by Ali Reza Eshraghi
News media accounts of reactions from Iran to the recent talks in Geneva remind me of a joke that has gone viral there:
A salesman shows a variety of hearing aids ranging in cost from one to a thousand dollars to a customer, who then asks, “How well does [...]]]>
by Ali Reza Eshraghi
News media accounts of reactions from Iran to the recent talks in Geneva remind me of a joke that has gone viral there:
A salesman shows a variety of hearing aids ranging in cost from one to a thousand dollars to a customer, who then asks, “How well does the one dollar one work?” The salesman responds, “It doesn’t work at all! But, people speak louder when they see you wearing it.”
For the first time, different political factions within the Islamic republic of Iran are in agreement about President Hassan Rouhani’s method for resolving the nuclear issue and negotiating with the United States. But local and international media coverage has focused on Iranian radical groups who have shrunk in size and been marginalized after June’s presidential election. While this group occupies a small space in Iran’s current nuclear discourse, it has been presented as a major actor by the media.
Much of this coverage focuses on Kayhan, the Iranian daily newspaper, and its editor-in-chief, Hossein Shariatmadari, who has openly criticized the Iranian delegates for keeping the details of their negotiations with the P5+1 powers (the United States, Britain, France, Russia and China plus Germany) confidential. For Shariatmadari, this secrecy is an indication that the Iranian delegation is making a bad deal.
Of course, Khayan and Shariatmadari are not the only ones who have criticized Iranian diplomats for keeping things under wraps when it comes to the nuclear issue. In October 2009, when the Saeed Jalili-headed negotiation team was trying to make a deal with the P5+1 in Geneva, Iranian reformist media also complained about the lack of available details on the discussions.
At that time, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, the sidelined candidate of Iran’s 2009 presidential election, accused the negotiators of trading the long-term interests of Iranians for “nothing” in a statement.
And last year — amid rumors of a meeting between Ali Akbar Velayati, a senior aide to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, with American officials — Kalameh, the flagship website of the opposition Green Movement, demanded that the negotiations be “transparent and [conducted] in front of people.”
Shrinking prominence
This time it’s the hardline Kayhan that has printed the loudest complaints against the confidential negotiations. But things are different now. Not long ago, each time Kayhan started a game of ball, it was immediately picked up and passed around in the Principlist front. Today, no one is willing to play along with the well-known daily.
Indeed, other conservative media outlets affiliated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC) apparently have no problem with the nuclear negotiations remaining confidential. Here is Sobh-e Sadeq, the official IRGC weekly, expressing satisfaction in its post-Geneva talks coverage:
“The Iranian delegation stressed the importance of respecting Iranian nation’s red lines, as well as the need of change in the position of the West from selfishness to a win-win interaction. [Our delegation] would not back down from the nation’s rights.”
Even more surprisingly, the IRGC has absorbed Rouhani’s vocabulary and is talking about a “win-win interaction with the US.” The Javan daily, another media outlet associated with the IRGC, stressed on Monday that the actions of the Rouhani administration “have the permission of the Supreme Leader.” Javan took this a step further by arguing that even if the administration was unsuccessful in the negotiations, Iran would still emerge victorious because it would be obvious that it was the Americans who, contrary to their claims, have no interest in resolving disputes and restoring relations.
Gholam Ali Haddad Adel, the head of the Majlis Principlist faction whose daughter is married to the Supreme Leader’s son, has also supported the confidentiality of the nuclear negotiations. Considered a hardliner, Haddad Adel, who used to favor Kayhan, could have remained silent in this debate. But he has criticized the newspaper for basing its suspicion of Iran’s diplomatic team on what he considers “the words of the Zionist media.”
With such remarks, Haddad Adel is — perhaps unintentionally — paving the road for reformists to launch a more powerful attack against the radicals. Mir-Mahmoud Mousavi, the former Director General of the Foreign Ministry and the brother of Mir-Hossein Mousavi, has also accused Iranian hardliners of using the language of Israeli hardliners. He believes they both “are trying to weaken Iran’s position in the talks.”
The position of Haddad Adel, the IRGC or even Ahmad Khatami, the radical and sometimes callous Tehran Friday Prayers Leader who also said Rouhani’s administration should be trusted, has confused analysts who measure Iranian politics with a who-is-closer-to-the-Supreme-Leader tape. These pundits are uncomfortably surprised each time they come across such perplexing results. The last such surprise occurred during Iran’s 2013 presidential election when Saeed Jalili, Iran’s nuclear negotiator who was touted as a favorite of the Supreme Leader, lost the vote.
After Ahmadinejad
Of course, it’s crucial to observe certain significant developments in Iran’s nuclear and foreign policy discourse that have occurred since Rouhani took office a few months ago. First, Iranian media can now write more openly and include a variety of opinions about their country’s controversial politics. This is why Mohammad Mohajeri, the editor-in-chief of the popular Khabar Online website and former member of the editorial board of Kayhan, reminded Shariatmadari that Jalili’s former negotiating team had tougher restrictions for the press. Before, “the press would get some burnt intelligence and were then told not to even discuss that useless information because of the confidential nature of the talks.” Compare that situation to the present when trying to gauge the level of change. Last week, for the first time, Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif took a group of Iranian reporters from various media outlets to Geneva. Each day they were briefed repeatedly by members of the Iranian team.
That the reformist media are not alone in attacking and quibbling with the hardliners is another new development. The moderate and progressive Principlists, in an unwritten division of labor with the reformists, have taken on the task of silencing the radicals themselves. Popular news websites affiliated with the Principlists like Alef, Khabar Online and Tabank have constantly — albeit with a softer tone — criticized Iran’s radicals since the talks in Geneva.
Bijan Moghaddam, the managing director of the widely circulated Jam-e Jam daily and the former political editor of the hardliner Fars News Agency, has warned the radicals that the “Iranian society has banished them” and asked hardliners to voice their criticism logically and “without creating a ruckus and swearing.”
Finally, there is now a visible rhetorical shift in the debate over Iran’s foreign policy. Critics of Rouhani’s diplomacy team do not merely rely on mnemonic tropes and the Islamic Republic’s ideological repertoire in their arguments. They are also invoking Iran’s “national interest” in criticizing the administration’s diplomatic method. Such changes are even visible in Khayan’s tone. For example, the daily recently criticized Rouhani for publically announcing ahead of the Geneva talks that the treasury is empty, saying that such statements would weaken Iran’s negotiating position.
In such an atmosphere, it’s not surprising that critics of the government’s foreign policy claim they are aiding the administration’s negotiating strategy. As a radical commentator recently said in an interview with the Javan daily, “President Rouhani can use the views of those opposing the talks with the US as powerful leverage to haggle with the US.”
Photo: Gholam Ali Haddad Adel greets Hossein Shariatmadari. Credit: Jam News
]]>by Djavad Salehi-Isfahani
The diplomatic push by Iranian President Hassan Rouhani to resolve the decade-long dispute over Iran’s nuclear program reached its zenith during his visit to New York in late September, exactly one year after Iran’s currency collapsed under the weight of US-led sanctions. Although the timing is largely accidental, the [...]]]>
by Djavad Salehi-Isfahani
The diplomatic push by Iranian President Hassan Rouhani to resolve the decade-long dispute over Iran’s nuclear program reached its zenith during his visit to New York in late September, exactly one year after Iran’s currency collapsed under the weight of US-led sanctions. Although the timing is largely accidental, the correlation between sanctions and Iran’s willingness to negotiate is not. These measures have clearly hurt Iran’s economy, and its leaders are searching for an agreement with the West that includes sanctions relief.
Much analysis of the reasons for Iran’s new conciliatory approach credits sanctions for the improved diplomatic prospects for reaching a deal. Where opinions differ is how to respond to Iran. Should the West begin with positive gestures and take steps to ease sanctions or tighten them to squeeze a better deal from an adversary in retreat. The question then becomes: whose side is time on?
As Vali Nasr argued forcefully in the New York Times last week, Tehran does not feel pressed for time on political grounds because it sees itself approaching new negotiations from a position of strength.
Only a few months ago, Iran concluded a landmark presidential election that brought to power a popular government much closer to the reformist camp than to the Supreme Leader, challenging the notion of the Islamic Republic as a political system in demise. The charm offensive in this case is an olive branch, not a white flag.
Those who believe that time is on the West’s side argue that Rouhani’s election is actually a sign of Iran’s desperation. They argue that Iran’s economy is in such dire circumstances that it has forced Ayatollah Ali Khamenei into a domestic compromise that makes an external one possible.
So how bad is the state of Iran’s economy, and will it collapse with more sanctions?
The “collapse” scenario, which at times excites US sanctions advocates into a frenzy like what we saw following the crash of the rial last October, is being revived as a way to dissuade the Obama administration from reaching a compromise with Iran too soon.
Iran’s economy is “already on the verge of collapse”, wrote the Times last week, failing to mention that it has been regarded as on that verge for quite some time. A Brookings report in 2009 called Iran’s economy “teetering”, when in fact it was one of the few countries in the world that was still growing after the Big Recession.
However, unlike political systems, economies do not collapse, they shrink. Economic activity in Iran declined by 2.9% last year (5.4% if you count oil activity) according to government figures, and unemployment is at historic levels, though not as bad as what we’re seeing in Greece or Spain.
If sanctions tighten, Iran’s economy will continue to slide for a year or two but will eventually reverse course. Per capita income will probably fall from about 20% below Turkey today to 30% below, but still more than 50% above that of Egypt. This doesn’t foreshadow a collapse as much as it does a slow adjustment to more difficult circumstances.
Positive steps to push Iran’s economy onto a recovery path were in fact taken in the last months of the Ahmadinejad administration and continue today. The rate of growth of Iran’s money supply and inflation started to fall before Rouhani took office. For the past three months, the average rate of inflation has been below 20% annually, about half of what it was in the months before.
The new economic team is also much more competent and looking in the right direction — to the private sector — for solutions to Iran’s economic problems.
Rouhani’s administration is the most business-friendly team to rule the Islamic Republic. The head of Iran’s Chamber of Commerce, Mohammad Nahavandian, is Rouhani’s chief of staff and the closest person to the president. The head of a private bank is also the governor of the Central Bank. Former president Hashemi Rafsanjani, whose men fill key posts in the new administration, encouraged the private sector to view Rouhani’s government as “family”.
Unemployment is approaching 20%, a record level, but will not surpass it. One reason is demography. For every person who entered retirement age in the last few years, 5 new people reached the working age. In the next few years this ratio will fall to 3, substantially reducing the pressure on the labor markets.
Future growth will also likely bring more jobs. After 2005, a large inflow of oil revenues opened a floodgate to cheap imports that hurt local production, causing jobless growth. Thanks to a more realistic value for the rial, the local production of most consumer goods has become more economical for local producers. The easing of sanctions, especially on the banking sector, would be of enormous help to these producers, but this will not be the game-changer.
In deciding how far they can push Iran, the P5+1 negotiating team should bear in mind another important fact about the political context in which the peace initiative of Iran’s new president is taking place. For Rouhani, reaching a compromise with the West is important, but not if it risks losing the support of his conservative rivals who are deeply suspicious of this process.
Rouhani sees his election as a historic opportunity to move Iran closer to a more pluralistic and tolerant society and not merely to settle the nuclear dispute. Forcing him to choose between making peace abroad and keeping it at home, which more sanctions would do, will not yield a better outcome for Iran or the West.
]]>by Farideh Farhi
Iran’s cabinet confirmation hearings this week were painful, but not for its new president Hassan Rouhani, despite the rejection of 3 out of his 18 ministerial nominees. They were painful for Iran’s hardliners, whose mismanagement of the country was spotlighted along with their weakening form of political speech.
A [...]]]>
by Farideh Farhi
Iran’s cabinet confirmation hearings this week were painful, but not for its new president Hassan Rouhani, despite the rejection of 3 out of his 18 ministerial nominees. They were painful for Iran’s hardliners, whose mismanagement of the country was spotlighted along with their weakening form of political speech.
A good number of Iran’s political class and punditry must have watched in awe as the people who have been framing and dominating public discourse in Iran — particularly in the last 4 years — adopted the role of the opposition. As they spoke, what has gone wrong with the Islamic Republic became more and more evident: the ideological governance, which is quite distinct from ideological rule, that frames the Islamic Republic as a system. The tension between the ideological framing of the Islamic Republic and the technocratic exigencies of a developmentalist welfare state has existed in the Islamic Republic from day one. But it was dramatically on display in these public hearings.
The undoing of Iran’s hardliners
In rhetorical confrontations between national-level figures and parochial-like local politicians, it’s not hard for the former to outshine the latter. But something else was going on here as well. The questioning of the center-reformist cabinet nominees by the parliament’s hardliners was consumed with the relationship of the nominees to the so-called sedition (fetneh) and had nothing to do with the nominees’ proposed ministerial plans and polices. In other words, the nominees’ qualifications were overshadowed by a focus on what they did during Iran’s 2009 post-election unrest. To boot, the questioning was carried out in a street-talk manner, which is completely out of place in a public forum broadcast on national television. One member of parliament even spoke about the “club” Iranian Lurs use to treat those who do not walk a straight line. He had to apologize for imputing a tendency towards violence to his own ethnic group.
The contrast between the MPs and Rouhani’s nominees — who maintained their dignity while responding to their opponents without transgressing acceptable political speech — was striking. After all, if post-election protests are identified as fetneh in official discourse, one would have a hard time achieving a ministerial post while admitting they supported them. But one can defend one’s record while stating allegiance to the Islamic Republic and its institutions, including the office of the Leader Ali Khamenei. And although some were better than others, Rouhani’s nominees defended themselves well and even engaged in a degree of pushback regarding why they acted more properly and humanely than MPs who showed no sympathy for Iranian protesters who were harmed or even killed.
Again, the contrast between the way Rouhani’s nominees’ spoke in defense of their policies and political outlook and the accusatory language of the MPs was striking. Of course, public displays of official denunciatory language aren’t new for the Iranian public. Indeed, it has been the dominant form political speech in the past few years. What made the broadcasted hearings fascinating was the gradual public realization that the folks who have led Iran into disaster are now sitting in judgment of the folks the electorate voted for. They were voted in precisely because they promised to run the country with managerial expertise and to loosen the grip of ideology over decision-making.
As the hearings proceeded — on the first day sedition-related words were reportedly used over 1,600 times — it became clear that “sedition” is the only ammunition the hardliners have. A prominent conservative MP even said out loud that hardliners have become “merchants of sedition” who are making a living from applying the label. But the confirmation of four of Rouhani’s key nominees who were accused of cavorting with seditionists was a disaster for the discourse of sedition. It’s obvious that the hardliners’ favorite mode of attack is becoming increasingly weak.
Ultimately, out of the many effective speeches given by the nominees, two stand out for me because of the unraveling of tensions that accompanied them.
Iran’s new foreign minister
Mohammad Javad Zarif’s speech literally quieted the cacophonous parliament hall. Zarif has spent most of his adult life in the United States as a student and later as a diplomat. This by itself makes him suspect. He did not serve in the Iran-Iraq War even though he was at age for military service at the time. Among other things, he was accused of being educated in the West, meeting with American diplomats and Iranian civil society activists who reside in the US and even suspiciously losing a briefcase that included important documents while he was there. In short, he was portrayed as a man who lost his soul in the West. What Zarif said was not as important as the way he broke apart that image.
Many in the US have heard him publicly speak in English, which he is very good at, but neither the MPs nor the Iranian public had heard him give a speech in Persian. And they had never seen him recite so many Qoranic verses! But Zarif’s speech on Tuesday seamlessly combined expertise and religious rhetoric. In a rather blunt way, he also pushed backed against the accusations that were hurled against him. He reminded the MPs that the previous government had forced him into retirement at the age of 47 and even made teaching difficult for him but that he had not left the country in more than 6 years even for teaching opportunities that had arisen elsewhere. His body language, voice and speech-content confirmed that he was as much of a stakeholder in the Islamic Republic as those who were judging him and that he had every right to be the foreign minister of a president whose promises of a foreign policy involving both expertise and moderation aided his election. Zarif also made clear that the power of Iran’s foreign policy rests on the electorate’s popular confidence in their government at home. As I already mentioned, Zarif’s performance was so stunning that it quieted the Majles chamber — the only time this happened during the hearings.
A noteworthy loss
Another important speech was given by Mohammad Ali Najafi, Rouhani’s nominee for the Ministry of Education. Again, the contrast between his speech and demeanor and the accusations leveled against him was something to behold. His pushback was also telling. Najafi was accused of meeting the families of protestors who died in 2009, to which he essentially responded with: I went to see the aggrieved families in my capacity as a member of the Tehran City Council, which would have been unnecessary if you guys had done your job of at least comforting them.
Although Najafi failed to receive the required number of votes for confirmation, the yay votes outnumbered the nays and a one-vote switch would have made him the cabinet minister. This situates him as an important advisor or a candidate for other posts if he desires them.
Beyond this, Najafi’s near confirmation turned into an argument for some Tehrani voters. Had they not mostly abstained in the 2012 parliamentary election and, ignoring reformist disqualifications and disarray, voted for a moderate conservative slate — which did exist — Najafi would have been the education minister today. The leader of that moderate conservative slate — Ali Mottahari — was the only one who made it into Parliament in 2012 and was a key organizer of votes for the Rouhani cabinet. One more deputy from that slate — which was possible with more participation — would have made a small but important difference in the scheme of things. Of course, yesterday that difference didn’t appear as small to the many teachers who were hoping for Najafi’s successful appointment.
Several blunt exchanges involving the intelligence and judiciary ministries should also be listened to by anyone trying to understand the tensions and polarizations of today’s Iran. The focal point of these tensions is based on issues related to human and civil rights, dignity and the operation of Iran’s surveillance state.
Rouhani’s position
In his closing speech, Rouhani laid out his argument for how to leave behind or at least lessen the deep rifts that resulted from the 2009 election. He argued for an acknowledgment that both sides had made mistakes. He did this by mentioning two words in one sentence: Kahrizak and orduskeshi. He said both were mistakes, giving them equivalency.
Kahrizak is the prison in which many of Iran’s 2009 protesters were abused and several were killed. Ordukeshi is the word used by the Leader to negatively describe the 2009 protests. Instead of acknowledging the constitutionally protected right to peaceful protests, the term frames the events as something the losers of the election illegitimately did by turning the electoral competition into street confrontations. Rouhani surely knows that this is a highly offensive term to many people who voted for him particularly in the city of Tehran, in which protests lasted much longer than the rest of the country.
By saying that mistakes were made in both Kahrizad Prison and by ordukeshi, Rouhani’s message seemed clear: rightly or wrongly, neither side can play the game of political righteousness. Stop asking each other for apologies, which will not be forthcoming from either side; learn to live with this reality. Let’s just move on based on the premise that the time for the continuation of the purge game is over because it is a dangerous game to play when the country is in dire need of civil interactions in the face of external pressures. This was not moral posturing; it was a plea for all to search for their pragmatic side.
These words can only be taken as serious advice if there is some movement on the front of reintegrating those who were purged because of the events of 2009, which will be a challenge for Rouhani. The ministerial confirmation of several former advisors to Mir Hossein Mousavi, who is still under house arrest, is a step in that direction. But it is not enough even if public tolerance for gradualism and moderation — and taking things slowly — seems relatively high at the moment.
Photo Credit: Amir Kholousi
]]>by Marsha B. Cohen
Mitch McConnell did it, Harry Reid didn’t. Elizabeth Warren did it, Bernie Sanders didn’t. Al Franken did it, Tom Coburn didn’t.
I’m referring to the signing of the latest letter, crafted by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and proffered by Senators Bob Menendez (D-NJ) and [...]]]>
by Marsha B. Cohen
Mitch McConnell did it, Harry Reid didn’t. Elizabeth Warren did it, Bernie Sanders didn’t. Al Franken did it, Tom Coburn didn’t.
I’m referring to the signing of the latest letter, crafted by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and proffered by Senators Bob Menendez (D-NJ) and Lindsey Graham (R-SC), urging President Barak Obama to turn a cold shoulder to newly elected Iranian president Hassan Rouhani while pursuing a more confrontational and aggressive Iran policy. The Arms Control Association’s Greg Thielmann has already penned an important discussion of why this measure complicates efforts to reach a peaceful solution with Iran, which I highly recommend.
It is worth recalling that another Iranian president-elect, Mohammad Khatami — a reformist whose surprise election shocked the Iranian political establishment — was also greeted by sanctions pushed through Congress. On August 19, 1997, weeks after Khatami took office, President Bill Clinton confirmed that virtually all trade and investment activities by US persons with Iran were prohibited. Those sanctions not only boosted Iranian hardliners who oppose a detente with the US, they also helped ensure that Khatami and his supporters would be unsuccessful in making many of the economic improvements and political changes needed to improve the lives of the Iranian people. His crippled victory was followed by the election of hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005. Since then, dozens of letters, resolutions and sanctions bills have emanated from Congress, which of late seems incapable of accomplishing anything else.
According to the “76 senators” who signed the letter:
We believe there are four strategic elements necessary to achieve resolution of this issue: an explicit and continuing message that we will not allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, a sincere demonstration of openness to negotiations, the maintenance and toughening of sanctions, and a convincing threat of the use of force that Iran will believe. We must be prepared to act, and Iran must see that we are prepared.
So the US must somehow demonstrate an “openness to negotiations” while maintaining and toughening sanctions and convincingly threatening to “use force”, even as it remains mired in Iraq and Afghanistan and utterly bewildered about Syria and Egypt?
Saxby Chamblis did it, Richard Shelby didn’t. Sheldon Whitehouse did it, Ron Wyden didn’t. Chuck Schumer did it, Barbara Boxer didn’t.
Signing and not signing such letters may be of limited practical consequence — though AIPAC and other lobbying groups are certainly keeping tabs — but the political fallout of abstaining can be deafening. When Chuck Hagel was nominated for Secretary of Defense, his detractors screamed about the anti-Iran “letters” he hadn’t signed, according them equal status with his actual votes.
Tammy Baldwin, who was mercilessly hammered by her 2012 opponent Tommy Thompson for wavering on Iran sanctions, didn’t sign onto this letter.
Al Franken (D-MN), who did, won his seat in 2008 after a recount that lasted for months, unseating incumbent Norm Coleman by a mere 312 votes. Coleman, a stalwart of the Republican Jewish Coalition, is salivating at the prospect of Franken making a single false move on the pro-Israel/anti-Iran front that would enable Republicans to pounce. While Franken seems to be in a strong position for reelection in 2014, he can take nothing for granted in the current political environment.
The last listed co-signer, newbie Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), is currently focused on the economy and particularly on who will be running the Fed. But she has been quick to climb aboard the bandwagon that’s torpedoing the prospect of improved relations with Iran, as has Angus King, the Maine Independent who replaced Republican Olympia Snowe.
Of course, the 24 who, for one reason or another, chose not to sign the letter are hardly “profiles in courage”. Some aren’t seeking reelection when their current Senate term is up and can run free of the AIPAC leash, among them Max Baucus, Tom Coburn, Jay Rockefeller and Carl Levin. Perhaps the most curious non-signers are the AIPAC-endorsed, staunchly pro-Israel senators who have consistently voted in favor of increasingly crippling Iran sanctions but also recently abstained from signing a similar letter last December, urging the President to stiffen them. This group includes Sens. Barbara Boxer (D-CA), Dick Durbin (D-IL), Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), Mark Kirk (R-IL) and Lisa Murkowski (R-AK).
Inferring that any senator not signing an AIPAC-crafted letter has opposed crippling sanctions or will oppose the next round of them would be a major mistake. Most of the two dozen non-signers of the latest letter, including Rand Paul (R-KY), who opposes a military attack on Iran, have voted in favor of sanctions in the past and will probably do so in the future unless some political incentive convinces them otherwise. The absent Barbara Boxer (D-CA) and Ron Wyden (D-OR) were among the original cosponsors of S. 65 – the AIPAC-promoted “Back Door to Iran War” resolution that expressed support of an Israeli attack on Iran. It garnered 91 cosponsors and passed the Senate 99-0 on May 22. Kirk’s website is meanwhile applauding the House’s passage of the latest Iran sanctions in the House (as is AIPAC; the accompanying photo to this post is the lead image on its website’s front page) and urges the Senate to act as well, which will likely happen in September.
Just about every resolution and vote ratcheting up sanctions against Iran has passed the Senate with a hefty majority. Murkowski, Wyden, and Jon Tester (D-MT) were among the 44 senators who signed an AIPAC letter in June 2012 opposing negotiations with Iran although they didn’t sign this one.
President Obama has defined insanity as “doing the same thing over and over again, and expecting a different result”. How ironic it would be if he were to heed this latest letter and, yielding to Congress, sign off on more and stricter sanctions, just as a new Iranian president offers at least an opening for a better era in US-Iran relations.
That said, Rouhani, who stated the other day that “we need to have negotiations without threats” needs to move quickly — while Congress is on its five week summer break — in making some headlines of his own, by, for example, establishing direct contact with the United States.
]]>by Farideh Farhi
After more than a month of intense speculation in Iran, Hassan Rouhani’s nominees for 18 cabinet posts were announced on the day of the new president’s inauguration. By law, Iran’s presidents have two weeks after taking office to offer their nominees to the parliament for confirmation hearings. However, as [...]]]>
by Farideh Farhi
After more than a month of intense speculation in Iran, Hassan Rouhani’s nominees for 18 cabinet posts were announced on the day of the new president’s inauguration. By law, Iran’s presidents have two weeks after taking office to offer their nominees to the parliament for confirmation hearings. However, as an indication of the task-oriented “competent” government to come, Rouhani followed through on his promise to announce his picks on Aug. 4.
The parliament will begin the confirmation process, which should not take long, next week. There is no guarantee that all the ministers will be approved (several of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s ministers who were nominated in his first term were not). But as of today, the bet is that they will all pass, even if a couple face a few hurdles.
Cabinet appointments are watched closely in Iran, not only because ministers are key actors in guiding the direction and management of their ministries, but also because they say something about how the newly elected president will run the country and the compromises he is willing to or must make. In any contested political terrain, including Iran, compromises result from negotiations with other centers of power.
I will get to Rouhani’s compromises shortly but let me first say a little about the power of Iranian ministers.
Traditionally, ministers mostly have substantial control over the operation and appointment of their ministerial team. They are hence vulnerable to individual parliamentary interpellation and impeachment if deemed of insufficiently fulfilling their duties.
I say mostly because this tradition of ministerial independence was severely violated during the Ahmadinejad era, when he and members of his office routinely intervened in the internal matters of various ministries, underwriting many expulsions of top-level appointees as well as the ministers themselves.
Other presidents have also intervened in the appointment process of various ministries. Former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani appointed a conservative minister of interior but then intervened in the appointment of many provincial governors, which is the prerogative of the interior minister. Driven by his interests, Ahmadinejad went much further and in effect became a meddling president at every level. Rouhani has promised to change that dynamic and the list of his cabinet nominees suggests he has mostly chosen individuals who will be agenda-setters in their own ministries and not agenda-takers. But he did make compromises and in the areas where he made major compromises, such as the Interior Ministry, he will likely act like Hashemi Rafsanjani and influence the gubernatorial appointments.
Hard Choices
The choice for the Interior Ministry is Abdulreza Rahmani Fazli, who is currently the director of the Supreme Audit Court, which is connected to the parliament. This body’s most important task is to issue yearly assessments of the financial operations of all government institutions and the extent to which their financial operations have been keeping in line with the budget as passed by the legislature.
Rahmani Fazli has been in the news for the past couple of years because of his office’s reports on missing funds that were discovered during Ahmadinejad’s presidency. But he is also a traditional conservative and a very close ally of parliament speaker Ali Larijani. His appointment was therefore a disappointment for Rouhani’s reformist backers who had hoped for someone with a clear record of support for citizens’ political and civil rights. (The interior minister also appoints the chief of police and licenses political parties and civil society organizations).
Rouhani also caved in at the last minute by nominating Mostafa Pourmohammadi, currently the head of Iran’s Inspectorate Office and Ahmadinejad’s minister of interior before he was fired at the end of the previous president’s first term. More importantly, Pourmohammadi was a prosecutor of the revolutionary courts and then deputy intelligence minister in the 1980s. He was implicated in some of the most horrific acts, including mass executions, against political prisoners.
Pourmohammadi is not a hardliner and in fact ran for president as a traditional conservative. But appointing him as justice minister does pose a question, to say the least, for a president who campaigned with the slogan of moderation and descuritization of the political environment — even if the justice minister is effectively the least powerful cabinet position.
It is true that the minister of justice is chosen among the four nominees offered by the head of the Judiciary and has no power in the selection of judges or its internal workings. It is also true that there is a saying in Iran that the justice minister is essentially the mailman between the Judiciary and the other two branches. Still, the appointment is a cave-in, likely to protect other ministerial nominees considered more important to Rouhani and effectively more essential in terms of influence.
In the arenas of foreign policy and economy, Rouhani did not make compromises and nominated individuals who are very close to him and his views. In foreign policy, Rouhani’s dilemma seemed to have been not about compromise but choice. He ultimately chose Javad Zarif over his deputy at the Center for Strategic Research, Mahmoud Vaezi, who was also considered a very strong choice. Others have written about Zarif’s appointment as an “olive branch” to the US. But it is a more important signal to the rank and file of the Foreign Ministry as well as the country as a whole.
Zarif represents the best and the brightest that the post-revolution Foreign Ministry has produced. He climbed the ranks without the help of religiously or politically important familial relations. Zarif’s important appointment is therefore a confirmation of Rouhani’s promise of a competent government. Yet to come, of course, are other foreign policy related appointments, in which Zarif will have quite a bit of say, including on Iran’s representative at the UN and a couple of deputy ministers. The latter becomes particularly important if the decision is made to return the handling of the nuclear file to the Foreign Ministry and send someone in the rank of US Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman to talks with the P5+1 nuclear negotiating team.
Vaezi, meanwhile, went to the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, where he was director general many years ago. I am not sure if Vaezi is happy with this appointment. There are even rumors — and rumors in Iran should never be trusted — that at the end of the day, Vaezi had to be convinced to take up the position at the prodding of former president Hashemi Rafsanjani. He does however have Rouhani’s strong backing and personality to lead the effort if the decision is made to reduce the influence the Islamic Revolutionary Guards has wielded in this ministry (an IRGC commander was leading it during the past couple of years).
This ministry’s revenues from cellular service usage is enormous. Last year it was the third highest depositor of money into the Treasury after the Ministry of Petroleum and the Ministry of Economy and Finance (which is in charge of taxation).
The question of the IRGC being engaged in too many economic activities is now front-and-center in Iranian politics. Prominent MP Ahmad Tavkoli even went as far as suggesting that the country’s leadership has to be decisive in limiting the IRGC’s and security forces’ role in the economy. Vaezi will be at the center of this fight should it take place.
Tackling Iran’s economy
In general, the desire to get state organs out of the economy seems to be the glue that holds together a largely neo-liberal economic team. It is one of the strange ironies of Iranian politics that the leftists of the 1980s were turned politically reformist and economically mostly neo-liberal in the late 1990s and continue to be so. It is true that the reaction Mohammad Khatami’s neoliberal policies elicited in the form of Ahmadinejad’s justice-oriented populism — at least rhetorically — has now been acknowledged and the economic policies pursued will try to strike a balance between “development” and “justice” and not simply assume that development will lead to the downward trickling of wealth. But the thrust of Rouhani’s center-reformist economic appointments indicates more concern with production and productivity in both the industrial and agricultural sectors.
Almost all of the economy-related ministers — with the exception of the minister of energy, Hamid Chitchian, whose political affiliation is not clear to me and seems to be a bureaucrat who has climbed the ranks of that ministry — are of a center-reformist mold. Bijan Namdar Zangeneh, who was Khatami’s petroleum minister, is nominated to return. Mohammadreza Nematzadeh, who was the co-chair of Rouhani’s campaign, will lead the Ministry of Industry, Mines and Commerce. Abbas Ahmad Akhundi will lead the Ministry of Road and Transportation, Ali Rabii will lead the Ministry of Labor, Cooperatives, and Welfare and Mahmoud Hojjati, who was Khatami’s minister of road and transportation, will return as minister of agriculture.
The only odd appointment in this list of like-minded and highly experienced officials is the minister of economy and finance, Ali Tayebnia, who comes in with little known experience and a mostly academic background. He was reformist candidate Mohammadreza Aref’s economic advisor during the presidential campaign and reportedly has academic expertise in monetary and taxation policies. It’s an odd appointment because of his dearth of experience. But perhaps the idea is that he will be part of an economic team that will be led by two key Rouhani economic advisors: Ishaq Jahangiri, a founding member of the center-reformist Servants of Construction party, former governor and minister of industry, who will be the first vice president — and Ali Nobakht, who will likely head the resurrected Management and Planning Organization. Also involved in economic decision-making is Rouhani’s chief of staff, Mohammad Nahavandian, currently the head of Iran’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
Not yet known is the person who will be appointed as the head of the Central bank of Iran (CBI). This position, like the positions of the first vice president and head of the Management and Panning Organization, does not require parliamentary approval. So far, the heads of Iran’s two largest private banks have been mentioned as potential CBI appointees.
Political boldness
Irrespective of whether one approves of the neo-liberal tendencies of these individuals, one has to marvel at the fact that three of these nominees were former presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi’s 2009 campaign advisors, and one is possibly former president Khatami’s closest political advisor. These appointments come in the midst of dire warnings by Hossein Shariatmadari of the hardline Kayhan Daily against appointments of “supporters of sedition” to key positions. Indeed, there is no doubt that Zangeneh will have a tough time getting by the parliament. But he is backed by his stellar record in both the ministries of energy and petroleum and the fact that his diehard opponents have so far failed to find any financial shenanigans on his part. He is “squeaky clean,” an academic who lives in Tehran told me.
Another minister who may have difficulty getting through is the nominee for the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology, which supervises the university system. Jafar Milimonfared was not Rouhani’s first choice. His first choice was received as too reformist and elicited harsh reaction from hardline and conservative forces. Still, Milimonfared was deputy minister of the same ministry during the Khatami era and even became its caretaker for a short when it was between ministers. This position elicits sensitivity because the new minister may reverse the Islamicization trend that has been pursued in Iran’s universities and remove some of the appointed faculty in the past 8 years. So, the fight is over both ideology and pork.
Interestingly, the nominee for Irans’ Education Ministry, Mohammad Ali Najafi, is expected to pass through relatively easily. He is also a founding member of the centrist Servants of Construction party and was until recently a member of the Tehran city council. Many considered him to be a more appealing reformist candidate for president than Mohammadreza Aref, who withdrew his candidacy in order for the reformists to line-up behind Rouhani. Najafi was the director of the Planning and Budget Organization (later renamed as the Management and Planning Organization) under Khatami. He was also the minister of culture and higher education when Mousavi was prime minister,.
This leaves the three key ministries of Defense, Culture and Islamic Guidance, and Intelligence — all of which ended up with a compromise choice. Note how I say a compromise choice and not an imposed choice. If the reported names are valid, none of the three nominees – Hossein Dehghan for Defense, Ali Jannati for Culture and Islamic Guidance and Hojatoleslam Seyyed Mahmud Alavi for Intelligence — were among Rouhani’s first choices. But these individuals cannot be considered as anyone else’s imposed choice either.
All three have worked for Hashemi Rafsanjani or Khatami and all three have a good relationship with Rouhani. Dehghan is a member of Rouhani’s Moderation and Development party, and Alavi was his link to Qom during the presidential campaign. And Jannati, whose father Ahmad Jannati is the Secretary of the Guardian Council, is much closer ideologically to Hashemi Rafsanjani than his father. He was deputy minister for international affairs at the ministry of culture and Islamic guidance during Hashemi Rafsanjani’s presidency and ambassador to Kuwait during Khatami’s presidency. He has the distinction of being removed from office by Ahmadinejad twice; once as deputy minister of the interior and once as Iran’s ambassador to Kuwait. Those working in the art, music and publishing world would have preferred a more reformist-minded nominee, but they are not complaining — at least not yet. This ministry has operated in such an erratic manner — for example by granting permission for movies to be made and then refusing to allow their release after much cost and effort — that anyone who brings consistency as well as lesser interference will be appreciated for now.
All in all the cabinet seems well-balanced with regard to Iran’s widely disparate political strands as well as the electorate that coalesced to make Rouhani’s victory possible. Expectedly, it features no hardliners since they were the clear losers of the presidential election. It does include a number of traditional conservatives but the cabinet mostly bends to the middle, as promised, while some individuals who are very close to former reformist president Khatami have been slated for key positions.
We’ll just have to wait and see if they will survive their confirmation hearings. The deputy-level appointments, which for many of those who deal with the various ministries are sometimes even more important than the ministerial heads, come next. It will take quite a few months before the depth of Rouhani’s efforts and commitment to instilling change will become clear.
Photo Credit: Roohollah Vahdati
]]>by Farideh Farhi
Paul Pillar has aptly explained why the vote this week in the House of Representatives for even more sanctions against Iran (H.R. 850) is at odds with the stated US foreign policy objective of changing Iran’s nuclear policies. While the Senate is unlikely to go along, at [...]]]>
by Farideh Farhi
Paul Pillar has aptly explained why the vote this week in the House of Representatives for even more sanctions against Iran (H.R. 850) is at odds with the stated US foreign policy objective of changing Iran’s nuclear policies. While the Senate is unlikely to go along, at least for now, the vote brings into question the motives for such a move.
I do not know whether the folks in the House wanted to remain in the good graces of the pro-Israel lobby, AIPAC, as Ali Gharib and M.J. Rosenberg suggest, or if they really do want to block any possibility of a deal with Iran to hasten regime change — which State Department folks keep telling me is not the official and stated policy of the US government. The bottom line is, however, that the motives are irrelevant to the chilling effect the vote’s outcome will have on negotiations and Iran’s skepticism about the Obama administration’s ability to “have the sanctions gone in a moment if it will substantively and constructively negotiate with the P5+1” as stated last month by Wendy Sherman, the US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs.
The vote is undoubtedly a signal that members of Congress are more interested in making the Iranian government cry uncle than negotiating. That’s not a smart move if the US government’s objective and stated policy is to convince Iran to limit its nuclear program and subject it to a more robust inspection regime. And let’s be clear: the message is not only to the Iranian government; it’s also to the Iranian people.
There is really no going around it. The House’s vote also shows the proverbial middle finger to the Iranian electorate, who went to the polls on June 14 in large numbers to the tune of 73 percent — a significantly higher participation rate than in years of US presidential elections — and voted for someone who was an unlikely victor because of his stated desire to reroute Iran’s foreign policy and improve relations with the world. That same electorate then treated Hassan Rouhani’s victory as a reflection of its will by celebrating in the streets.
Just to reiterate, in addition to the systemic odds against him, Rouhani was elected by an Iranian public who refused inaction despite the results of the contested 2009 election and the repression that followed. Prodded by two former presidents, centrist Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and reformist Mohammad Khatami, Iranian voters forcefully entered the fray to support Rouhani’s key promises of “prudent” economic management, interaction with the world and a relaxation of the highly securitized political atmosphere.
The vote ensures that Rouhani will be actively involved in convincing his Western interlocutors as well as skeptics inside Iran that through diplomacy, an agreement that respects Iran’s sovereignty — as well as the Islamic Republic’s legitimacy in protecting that sovereignty — and addresses Western concerns regarding the potential weaponization of Iran’s nuclear program is possible.
It is true that Rouhani will not be the sole decision-maker and has to negotiate with Iran’s other centers of power. An agreement must also receive broad support inside Iran and could be torpedoed by domestic forces framing it as a disproportionate concession to Western “bullying”.
But the need to convince other domestic stakeholders should not be confused with Rouhani not being given room to pursue, at least for a while, a “fair” agreement that also addresses the P5+1′s concerns. The fact that Rouhani is being told by no less than Leader Ali Khamenei not to trust Western powers should be construed as Khamenei’s fall-back “I told you so” position in case of failure and not an inhibitor of the attempt to reach an agreement.
Both reformist Khatami and hardline Mahmoud Ahmadinejad were given room to negotiate with Western powers during their presidencies. An agreement during Khatami’s presidency could not be reached because of the Bush administration’s insistence on “not a single centrifuge spinning.” A potential confidence-building agreement to transfer fissile material out of Iran during Ahmadinejad’s presidency was first rejected by a whole array of political forces inside Iran who were fearful that a deal with outsiders would pave the way for domestic repression in the tumultuous post-2009 election. Later, a similar agreement was rejected by the Obama administration, which did not want to abandon the success it was having in creating a willing coalition in favor of sanctions.
And herein lies the challenge for the folks who seem to have a voracious appetite for sanctions. In voting into office a reasonable face of Iran, the Iranian electorate is also counting on an encounter with the US’ reasonable face. Demanding significant confidence-building measures from Iran in exchange for vague promises of significant steps by Western powers in the future — promises that, given Congress’ stamp on many of the sanctions in place, are unlikely to be fulfilled soon — doesn’t seem all that reasonable.
The attitude and judgment of the Iranian electorate should not be taken lightly. In the midst of a region where hope about the positive impact of an Obama presidency has all but vanished, failure to reach an agreement with the reasonable face of Iran will be perceived as yet another clueless — and dangerous — US policy of heavy-handed demands without a clear understanding of the end game and the costs for achieving it.
With the Iranian government and electorate in the same corner, at least for now, it will be much harder to describe the sanctions regime as anything but a vindictive policy of collective punishment intended to not only bring down the Iranian government, but also destabilize the lives and livelihoods of the Iranian people. An academic who regularly visits Iran recently told me he was surprised by the extent of negative attitudes towards the US even in northern Tehran — the supposed bastion of secular and “westernized Iranians”. Things have really changed in a couple of years, he said.
I am not very keen on anecdotal evidence but the observation makes sense. Moves that reject the Iranian people’s efforts to change the course of their government’s policies and instead intensify policies of collective punishment will reap what they sow.
Photo Credit: Mona Hoobehfekr
]]>by Ali Reza Eshraghi
Nearly two weeks after Iran’s June 14 presidential election, there’s an unprecedented optimism in the air. Seemingly endless speculation is occurring on a daily basis about the make-up of president-elect Hassan Rouhani’s cabinet. At the same time, another debate is taking place over how Iran’s new government can [...]]]>
by Ali Reza Eshraghi
Nearly two weeks after Iran’s June 14 presidential election, there’s an unprecedented optimism in the air. Seemingly endless speculation is occurring on a daily basis about the make-up of president-elect Hassan Rouhani’s cabinet. At the same time, another debate is taking place over how Iran’s new government can be pressured to meet public demands without being rushed into radicalization.
Within this hopeful atmosphere, the fact that only a few weeks ago such a victory was unthinkable — it was, after all, only possible through a prudent marriage of convenience between idealism and realism — seems forgotten. Debunking this victory’s history will shed light on the birth of a new type of politicking in Iran.
What Happened
Pro-reform groups critical of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameni forced his allied security apparatus to play chess instead of engaging in a wrestling match. They won an unfair match in which they were not allowed to use their bishop and had lost many of their pawns.
Many analysts inside and outside the country did not expect Iran’s regime to honor the people’s vote. The Washington Post editorial board wrote with absolute certainty a few days before the election that Rouhani “will not be allowed to win.” Some mid-level reformist politicians who have left the country over the past four years even advocated against going to the polls — exemplifying just how much being away from Iran can impact your judgment. Pundits, excited by the Arab Spring, forecast that many would abstain from voting and that sooner or later Iran’s future would be decided on the streets.
Yet 72.7% of Iranians participated in this election. In Iran’s Kurdish regions, 60% of the population voted despite calls from Kurdish opposition parties to stay home.
How did such a victory happen? First and foremost, it was pressure from Iranian society that forced the opposition to participate in a game they could not even imagine winning. The 2013 election was a beautiful tango between popular and elitist politics. As the experience of the 2009 election showed, even Iran’s elites must be able to safely navigate their ship from the deep, undulating ocean of the people to the shallow, mine-filled port of the Iranian regime. According to Saeed Leylaz, a reformist economy expert, “ the regime exerted all the pressure it could so that we would throw the game.” Not only did groups critical of the Supreme Leader resist this pressure; for the first time they actually united. They also signaled that the king would not be checkmated if the game goes their way.
Some Recent History
Let’s begin with a cold Friday on March 2, 2012. Reformist Mohammad Khatami — Iran’s former president — travels to a small town 80 kilometers outside Tehran to quietly cast his vote in the 9th Majlis elections. At a time when the majority of Iran’s reformists had decided to ban the vote, Khatami’s participation made him the victim of harsh criticism and even bitter insults. But by voting he sent the message that despite his opposition, he would play inside the regime instead of voluntarily pulling out like a dissident and being at loggerheads with the whole system.
One year later, in March 2013, the reformist’s lower elites began mounting pressure on Khatami to run for president. But he cleverly refused, saying that “no matter the cost”, the regime would not allow him to run and such a move would only make the society more antagonized. Politics would also become more securitized by the regime, argued Khatami.
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani — another former president who considers himself a centrist — was not so sure about the regime’s reaction to his own bid. At the last minute, he registered for candidacy.
The reformists welcomed his run. In the 10 days between his registration on May 11 to his disqualification by the Guardian Council on May 21, popular politics became reenergized. This concerned the regime. The experience of 2009 had shown that emotional build-up during the campaigning stage of an election could be more troublesome than the actual result. Rafsanjani was not surprised by his disqualification, but he did not expect it either; not every move by political actors is necessarily calculated.
But Rafsanjani remained true to his politically shrewd reputation. As Abbas Abdi, a renowned social analyst wrote, “Hashemi did not even change his tone and more interestingly he called for [the participation of people in the election to create] a political epic.”
Rafsanjani knew that objecting would only lead to his further marginalization in the political arena. By refusing to protest, he sent a message to Ayatollah Khamenei that he is not looking to radicalize public sentiments. The Supreme Leader received this message and in a public speech implicitly thanked Rafsanjani.
After Rafsanjani’s elimination, the reformists became more discouraged and confused. Two candidates close to them had passed through the Guardian Council’s filter but neither was ideal. Mohammadreza Aref , a vice president during Khatami’s term, was considered the most conservative in the reformist camp as he remained publicly silent during the post-election crackdowns in 2009. Rouhani — a former secretary of the Supreme National Security Council with close ties to Rafsanjani — was known as a centrist but had once condemned a February 14, 2011 Green Movement protest. Both these candidates had decided to run for the presidency without consensus from their political camps.
The Politics
From May 21 when Rafsanjani was disqualified until June 10 when Aref withdrew his bid, groups critical of the Supreme Leader experienced non-stop tension and doubt.
At the bottom, those who want change expected these groups to unite and use the opportunity afforded by the elections. At the top, three high-ranking figures from different political currents — reformist Khatami, centrist Rafsanjani and Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri, a former Majlis Speaker who’s considered a moderate principlist — were of the same opinion. But in the middle, confused politicians and political groups were in chaos and competition.
Eshaq Jahangiri, Rafsanjani’s campaign manager, speaks of a meeting on May 28 with Rafsnajani in which he asks reformists and moderate principlists to cooperate and unite to “change the course of the election.” Otherwise, “the radicals could throw the country into crisis by isolating all rationale figures.” A day before, the Reformists Consultative Council also had a meeting at Khatami’s office. But during that meeting the opinion of the majority of the reformists persisted: don’t participate.
The reformists were quickly faced with a bottom-up pressure that the body of society was exerting on them. As Abdi put it, “the principle of participating in the election was imposed on them by the people.”
Different surveys conducted before the election showed that about 60 to 70 percent of Iranians would participate in the elections. Forty-six members of the Reformists Consultative Council residing in the capital city of Tehran were especially facing pressure from their lower cohorts in the townships demanding a coalition between the two candidates. Ultimately, the periphery forced the center to surrender — the reformists must participate in the elections and they must form a coalition.
There was disagreement about the decision-making process. Some mid-rank reformists in the capital wanted to decide on the coalition-candidate behind closed doors. But the decision to consult public opinion ultimately persevered. “Just as in participating or banning the election the collective intellect of the people and Reformists in townships was accepted we must also refer to them on this issue,” said Ahmad Masjed-Jamei, a member of the council.
Ahead of the alliance that propelled him to victory, surveys showed that Rouhani, the candidate who was not affiliated with any reformist group, was more popular. Some reformists questioned the validity of the opinion poll. The process, which was supposed to result in the unity of progressive groups, was headed towards nasty party politics filled with rivalry and competition between mid-level elites lusting after extracting rents and getting public office in the next administration.
While the result of the final coalition headed by Khatami and Rafsanjani was supposed to be announced by Khatami’s Consultative Council, a number of reformist parties announced early endorsement of Aref to present Khatami’s council with a fait accompli. With public opinion still polling in favor of Rouhani on June 8, to reign in the competing reformist groups, the Consultative Council delayed announcing its official endorsement until late Monday night (June 10). On Tuesday, with only two more days of official campaigning left before the polls opened, Khatami and Rafsanjani announced their endorsement of Rouhani.
Aref withdrew his bid with displeasure and refused to officially endorse Rouhani. But this is not important. Despite the disagreements and rivalries, the political groups in Iran managed to ultimately reach a final and determining decision.
Rouhani’s Message
It is wrong to consider Rouhani’s victory the result of the endorsement of political groups, particularly the reformists. This 65-year-old cleric has years of experience in difficult domestic and foreign policy arenas and conflict resolution. He also had a hand in persuading the public to vote for him.
Building a constituency for Rouhani was difficult in this election. As I have written before, the regime had learned from the 2009 election and wanted to keep the streets clear of campaign carnivals and antagonism. It was only in the two final official days of campaigning that a bit of election fervor was displayed, though only in some parts of north Tehran. In such a restricted atmosphere, where the public is not given an opportunity to discuss and engage in political deliberation, Rouhani had to rely on his rhetoric to gather votes.
Aristotle called rhetoric “the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion.” Rouhani showed he is well capable of this. With his warm yet calm style of oratory stemming from the tradition of Shia-preaching, he reproduced almost everything that Mir-Hossein Mousavi — the 2009 candidate who is currently under house arrest — said and more.
Rouhani criticized the handling of the nuclear issue — “centrifuges can run [but only] if the country [can also be] run.” He stated he would end the securitized atmosphere [of the past four years], adding, “You who have brought this upon the country, the people don’t want you anymore.” He even promised to prepare the grounds so that “anyone who has fled the country for whatever reason can return.”
While stating the demands of the reformists in his election campaign, he also tried to give moderate principlists a place. A remark he made during one of the election debates became his representative anecdote for the public: “I am a jurist, I am not a colonel.”
At the same time, in one of his campaign videos, Rouhani quoted Hassan Firouzabadi — Commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces — who praised his “prudent yet ethical and friendly management” of the military during the 1980s Iran-Iraq war. He delivered his first campaign speech at Jamaran Husseiniyeh, a symbolic location used by Ayatollah Khomeini, founder of the Islamic Republic, to address the masses. But he also highlighted that for the past 24 years he has been Ayatollah Khamenei’s representative at the Supreme National Security Council.
The magic of elections in Iran is that candidates are forced to quickly upgrade and revise their vocabulary so that voters can identify their demands. But Rouhani touched upon what the people wanted while refraining from threatening the regime. His election symbol, a key — which according to his campaign aides was his own idea — meant just that. It signified to the public that closed doors would open to them while assuring the regime that he had no intention of breaking through locks.
This tactic enabled Rouhani to turn many principlist elites — whom he had dealt with for years — to support him and convince many others to remain silent instead of attacking him. In his trips to major Iranian cities like Ahvaz, Isfahan,and Rasht, the Friday Prayers leaders — who are the Supreme Leader’s representatives but can have different inclinations and opinions — met with him. High traffic websites like Alef and Khabaronline, which belong to the principlists, were silent on Rouhani and instead mainly criticized Saeed Jalili, the candidate who was most vocal about his allegiance to the Supreme Leader.
The regime’s hardliners tried their best to guide Rouhani towards radicalization; to find a pretext for repressing him. They arrested dozen of his young supporters and campaign staff. But instead of using this to boil over public emotions, Rouhani calmly began to negotiate their release.
In his campaign ads, Rouhani did not conceal the fact that for years, he was the man behind the curtain. Such a representation would have made voters run for the hills in the past two elections; Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won the 2005 election by implying that he would unveil secrets and out the regime’s backstage people. But this time the majority of the people voted for the man who gave them omid — hope that he would solve problems behind-the-curtain with tadbir — prudency.
In Persian culture, politics is likened to backgammon. Unlike chess, backgammon is a game of contingencies. The dice are thrown, but what’s important is that in every circumstance, the best and most suitable move is made to triumph over fortune. This is exactly what prudence means — it concerns the domain of probabilities.
Many have inquired about the conditions that created the possibility of such an unimaginable victory in Iran’s 2013 elections. Why didn’t the regime rig the vote? How were the ballots counted with such precision that Rouhani won with only 0.7% more than the 50% required for an outright victory when even minor tampering would force a second round? These are important questions. But it’s just as important that in the instant when there was a sudden opening, the prudent move was made by the pro-change groups. If they had decided not to play — that is, participate in the elections, form a coalition and at the same time calm the opponent — there would have been no victory. An unknown Quattrocento humanist once described prudence as a “faculty of judgment exemplary for civic life.” This election showed that civic life and politicking can not only function well in Iran; they also have a chance at succeeding.
– Ali Reza Eshraghi was a senior editor at several of Iran’s reformist dailies. He is the Iran Project Manager at the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) and a teaching fellow in the Department of Communication Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
– Photo Credit: Mehdi Ghasemi
]]>via IPS News
The victory of Hassan Rouhani in Iran’s Jun. 14 election marked a significant shift in Iranian politics, occasioned by the forceful return of the two most important political factions of the Islamic Republic – traditional conservatives and reformists.
These two factions had been sidelined in the past [...]]]>
via IPS News
The victory of Hassan Rouhani in Iran’s Jun. 14 election marked a significant shift in Iranian politics, occasioned by the forceful return of the two most important political factions of the Islamic Republic – traditional conservatives and reformists.
These two factions had been sidelined in the past decade. In fact, many had assumed that they had permanently lost their significance, giving way to either a more radical version of conservatism or the personal dictatorship of Leader Ali Khamenei.
But the alliance that was created in support of Rouhani’s candidacy by three key figures of the Islamic Republic – former presidents Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, as well as former speaker of the Parliament and presidential candidate Ali Akbar Nateq Nouri – set the stage for the return of both traditional conservatism and reformism to Iranian politics.
These two factions were effectively the founding pillars of the Islamic Republic. In the 1980s, they were identified as the right and left wings of the Islamic Republic because of their disagreements over the economic direction of the country.
But, by the late 1990s, they became known as the principlist and reformist wings due to their political differences over whether the republican or Islamic sides of the Islamic Republic should be given greater emphasis.
In the 1980s, prime minister Mir Hossein Mussavi, now under house arrest, was considered a leftist, focusing on economic justice and state control of the economy, while then-president Khamenei was deemed close to the Islamic Republic’s right wing which defended the importance of private property and the private sector.
Even the membership of the Guardian Council – which, along with the vetting of candidates for the executive and legislative branches, is tasked with assessing legislation for their constitutionality, as well as their Islamic content – included individuals from both factions.
Control of Iran’s Parliament shifted from one faction to another and from one election to another over the years. President Rafsanjani (1989-97), who has long tried to straddle both wings as a self-identified centrist and moderate, had to deal with both leftist- and rightist-controlled parliaments. Similarly, reformist President Khatami (1997-2005) had to negotiate with both reformist and principlist-controlled parliaments.
But this political arrangement began to fall apart with the 2004 parliamentary election and then the 2005 election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president. He came to power with Principlist support and immediately began the process of purging the leftist/ reformist wing of the Islamic Republic.
Initially, the purge created a temporary alliance between Ahmadinejad and traditional conservatives who were happy to see their ideological opponents pushed out of the political process.
But positioning himself as a younger-generation populist, Ahmadinejad soon began to turn against the other political pillar of the Islamic Republic: traditional conservatism. While traditional conservatives maintained their presence in the judiciary and the parliament, Khamenei’s support permitted Ahmadinejad to effectively prevent any kind of legal challenge to his imperial governing style in the executive branch.
After the 2009 contested election in which Ahmadinejad was re-elected, it was Khamenei’s continued backing that led to parliament’s approval of his cabinet ministers, the prevention of various efforts to impeach him, and halting the many judicial cases against Ahmadinejad’s illegal conduct, including his repeated refusal to implement legislation passed by the Parliament.
It was within this context that Iran’s traditional conservatives began to realise that they could meet the same fate as the reformists if they did not step up and help revive some of the old political pillars of the Islamic Republic.
Instead of competing against their old their old nemeses, the reformists, they forged an alliance behind the candidacy of Rouhani, who, while belonging to the Islamic Republic’s right wing, successfully wooed the reformist vote through his criticism of the increasingly securitised political environment of Iran and the purge of key reformist politicians in the past decade.
To understand the extent of the change this alliance represented in Iran’s recent history, suffice to say that the two main candidates who ran against each other in 1997 – reformist Khatami and conservative Nateq Nouri – joined hands to rally their supporters behind Rouhani’s candidacy.
The intent of the alliance was to forestall the encroaching dictatorship of the office of the Leader and prevent the radicals with little respect for the electoral process from consolidating their control of that office.
In many ways, the formation of this alliance was an unprecedented act in the history of modern Iran and, according to many observers inside the country, reflective of the “maturity” of the political players.
In the words of reformist journalist Abbas Abdi, writing for Etemaad Daily, “This election was deeper than other elections in Iran in terms of its political meaning, and at this time we can be hopeful that it will be the beginning of a new trend in the Iranian society.”
A historian of contemporary Iran who did not want to be identified went further. He told IPS that in Iran’s recent history there were many moments when political players could have paved the way for further change and democratisation had they been able to co-operate with each other and form alliances. However, their inability to do so led to the eventual purge of all of them and the re-establishment of personal dictatorship.
The most noted example in recent memory was the collapse of the democratic coalition built by Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq with the help of cleric Ayatollah Abolqassem Kashani in the early 1950s. Ultimately Mossadeq’s fall from power was assured through a CIA-sponsored military coup that brought the Shah back to power. But the coup was made easy because the coalition built by Mossadeq had by then fallen apart.
According to this historian, “the principlist-reformist alliance is such an important event that it can be said to have catapulted Iran into a new stage of its history.”
This historian also notes that at no time in Iran’s modern history has there been such “an urge in both society, as well as government circles for unity and cooperation, in the face of external threats,” including both the U.S.-led economic sanctions and threats of war by Israel and the United States.
Photo Credit: Hamid Forootan
]]>by Reza Marashi
The election of Hassan Rouhani as Iran’s next president has elicited different interpretations in Washington. To some, Iranian officials from both sides of the political spectrum are cut from the same cloth, so a pox on both of their houses! To others, a centrist Iranian president offers the best [...]]]>
by Reza Marashi
The election of Hassan Rouhani as Iran’s next president has elicited different interpretations in Washington. To some, Iranian officials from both sides of the political spectrum are cut from the same cloth, so a pox on both of their houses! To others, a centrist Iranian president offers the best opportunity for finding a peaceful solution to the US-Iran standoff since Barack Obama’s first year in office. That said, Iranian politics can simultaneously produce continuity and change. A few key signposts stand out.
The Changes
A freshly elected Rouhani will feel bolstered in his views, and in turn, will work to push forward his agenda. Nevertheless, he is not all-powerful with regards to nuclear negotiations and improving US-Iran relations. In an effort to boost his chances of success internally, Rouhani will likely build a coalition government that utilizes diverse factional views and figures. This will pave the way for the return of many reformist and technocratic mindsets to the executive branch who have a demonstrated track record of seeking more professional approaches in addressing Iran’s foreign policy and national security challenges.
Yes, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei will have the last word on Iran’s nuclear program and on its relationship with the United States. But Rouhani’s coalition government will almost certainly facilitate the process. The diversity of views in his government may complicate negotiations at first, as different personalities and factions re-learn to work with one another, but finding creative solutions will likely become more feasible for one key reason: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s (and to be fair, Khamenei’s) insistence on using inexperienced forces in Iran’s diplomatic apparatus will no longer be a glaring weakness in Tehran.
Simply put, Ahmadinejad’s departure from office can provide a burst of momentum to facilitate reciprocal, confidence-building overtures between Tehran and Washington — momentum that was nearly impossible over the past eight years due to Ahmadinejad’s political toxicity.
The Continuity
From monarchists to mullahs, Iranian officials have long been focused on consolidating their country as a regional power, undeterred by the objections of great powers. The key cornerstones of this strategy will not change under a Rouhani presidency. As with the Rafsanjani, Khatami and Ahmadinejad presidencies, Iran will seek to improve ties with its immediate neighbors, as well as prominent Islamic countries. To that end, relations with regional powers Saudi Arabia and Turkey will likely be Rouhani’s top priority.
A Rouhani presidency will also continue Iran’s prioritization of improving its indigenous technological capabilities. The very existence of Iran’s nuclear program, missile development, satellite launches and arms procurement are key examples of issues deemed contentious by Washington and non-negotiable by Tehran. However, the contours of these activities are negotiable, and Iran is willing to place limitations on them — for the right price.
It’s critical for Washington to understand the value that all political factions in Iran — including Rouhani — place in the principle of standing up to western pressure. As the Supreme Leader’s chief foreign policy advisor (and potential Rouhani political appointee) Ali Akbar Velayati remarked, Iran will “never give in and never give up.”
The bottom line of Tehran’s nuclear negotiating stance — aimed at achieving acknowledgment of its right to enrich uranium on Iranian soil and the lifting sanctions — has transcended presidential administrations. The key difference between the governing style of Rouhani and his former campaign rival, Saeed Jalili, will be more in style rather than substance. Indeed, during the presidential debates Rouhani did not object to Jalili’s nuclear objective and rather to Jalili’s inability to avoid high costs while pursuing those objectives.
What Happens Now
An opening to the US during Rouhani’s presidency will likely be accepted by Iranian elites — provided it’s not interpreted as a sign of weakness and helps bolster rather than damage Iran’s regional standing. To that end, confidence-building measures have proven to be a difficult construct, largely due to what former President Mohammad Khatami describes as a “wall of mistrust” between the countries.
Contrary to popular assumption in Washington, the Iranian power structure has produced — not “allowed” — a shift in the Iranian presidency, which will likely produce some changes in policy. The degree to which these policy shifts are favorable to Washington’s interests will largely depend on its own actions in moving forward.
When Rouhani and his team attempt to challenge and re-define policies, it will be incumbent upon them to demonstrate an alternative narrative that is squarely in the best interest of the system. Few would argue against the notion that Ayatollah Khamenei’s prevailing narrative is predicated on the idea of nefarious US intentions. Since it will be vital to break Khamenei’s narrative for diplomacy to succeed, Washington must demonstrate through word and deed that it is not against Iran’s scientific, technological and regional progress.
The track record over the past fifteen years is clear: eased foreign tension empowers Iranian centrists and moderates; increased foreign pressure cements the anti-western narrative in Iran. Want to help Iranian hard-liners box in Rouhani? Want to push moderate elements of the Iranian elite into the mindset of distrusting the US? Increasing sanctions and other forms of pressure will almost certainly produce these outcomes.
Contrary to a reigning assumption in certain Washington circles, sanctions did not force the regime to “allow” Rouhani’s victory. Instead, pressure from the Iranian people at the ballot box forced the regime to honor the vote for fear of a 2009 post-election redux that could deepen existing wounds within the regime and, in turn, bring about its total collapse. Khamenei could cheat once, but not twice in a row.
The show of popular force behind Rouhani will provide him with a degree of latitude to break from the previous administration’s policies. But his political rivals won’t have to dig very far into their playbook to sabotage his efforts if new sanctions render him unable to fend off charges of weakness. In this scenario, rather than compromise with the US, Rouhani will be forced to back Khamenei’s narrative, “We respond to pressure with pressure.”
Failure on the part of Washington to seize the opportunity presented by Rouhani’s victory will render his more conciliatory approach to the US stillborn. Of course, for some, this is the preferred outcome.
– Reza Marashi is Director of Research at the National Iranian American Council.
– Photo Credit: Roohollah Vahdati
]]>by Jim Lobe
Exactly three weeks ago, a confident Dennis Ross, President Barack Obama’s top Iran policy-maker for most of his first term, made the following assessments and predictions in an op-ed entitled, ironically, “Don’t Discount the Iranian Election:”
So now Ayatollah Khamenei has decided not to leave anything [...]]]>
by Jim Lobe
Exactly three weeks ago, a confident Dennis Ross, President Barack Obama’s top Iran policy-maker for most of his first term, made the following assessments and predictions in an op-ed entitled, ironically, “Don’t Discount the Iranian Election:”
So now Ayatollah Khamenei has decided not to leave anything to chance. …If there had been any hope that Iran’s presidential election might offer a pathway to different policy approaches on dealing with the United States, he has now made it clear that will not be the case. His action should be seen for what it is: a desire to prevent greater liberalization internally and accommodation externally.”
…Clearly, the Supreme Leader wanted to avoid the kind of excitement that Rafsanjani would have stirred up had he continued making public statements, as he has over the last two years, about Iran’s need to fix the economy and reduce Iran’s isolation internationally (a theme he has emphasized in recent years). But the exclusion of Rafsanjani from the election is also an important signal to anyone concerned about Iran’s nuclear program. If the Supreme Leader had been interested in doing a deal with the West on the Iranian nuclear program, he would have wanted [former President Akbar Hashemi] Rafsanjani to be president.
I say that …because if the Supreme Leader were interested in an agreement, he would probably want to create an image of broad acceptability of it in advance. Rather than having only his fingerprints on it, he would want to widen the circle of decision-making to share the responsibility. And he would set the stage by having someone like Rafsanjani lead a group that would make the case for reaching an understanding. Rafsanjani’s pedigree as Khomeini associate and former president, with ties to the Revolutionary Guard and to the elite more generally, would all argue for him to play this role.
…(T)he fact that the Iranian media is lavishing attention on [Saeed] Jalili certainly suggests that he is Khamenei’s preference, even though he has the thinnest credentials of the lot.
If Jalili does end up becoming the Iranian president, it will be hard to avoid the conclusion that the Supreme Leader has little interest in reaching an understanding with the United States on the Iranian nuclear program.”
Three weeks later, we know not only that Jalili did not win the election, but that the candidate backed with enthusiasm by both Rafsanjani and former reformist president Mohammad Khatami — Hassan Rouhani — did. Moreover, during his campaign, Rouhani did exactly what, in Ross’s assessment, made Rafsanjani’s candidacy unacceptable to Ali Khamenei: he spoke “about Iran’s need to fix the economy and reduce Iran’s isolation internationally…” — themes which he repeated in his 90-minute post-election press conference. In addition, Rouhani — given his 15 years on the Supreme National Security Council — appears to be an excellent vehicle for creating “an image of broad acceptability of [an agreement on Iran's nuclear program] in advance” if Khamenei were interested in such an accord. And, although he isn’t a former president like Rafsanjani, Rouhani’s reputed ability to bridge differences between conservatives, pragmatists and reformists would help Khamenei “widen the circle of decision-making to share the responsibility” of a deal. He would also be well placed to “lead a group that would make the case for reaching an understanding.”
Thus, if we assume, as Ross did three weeks ago, that Khamenei leaves nothing to chance and has the power to do so — a very questionable assumption among actual Iran experts (see here and here for examples) — then we might also see Jalili’s defeat and Rouhani’s surprise victory on what was essentially Rafsanjani’s platform as clear signals that Khamenei is indeed “interested in doing a deal on the Iranian nuclear program.” The only missing element in this scenario was Rafsanjani who, as noted above, strongly backed Rouhani and helped rally the centrists and reformists behind him. In light of Ross’s previous assessments regarding how the supreme leader signals his intentions on nuclear negotiations, would it be unreasonable to expect that Ross would not only be somewhat humbler with respect to his understanding of Iranian politics, but also rather hopeful about prospects for a real deal?
On the question of humility, the answer is not really, at least judging by his latest analysis, entitled “Talk to Iran’s New President. Warily.” Ross doesn’t even mention Jalili, Khamenei’s previously presumed chosen one. And while Ross seems genuinely puzzled by why Khamenei “allowed Mr. Rowhani to win the election,” particularly in light of the fact that the president-elect had “run against current [Khamenei-approved] Iranian policies,” he still sees the supreme leader as all-powerful, implying that Rouhani would not have won had Khamenei not approved of his victory.
As to the meaning of Khamenei’s permitting Rouhani to win, Ross floats four possible options, none of which, however, admits the possibility that Khamenei is prepared “to do a deal” acceptable to the West (a possibility for which Ross, just three weeks before, believed could have been signaled by the Guardian Council’s approval of Rafsanjani’s candidacy). He does entertain the possibility that Rouhani gained Khamenei’s approval for reasons related to the nuclear issue, but strictly for tactical purposes — not to reach a final accord that would preclude Iran’s attaining “breakout capability” (as would presumably have been possible if Rafsanjani had won the presidency):
He [Khamenei] believes that Mr. Rowhani, a president with a moderate face, might be able to seek an open-ended agreement on Iran’s nuclear program that would reduce tensions and ease sanctions now, while leaving Iran room for development of nuclear weapons at some point in the future.
He believes that Mr. Rowhani might be able to start talks that would simply serve as a cover while Iran continued its nuclear program.
Ross, who has been arguing for several months now that Washington needs to drop its approach of seeking incremental confidence-building accords with Iran in favor of making a final ultimatum-like offer (backed up by ever-tougher sanctions and ever-more credible threats of military action) that would permit Tehran to enrich uranium up to five percent (subject to the strictest possible international oversight in exchange for a gradual easing of sanctions), goes on to reject any let-up in pressure on Tehran.
Even if he were given the power to negotiate, Mr. Rowhani would have to produce a deal the supreme leader would accept. So it is far too early to consider backing off sanctions as a gesture to Mr. Rowhani.
We should, instead, keep in mind that the outside world’s pressure on Iran to change course on its nuclear program may well have produced his election. So it would be foolish to think that lifting the pressure now would improve the chances that he would be allowed to offer us what we need: an agreement, or credible Iranian steps toward one, under which Iran would comply with its international obligations on the nuclear issue.”[Emphasis added.]
Now, I, for one, find this reasoning difficult to understand. Ross may be right that external pressure was responsible for Rouhani’s election, but I suspect that it was a good deal more complicated than that, and, in any event, one of the last people I would seek out for an explanation as to why Rouhani won would be Ross, given his assessments of Iranian politics just three weeks ago. But to assert that easing pressure on Iran once Rouhani takes office (as a goodwill gesture) would somehow reduce the chances that Rouhani would be allowed to make concessions on the nuclear issue just doesn’t make much sense, if, for no other reason, virtually all Iran experts agree that Khamenei (and presumably hard-liners in and around his office) don’t believe Washington really wants an agreement because its ultimate goal is regime change. (Just today, Khamenei, while insisting that “resolving the nuclear issue would be simple” if hostile powers put aside their stubbornness, noted, “Of course, the enemies say in their words and letters that they do not want to change the regime, but their approaches are contrary to these words.”) If Khamenei is to be persuaded otherwise, Washington should work to bolster Rouhani and the forces that supported him in the election.
Indeed, most Iran specialists whose work I read argue that Rouhani’s election has really put the “ball in President Obama’s court”, as the International Crisis Group’s Ali Vaez wrote this week. They say that the response should not only be goodwill gestures, such as a congratulatory letter on his inauguration, but far more generous offers than what has been put on the table to date. Vali Nasr, for example, made the point last week when he argued that Rouhani “will likely wait for a signal of American willingness to make serious concessions before he risks compromise.”
For the past eight years, U.S. policy has relied on pressure — threats of war and international economic sanctions — rather than incentives to change Iran’s calculus. Continuing with that approach will be counterproductive. It will not provide Rowhani with the cover for a fresh approach to nuclear talks, and it could undermine the reformists generally by showing they cannot do better than conservatives on the nuclear issue.
…There is now both the opportunity and the expectation that Washington will adopt a new approach to strengthen reformists and give Rowhani the opening that he needs if he is to successfully argue the case for a deal with the P5+1.”
Paul Pillar made a similar point in the National Interest last week:
Rouhani’s election presents the United States and its partners with a test — of our intentions and seriousness about reaching an agreement. Failure of the test will confirm suspicions in Tehran that we do not want a deal and instead are stringing along negotiations while waiting for the sanctions to wreak more damage. …Passage of the test …means not making any proposal an ultimatum that is coupled with threats of military force, which only feed Iranian suspicions that for the West the negotiations are a box-checking prelude to war and regime change.”
“The Iranian electorate has in effect said to the United States and its Western partners, “We’ve done all we can. Among the options that the Guardian Council gave us, we have chosen the one that offers to get us closest to accommodation, agreement and understanding with the West. Your move, America.”
And, in contrast to Ross, who believes that time is fast running out and the “multilateral step-by-step approach …has outlived its usefulness,” the Brookings Institution’s Suzanne Maloney argued in Foreign Affairs that
To overcome the deep-seated (and not entirely unjustified) paranoia of its ultimate decision-maker, the United States will need to be patient. It will need to understand, for example, that Rouhani will need to demonstrate to Iranians that he can produce tangible rewards for diplomatic overtures. That means that Washington should be prepared to offer significant sanctions relief in exchange for any concessions on the nuclear issue. Washington will also have to understand that Rouhani may face real constraints in seeking to solve the nuclear dispute without exacerbating the mistrust of hard-liners.
In spite of this advice, things are moving in the opposite direction. On July 1, tough new sanctions to which Obama has already committed himself will take effect. Among other provisions, they will penalise companies that deal in rials or with Iran’s automotive sector. The Republican-led House is expected to pass legislation by the end of next month (that is, on the eve of Rouhani’s inauguration) that would sharply curb or eliminate the president’s authority to waive sanctions on countries and companies doing any business with Iran, thus imposing a virtual trade embargo on Iran. Other sanctions measures, including an anticipated effort by Republican Sen. Lindsay Graham to get an Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) resolution passed by the Senate after the August recess, are lined up.
It would be good to learn what Ross, who is co-chairing the new Iran task force of the ultra-hawkish Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, thinks of these new and pending forms of pressure and whether they are likely to improve the chances that Rouhani will be able to deliver a deal.
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