by Jasmin Ramsey
On Saturday Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, who now heads the country’s nuclear negotiating file, said Iran expects a new proposal from the 6-world power p5+1 negotiating team. “The previous plan given to Iran belongs to history and they must enter talks with a new point of view,”
by Jasmin Ramsey
On Saturday Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, who now heads the country’s nuclear negotiating file, said Iran expects a new proposal from the 6-world power p5+1 negotiating team. “The previous plan given to Iran belongs to history and they must enter talks with a new point of view,” said Zarif during an interview with Iranian state TV on Saturday. Zarif recently returned to Tehran from New York where he had a historic 30-minute private meeting with Secretary of State John Kerry on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly (UNGA). The Iranian delegation’s trip was generally well-received domestically and the US-Iran meeting aroused a substantial amount of optimism almost everywhere about upcoming nuclear talks slotted for Oct. 15-16 in Geneva, Switzerland.
For its part, the United States has repeatedly stated that it wants a response from Iran to the proposal put forward by the P5+1 in Almaty in February. Kerry reiterated this today. And while Kerry and Zarif were cordial in New York, the proximity of the Geneva talks means that we’re now going to see much more hardened rhetoric from both sides — which shouldn’t necessarily be taken at face value.
“Kerry appears to reject Iran’s call for new nuclear proposal” blares a Washington Post headline from today, leading from a quote from Kerry’s joint press conference with his Russian counterpart in Bali, Indonesia. Of course, Kerry, who will now be directly involved in the negotiating process, like Zarif, can’t be expected to reveal any hope he may have about the new round of talks, which will involve a new Iranian negotiating team. Indeed, according to Iran analyst Reza Marashi, a lot of what we’re going to hear and see ahead of the talks will be political posturing.
“Both sides are trying to assign responsibility to the other so if things take a turn for the worst there’s less culpability and responsibility,” Marashi, who formerly worked at the State Department’s Iran desk, told LobeLog. “There’s probably enough private communication between the two sides so that nobody walks blind into Geneva, and Secretary Kerry and Dr. Zarif’s meeting in New York was a good example of that, but nobody wants the ball in their court at this point,” he said. “We’ve seen this sort of thing in the run-up to each round of talks.”
]]>Zbigniew Brzezinski, Iran should be key topic at hearings: The former National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter urges the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to include a discussion about the implications of a “self-generated” war with Iran during its upcoming hearing. Key paragraph:
It follows that a failure to reach a satisfactory negotiated solution with Iran [...]]]>
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Iran should be key topic at hearings: The former National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter urges the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to include a discussion about the implications of a “self-generated” war with Iran during its upcoming hearing. Key paragraph:
It follows that a failure to reach a satisfactory negotiated solution with Iran should not be viewed as the trigger for a new U.S.-initiated war that is not likely to be confined just to Iran. A more prudent and productive course for the United States would be to continue the painful sanctions against Iran while formally adopting for the Middle East the same policy that for decades successfully protected America’s European and Asian allies against the much more dangerous threats emanating from Stalinist Russia and lately from nuclear-armed North Korea. An Iranian military threat aimed at Israel or any other U.S. friend in the Middle East would be treated as if directed at the United States itself and would precipitate a commensurate U.S. response.
Seyed Hossein Mousavian and Mohammad Ali Shabani, How to Talk to Iran: The Iranian perspective provided by a former lead Iranian negotiator (now at Princeton) and a SOAS doctorale candidate. Any deal with Iran needs to offer Iran a face-saving way out, they argue:
While Tehran views a deal on its nuclear program as being in its self-interest, Western leaders need to grasp that it would be devastating for Iran’s aberu to take the first step solely in exchange for promises. The dominant discourse in Tehran portrays the 2004 decision by the former Iranian president Mohammad Khatami to suspend uranium enrichment on a voluntary, temporary basis as a failure because it resulted only in humiliating calls by the West for an indefinite suspension. The moral of this narrative is that placing maslahat above aberu, even temporarily, leads to nothing good.
Trita Parsi, Is A Deal With Iran In The Offing?: The Iran expert, whose book, A Single Roll of the Dice – Obama’s Diplomacy with Iran topped Foreign Affairs’ Best Books of 2012 on the Middle East list, describes the motivation behind the US-led Iran sanctions regime in his analysis of whether a deal is possible this year:
…the deal must not just prevent a nuclear weapon in Iran, it must also put Iran “back into its place” within the regional pecking order. While acceptance of limited enrichment in Iran opens the way for a nuclear deal, strangulating sanctions are deemed necessary to remind Tehran and other regional powers who is the de facto hegemon in the region—and who isn’t.
Reza Marashi, Step by Step with Iran: The former Iran desk state department staffer and analyst argues that a step-by-step process based on reciprocity provides a framework for the least bad option for both sides of the Iranian nuclear spectrum:
Tehran would stop enriching to the 20 percent level; ship out its stockpile of corresponding uranium to a mutually agreed-upon third-party country; shut down its Fordow facility; and reduce its existing stockpile of low-enriched uranium below the level needed for any possibility of weaponization. In turn, Washington would suspend key banking sanctions, back a suspension of the EU oil embargo, and freeze new sanctions initiatives. Under this arrangement, both sides are trading an equal number of concessions, which in turn builds trust, buys time for negotiations to continue, and helps disarm spoilers in Washington, Tehran, Tel Aviv, Brussels and Riyadh.
Joe Klein, Obama’s Next Foreign Policy Battle: The TIME political columnist sums up how the battle over Chuck Hagel’s nomination as Secretary of Defense factors in to the tug-of-war between Israel lobby groups in the US and the President and his allies:
And then there’s Iran. A nuclear deal may be negotiated this year. The Iranians are suffering economically; there are indications that they are ready to talk. But any such deal will be vehemently opposed by Netanyahu and the neoconservatives. The Hagel nomination, if it comes, will be the warm-up act for those battles. It is a fight that would send an important message about the President’s intentions–to Iran, to Israel and to the out-of-touch leaders of the American Jewish community.
Eskandar Sadeghi-Boroujerdi, Former Supreme National Security Chief: Crass talk is not foreign policy: The title says it all. A key quote from a former Chief of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council:
“It is not clear whether the actions that have been undertaken in these last couple of years were engagement or confrontation. If we want to have a role in global decision making, we must in reality choose engagement…Let’s define “offensive”; “offensive” means an action we undertake which doesn’t allow the enemy to implement his plan against us or a conspiracy he wants to commit against us, and we move one step”.
David Axe, Iran Unveils Copycat Arsenal: The Danger Room’s military correspondent provides a rundown of Iran’s makeshift though still potentially dangerous weapons arsenal:
]]>But that doesn’t mean all of Tehran’s weapons suck. Far from it. While some of the sillier Iranian gear is obviously meant mostly for fleeting propaganda purposes, the main hardware is grounded in experience and hardship. Driven by desperation and shaped by the isolation that comes with widening external sanctions, Tehran’s copycat arsenal could contain a few nasty surprises for the U.S. and its allies in the unlikely event that tensions over Iran’s nuclear program come to blows.
Former Iran-desk State Department staffer Reza Marashi and journalist Sahar Namazikhah remind us that Iran’s influnetial Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) has publicly recognized the benefits of negotiating with the US to avert a military conflict through a report that’s available on their website. “To that end, the Intelligence Ministry [...]]]>
Former Iran-desk State Department staffer Reza Marashi and journalist Sahar Namazikhah remind us that Iran’s influnetial Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) has publicly recognized the benefits of negotiating with the US to avert a military conflict through a report that’s available on their website. “To that end, the Intelligence Ministry can play a role in planting ideas within the minds of Iran’s top decision-makers,” write Marashi and Namazikhah, adding that the MOIS report directly “articulates why President Obama is different than Israel”:
The primary obstacle? According to the MOIS, it is Israel – but not for the reasons many might assume. Rather than ideology, Iran’s Intelligence Ministry sees geopolitics as the driving force: “[Israel is concerned that] the balance of power in the region will be against the Zionist regime” and it therefore “considers enrichment a threat to its national security and wants to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities”.
The way that Iran’s Intelligence Ministry distinguishes between Obama and Israel is important. As a key source of information in the Iranian system, the MOIS has said that Obama shows he is not willing to rush into war – and it has given him de facto credit for it. To that end, policymakers in Washington should carefully study this publication as a potential opening from Iran.
Gary Sick, an acute observer of US-Iranian relations for more than three decades who served on the National Security Council staff under president Ford, Carter and Reagan, meanwhile argues that the path to middle east peace goes through Tehran. But even if conditions are ripe for a serious attempt at reaching a deal — which President Obama seems interested in – both sides will need to make concessions:
The United States and its allies will have to accept a measure of Iranian domestic enrichment of uranium. Iran will have to accept limits on its entire nuclear infrastructure, subject to intrusive inspections and monitoring. Iran will need to document the history of its nuclear program, and the West will need to remove sanctions. All of this must happen in a step-by-step process with safeguards and verifications at each stage.
Writing in Al-Monitor, Banafsheh Keynoush argues that Iran’s hardliners are ready to engage, but won’t submit without serious incentives. Indeed, as Iran scholar Farideh Farhi points out, the key to moving the diplomatic process forward and avoiding a military conflict is flexibility on both sides:
]]>Unless Khamenei and company are given a way out of the mess they have taken Iran into (with some help from the US and company), chances are that we are heading into a war in the same way we headed to war in Iraq. A recent Foreign Affairs article by Ralf Ekeus, the former executive chairman of the UN special Commission on Iraq, and Malfrid-Braut hegghammer, is a good primer on how this could happen.
The reality is that the current sanctions regime does not constitute a stable situation. First, the instability (and instability is different from regime change as we are sadly learning in Syria) it might beget is a constant force for policy re-evaluation on all sides (other members of the P5+1 included). Second, maintaining sanctions require vigilance while egging on the sanctioned regime to become more risk-taking in trying to get around them. This is a formula for war and it will happen if a real effort at compromise is not made. Inflexibility will beget inflexibility.
George Washington Political Science Professor Mark Lynch in Foreign Policy:
With military action in the background but not imminent, and sanctions taking a real political and economic toll inside of Iran, now seems to be the right time to begin a serious effort at real talks with Iran over [...]]]>
George Washington Political Science Professor Mark Lynch in Foreign Policy:
With military action in the background but not imminent, and sanctions taking a real political and economic toll inside of Iran, now seems to be the right time to begin a serious effort at real talks with Iran over its nuclear program — and to be prepared to take yes for an answer.
Roya Boroumand, the executive director of the Iranian human rights-focused Abdorrahman Boroumand Foundation, for the Huffington Post:
But there is still hope. Today, unlike the immediate post-revolutionary years, the Iranian leaders are concerned about their image abroad. They also respond to their critics and deny the routine violation of their obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Since 1975, Iran is bound by the ICCPR, which set forth the rights and freedoms essential to an open, safe and pluralistic political system where citizens can be heard and determine their own destiny.
For too many years, the international community, including the United States, has dealt with Iran’s nuclear ambitions and its use of violence in foreign policy independently from the abysmal human rights situation inside the country. It is time for a long-term strategy that would seriously challenge the leadership by shifting the focus to their human rights record, the non-representative nature of Iran’s political system and on the rights of citizens to organize and express themselves.
Former senior State Department intelligence analyst, Greg Thielmann, in Arms Control Now:
Any successful solution to the Iran nuclear crisis will have to include Iran’s agreement to again abide by the terms of the Additional Protocol, if not to grant even wider access to IAEA inspectors. As former IAEA Deputy Director General Olli Heinonen stated in an October 31 email exchange with the author, “[the Additional Protocol] will be indispensable in understanding [Iran’s] enrichment and heavy water programs…”
Various Iranian officials have suggested a willingness to accept the Additional Protocol if Iran’s right to enrichment is made clear. Endorsement of the Additional Protocol by Iraq, one of Iran’s few friendly neighbors, should help to increase pressure on Iran to do likewise.
Iran scholar and Lobe Log contributor, Farideh Farhi:
Unless Khamenei and company are given a way out of the mess they have taken Iran into (with some help from the US and company), chances are that we are heading into a war in the same way we headed to war in Iraq. A recent Foreign Affairs article by Ralf Ekeus, the former executive chairman of the UN special Commission on Iraq, and Malfrid-Braut hegghammer, is a good primer on how this could happen.
The reality is that the current sanctions regime does not constitute a stable situation. First, the instability (and instability is different from regime change as we are sadly learning in Syria) it might beget is a constant force for policy re-evaluation on all sides (other members of the P5+1 included). Second, maintaining sanctions require vigilance while egging on the sanctioned regime to become more risk-taking in trying to get around them. This is a formula for war and it will happen if a real effort at compromise is not made. Inflexibility will beget inflexibility.
Former chief analyst of the CIA’s Counter-terrorism Center, Paul Pillar, in the National Interest:
On that all-preoccupying matter involving Iran’s nuclear program, the Iranians have given ample indication of flexibility on restricting their enrichment of uranium and on much else. But they would be foolish to make unilateral concessions with no prospect of getting anything in return on matters of importance to them.
When someone seems to be adhering to a position that ought not to be a vital interest to them, we should not make the mistake of interpreting this as a mark of obduracy and unreasonableness. More likely it means they are willing to bargain.
Also for the Huffington Post, Reza Marashi and Trita Parsi of the National Iranian American Council:
]]>Both Tehran and Washington have realized that their opening offers this past summer were non-starters. Iran wanted all sanctions lifted before it would begin limiting its enrichment program. American sought Iranian concessions upfront only to offer sanctions relief at the very end of the step-by-step process. Moreover, “going small” — that is, demanding less of Iran in order to justify the absence of sanctions relief — was politically unfeasibly.
This gave birth to the idea of ‘Going Big’ — circumventing the politically tricky sequencing and instead putting everything on the table. But somehow, ‘Going Big’ was mysteriously linked to an ultimatum. If the Iranians did not agree to our last (and first) big offer, there would be war.
This would be a serious mistake that would guarantee war. While going bigger may be necessary to reach an agreement, we can’t get a big offer right through a single attempt. If the Iranians presented a big offer to the P5+1 — “or else,” the world would rightly reject it and see it as an attempt to justify Iranian intransigence.
Similarly, Tehran — and the world — will view any US ultimatum as an attempt to create a path towards war. Diplomacy should help avoid war, not lay the groundwork for it.
The Guardian is reporting that a ”reformulated” proposal including “limited sanctions relief” will be launched by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (p5+1) after the US presidential election.
Earlier this week Al-Monitor reported along the same lines and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made
The Guardian is reporting that a ”reformulated” proposal including “limited sanctions relief” will be launched by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (p5+1) after the US presidential election.
Earlier this week Al-Monitor reported along the same lines and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made similar general comments. But according to Reza Marashi, a former Iran-desk State Department staffer, we’ll have to wait and see if the comments result in substantial changes on the part of the negotiating powers.
“The rhetoric we’re hearing from these unnamed U.S. and EU officials is positive, and it should be both praised and reinforced,” Marashi told Lobe Log. “But as we’ve learned over the past four years, actions speak louder than words for officials in Washington, Brussels and Tehran.”
Marashi noted that Western officials had already recognized the need for offering Iran a deal that it could sell at home “but domestic political realities forced the U.S. to move the goalposts.” If there is to be any real progress, it will happen after the US presidential election on November 6th. According to Marashi, “until then both sides recognize the need for better PR. We’re already seeing this on Iran’s end with Foreign Minister Salehi.”
“Both sides are spending political capital to shape the narrative in case talks fail, rather than spending the necessary political capital to ensure talks succeed,” he said.
Ever since negotiations resumed and began heading downhill this year, analysts have been saying that a successful deal requires sanctions relief to also be on the table. In July, former top CIA analyst Paul Pillar explained why the “Nothing-But-Pressure Fallacy” is doomed to fail if an acceptable deal for both sides is the objective:
…And the story of stasis in the nuclear talks is also pretty simple. The Iranians have made it clear they are willing to make the key concession about no longer enriching uranium at the level that has raised fears about a “break-out” capability in return for sanctions relief. But the P5+1 have failed to identify what would bring such relief, instead offering only the tidbit of airplane parts and the vaguest of suggestions that they might consider some sort of relief in the future. The Iranians are thus left to believe that heavy pressure, including sanctions, will continue no matter what they do at the negotiating table, and that means no incentive to make more concessions.
But success from the declared US perspective (that is, verifiable moves from Iran showing that it will not build a nuclear weapon) also depends on what kind of, as well as how much sanctions relief is offered (consider George Perkovich’s comment at the end of Chris McGreal’s report); Iranian acceptance of the notion that the US will not seek regime change once Iran makes serious concessions; what Iran is willing and able to do to prove good and true intentions; and who is running the show in Iran and the US when the new deal is offered.
Regarding the last two points: sources say that this SPIEGEL interview with Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi where he implies that Iran could halt 20% enrichment (a major p5+1 requirement) in exchange for a guaranteed fuel supply echoes previous statements that Iranian officials have been making for quite some time. Iran-watchers have also been speculating that the country’s hardline leaders will not allow Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to achieve any diplomatic successes while he is in office and any deal is therefore only possible following his exit in June 2013.
Meanwhile, Jim reports for IPS News that earlier this week Republican Sen. Lindsay Graham said he is working on a new Congressional resolution which he hopes to pass in any lame-duck session after the Nov. 6 elections that would promise Israel U.S. support, including military assistance, if it attacks Iran. And after the new Congress convenes in January, Sen. Graham suggested he would push yet another resolution that would give the president – whether the incumbent, Obama, or his Republican challenger, Mitt Romney – broad authority to take military action if sanctions don’t curb Iran’s nuclear programme.
Not to mention the fact that while Iran’s economy and people continue to struggle under the weight of sanctions, the US and EU are piling more on, making the Iranian hope of an end to sanctions and the domestic suffocation at home, seem like a far away dream.
]]>Former Iran-desk State Department staffer Reza Marashi and Iran scholar Reza Sanati write that after more than 3 decades of “institutionalized enmity”, damaging myths perpetuated by both sides have “facilitated and exacerbated U.S.-Iran hostility.” The authors list five such false narratives; here’s the most damaging/alarming one:
5.) Shared Myth: The status quo [...]]]>
Former Iran-desk State Department staffer Reza Marashi and Iran scholar Reza Sanati write that after more than 3 decades of “institutionalized enmity”, damaging myths perpetuated by both sides have “facilitated and exacerbated U.S.-Iran hostility.” The authors list five such false narratives; here’s the most damaging/alarming one:
]]>5.) Shared Myth: The status quo U.S.-Iran cold war is sustainable.
The Reality: America’s decade-long wars in the Middle East have engendered a degree of political realism in Washington. The inconclusive nature of its combat withdrawals, the global financial crisis and the ongoing flux of the Arab Spring have pushed U.S. strategists to focus on what is viable. Still, occasional efforts at sustained diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear program by both parties have not resolved the larger political conflict. Right now, the process mostly serves to maintain the same old rivalry.
U.S. and Iranian strategies are stuck in the status quo, but the world around them is changing. From Egypt to Pakistan, longtime U.S. allies surrounding Iran are increasingly at odds with Washington, each for its own reasons. Most notably, some Israeli leaders are threatening a military conflict with Iran, a mess that the United States might have to clean up.
For Tehran, sanctions are too severe to circumvent by the old means. The U.S.-led assault on Iran’s banking infrastructure, shipping lines and oil exports has forced the Islamic Republic to create new methods of trade. And the Arab Spring is challenging U.S. and Iranian influence in the Middle East. Neither country really wants a collision—war would be disastrous for both—but that is where the status quo appears to be headed.
Both Iran and the United States are playing an extremely dangerous game based on misperceptions. Each side seems to be misreading the strength and resolve of the other. In this game of chicken, small errors in [...]]]>
]]>Both Iran and the United States are playing an extremely dangerous game based on misperceptions. Each side seems to be misreading the strength and resolve of the other. In this game of chicken, small errors in judgment can result in military confrontation. And in game theory, the opponent that seems “irrational” or “crazy” can win. That perception in Tehran could heighten the danger.
For the Islamic Republic, this has been the underpinning of its approach since Ahmadinejad assumed the presidency in 2005. It is also one reason why the Iranian system did not try to contain him until recently. During my tenure at the State Department, it was unmistakable that Ahmadinejad’s image of being ideological and seeking to drive Iran into a war to expedite the Hidden Imam’s return had crystallized within the Washington policy-making community. Few could understand why the Islamic Republic did not contain him to the degree that it could, given how fragile the U.S.-Iran impasse had become.
Iran knows that it is playing a risky game, but its self-confidence vis-à-vis the United States has grown since it survived what it saw as eight years of antagonism and confrontation from the George W. Bush administration. Adding to that confidence is the widespread regional upheaval. Thus, Tehran will likely continue waiting for what it perceives as appropriate U.S. moves toward dialogue. These misperceptions and miscalculations will likely prevent the Iranian government from backing down in the current standoff because it believes that, if Iran does not give up, geopolitical realities will cause America to change course at some point in the foreseeable future.
While serving in the State Department’s Office of Iranian Affairs, I learned the 10 percent [...]]]>
While serving in the State Department’s Office of Iranian Affairs, I learned the 10 percent rule: intelligence is meant to make up approximately 10 percent of the overall information used to analyze strategic issues. The remaining 90 percent consists of embassy reporting and unclassified, open-source information.
As a whole, this symbiotic process is meant to provide a balanced, broader context to policymakers. Intelligence is supposed to be the missing piece of the puzzle — not the only piece. Overreliance on intelligence to support key policy decisions results in skewed or incomplete analysis that lacks the fuller context needed for sound decision-making. As this information vacuum grows over time, so too does the likelihood of misperceptions, miscalculations and dangerous mistakes.
Intelligence is not a substitute for the critical work of diplomats on the ground — and perhaps no foreign policy issue demonstrates this more forcefully than Iran. Simply put, a vital national security process has been broken for over three decades, and American politicians are exacerbating rather than repairing it.
Read more.
]]>On Iranian perception and strategy:
- Overall, Iran’s geopolitical strategy aims to consolidate the Islamic Republic as a regional power. The cornerstones of its strategy are: 1) Improving, or at the very least managing, ties with immediate neighbors and key Islamic countries. Relations with Turkey and Saudi Arabia are key factors in Iran’s regional positioning for influence in Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, and elsewhere. 2) Consolidating Iranian regional preeminence with indigenous technical capabilities. The country’s nuclear program, missile tests, and satellite launch are all facets of this strategic track. 3) Standing up to the West. In the words of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran intends “not to give in” to Western pressure.3 Iran’s approach in the nuclear standoff is a good example of this conviction.
Historical precedent has shown Iran that Western powers tend to accept the status of a regional power when that power becomes formidable; China, India, and Brazil are often cited as examples. The Islamic Republic is counting on such an eventual acceptance. The key virtue from Iran’s perspective has been patience.
The Iranian government’s reluctance to negotiate with the U.S. is not necessarily rooted in an ideological opposition to the idea of talking or improving relations with Washington. Instead, hard-liners in Tehran fear that any relationship with the U.S. would require Iranian acquiescence to status quo regional policies, thereby stripping Tehran of its independence and forcing it to follow America’s investment in Arab dictatorships rather than the Arab street.
Despite showing significant ideological flexibility in the past, Iran’s knows that its ability to adjust to new realities over the long term is limited. A more democratic Middle East would highlight Iran’s own political, economic, and social shortcomings; a more autocratic region would continue using Shiite Iran as a pretext for its own domestic crackdowns.
Because the primary concern for decision-makers in Tehran is regime survival, they fear the unpredictable consequences of proactive decision-making at home and abroad. Iran’s own internal problems and paralysis among domestic political elites reinforce its reactive posture. It displays less foresight than cognizance. Nevertheless, Iran knows that success for its regional strategy does not require the same level of certitude or stability as it does for its rivals, and it therefore stands to benefit most from continued popular unrest. In the foreseeable future, this is arguably the most likely scenario.
On the decline of the U.S.–Israeli–Saudi vertex:
- In Iran’s view, the U.S.–Israeli–Saudi vertex is in a decline set in motion by the invasion of Iraq and increasingly evident through region-wide protests, creating a power and leadership vacuum that the Islamic Republic seeks to fill. Although Iran has long anticipated this moment, it knows that there are additional contenders for power. It also understands how its ambitions could be thwarted both by the nature of the vacuum and by its own position in the region.
On Iran’s relations with a rising Turkey:
- The greatest challenge that Iran sees going forward is the emergence in the region of a foreign policy realignment by states that have traditionally followed America’s lead. The impact of Turkey’s shift is evident to Tehran: Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is one of only two world leaders to poll higher among Arabs than Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Despite growing economic and political cooperation, decision-makers in Tehran know that competition over regional clout will test Turkish–Iranian ties in the long run. Thus, as the situation on the Arab street remains fluid, Iran is preparing itself for the possibility that the balance of its competition and collaboration vis-à-vis Turkey may tilt toward the former.
To the Islamic Republic, recent developments have shaken up not only existing political systems (including its own), but also its rivalry for regional influence with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S. on one side, and Turkey as the third vertex in what can be seen as an emerging triangle of competition. Iranian decision-makers see this shock as changing the context of the rivalry rather than ending it, and creating challenges and opportunities for all sides.
Turkey’s significant political, economic, and cultural influence have steadily increased in Iraq, as it rebalanced its strategic approach and maneuvered to fill the power vacuum created by the U.S.14 Unlike Iran, however, Turkey has been able to increase its influence in Iraq—and by extension work against the U.S.–Israeli–Saudi status quo—without the burden of historical mistrust (the Iran–Iraq War), international hostility (sanctions, the nuclear impasse), or democracy deficits (Turkey’s democratic model versus Iran’s model of militaristic theocracy).
One observer in Tehran quipped to one of the authors that Iran had done all the groundwork “in the resistance against Israel,” and at the last minute the Turks stole the show. Turkey’s comprehensive soft power in the region, including cultural affinity, economic ties, and a balanced approach toward Israel, may present Iran with a major challenge in any future competition for leadership in the region.15 Insofar as Turkey’s new assertive foreign policy continues to challenge the U.S.–Israeli–Saudi vertex in the long run, Iran will feel the uniqueness of its regional position—and its source of soft power—to be increasingly at risk.
On a post-Mubarak Egypt:
- As Iran jockeys for regional preeminence, Egypt will become a new geopolitical battlefield for its soft-power projection. Widely regarded as the beacon of the Arab world, Egypt is also the wild card that can potentially tip the scales in favor of any one of these three aspiring regional hegemons. It is already being pulled in three very different directions. Egyptians took an important step toward democracy with the toppling of Mubarak, but many daunting challenges remain—not least of which is the fact that each of the key Egyptian leaders serving in the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces was a high-level member of the Mubarak regime. A transition to democracy through free and fair elections has been promised, but concerns linger regarding the timing of elections and the demonstrably non-democratic behavior exhibited by the council on issues including freedom of the press and freedom of assembly. Precisely because Egypt’s revolution remains unfinished, and domestic stability in the short to medium term is unlikely, Iranian decision-makers see an opportunity to exert regional influence while capitalizing on Egypt’s inward orientation.
On Syria:
- At best, Iran sees an opportunity to maintain a semblance of the status quo in its alliance with Syria: together they stand a better chance to survive and achieve their long-term goals. Syria wants to regain the Golan Heights from Israel and maintain its influence in Lebanese politics, both goals that are aided by Iranian support for Hamas and Hezbollah, who maintain instability on Israel’s flanks and increase the costs of Israel’s occupation. In return, Syria aids the Islamic Republic’s quest to assume preeminence in the Persian Gulf by helping to neutralize Israeli capabilities and American encroachment. Any change in Syria’s government increases the likelihood that Damascus will adopt regional policies more in line with its Arab brethren, such as support for Sunni political forces in Iraq. It could also lead to Syria becoming a full-fledged Saudi client. That could strip Iran of its strongest Arab ally, and a notable element of leverage it holds over regional rivals. The Islamic Republic would prefer to see a weakened Al-Assad regime remain in power; such a scenario hedges against Damascus swinging toward the U.S. and increases Syrian dependence on Iranian support.
These are the same allegations that Dennis Ross, Obama’s top National Security Council official for [...]]]>
These are the same allegations that Dennis Ross, Obama’s top National Security Council official for Iran policy, pushed back against in his talk yesterday at a U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) event.
In the Leveretts’ piece, they cite a Huffington Post article by Reza Marashi, who just joined the National Iranian American Council (NIAC) as research director after four years in the State Department’s Office of Iranian Affairs:
It should now be clear that U.S. policy has never been a true engagement policy. By definition, engagement entails a long-term approach that abandons “sticks” and reassures both sides that their respective fears are unfounded. We realized early on that the administration was unlikely to adopt this approach. [...]
Moreover, as the leaked cables show, the highest levels of the Obama administration never believed that diplomacy could succeed. While this does not cheapen Obama’s Nowruz message and other groundbreaking facets of his initial outreach, it does raise three important questions: How can U.S. policymakers give maximum effort to make diplomacy succeed if they admittedly never believed their efforts could work? …And what are the chances that Iran will take diplomacy seriously now that it knows the U.S. never really did? The Obama administration presented a solid vision, but never truly pursued it.
This is pretty damning stuff from a guy who just left the Obama State Department. He was on the inside. And the Leveretts are feeling vindicated:
This, of course, provides additional powerful and public confirmation—from inside the Obama Administration—for our argument, in a New York Times Op Ed published in May 2009, that the Obama Administration’s disingenuous approach to dealing with Iran had already betrayed the early promise of President Obama’s initial rhetoric about engagement.
They mention that Ross was quite displeased with what they then had to say, and he let them know. The Leveretts note that Ross had Ray Takeyh, then his assistant at the State Department, push back against the notion that Obama’s “extended hand” to Iran was a checklist item for building international backing for more pressure on Iran, and possibly eventually military strikes. Takeyh called the idea “wrong and fraudulent.”
The Leveretts want to know what Takeyh thinks now:
]]>In light of the Wikileaks cables and Mr. Marashi’s public confirmation that the Obama Administration was, in fact, pursuing engagement to pave the way for more coercive options, including expanded sanctions, we ask Ray Takeyh: who was perpetrating a fraud with regard to the underlying intent of the Administration’s Iran policy?