government officials — installed by the U.S. — were passing along the document should have raised some alarms. And while Coughlin acknowledges uncertainty over the letter’s authenticity, he never notes that it was roundly regarded as a forgery.
Indeed, investigative journalist Ron Suskind later reported that the document was certainly a forgery — with its origins in the Pentagon. That such a blatant forgery didn’t challenge Coughlin’s credulity should give readers pause when considering his more recent work.
In his piece on the alleged Iranian donation to Erdoğan’s ruling party (AKP), he concludes by writing (with my emphasis): “Apart from transferring funds to the AKP, diplomats say Iran has also agreed to provide financial support for the IHH, the Turkish Islamic charity IHH which supported last May’s aid flotilla which ended in disaster when it was intercepted by Israeli commandos, which resulted in the deaths of nine activists.”
Coughlin’s disdain for the AKP as well as the IHH have long been on display. In the aftermath of the now-infamous Israeli flotilla debacle, he penned a piece titled “Turkey’s role in the Gaza flotilla affair should worry us all in the West.” The title speaks for itself as to where Coughlin is coming from.
After Erdoğan’s bold and scrupulous stance against recent Israeli wrongs in the region and his “audacity” to come darn close to resolving the Iranian nuclear issue with Brazilian President Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva, why do I think that Coughlin’s recent work is part of ongoing neocon efforts to discredit Erdoğan in the eyes of the West by trying to organically link him and his party to Iran and other extremist Islamic elements? (See Jim Lobe’ s report on how the neocons have already declared “war” on Erdoğan early in the summer of 2010, following the Gaza flotilla incident.)
Alas, it is to no avail, as Erdoğan and his party are marching forward ever more relentlessly, after winning — yet again — a decisive victory in the recent 12 September 2010 referendum for a more democratic constitution in Turkey, and boasting record economic growth rates among G20 nations, second only to China.
Edited by Ali Gharib
- The Wall Street Journal: Joe Parkinson reports on Turkish Prime Minister Tayyup Erdogan’s comments on Thursday that Ankara is seeking to triple its trade with Iran over the next five years. Erdogran told business delegates in Istanbul that Turkey and Iran were on the verge of signing a “preferential trade agreement” and that trade volumes between the two countries could swell to $30 billion. Turkey has been seeking to strengthen ties with its neighbors, including Iraq, Syria and Russia, after the recent deterioration of relations with Israel. “I can’t see any reason why we can’t establish an unimpeded trade mechanism with Iran similar to the one with Europe,” Erdogran said. “There are lots of things that we can give to Iran, as Turkey has made a serious industrial leap.” Erdogan’s announcement is likely to further strain relations between Washington and Ankara, as the Obama administration is seeking to tighten sanctions enforcement and deter investors from trading with Iran.
- Washington Post: Columnist David Ignatius hints the Obama administration may be ready to take up Iran on its offer of cooperation in Afghanistan — and endorses this possibility. He notes that Iran, which has its own interests in combating Afghan drug smuggling and hardline Sunni influence on its borders, has made some positive moves with regards to stabilizing Afghanistan. Now the administration must weigh whether engaging Iran on a “separate track” — i.e., Afghanistan — “might blunt U.S. pressure on the nuclear issue” or whether engagement “could be an important confidence-building measure.” Neoconservative writer Michael Rubin has already attacked the notion of such cooperation on the National Review‘s The Corner blog.
- Foreign Policy: Marc Lynch, in a cross-post on his own FP blog and its Mid East Channel, writes that the Obama administration appears to be pursuing a path of “Keeping Tehran in a Box”, à la U.S. policy toward Iraq in the 1990s. “Eventually, as with Iraq,” he writes, “the choices may well narrow sufficiently and the perception of impending threat mount so that a President — maybe Obama, maybe Palin, maybe anyone else — finds him or herself faced with ‘no choice’ but to move towards war.” He observes it’s “not a pretty scenario”, and “variants of the status quo” are needed as clearly designated “off-ramps” to avoid getting stuck in dead end policy positions. He posits an enrichment deal or a change in Iranian internal politics as the sort of “off-ramp” that might avoid the current trajectory of the U.S.’s Iran policy, but he concedes neither are incredibly likely.
This would the first time an Israeli Prime Minister has ever agreed to a UN investigation into the actions of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Israel had refused to cooperate with an investigation conducted by the UN Human Rights Council, headed by Richard Goldstone. Israel accused Goldstone, a renowned South African Jewish jurist, of focusing disproportionately on Israeli actions when the UNHRC report was released. The “Goldstone report” concluded that both Israel and Gaza’s militant Hamas rulers had committed war crimes.
Now, Netanyahu claims that it is “in Israel’s national interest to ensure that the factual truth regarding the flotilla incident would be exposed for the world to see.” When Ban originally proposed the investigative panel on the Gaza flotilla in early June, days after Israeli commandos intercepted the Gaza-bound convoy, Haaretz reported that “Senior government officials said the Foreign Ministry recommends responding favorably to establishing the committee because Turkey will probably oppose it.”
Another opinion about why Israel agreed to be part of the investigative panel: as the Israeli say in Hebrew, Ayn breira–no choice.
“There was no choice but to agree to the international community’s demands, first and foremost those of the US and the UN,” one official source said.
“We could have been considered naysayers, or we could have done what we did, which was to take part in determining the mandate that will be given to the committee and affect its program.”
The source said the committee would have been established in any case, even without Israel’s consent. “Though Israel didn’t want another inquiry, there was no choice,” he said.
The panel will be authorized to review reports submitted by investigators in both Israel and Turkey, but will not have the authority to subpoena any witnesses. One of the concessions Israel won as a condition of its participation is that neither Israeli soldiers nor any Israeli citizens can be questioned by the panel. At most, political leaders may be allowed to give statements.
Turkey, which withdrew its ambassador to Israel and suspended joint military exercises with Israel in protest of the attack, has been demanding an international investigation into the attack on the flotilla all along. Eight Turks and one Turkish-American on the convoy’s flagship were killed by Israeli naval commandos determined to keep the flotilla’s Gaza-bound aid from reaching to shore. Just before Ban announced Israel’s acceptance of the UN panel of inquiry, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan reiterated in a phone conversation with Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu that Turkey insists on its right to an apology and compensation for the victims.
The UN Panel of Inquiry is to be chaired by former Prime Minister of New Zealand Sir Geoffrey Palmer, an international lawyer and an expert on maritime law. Palmer anticipates that chairing the inquiry be a “very challenging and demanding task.”
The outgoing President of Colombia, Alvaro Uribe, will be the panel’s Vice-Chair. Representatives of Israel and Turkey will also serve on the panel, which is to begin its work on August 10 and give Ban a progress report by mid-September.
The choice of Uribe for a prominent role on the investigative panel might seem curious. Tensions have been rising between Colombia and its neighbor Venezuela. Last week, Venezuela’s Ambassador Valero met with Ban, and presented him with a letter accusing Colombia of warlike acts. On July 23, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez severed diplomatic ties with Colombia.
The pro-American Uribe is viewed favorably by Israelis because of his criticism of Chavez, whom Uribe accuses of aiding FARC rebels. Chavez has taunted Colombia for being “the Israel of Latin America” and the US as the “evil empire.” Colombia, the largest recipient of US military and foreign aid in Latin America, granted the Pentagon the use of seven military bases last year after Ecuador refused to renew a 10 year lease on the US’s regional military base in Manta.
Colombia is one of Israel’s biggest customers in Latin America for military equipment. During a visit to Israel in at the end of April to promote expanded ties, Colombia’s Foreign Minister Jaime Bermudez told the Jerusalem Post:
Colombia and Israel have had a very long relationship and a very strong partnership, too. Both countries and our peoples have suffered and have endured, in a way, similar difficulties. At the same time, I would say that we both are resilient and determined, that we share somehow a lot in common. I would say that for us, it’s very important to make a partnership with Israel in several aspects.
Colombia employs former Israeli intelligence experts as mercenaries to fight against left wing guerillas. The UN Working Group holds mercenaries responsible for many of the human rights violations of which Colombia has been accused. Furthermore the use of mercenaries violates the United Nations International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, which entered into force in 2001.
In 2007, the American Jewish Committee presented Uribe with its “Light unto the Nations” Award:
“President Uribe is a staunch ally of the United States, a good friend of Israel and the Jewish people, and is a firm believer in human dignity and human development in Colombia and the Americas,” said AJC President E. Robert Goodkind, who presented the award at AJC’s Annual Dinner, held at the National Building Museum in Washington.
Under President Uribe’s tenure, Colombia has fought rebel guerillas and drug traffickers and has made a serious attempt at demobilizing the paramilitary. Colombia is the third-largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid.
“Despite many odds, President Uribe has remained committed to the pursuit of security, peace and broad-based economic growth for all Colombians,” Goodkind said. Indeed, while President Uribe and his family have personally suffered due to the violence that has long plagued Colombia, he remains committed first and foremost to curbing violence and restoring peace and security.
Goodkind noted the shared experiences of Colombia and Israel. “Both Colombia and Israel have been forced for decades to face challenges regarding their survival and their citizens have suffered the threat of terror on a daily basis,” he said. “Nevertheless, Colombians like Israelis continue tirelessly to build democratic and prosperous societies, and remain passionate about achieving peace.”
[nb: In 2009, the AJC conferred its National Human Relations Award to media magnate Rupert Murdoch.]
It’s quite obvious why Israelis would want Uribe on the UN panel. What’s in it for the Turks?
Turkey has been seeking closer diplomatic ties with Latin America and the Caribbean since the late 1980s. An “Action Plan for Latin America and the Caribbean” was prepared and put into effect in 1998. The year 2006 was declared to be the “Year of Latin America and the Caribbean.” Trade between Turkey and Latin America has more than quadrupled in the past decade. Turkey has resident embassies in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Mexico and Venezuela, but not in Colombia–as yet.
What Turkey does have going in Colombia (besides an Inter-Parliamentary Friendship Group) is its participation in the advanced and cost-effective M60A1 battle tank, for which Colombia may be the first customer. A new joint venture announced this spring between Turkey’s procurement agency, the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries, or Savunma Sanayi Mustesarligi (SSM), and state-owned Israel Military Industries (IMI), who are teaming up to ward off at least four competitors and to sell Columbia’s military an order of tanks worth about $250 million,
The defense ministries of the two countries approved the joint venture and requisite licensing issues at the height of tensions between the Islamist government of Turkish Prime Minister Recip Erdogan and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s rightist coalition government over Israel’s early 2009 war in Gaza and disputes over Gaza, Iran and Syria.
The joint venture between IMI and Turkey’s Aselsan aims for a 50-50 work share based on Israeli electronics, subsystems and weaponry, with the bulk of production and assembly work to take place in Turkey and later under licensed production in customer countries.
So while Israeli and Turkish diplomats foreign ministry officials may be snarling at each other, it’s those guys at their respective Ministries of Defense who understand how important getting along is to the business of war.
Seen in this dim if somewhat perverse light, Uribe becomes a very suitable, if surprising, investigator and arbitrator, if not a particularly neutral one. While Uribe’s bias toward Israel is unquestionable, the participation of Colombia and Turkey on the panel may quietly yield improved ties between them, whatever the panel concludes about the Gaza flotilla.
Sir Geoffrey Palmer, however, may be the most interesting panel participant and the one who most bears watching. Palmer , who served as New Zealand’s Prime Minister for about a year (1989-90) and was appointed to the International Whaling Commission in 2002, says he was asked to take the job because he is seen as “detached and evenhanded” and New Zealand as “impartial.” (Surely any investigative panel should have at least one of those, at least on principle.) Although the panel will be based in NY, Sir Geoffrey doesn’t plan on spending very much time there, although he will travel there soon to meet with Ban and define his mission.
Nonetheless, NZ Foreign Minister Murray McCully, welcoming Palmer’s appointment, took the trouble to point out:
“He will be acting entirely as an independent expert, and in no way as a representative of the New Zealand government. Sir Geoffrey is taking on a challenging and demanding task, and I wish him well in his work – the long-term goal for this government, and for others, is an enduring peace for all in the Middle East.”
As the old saying goes, still waters run deep. Palmer has stated that “”This is a very sensitive matter. It’s a quasi-judicial inquiry, so it is really very important to maintain a sense of detachment.” Is it possible that that the understated and aloof Sir Geoffrey might actually be the one person on the panel who will make some waves if he opines, even on the narrowest technical grounds, that according to the Law of the Sea, Israel’s interception of the Gaza flotilla in international waters, was a violation of international law for which it owes Turkey a mea culpa, however half-hearted, and some cash, however nominal? This has been the Turkish demand along.
Uribe’s job, on the other hand, may be to bring Turkey back on board with the US, Israel and Colombia, if not as a partner for peace, then at least a partner in war. Zvi Bar’el of Haaretz identifies Turkey as one of two contenders (the other is Bulgaria) to host a high powered American x-band radar system to counter the threat of Iranian-launched missiles, described in this past Sunday’s Washington Post. Furthermore, Bar’el writes, “Turkey could also receive Patriot anti-missile systems from the U.S., while Turkish press reports suggest plans in the country to acquire long-range offensive missiles from its American ally.”
There’s much more truth than humor in the old joke that advises a young lawyer starting out: “When the facts are on your side, pound the facts. When the law is on your side, pound the law. And when neither the facts or the law are on your side, pound the table.”
Israel has agreed to join the panel because it’s sure that the facts are on its side: not necessarily concerning what did or didn’t happen in the assault on the Mavi Marmara, but rather the fact that Israeli technology is inextricably embedded in almost every weapons system and piece of military technology the US produces and sells to its allies. Through Israel, Turkey has the opportunity to actively participate in that military technology network.
Turks are invoking the Law of the Sea in defense of the Turkish-led Gaza flotilla at the very point in the twenty-first century when maritime law is ripe for reinterpretation. The resurgence of piracy off the African coast; the sanctions against Iran that call for inspection of ships in the Persian Gulf that might be providing Iran with dual use good and other articles forbidden by western fiat; the damage done by oil companies to bodies of water and ecosystems far from their home offices; and the massive aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines and giant oil tanker platforms that have been silently redefining the notion of territorial waters may give even the most modest interpretation about the actions of Gaza flotilla–and Israel’s handling of it–long-term and long-distance significance. The Washington Post reports that the US Navy has been deploying Aegis-class destroyers and cruisers equipped with ballistic missile defense systems in the Mediterranean Sea for the past year.
The ships, featuring octagonal Spy-1 radars and arsenals of Standard Missile-3 interceptors, will form the backbone of Obama’s shield in Europe.
Unlike fixed ground-based interceptors, which were the mainstay of the Bush missile defense plan for Europe, Aegis ships are mobile and can easily move to areas considered most at risk of attack.
Another advantage is that Aegis ships can still be used for other missions, such as hunting pirates or submarines, instead of waiting for a missile attack that may never materialize.
These are the facts that will underlie and shape the findings of the UN Panel.
Don’t like them? Pound the table.
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