On December 11, the spokesman for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that his agency was, as Gareth Porter asserted on this website earlier this month, not interested in accepting a recent invitation by Iran to visit Marivan, at least at this time.
The spokesman, Serge Gas, reportedly told Reuters in an email that the agency had “explained clearly to Iran—on more than one occasion—that an offer of a visit of Marivan does not help address specific concerns related to the issue of large-scale high explosive experiments.” No further elaboration was made in the email, according to Reuters.
As someone who has worked at a senior level for the IAEA and who has respect for its mission and its dedicated personnel, I found this statement—and the decision not to accept Iran’s invitation—disappointing and worrisome.
In its 2011 special report on weaponization in Iran that was leaked to the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), among others, the IAEA asserted that it had received generally consistent “information” that “large scale high explosive experiments” for nuclear-weapon development had been carried out “in the region of Marivan” (paragraph 43 of the Annex). The information, which appeared in more than 1,000 pages of documents (paragraph 12), cited hemispherical explosive configuration, fiber optic sensors, and streak cameras, among many other details. Indeed, the IAEA’s description of the experiments allegedly carried out at Marivan was some of the most detailed in the weaponization annex.
The report said the source for this information was an unnamed “Member State” and that more than ten other Member States provided supplementary information (paragraph 13)—including “procurement information, information on international travel by individuals said to have been involved in the alleged activities, financial records, documents reflecting health and safety arrangements, and other documents demonstrating manufacturing techniques for certain high explosive components”—that “reinforces and tends to corroborate the information.”
The report about the large high-explosive experiments involving hemispherical charges at Marivan constitutes a very serious allegation because, if the hydrodynamic experiments were actually conducted using uranium (which is not mentioned in the report), they would constitute not only a violation of the IAEA’s safeguards agreement with Iran, but also a “smoking gun” pointing to the existence of a nuclear weapons program. And while such experiments carried out without uranium would not constitute a safeguards violation, they would unquestionably also support critics’ claims that Iran was indeed developing nuclear weapons.
The IAEA report and its annex have never been published by the Agency. In fact, a search for “Marivan” on the IAEA website turns up nothing. Nonetheless, no one has questioned the authenticity of the leaked version of the report that includes the paragraph referencing “the region of Marivan.” Since then, the story has been picked up by think tanks, NGOs, and media reports all of which breathlessly describe the alleged experiments but fail to mention their allegedly having taken place in Marivan.
As Porter reported, Iran’s Permanent Representative to the IAEA, Reza Najafi, informed the agency’s Board of Governors on November 21 that Iran was ready to give the IAEA “one managed access” to the Marivan region to verify the information included in the Annex. But the IAEA has now rejected the invitation. As noted by Reuters, “…the IAEA’s main priority for its long-stalled investigation into Iran’s nuclear program has been to go to another location, the Parchin military base [sic] southeast of Tehran, where the Vienna-based agency says other nuclear-related explosives tests may have been conducted, perhaps a decade ago.”
I addressed at some length in a previous post the many reasons why I find it quite improbable that the building that the IAEA has asked to visit at Parchin (which is actually not a base at all, but rather a sprawling complex of military factories) would be the site of sensitive nuclear weapons-related testing. Moreover, it bears noting that the alleged Marivan tests cited in the IAEA’s report are of too great a magnitude to be conducted at the Parchin site, which was purportedly designed to combine uranium and high explosives in much smaller experiments. The IAEA’s insistence to visit Parchin under the circumstances is puzzling, to say the least.
Marivan is important. In fact, it is the litmus test for the credibility of the IAEA’s 2011 report. If the IAEA claims detailed knowledge of a test and its location, it is critical that it work with Iran to verify that information. If, however, the information turns out to be false, irrelevant, inactionable or beyond the scope of IAEA’s expertise, then the agency should either withdraw its 2011 “Weaponization Annex” or issue a revised report after a thorough vetting of the rest of its contents. As noted above, the large-scale high explosive experiments are the most detailed claim in the agency’s weaponization report. That claim needs to be investigated and resolved, and the IAEA’s reluctance to do so is deeply disturbing.
Marivan is also important because if, indeed, the report was based on false information, it further weakens the already-thin case for visiting Parchin, which, in my view, constitutes a quixotic quest that threatens to derail far more important talks and agreements involving Iran’s nuclear materials The Agency’s strong suit has always been tracing and accurately reporting the quantities of nuclear materials of Member States, and it should focus on that mandate as a priority.
Bob Kelley is a professional nuclear engineer licensed in California. He spent the early years of his career in the nuclear weapons program of the US on topics such as plutonium metallurgy, vulnerability of nuclear warheads and warhead engineering. He has worked on a number of isotope separation schemes for the actinides including uranium separation by gas centrifuge and plutonium laser isotope separation. In mid-career he switched to analysis of foreign nuclear weapons programs. This included the use of satellite imagery and other kinds of intelligence information. This led to becoming Director of the Remote Sensing Laboratory in Las Vegas, the premier nuclear emergency response and aerial measurements laboratory for image and radiation sensing in the USDOE. He later applied this knowledge for the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna as a Director for challenging nuclear inspections in Iraq and many other countries.
]]>by Derek Davison
American sanctions on Iran: what have they accomplished? There seems to be little dispute that the sanctions have hurt the Iranian economy, the oil revenues of which have been drastically cut, not to mention Iran’s double-digit inflation, and its lack of access to SWIFT, the network that facilitates [...]]]>
by Derek Davison
American sanctions on Iran: what have they accomplished? There seems to be little dispute that the sanctions have hurt the Iranian economy, the oil revenues of which have been drastically cut, not to mention Iran’s double-digit inflation, and its lack of access to SWIFT, the network that facilitates most of the world’s international banking transactions. The conventional wisdom, especially here in DC, is that the economic hardship imposed by these sanctions has led to the current negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, by creating the conditions under which moderate Hassan Rouhani could be elected president of Iran, or by forcing Rouhani to come to the negotiating table to get them eased, or both. Trita Parsi, President of the National Iranian-American Council (NIAC), opposed this notion in May, noting that Rouhani’s election was driven by a desire for reform and not by economic hardship, and that the resumption of talks was spurred by diplomatic overtures from Washington to Tehran. His argument is bolstered by Iran’s pursuit of a negotiated settlement with the United States years before the strongest nuclear sanctions were imposed.
Yet much of the DC foreign policy establishment, especially hawks and neoconservatives, has endorsed sanctioning Iran, in growing degrees, even while doubting the sanctions ability to get Iran to abandon its alleged nuclear aspirations. As the negotiations in Vienna get ever closer to the July 20 deadline imposed by last November’s Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), hardliners in Congress and the neocon establishment are insisting that there be no sanctions relief unless Iran not only dismantles its entire uranium enrichment apparatus, but also does away with its ballistic missile program, ends its “support for international terrorism,” and agrees to uniquely intrusive monitoring requirements for at least 20 years. If those demands, none of which can be acceptable to the Iranians, somehow didn’t scuttle the deal, the neocons would probably require an apology for the Battle of Thermopylae.
While some Iran hawks might prefer military action either instead of or in addition to the sanctions, others appear more concerned with punishing Iran — and, whether they want to or not, Iranians – than reducing the chances of military conflict. Indeed, just this week the Daily Beast’s Eli Lake wrote a sarcastic “Thanks Obama!” piece bemoaning and overemphasizing whatever slight improvement the JPOA’s easing of sanctions has spurred in Iran’s limping economy, based on a report by the neoconservative Foundation for Defense of Democracies, and Roubini Global economics. If US sanctions on Iran were indeed aimed at solving the conflict over its nuclear program through diplomacy rather than military force, then the tiny improvement in Iran’s economy following the interim nuclear deal should not be worrisome. Rather, it’s an indicator that incentives are more useful in achieving objectives than punishments; remember, the Iranians are still at the negotiating table where, slowly or not, progress is being made.
Everybody argues about what the sanctions have or have not done to Iran’s economy, but few seem interested in what they may be doing to America’s economy. That’s where a new report by NIAC, “Losing Billions: The Cost of Iran Sanctions to the U.S. Economy,” comes in. Using an economic model called the “gravity model of trade,” NIAC estimates that between 1995 and 2012 the US economy lost, at a minimum, between $134.7 and $175.3 billion in revenue that it could have earned via bilateral trade with Iran (the figures for several European countries are actually larger, relative to the size of their respective economies).
Using the US Department of Commerce’s calculations for the number of jobs created per additional billion dollars in exports, NIAC estimates that sanctions on Iran have cost the US somewhere between 51,043 and 66,436 job opportunities per year over the same period, on average. Any improvement in Iran’s economy over its real world 1995-2012 performance (which could be expected in the absence of sanctions) would push these estimates higher.
Though NIAC’s overarching point (sanctions on Iran have blown back on the US economy) is sound, there are reasons to be skeptical of their exact figures. The gravity model of trade predicts bilateral trade based on the size of the two economies and the distance between the two nations, just as the actual theory of gravity estimates the attraction between two bodies based on their masses and the distance between them. It also incorporates additional variables like past colonial relationships, contiguous borders between the two nations, and linguistic affinities. The report then compares Iran’s trade volume with other countries to estimate how much trade it would have done with America in the absence of sanctions. But Kimberly Elliott, co-author of one of the academic studies underpinning the gravity model, told Al-Monitor that this method doesn’t include the extent to which any lost trade between the US and Iran has been offset by increased trade between the US and other nations. The Brookings Institution’s Barry Bosworth also noted that the US has been a weak exporter in general for much of the period that NIAC was studying, and so the actual impact of sanctions on the US economy may be less than the theoretical impact. The estimates also don’t take into account the particular complications in the US-Iran relationship; Washington didn’t suddenly cut diplomatic and economic ties with Tehran in 1995, so assuming, as the study does, more-or-less normal trade relations between the two countries over the period 1995-2012 seems problematic. Even absent formal sanctions, it’s unlikely that American and Iranian trade ties would have been that close.
Complicating factors aside, there is no denying that American sanctions on Iran have had a drag effect on America’s economy. NIAC’s report not only reminds us of that easily-forgotten fact, it also puts the dollar figure of that drag into some kind of a ballpark. Though NIAC makes no explicit claim as to whether or not the sanctions were “worth it” in the sense that trading economic growth for (presumed) leverage over Iran’s nuclear program may (arguably) still have been the right course of action, the negotiators in Vienna ought to take into account the damage done to the US and European economies as a result of these policies, even if China and Russia don’t want them to.
Photo: Port Newark and Port Elizabeth container complex in New Jersey, near Newark International Airport.
]]>by Peter Jenkins
Last week an independent, cross-party commission of inquiry into UK nuclear weapons policy issued its report.
The commission (comprising three politicians, two diplomats, one field marshal and two academics) reviewed the arguments for and against the UK retaining nuclear weapons. They came, somewhat hesitantly, to the conclusion that [...]]]>
by Peter Jenkins
Last week an independent, cross-party commission of inquiry into UK nuclear weapons policy issued its report.
The commission (comprising three politicians, two diplomats, one field marshal and two academics) reviewed the arguments for and against the UK retaining nuclear weapons. They came, somewhat hesitantly, to the conclusion that on balance a UK strategic nuclear deterrent should be retained.
LobeLog readers may be most interested in the commission’s review of the global threat environment, which is based on a distinction between threats that are an argument for retaining a nuclear deterrent and threats that are not.
That review opens with an endorsement for the British government’s view that threats are a product of both capability and intent: “The Commission [agrees] that currently no state has both the intent to threaten our vital interests and the capability to do so with nuclear weapons.”
This reminder of the compound nature of nuclear threats is relevant to the US debate on Iran’s nuclear activities — relevant, indeed, to the negotiations that are ongoing in Vienna. A fixation on Iran’s growing nuclear capabilities seems to blind some to the fact that there is still no sign that Iran’s leaders intend to build and use nuclear weapons to threaten vital US interests.
The commission’s view is that an Iranian nuclear threat has yet to emerge and (by implication) is not bound to do so: “Any further development of a nuclear programme in Iran, were the current developments to take a turn for the worse, is not a reason on its own for Britain to retain a nuclear deterrent.”
The commission is equally sanguine about the potential for the four nuclear–armed states (Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea) to pose a threat that requires the retention of a nuclear deterrent. The commission is confident that neither India nor Pakistan will ever want to target the UK. They consider the UK’s strategic footprint in the Far East too small (what a change over the last 100 years!) for North Korea’s nuclear weapons to pose a substantial threat to the UK. Of Israel they write: “Israel’s nuclear arsenal does present a major challenge to regional arms control in the Middle East and to universalisation of the NPT, and as such is a difficult and critical obstacle to realising the essential global non-proliferation agenda. But it is no direct threat to the UK.”
These conclusions, together with the belief that strategic confrontation with China is highly unlikely, leave the commission contemplating only one possible threat as an argument for retention. In the commission’s view, recent events show that Russia is willing “to use the threat of military force…to shape the internal affairs of a sovereign country to conform to its desires.” This prompts the commission to the conclusion that NATO (and, by implication, Britain) should maintain a capacity to deter Russia from considering nuclear blackmail in pursuit of political objectives.
Following are three other arguments for retention, in the commission’s opinion:
- while the US Trident program dwarfs the British one, there would be a technical, scientific and economic impact on the US were the UK to pull out, and the US might resent that;
- the UK is explicitly committed to contributing to NATO security through its nuclear forces;
- the pursuit of a multilateral nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agenda is crucial to strengthening UK security; possession of nuclear forces allows the UK to retain influence over the other Nuclear Weapon States, and to encourage them to move towards the shared US/UK vision of a world free of nuclear weapons.
And here are four arguments that the commission dismisses:
- the UK’s international status would suffer were it to give up nuclear weapons;
- nuclear weapons can deter attacks by non-state actors, or chemical and biological weapon use by hostile states;
- nuclear weapons are needed as a general insurance against an uncertain future;
- nuclear weapons can serve as a “shield” for UK conventional forces to intervene out-of-area.
In reviewing industrial and budgetary considerations, the commission is more tentative. They recognize that several British communities have been dependent on the UK submarine industry for their viability, but they believe it would be wrong to allow this to be a decisive influence on a national security question. They find that capital expenditure on the Trident program, during the years when replacement submarines are being procured, will consume a quarter of the Defense Ministry’s capital projects budget, but they characterize this cost as “not prohibitive given the possible implications were the UK in future to face a nuclear-armed state.”
This last sentence suggests one flaw in the report. Though the commission is opposed to seeing a nuclear deterrent as insurance against uncertainty, their central argument can be reduced, irreverently, to: “We don’t really need it now, but it could come in handy one day.” Of course, this may be fitting: a majority of Britons would probably agree.
Photo: The HMS Victorious is the second Vanguard-class submarine of the Royal Navy. Victorious carries the Trident ballistic missile, the UK’s nuclear deterrent.
]]>by Derek Davison
The three key timelines at the center of the negotiations between world powers and Iran over its nuclear program were the subject of a panel discussion at the Wilson Center today. Jon Wolfsthal of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies spoke about the duration of a hypothetical comprehensive [...]]]>
by Derek Davison
The three key timelines at the center of the negotiations between world powers and Iran over its nuclear program were the subject of a panel discussion at the Wilson Center today. Jon Wolfsthal of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies spoke about the duration of a hypothetical comprehensive agreement, Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association (ACA) discussed Iran’s “breakout” period, and Robert Litwak of the Wilson Center talked about possible timeframes for sanctions relief.
While there may be flaws in the P5+1’s (US, UK, France, China, and Russia plus Germany) decision to make “breakout” their primary focus, it is that timeline, and specifically its uranium enrichment component, that dominates the negotiations and related policy debates. Uranium enrichment capacity is, according to Kimball, the “key problem” in terms of coming to a final agreement, given that more progress seems to have been made between the two parties on limiting the Arak heavy-water reactor’s plutonium production, and on more intensive inspection and monitoring mechanisms. He also discussed the contours of a deal that would allow Iran to begin operating “next generation” centrifuges, which enrich uranium far more efficiently than the older models currently being operated by the Iranians.
Kimball’s suggestion mirrored a new piece in the ACA’s journal by Princeton scholars Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian, Hossein Mousavian, and Frank von Hippel. They proposed a two-stage process for modernizing Iran’s enrichment technology and eventually finding a stable consensus on the enrichment issue. In the first stage, to last around five years, Iran could begin to replace its aging “first generation” centrifuges with more advanced “second generation” centrifuges so long as Iran’s overall enrichment capacity remains constant, and it would be able to continue research and development on more modern centrifuge designs so long as it permitted inspectors to verify that those more advanced centrifuges were not being installed. That five year period would also allow Iran and the international community time to work out a more permanent uranium enrichment arrangement, which could take the form of a regional, multi-national uranium enrichment consortium similar to Urenco, the European entity that handles enrichment for Britain and Germany.
As the authors note, Iran is one of only three non-nuclear weapon states (Brazil and Japan are the others) that operate their own enrichment programs, so the global trend seems to be moving in the direction of these multi-national enrichment consortiums. It is unclear if Iran would agree to this kind of framework, but this piece was co-authored by Mousavian, who has ties to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, suggesting that it could become acceptable to the Iranian government.
One major hurdle in the talks remains Iran’s desire, as noted by Kimball, to be able to fully fuel its Bushehr reactors with domestic enriched uranium by 2021, the year when its deal with Russia to supply fuel to Bushehr runs out. Fueling the Bushehr reactors alone would require vastly more enrichment capacity than the P5+1 would be able to accept, and Iran has plans for future reactors that it would presumably want to be able to fuel domestically as well. The P5+1 negotiators, and well-known non-proliferation organizations including ACA, argue that Iran can simply renew its fuel supply deal with Russia and thereby reduce its “need” for enriched uranium substantially. But from Iran’s perspective, domestic enrichment is its only completely reliable source of reactor fuel. Indeed, Russia has historically proven willing to renege on nuclear fuel agreements in the name of its own geopolitical prerogatives. Any final deal that relies on outside suppliers to reduce Iran’s enriched uranium requirements will have to account for Iranian concerns about whether or not those outside suppliers can be trusted. It’s possible that the kind of enrichment consortium described in the ACA piece will satisfy those concerns.
The other timelines in question, the overall duration of a deal and the phasing out of sanctions, spin off of the more fundamental debate over enrichment capacity, and both revolve around issues of trust. Wolfsthal argued that the P5+1 may require a deal that will last at least until Rouhani is out of office, in order to guard against any change in nuclear posture under the next presidential administration. In his discussion of sanctions relief, Litwak pointed to an even more fundamental question of trust: is Iran willing to believe (and, it should be added, can Iran believe) that the United States is prepared to normalize relations with the Islamic Republic and to stop making regime change the paramount goal of its Iran policy? If the answer is “yes,” then Iran may be willing to accept a more gradual, staged removal of sanctions in exchange for specific nuclear goals, which the P5+1 favors. If the answer is “no,” then Iran is likely to demand immediate sanctions relief at levels that may be too much, and too quick for the P5+1 to accept.
]]>by Derek Davison
The resurgence of “Salafi-jihadist” terrorist groups is once again at the forefront of national security thinking in Washington. A report released this week by the RAND Corporation, “A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of al Qa’ida and Other Salafi Jihadists,” explains why.
There were 20 active “Salafi-jihadist groups” around [...]]]>
by Derek Davison
The resurgence of “Salafi-jihadist” terrorist groups is once again at the forefront of national security thinking in Washington. A report released this week by the RAND Corporation, “A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of al Qa’ida and Other Salafi Jihadists,” explains why.
There were 20 active “Salafi-jihadist groups” around the world in 2001, according to Rand; last year this number was 49. In 2007 there were around 100 attacks around the world by al-Qaeda and affiliated groups; in 2013 there were over 900. The report offers many of the same dire assessments as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s (CEIP) May 30 conference, “Al-Qaeda Transformed,” which featured a talk by Georgetown professor and terrorism expert, Bruce Hoffman, titled “Al-Qaeda’s Curious Comeback.” Not only is the number of terrorist groups at unprecedented levels, but their geographic reach has expanded as well, particularly into Africa.
What explains this turn of events? The key lies in the word the CEIP used in the title of its conference: transformation. Al-Qaeda is no longer the single, hierarchical group that perpetrated the 9/11 attacks. That hierarchy still exists in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, but its direct role in carrying out terror attacks is negligible and its function is more an ideological totem than an active terror network. In its place is a network of local terror groups, who share a similar Salafi ideology and who to varying degrees have chosen to align themselves with al-Qaeda’s reputation or “brand.” These local groups may be directly affiliated with “core” al-Qaeda (like Syria’s Jabhat al-Nusra) or may share only the barest of connections (like Nigeria’s Boko Haram). But the overall result is a global, ideologically similar, collection of terrorist “franchises” that can exploit any local opportunity to expand their reach and capabilities. The Arab Spring, which was arguably a repudiation of violent Salafi extremism in favor of civil protest and reform movements, has actually enabled the rise and development of many of these local groups. It has led to lawless chaos and anti-government violence in places like Syria and eastern Libya, and Salafi terror groups have thrived in those conditions.
The other conclusion that can be drawn from this resurgence of Salafi terrorism, and the reemergence of al-Qaeda in its new, atomized form, is that the US’ “War on Terror” is failing. Every face of America’s counterterrorism policy has to be called into question, from the War in Afghanistan, to drone strikes (which have very likely created more terrorists than they killed), to the indefinite detention and torture of suspected terrorists (which have only served as rallying cries for terror groups).
Yes, America has managed to avoid another 9/11-style attack, but the decentralization of terror networks explains that as well. Al-Qaeda has always had two targets: the “far enemy” (America, the West) and the “near enemy” (hostile and/or secular governments in the Middle East). As al-Qaeda’s organization has decentralized, its local networks have refocused their attention on the “near enemy,” sparing America the brunt of their efforts. These regional al-Qaeda affiliates recruit new followers based on local conditions, to join a local fight. But the danger is that, as their capabilities grow, these locally focused groups will shift their attention to the far enemy. The fact that so many Salafi groups see a benefit to being connected to Al-Qaeda’s name, its cause, and its reputation shows that al-Qaeda’s core ideology still has resonance with potential recruits, so the chance that at least some of these affiliates will eventually take up Al-Qaeda’s fight against the West is not insignificant.
Both Hoffman and Rand suggest a number of policies to counter the rising Salafi tide. They range from direct US military action to countering Salafi propaganda online, to the increasingly popular idea of aiding Middle Eastern governments as they try to develop governing institutions, to improve their internal security situations, and to stabilize regions (eastern Libya, for example) that are currently outside government control. The latter is the focus of President Barack Obama’s newly proposed “Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund,” a $5 billion program aimed at training local security forces to respond to internal threats. While improving governance and security is a worthwhile goal in the abstract, these funds should not be misused. It’s a cliché to say, “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter,” but if US counterterrorism resources are used by authoritarian regimes to stifle legitimate political opposition, then this program, too, will only damage America’s reputation and work against its long-term national security goals.
After 9/11, George W. Bush informed Americans that “they [the terrorists] hate our freedoms.” That notion, ridiculous when it was first uttered, appears all the more ridiculous today, after we’ve watched Arabs, Iranians, and Turks take to the streets to fight — and in some cases die — for their personal freedom over the past five years. It is accordingly past time for the US to reckon with how its own policies have legitimized Salafi/Al-Qaeda propaganda about “the far enemy.” Drones, detention, and torture may well have created more terrorists than they’ve killed or otherwise prevented, but there is more to it than that. A foreign policy that supports Israel regardless of what Israel does to Palestinians trapped in Gaza or forced into Bantustans in the West Bank creates anti-US sentiment. When US weaponry, whether wielded by American forces or by American clients, is killing civilians in places like eastern Libya, Gaza, and Sinai, anti-US sentiment will increase. American patronage of authoritarian Middle Eastern regimes absolutely creates anti-American sentiment. That sentiment is what will allow currently localized terror networks to shift their attention from the enemy at home to America, the enemy abroad.
It’s easy to rattle sabers about “freedom” and “human rights” when the target has already been cast as the villain, so it’s no surprise that US foreign policy has emphasized these issues when it comes to Bashar al-Assad, or Saddam Hussein, or the Iranian clerical regime. But unless America embarks on some hard choices about holding its allies to the same standards it demands of its enemies, its reputation will continue to suffer. The Leahy Amendment, a 1997 law that requires the US to cut off aid to foreign security forces that are suspects of human rights violations, ought to force these hard choices, but it needs to be applied consistently rather than ignored when it becomes inconvenient (as in, for example, Bahrain). The US military establishment chafes against Leahy’s restrictions, arguing that it constrains them from aiding foreign militaries that are confronting potential threats to the US, but this criticism is short-sighted. It’s far better for US security in the long-term if it can avoid links to acts of oppression or violence perpetrated by authoritarian regimes.
When US actions contradict US rhetoric, it damages America’s stature in the world and gives more ammunition to the message of groups like al-Qaeda. Without the political willingness to frankly and honestly examine America’s role in the world and the impact of US policy choices, then Salafi terrorism in all its forms will remain a potential threat.
Photo: Sinai militia carrying al-Qaeda flags head for a funeral of killed militants on August 10, 2013. Credit: Hisham Allam/IPS.
]]>by Jim Lobe
While this blog is devoted to U.S. policy toward the Middle East, it should come as no surprise to regular readers that I regard climate change as likely to be the greatest challenge faced by the United States and the world over for the coming century and beyond.
[...]]]>by Jim Lobe
While this blog is devoted to U.S. policy toward the Middle East, it should come as no surprise to regular readers that I regard climate change as likely to be the greatest challenge faced by the United States and the world over for the coming century and beyond.
The most recent news, including the latest government report on how climate change is already impacting the United States, and the studies that came out three weeks ago regarding the apparently irreversible collapse of the West Antarctica ice sheet, clearly underline the rising stakes, not only from a strictly environmental point of view, but also with respect to national security. After all, as Tom Friedman and others have argued, the civil war in Syria owes much to the extended drought conditions that have prevailed in that country over the past decade and more, driving millions of mostly Sunni small farmers from the countryside into the big cities where they were unable to earn a decent living in fast-growing shanty towns that have mushroomed over that period. (Obviously, western-backed neoliberal economic policies and corruption didn’t help.) While that drought, like a similar phenomenon in central Mexico that has sent hundreds of thousands of people across international borders in search of work, may not be 100% provably attributable to global warming, there is sufficient consistency in the predictions by increasingly refined computer models developed by climatologists over decades to conclude that there is almost certainly a strong connection between the amount of carbon being pumped up into our atmosphere and these changes in weather patterns over significant swathes of our planet.
And, as the indefatigable Tom Engelhardt, in an essay about “climate change as a weapon of mass destruction“, requested of anyone in Wyoming to ask former Vice President Dick Cheney if they should happen to run into him:
How would he feel about acting preventively, if instead of a 1% chance that some country with weapons of mass destruction might use them against us, there was at least a 95% — and likely as not a 100% — chance of them being set off on our soil?
Of course, it’s Cheney and his neoconservative and right-wing friends (too often aided by liberal hawks like the Washington Post’s editorial board), who have consistently derided President Obama’s alleged timidity and failure to “lead” in foreign policy (by which they ordinarily mean using or threatening to use military force in dealing with any crisis). Indeed, just last week, in an interview with Fox News’ Sean Hannity, Cheney, who, next to George W. Bush, bears the greatest responsibility for the worst U.S. foreign policy debacle at least since the Vietnam War, remarked:
He’s a very, very weak president, maybe the weakest certainly in my lifetime. And I know from my own experience on a recent trip to the Middle East, spending several days talking with folks I’ve dealt with all the way back to Desert Storm, they all are absolutely convinced that the American capacity to lead and to influence events in that part of the world has been dramatically reduced by this president.
We’ve got a problem of weakness. It’s centered right in the White House.
This “weakness” is sometimes attributed by critics to Obama’s supposed left-wing worldview and/or naiveté. Arguing that Obama’s motivations are more cynical and political, others have noted its consistency with the general public’s allegedly “isolationist” tendencies and its disenchantment with the military “hammer”(that was used so promiscuously by Bush and Cheney), as expressed in countless surveys and polls.
In any event, this charge of Obama’s weakness, timidity, retreat, and lack of leadership has now become a neoconservative and Republican mantra repeated and recycled endlessly in the mass media as each new foreign policy challenge moves into the spotlight — from Benghazi to Beijing to Bergdahl. It has become the meta-narrative for analyzing Obama’s foreign policy, from which even many Democrats (watch Hillary Clinton carefully; it’s already out there that she opposed a deal to free Bergdahl) are now trying hard to distance themselves.
Of course, it is in this context that it’s important to ask how such a weak, timid, and “lead-from behind” president could also address climate change as he did earlier this week by taking executive action to curb emissions from coal-fired power plants — a move that appears to offer him no particular political advantage and may indeed prove counter-productive to his hopes of retaining Democratic control of the Senate. In his blog post at the National Interest, Paul Pillar, who, as National Intelligence Officer for the Middle East and South Asia, commissioned the pre-invasion study that predicted much of the fiasco that followed the Iraq invasion — only to be ignored by Cheney, Bush & Co. — was similarly struck by this apparent anomaly and wrote a blog post entitled “Leading from the Front on Carbon Dioxide.” It deserves more attention.
A constantly recurring theme in criticism of Mr. Obama’s foreign policy is that he allegedly is a weak leader, or when he leads does so only from behind. An action such as his recent move on power plant emissions highlights how such accusations, insofar as they are not just opposition for the sake of opposition, really aren’t about leadership at all but instead about disagreement on the substance of whatever issue is at hand.
Much criticism of the president has combined an image of him as a weak, stay-in-the-rear leader on foreign policy with a picture of an over-reaching, rule-flouting chief on domestic policy. Opponents will catalog the new rules on power plants in the latter category. Efforts to curb destructive emissions are ultimately a foreign policy problem, however, because Earth is a single planet with a single atmosphere. Pollution problems vary with the locale, and it may be sensible practical politics for the president to talk about respiratory problems among American children, but climate change is global. The heaviest lifting will involve getting China and other heavy polluters to do their part. It is a task as troubling and challenging as any that involve China using dashed lines on maps to make territorial claims.
The task is hard enough given the belief of developing countries that the United States and other Western nations already had their opportunity to develop and to become prosperous and to pollute with impunity as they did so. It would be discriminatory, according to this belief, for late developers to be subject for environmental reasons to more economic restraints than early ones. The least the United States can do, to keep this task from being any harder than it has to be, is to exercise leadership by setting an example and cleaning up its own act.
President Obama also gets criticized for playing small ball in foreign policy, a criticism he partly brings on himself by talking about hitting singles and doubles rather than home runs. Stopping climate change is not small ball. Saving the planet would be a home run. Small ball is played by those, Democrats as well as Republicans, who would rather talk about the health of the coal industry in Kentucky than about the health of the planet. And small ball is played by those who cannot or will not see beyond the powering of most of the world’s economy through any means other than burning what alternative energy guru Amory Lovins has called “the rotten remains of primeval swamp goo.”
Photo: The melting of Mexico’s Orizaba glacier is another consequence of global warming. Credit: Mauricio Ramos/IPS
]]>by Peter Jenkins
Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued a joint statement on May 21 to the effect that they had agreed on a further set of practical measures within the framework of their cooperation agreement reached November 11, 2013. The first two measures relate to IAEA [...]]]>
by Peter Jenkins
Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued a joint statement on May 21 to the effect that they had agreed on a further set of practical measures within the framework of their cooperation agreement reached November 11, 2013. The first two measures relate to IAEA concerns about a possible military dimension (PMD) to Iran’s nuclear program, the other three to Iran’s Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards agreement:
1) Exchanging information with the Agency with respect to the allegations related to the initiation of high explosives, including the conduct of large-scale high explosives experimentation in Iran.
(2) Providing mutually agreed relevant information and explanations related to studies made and/or papers published in Iran in relation to neutron transport and associated modelling and calculations and their alleged application to compressed materials.
3) Providing mutually agreed information and arranging a technical visit to a centrifuge research and development centre.
(4) Providing mutually agreed information and managed access to centrifuge assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops, and storage facilities, as well as concluding the safeguards approach for the IR-40 reactor.
The aim here is to complete implementation of these measures by Aug. 25, 2014. This is alsothe third of such sets. The first was announced on Nov. 11 of last year, the second on February 20.
The absence in Wednesday’s statement of any news about implementation of the Feb. 20 measures is almost certainly insignificant. The IAEA reported on implementation of the Nov. 11 measures in one of its quarterly reports on Iran to the IAEA Board of Governors. It can be inferred that the IAEA intends to report on the Feb. 20 measures in the quarterly report that will likely be issued some ten days before a June 2 meeting of the Board.
A particularly interesting feature of that report will be the IAEA’s findings in relation to the last of the Feb. 20 measures: “Providing information and explanations for the Agency to assess Iran’s stated need…for the development of Exploding Bridge Wire [EBW] detonators”.
Since February 22, 2008, if not earlier, the IAEA has believed that such detonators could “be relevant to nuclear weapon R&D”. Will Iran have succeeded in persuading the IAEA that its development of EBW detonators was for conventional military or even civil applications? “EBW detonators are the standard in virtually all conventional military applications and in the mining industry. There is a huge market for them. So characterising them as an indicator of a nuclear weapons program is odd” notes Robert Kelley, a nuclear weapons expert who has worked at the IAEA.
Items 1 and 2 in the new list are IAEA concerns first made public in the annex to GOV/2011/65 of November 8, 2011. In paragraph 57 of that annex, at the end of a section on the neutron initiation of nuclear explosions, the IAEA stated: “Given the importance of neutron generation and transport, and their effect on geometries containing fissile materials in the context of an implosion device, Iran needs to explain to the Agency its objectives and capabilities in this field”.
Paragraphs 47-51 of the same annex relate to alleged Iranian “hydrodynamic experiments”. They detail information made available to the IAEA by third parties; this information suggested that Iran had manufactured surrogate nuclear weapon components (not using fissile or nuclear material) and might have used those surrogates in high explosive experiments.
The fact that Iran is now ready to address these concerns is promising. It suggests a decision in Tehran to be more cooperative than in the past in resolving issues that have enabled Iran’s enemies to impute to Iran the blackest of nuclear intentions.
Nonetheless, it is to be seen whether the IAEA will be satisfied if Iran declines to provide answers that indicate a nuclear weapon connection — if, for instance, they point to a nuclear reactor connection. “Neutron transport is important in reactors as well as nuclear weapons,” remarks Kelley. Can the IAEA bring itself to accept answers that do not support the nuclear weapon accusations that have been leveled at Iran?
The last point to note about this week’s statement is the target completion date of Aug. 25. This is a reminder that the IAEA is pursuing its investigations into Iranian compliance with its NPT safeguards obligations, and alleged nuclear-related activities, in parallel with, but without any formal connection to the negotiations on which the US, Iran and five other powers have embarked pursuant to the November 24, 2013 Joint Plan of Action (JPOA).
It also suggests that the parties to this negotiation have agreed that the resolution of all PMD concerns is not a necessary precondition for agreeing the “comprehensive solution” envisaged in the JPOA, since the negotiation parties continue to hope that, despite recent difficulties, they can wrap up their work by July 20 or thereabouts.
. The first two measures relate to IAEA concerns about a possible military dimension (PMD) to Iran’s nuclear program, and the other three to Iran’s Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards agreement:
1) Exchanging information with the Agency with respect to the allegations related to the initiation of high explosives, including the conduct of large-scale high explosives experimentation in Iran.
(2) Providing mutually agreed relevant information and explanations related to studies made and/or papers published in Iran in relation to neutron transport and associated modelling and calculations and their alleged application to compressed materials.
3) Providing mutually agreed information and arranging a technical visit to a centrifuge research and development centre.
(4) Providing mutually agreed information and managed access to centrifuge assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops, and storage facilities, as well as concluding the safeguards approach for the IR-40 reactor.
The aim here is to complete implementation of these measures by Aug. 25, 2014. This is the third of such sets. The first was announced on Nov. 11 of last year, the second on February 20.
The absence in Wednesday’s statement of any news about implementation of the Feb. 20 measures is almost certainly insignificant. The IAEA reported on implementation of the Nov. 11 measures in one of its quarterly reports on Iran to the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2014/10 of 20 February 2014). It can be inferred that the IAEA intends to report on the Feb. 20 measures in the quarterly report that will likely be issued some ten days before a June 2 meeting of the Board.
A particularly interesting feature of that report will be the IAEA’s findings in relation to the last of the Feb. 20 measures: “Providing information and explanations for the Agency to assess Iran’s stated need…for the development of Exploding Bridge Wire [EBW] detonators”. Since February 22, 2008 (GOV/2008/4), if not earlier, the IAEA has believed that such detonators could “be relevant to nuclear weapon R&D”. Will Iran have succeeded in persuading the IAEA that its development of EBW detonators was for conventional military or even civil applications? “EBW detonators are the standard in virtually all conventional military applications and in the mining industry. There is a huge market for them. So characterizing them as an indicator of a nuclear weapons program is odd” notes Robert Kelley, a nuclear weapons expert who has worked at the IAEA.
Items 1 and 2 in the new list are IAEA concerns first made public in the annex to GOV/2011/65 of November 8, 2011.
In paragraph 57 of that annex, at the end of a section on the neutron initiation of nuclear explosions, the IAEA stated: “Given the importance of neutron generation and transport, and their effect on geometries containing fissile materials in the context of an implosion device, Iran needs to explain to the Agency its objectives and capabilities in this field”.
Paragraphs 47-51 of the same annex relate to alleged Iranian “hydrodynamic experiments”. They detail information made available to the IAEA by third parties; this information suggested that Iran had manufactured surrogate nuclear weapon components (not using fissile or nuclear material) and might have used those surrogates in high explosive experiments.
The fact that Iran is now ready to address these concerns is promising. It suggests a decision in Tehran to be more cooperative than in the past in resolving issues that have enabled Iran’s enemies to impute to Iran the blackest of nuclear intentions.
Nonetheless, it is to be seen whether the IAEA will be satisfied if Iran declines to provide answers that indicate a nuclear weapon connection — if, for instance, they point to a nuclear reactor connection. “Neutron transport is important in reactors as well as nuclear weapons,” remarks Kelley. Can the IAEA bring itself to accept answers that do not support the nuclear weapon accusations that have been leveled at Iran?
The last point to note about this week’s statement is the target completion date of Aug. 25. This is a reminder that the IAEA is pursuing its investigations into Iranian compliance with its NPT safeguards obligations, and alleged nuclear-related activities, in parallel with, but without any formal connection to the negotiations on which the US, Iran and five other powers have embarked pursuant to the November 24, 2013 Joint Plan of Action (JPOA).
It also suggests that the parties to this negotiation have agreed that the resolution of all PMD concerns is not a necessary precondition for agreeing the “comprehensive solution” envisaged in the JPOA, since the negotiation parties continue to hope that, despite recent difficulties, they can wrap up their work by July 20 or thereabouts.
Photo: IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano meett with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javed Zarif at IAEA headquarters in Vienna on February 18 on the margins of the nuclear-related talks between Iran and world powers. Credit: Dean Calma/IAEA
]]>by Derek Davison
As talks aimed at a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran continue, with principals from Iran and world powers meeting in Vienna this week, two recent analyses of the negotiations have compared the talks to a “Rubik’s Cube.”
A May 9 report from the International Crisis Group [...]]]>
by Derek Davison
As talks aimed at a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran continue, with principals from Iran and world powers meeting in Vienna this week, two recent analyses of the negotiations have compared the talks to a “Rubik’s Cube.”
A May 9 report from the International Crisis Group (ICG) entitled, “Iran and the P5+1: Solving the Nuclear Rubik’s Cube,” offers 40 recommended action items that Iran and the P5+1 (the US, UK, France, China and Russia plus Germany) could agree to implement in a comprehensive deal. Today the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) also held a panel discussion called, coincidentally, “The Rubik’s Cube of a Final Iran Deal,” moderated by Colin Kahl, the top Middle East policy official at the Defense Department for most of Obama’s first term, and featuring Robert Einhorn, who served as the State Department’s special advisor on non-proliferation and arms control until less than a year ago, Joe Cirincione, the president of the Ploughshares Fund, and Alireza Nader, an Iran expert at the RAND Corporation.
There’s a clear sense in both analyses that a deal is reachable. Cirincione rightly pointed out at the USIP event that the current talks are “the closest we’ve come to an agreement, ever,” and predicted that “absent some unforeseen event, we are going to get a deal.” Indeed, the very existence of something like the ICG report, a specific and detailed look at what a deal might actually contain, would have appeared presumptuous even six months ago but now seems very reasonable given the progress that has already been made.
However, optimism aside, a great deal of work still needs to be done before a deal can be finalized. The level of detail contained in the ICG report speaks to the complexity involved in the negotiations. The ICG recommends, for example, an immediate cap on Iranian uranium enrichment of 6400 Separative Work Units (SWU, a measurement of enrichment capacity that incorporates both the number and technological advancement of operational centrifuges) per year, which is a steep cut from Iran’s current 9000 SWU/year capacity (that Iran sees as already too low), and one that the Iranians may be unwilling to make. That cap would then be lifted, over 8-10 years, to around 19,000 SWU/year, an increase that could theoretically reduce the time it would take Iran to manufacture a nuclear weapon if it chose to pursue that goal. Of course, it remains to be seen whether Iran and the P5+1 would agree to those terms.
The ICG framed its recommendations around four points:
- constraining any Iranian capacity to build a nuclear weapon;
- implementing a stringent monitoring and verification system on Iran’s nuclear program,
- establishing concrete negative consequences for a breach of the deal by either side;
- and establishing positive consequences for compliance.
But the ICG’s recommendations, and the discussion on the USIP panel, make it very clear that these objectives will be difficult to meet in a way that satisfies both parties. The two sides disagree on even basic elements of the talks; as Kahl explained, the Iranian government rejects the P5+1’s continued focus on Iranian “breakout capacity” because it has officially sworn off of any military application of its nuclear program. The P5+1 does not accept those assurances, but Iran also has legitimate questions as to why other countries with civilian nuclear programs have not been subject to the same requirements that Iran has faced.
The USIP panel seemed to reach a general consensus that the biggest remaining hurdles to a comprehensive deal revolve around Iran’s uranium enrichment program. This includes both Iran’s capacity for enrichment and the amount of enriched uranium it will be allowed to stockpile; the level of access that Iran will permit to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its inspectors; and the timing of and conditions for sanctions relief.
The P5+1 are seeking to maximize the limits on Iran’s nuclear program and the IAEA’s access to Iranian nuclear sites while maintaining sanctions at a high level for a considerable period of time, perhaps decades. Iran, obviously, is seeking the opposite – minimal limits on its nuclear program in return for considerable sanctions relief and only a short period in which its program is subject to international monitoring. As the ICG report put it, “it would appear that the P5+1’s maximum — in terms of both what it considers a tolerable residual Iranian nuclear capability and the sanctions relief it is willing to provide — falls short of Iran’s minimum.”
The single biggest complication to these talks is the utter lack of trust on both sides. As Nader argued, mutual trust is not a requirement for success and the lack of trust can be worked around with stringent inspections requirements and firm commitments to agreed-upon sanctions relief. But that lack of trust adds considerable complexity and difficulty to the negotiations. Iran is ultimately being asked to prove a negative, that it has no nuclear weapons program, and because the P5+1 do not trust Iran to uphold its promises, demands for monitoring requirements and caps on nuclear capacity may simply be too much for Iran to accept.
This is particularly true given a domestic political environment that Nader termed “poisonous,” with Iranian hardliners increasingly concerned about President Hassan Rouhani’s commitment to protecting Iran’s interests in these negotiations, and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s support for the talks vulnerable to shifting political winds.
Iran will also have difficulty trusting the P5+1 to uphold its end of a deal to reduce sanctions assuming that Iran meets, and continues to meet, its obligations. Indeed, Cirincione pointed out today out that western banks, fearful of running afoul of sanctions laws, have still not released the Iranian assets that were unfrozen under the terms of last November’s “Joint Plan of Action.” The challenge of getting a final deal through a potentially hostile US Congress, particularly in an election year, could also give Iran reason for concern.
Yet failed talks could be disastrous for both sides, according to the ICG. Failure now would make another attempt at negotiations very unlikely, would result in new punitive measures against Iran (including new sanctions on an already sputtering economy, and potential military strikes on Iranian nuclear sites), and could ultimately push Tehran to rush for a nuclear weapon, something which everyone, including Iran, says they don’t want.
]]>The Iran experts at the Rand Corporation, including Alireza Nader, who has written for LobeLog, are always worth reading. That’s why Iran-watchers like me can willfully spend part of a slow-news Friday reading a Rand report on what regional responses to a final deal with Iran over [...]]]>
The Iran experts at the Rand Corporation, including Alireza Nader, who has written for LobeLog, are always worth reading. That’s why Iran-watchers like me can willfully spend part of a slow-news Friday reading a Rand report on what regional responses to a final deal with Iran over its nuclear program might look like. The video I’ve included above includes discussion on some of the report’s main points and you can read the entire report below or download it on Rand’s website. I was particularly interested in the part on how Israel may react.
[gview file="http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE122/RAND_PE122.pdf"]
]]>by Derek Davison
The CIA and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) have been embroiled for several weeks in a dispute over the declassification of a sweeping Senate report, the product of an investigation into the George W. Bush-era CIA’s so-called “enhanced interrogation” program. The SSCI’s chair, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), has accused the CIA of [...]]]>
by Derek Davison
The CIA and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) have been embroiled for several weeks in a dispute over the declassification of a sweeping Senate report, the product of an investigation into the George W. Bush-era CIA’s so-called “enhanced interrogation” program. The SSCI’s chair, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), has accused the CIA of removing documents related to the investigation from the committee’s computers, and of attempting to intimidate committee staffers by requesting a Justice Department review into how the committee was able to obtain an internal CIA review of the program. Now, as the White House and CIA review the SSCI report for declassification, its major findings have been leaked to the public, and they reveal that the CIA’s use of enhanced interrogation techniques, and the conditions under which it held its detainees, were “brutal and far worse than the agency communicated to policymakers.”
While the public still does not know what the committee’s report says (the committee voted 11-3 on April 3 to declassify its executive summary and conclusions, but the CIA and White House must conduct a final review before it can be released), members of the committee have talked openly about its findings. Senator John McCain said that the report “confirms…that the cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of prisoners is not only wrong in principle and a stain on our country’s conscience, but also an ineffective and unreliable means of gathering intelligence.” Defenders of the program, like Fox News contributor Liz Cheney, argue that it produced important intelligence that helped the United States to thwart terrorist plots and to degrade Al-Qaeda’s capacity to sponsor further attacks, but what we know of the findings of the SSCI report contradicts that argument. Not that it should matter; any debate over the enhanced interrogation program must, as Vincent Warren of the Center for Constitutional Rights has argued, reckon the morality of torture, not its effectiveness.
It is torture that we’re talking about, euphemisms like “enhanced interrogation” aside. In a remarkable editorial in the April 11 Washington Post, former contract interrogator Eric Fair described what he saw and did during his time in Iraq:
In April 2004 I was stationed at a detention facility in Fallujah. Inside the detention facility was an office. Inside the office was a small chair made of plywood and two-by-fours. The chair was two feet tall. The rear legs were taller than the front legs. The seat and chair back leaned forward. Plastic zip ties were used to force a detainee into a crouched position from which he could not recover. It caused muscle failure of the quads, hamstrings and calves. It was torture.
Fair concludes that the “stain” of the torture program demands a full accounting, for the sake of the nation as well as those who participated in the program directly.
History tells us that we should not be surprised by the Obama administration’s reluctance to fully investigate allegations of wrongdoing by its predecessor. Barack Obama made it very clear, even before he took office, that he preferred to “look forward as opposed to looking backward” when it came to the subject of investigating potential Bush administration crimes, and he has adhered to that position over the past five-plus years.
Obama is not the first president to turn a blind eye to possible transgressions by a former administration. The obvious example of this phenomenon was Gerald Ford’s decision to pardon Richard Nixon for any crimes related to the Watergate scandal, in 1974. But Ford had been Nixon’s Vice-President, making his act somewhat understandable. Bill Clinton’s decision not to investigate alleged crimes that took place under the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations was, as Robert Parry notes, motivated by the same desire to focus on advancing his own agenda, to “look forward as opposed to looking backward,” which Obama intimated as president-elect.
While it may behoove a particular administration to avoid the appearance of vindictiveness toward previous administrations, the decision not to investigate something as pernicious as the officially sanctioned torture of prisoners sacrifices the US’ credibility in the long run. It should not go unnoticed, for example, that while the US Ambassador to Kosovo is urging that nation to conduct a tribunal over the issue of organ trafficking by Kosovar Albanian militias in order to “build up its international credibility,” two branches of the US government are openly at odds over whether to even publicly acknowledge the past abuses of our “interrogation” program. It probably doesn’t go unnoticed that while the US refuses to reckon with its abuse of detainees, it is also refusing to issue a visa to Iran’s newly appointed UN Ambassador on the grounds that he was a background participant in the 1979 takeover of the US embassy in Tehran (he’s now part of Iran’s “reformist” camp). If the US can’t honestly reflect on its own past, how does it have the standing to demand the same of other nations?
The CIA’s resistance to a candid assessment of its torture program, even under an administration that firmly and officially disavowed that program upon taking office, speaks to an overall unwillingness to face accountability for any excesses wrought by the US’ ongoing “War on Terror.” While the Senate has investigated the failures in pre-war intelligence that led to the Iraq War, there has been no consequence to anyone involved in those failures. It is safe to say that there will be no consequences for anyone involved in the torture program as well, given the Obama administration’s deference to CIA efforts to stonewall even the release of a report detailing what actually took place.
It is impossible to imagine, then, that any future administration will have any interest in reckoning with other morally and legally questionable national security policies of this period, like the use of drones or the enlargement of the surveillance state. When it comes to the “War on Terror,” the rule seems to be “what’s past is past.”
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