by Robert E. Hunter
“Then we’ll have done all we can.”
“Very heartless.”
“It’s safer to be heartless than mindless. History is the triumph of the heartless over the mindless.”
Yes, [...]]]>
by Robert E. Hunter
“Then we’ll have done all we can.”
“Very heartless.”
“It’s safer to be heartless than mindless. History is the triumph of the heartless over the mindless.”
Yes, Prime Minister.
President Barack Obama, it is said, has painted himself into a corner with his repeated statements that the use of chemical weapons by the Assad government will be a “game changer” or cross a “red line.” The difficulty of definitions has produced what must have been one of the most ambiguous letters ever to be put on White House stationery. It came as a response to a demand from two US Senators about presidential policy in the event of such weapons use.
More accurately, however, the president can be said to have painted himself into a corner with Syria on two occasions, initially as early as August 2011, and repeated since, by declaring that “Assad must go.”
Of course, Assad has not gone, thus demonstrating once again the first rule of being US President: never call for something, especially in a simple declaratory sentence, if you are not prepared to follow through and make it happen.
This recitation is not meant to be an attack on the US president. It is an introduction to what has to be a genuine dilemma, indeed, a series of dilemmas, which come in several forms.
Syria’s Future
The first dilemma regards the potentiality of a positive outcome in Syria. Assad and company are engaged in the massive slaughter of their own people, which, along with those killed by the rebels, numbers more than 70,000 by a recent (likely conservative) count, plus the creation of more than a million refugees. There is meanwhile no resolution in sight of what has become a full-scale civil war.
Let us assume that Assad is killed (or decides to seek a safe haven) tomorrow. What then? It is a vast stretch of the imagination to believe that the killing would then stop.
What is happening in Syria is radically different from what happened in the so-called “Arab spring” in Tunisia, Egypt, or even Libya. This is not primarily a matter of whether a leader who stayed too long and was too repressive will go; but whether a particular minority will continue to be able to dominate the rest of the population, or, with “regime change,” whether there will be a bloody free-for-all competition for power. None of the other three regime changes were about that.
More relevant is what happened in Iraq, when the US and partners, by invading in 2003, overturned centuries of admittedly unjust domination of a majority (Shi’ite) by a minority (Sunni). Or what is happening, or rather not happening, in Bahrain, where the situation is just the reverse but has been kept in check by military power, much of which has been applied by neighboring Saudi Arabia, with the US, concerned about its base in Bahrain for the Fifth Fleet, at best “turning a blind eye.”
It’s therefore hard to see what the United States, or any combination of outsiders, could usefully do — not to help overthrow Assad and his Alawite-dominated military (that can be done) — but to help “shape” a future in Syria that won’t lead to even more bloody chaos before something approaching “stability” could ensue. Even if that were possible, it would likely take the form of a new suppression, but by the majority (Sunni) over various minorities.
Public Opinion
The second dilemma — perhaps it should be first — is related to whether the American people are ready and willing to see the US engaged in yet another Middle East war. The answer (“No”) is clear, but so far policy is not — hence the dilemma.
There should be no indulgence in the nonsense that all could be accomplished by providing more lethal arms to the rebels, imposing a no-fly zone, or using air power directly. That would be relatively sterile in today’s military taxology, but even if/when successful, it leads back to the first dilemma. And if unsuccessful, the US would then be called upon to do what, in current jargon, is called “boots on the ground” — that is, invasion. There should be no nonsense, however, about the US being able, as in Libya, to “lead from behind.” Even though the British and the French (the latter was the former mandatory power in Syria after World War I) would like to see something done, they are this time ready to hold the US coat, but not lead themselves.
To his credit, the president so far has been wary of getting more deeply engaged, presumably due to a combination of his awareness of the two dilemmas above, the second of which (US public opinion), if ignored, would surely take attention away from what he clearly sees as his legacy: repairs to the heavily-damaged US economy (and the global financial system) and his historical goal, which can be summarized in a few simple words: the promotion of equality in American society.
Regional Context
The third dilemma derives from the manner in which the conflict in Syria began. It did have domestic roots (as in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya), but it also had external causes and active agents, notably a desire by leading Sunni states (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and to a lesser degree, Turkey) to right the informal and rough regional “balance of power” between them and Shi’a states that was so heavily upset by the US invasion of Iraq. This came after the spread of the “disease” from revolutionary Shi’a Iran had both been almost entirely contained in the region and had most of its fires banked at home. Some Sunni states still fear contagion, however, notably Saudi Arabia, where oil lands are heavily concentrated in Shi’a territories (hence Riyadh’s desire to get rid of the Alawite rule in Syria).
So here it is: an already slow-rolling civil war across the region, pitting Sunnis versus Shi’as, but only in part about religion, is also about competitions for power. In this case, it’s an essentially four-cornered competition among Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel and Turkey, the first three of which have as much to do in fueling the current confrontation with Iran as does its nuclear program.
Would the overthrow of the Assad regime cause this regional civil war to intensify? Or would it lead to a new, informal balance among religious groupings that would be reasonably “stable,” whatever that means in today’s roiling Middle East? It would take a Dr. Pangloss to argue the case for stability over more competition and even less stability and predictability about the future of inter-state relations and internal developments.
Non-governmental Actors
Dilemma number four flows from the above. As the civil war has continued and intensified, Sunni Islamist militants, including elements of al-Qaeda, Wahhabis and Salafists, have increasingly become engaged. That should be no surprise. These groups batten on conflict, especially a conflict with intense emotion and deep-seated religious inspiration. Thus even with Assad gone — perhaps by magic wand tomorrow — would the outcome of the civil war be ruled by a Sunni strongman, pacifying the country by force? Or solidification of another base for continuing terrorist operations by some of our and our allies’ worst enemies?
Israel’s Circumstances
One argument for getting rid of Assad and his Alawite-dominated regime is that this would help deprive the Lebanese Hezbollah of its rear base, which provides political support and a supply route for Iran as it seeks to counter pressure from the US and Israel. But at what (potential) price would Iran be thus incommoded?
Since 1974, Israel existed uneasily but still reasonably comfortably with Assad père et fils, as both countries learned to live with one another. Their mutual frontier along the Golan Heights was so stable that Israel could even invade Lebanon (twice) and attack a Syrian nuclear reactor without a military response. Now that modus vivendi is very much in jeopardy.
Indeed, for many months after the Syrian civil war started, Israel was clearly at least ambivalent about whether Assad’s departure was in Israel’s best interest. It now seems to have passed that point, but even that is not entirely clear.
What should be clear, however, is that if Assad goes and there is an intensifying civil war, with “free play” for Islamist radicals of the worst stripe — the kind that have inspired and in many cases conducted the killing of Americans in Afghanistan — the US will be called upon to be even more robust in support of Israel’s security.
Would that mean US forces on the Golan Heights? Israel has never wanted this direct military engagement from the US, but the need for extra commitments to Israel’s security would be very likely. Furthermore, the argument that Iran would be the big loser from Assad’s departure might even be turned on its head. The balance in Tehran could be tipped toward those who argue that Iran should get nuclear weapons in order to deter a burgeoning list of enemies.
Strategy
Then a final dilemma: the US desire to “pivot” to Asia. But at least some refocusing of policy and military assets will not be as easily done as has been hoped with the end of the Iraq War, the winding down of the Afghanistan War and the efforts to keep Iran from crossing either US or Israeli red lines on its nuclear program.
With Syria and its interlocking dilemmas, plus other continuing challenges in the region, the US will not be able to rid itself of a major security role in the Middle East anytime soon, even if it (rightly) promotes an international approach to even some of these dilemmas, no matter how much oil and gas is eventually produced in the continental US.
It is probably — but not certainly — too late to find some means whereby Assad could stay in power but with genuine power-sharing that would radically reduce the prominence of the Alawites without leaving them to be victimized as they have victimized other Syrians for so long. Of course, power-sharing efforts almost always fail in mechanical approaches to foreign policy, so perhaps that was never a real option, a triumph of Western “hope over experience.”
So what is to be done at this juncture of “no good options?” The best to be hoped for now is for President Obama to keep his nerve (backed by the US military leadership) and continue resisting attempts to drag the US even more deeply into Syria. At the same time, the US must avoid the temptation to perceive another looming chance to experiment with “nation building”; Iraq and Afghanistan should have inoculated us against that.
As a cardinal principle, the US should internationalize whatever is done — by the United Nations, NATO, the European Union and Arab League — and not regard Syria as a test of US “leadership,” as asserted in the aforementioned White House letter (“strengthen our leadership of the international community.”) It should put out the word in very clear terms to other states in the region to stop meddling in Syria, and in particular, to rein-in their nationals who are engaged in spreading Islamist militancy in Syria (and elsewhere), with both ideas and arms.
Finally, the US needs to begin seeing the region as a whole, not as a series of bits and pieces, loosely connected to one another, with Washington attempting only “to put out fires” here and there, while pretending that the whole region is not potentially ablaze. The president has to recruit for his administration the very best people to think strategically and this time plan ahead. They must understand that the US has to create consistent and coherent policies for the entire region that have some chance of success for the long haul.
]]>The New York Times reports that despite US reluctance to arm Islamist actors in Syria, that’s happening as the US does little to vet the actions of its partners Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Though the amount of aid flowing to the badly-equipped rebels is still relatively small as other on-the-ground [...]]]>
The New York Times reports that despite US reluctance to arm Islamist actors in Syria, that’s happening as the US does little to vet the actions of its partners Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Though the amount of aid flowing to the badly-equipped rebels is still relatively small as other on-the-ground reports have reiterated, the Times suggests that unless the US takes a more direct route, the situation will come to favor the Islamists:
“The opposition groups that are receiving the most of the lethal aid are exactly the ones we don’t want to have it,” said one American official familiar with the outlines of those findings, commenting on an operation that in American eyes has increasingly gone awry.
The United States is not sending arms directly to the Syrian opposition. Instead, it is providing intelligence and other support for shipments of secondhand light weapons like rifles and grenades into Syria, mainly orchestrated from Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The reports indicate that the shipments organized from Qatar, in particular, are largely going to hard-line Islamists.
Jackson Diehl, the Washington Post‘s editorial pages hawkish deputy editor, expanded on the argument that Obama’s skittishness is leading the US to disaster in Syria. Diehl has been a forceful advocate of non-engagement with Assad since before the Syrian uprising began, and has called for more assertive US policy to help remove Assad from power:
…. Obama rejected suggestions by several senators that he lead an intervention. Instead he committed a second major error, by adopting a policy of seeking to broker a Syrian solution through the United Nations. “The best thing we can do,” he said last March, “is to unify the international community.”
As countless observers correctly predicted, the subsequent U.N. mission of Kofi Annan was doomed from the beginning. When the White House could no longer deny that reality, it turned to an equally fantastical gambit: Vladimir Putin, it argued, could be persuaded to abandon his support of Assad and force him to step down. The nadir of this diplomacy may have been reached on June 30, when Clinton cheerfully predicted that the Kremlin had “decided to get on one horse, and it’s the horse that would back a transition plan” removing Assad.
Needless to say, Putin did no such thing. The war went on; thousands more died. For the past three months, Obama’s policy has become a negative: He is simply opposed to any use of U.S. power. Fixed on his campaign slogan that “the tide of war is receding” in the Middle East, Obama claims that intervention would only make the conflict worse — and then watches as it spreads to NATO ally Turkey and draws in hundreds of al-Qaeda fighters.
Al Qaeda’s presence in Syria has often been cited both for and against the case for direct Western intervention. But the number of foreign fighters in Syria is not known. According to Max Rodenbeck, “by no current estimate does the number of foreign fighters in Syria — young men who mostly see themselves as part of a Spanish Civil War–style international brigade rather than as terrorist ninjas — surpass a thousand, out of at least 50,000 armed men on the rebel side.” The Times itself adds that some militias appear to be falsely burnishing “Salafist” credentials in order to woo donors.
Though non-governmental rebel advocates like the Syrian Support Group have downplayed the question of where the militias fall ideologically, the Wall Street Journal, TIME and Real Clear Politics report that rivalries among Islamist factions for arms procurement are undermining their nominal joint effort against the Syrian Army. The Times has reported before that even the rebels’ Gulf backers are starting to consider the possibility of ”blowback.”
The Times adds that even though Obama’s course is being criticized by interventionists, GOP presidential candidate Mitt Romney has not offered the sort of direct military aid some in the Beltway would prefer:
But Mr. Romney stopped short of saying that he would have the United States provide those arms directly, and his aides said he would instead rely on Arab allies to do it. That would leave him, like Mr. Obama, with little direct control over the distribution of the arms.
Diehl also blames Obama for “reversing Bush’s policy of distancing the United States from strongmen like Assad and Hosni Mubarak.”
]]>Last Sunday former President Bill Clinton asked the CEO of Walmart if he would open a store in Libya.
Surely Libya needs more jobs and needs to get its economy going, but I am not sure how a Walmart would do that. A large proportion of the goods that [...]]]>
Last Sunday former President Bill Clinton asked the CEO of Walmart if he would open a store in Libya.
Surely Libya needs more jobs and needs to get its economy going, but I am not sure how a Walmart would do that. A large proportion of the goods that Walmart sells in the United States are imported into the United States, not made there. Seventy-five percent of the foodstuffs in Libya are imported from elsewhere. Libya has no real manufacturing base. Libya’s supply chains are hardly up to the task for feeding into a group of Walmarts. Most of the managers and even greeters may have to be foreigners initially. The people setting up the supply chains would also likely be non-Libyans given the complexity of what needs to be done and the lack of applicable training for most Libyans.
The finance for the setting up of the Walmart(s) would have to be via foreign direct investments likely from the United States. Those investments would need some insurance from the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. There would also need to be lots of cooperation and aid from the US government and the Libyan government regarding security for the initial buildings and the entire supply chain within Libya. Maybe the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation and others could be involved in developing the basic infrastructure and connections needed. Effort would also be required for improving the capacity of the Libyan government to handle economic development and the development of businesses.
Physical as well as financial security would be keys to the success of a Walmart in Libya. It would not take much for some trucks or even a store to have problems. Walmart is definitely an American brand and there are lots of Salafis and others who would want to do damage to anything representing an American brand. Consider what happened to the French Carrefour markets in Tunisia during its revolution. Think of what happened to outlets of major American food chains like KFC during the recent riots against that repulsive anti-Islam film. Think of the increasing anti-Americanism amongst some groups in the region and you can see that there could be some physical security issues.
Financial security may require that the payrolls, insurances, cash flows for inventory, maintenance, upkeep and more be kept offshore in part for a while. As the security and banking capacity situations in Libya change this could change. There could also be some significant foreign exchange risk involved, especially if the new Libya becomes more unstable and cannot get its economic act together. However, a good risk management team could hedge this if they knew the country well.
There are also some inherent financial and physical risks by simply being in North Africa and near Egypt and Tunisia, two countries that are still in the midst of trying to find their ways. Their revolutions are likely far from over. There is also a problem with Al Qaeda in the Maghreb and other AQ-like groups floating around the region. The instabilities to the south of Libya are hardly comforting.
Even so, my sense is that President Clinton’s heart was in the right place even if his logic needed a bit more work.
Libya needs foreign investment. There is a lot that American companies can do in Libya.
There are many people in Libya who are pro-American given that we helped their country gain some independence from the wretched regime of Qhaddafi. Many of the expatriate leadership of Libya of the older generations spent some time in the United States. We could gain a lot by helping some of the younger people, appropriately vetted, to get scholarships to visit and study in the United States. Sometimes the best way to make friends and future allies is to give them a good experience in the United States and provide high-quality education and training. There are great opportunities even within the massive and volatile risks of Libya.
That said there are many people in Libya including some militias, extremist groups, pro-Ghaddafi remnants and more who do not like the United States, to put it mildly.
It will be vital to understand the overall environment on the ground of who is who and where they stand before moving forward. It may be a big mistake to write off Libya because of the vicious and evil behavior of a few when the majority of the country could benefit. But we need to be sure.
However, dropping Libya as a place to help may end up delivering it to the extremists and that is a very bad idea.
There is another side to the Walmart story. What about all of the small mom and pop stores, green grocers, kiosks and others in Libya who may be put out of business due to the Walmart. Many of these have been put out of business here. How would Libyans react to being put out of business by a massive American company?
On the other hand, if Walmart and other US companies take the leap into the new North Africa they could help develop countries and their people while at the same time making serious profit. However, the Walmart model may not be the best one to start out with.
Indeed, there are risks. Normally in such situations the only companies that come in are the oil and gas companies or other major energy companies that have vast experience working in conflict and post-conflict zones.
Maybe President Clinton was trying to get a discussion and debate going in US business communities as well as in the government about how the US could help the economies of these hurting countries in a (hopefully) post-conflict environment. This is an important thing to consider even if the situation looks dismal from afar.
Developing the economies of these countries will be far from easy and there are likely to be many bumps along the road – some of them very steep and risky. However, with the right incentives and the right risk management, it may be possible to make a difference and to do well by doing good.
Perhaps there could be some tax breaks and free land to build on in return for training and educating Libyans and increasing the percentage of Libyans working at the Walmart or other such stores. There will need to be some give and take. I know that the tax breaks and free land (for a limited time of perhaps 10 to 20 years and then the lease fees kick in) are contentious. But Libya needs to move forward and get its people — especially its young people — employed. Maybe the United States could improve its reputation in the region by doing just that.
You make more friends by creating jobs than dropping bombs. Developing a better security situation in a region via real strategic thinking can involve a lot more than just the military and the State Department. Sometimes businesses can make a big difference.
However, many businesses need to be sure that they are not going to walk into mine fields before they move forward with serious investments.
There is a certain menace attached to Libya now. Violent extremists created that. Should we give up on the rest of the Libya because of the people who want to destroy it rather than build it up?
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The recent visit by Abd al-Halim Murad, head of the Bahraini Salafi al-Asalah movement, to Syria to meet with Syrian rebels is an attempt by him and other Gulf Salafis to hijack the Syrian revolution.
Sadly, the Saudi and Bahraini governments have looked the other way as their Sunni Salafis [...]]]>
The recent visit by Abd al-Halim Murad, head of the Bahraini Salafi al-Asalah movement, to Syria to meet with Syrian rebels is an attempt by him and other Gulf Salafis to hijack the Syrian revolution.
Sadly, the Saudi and Bahraini governments have looked the other way as their Sunni Salafis try to penetrate the Syrian opposition in the name of fighting Assad, Alawites, Shia, Hizballah and Iran.
The Assad regime has pursued a sectarian strategy that has resulted in promoting violent “jihadism” in order to bolster his narrative that the opposition to his regime is the work of foreign radical Salafi terrorist groups. Despite Assad’s self-serving claims, violent Salafi activists are nevertheless exploiting instability and lawlessness in some Arab countries, Syria included, to preach their doctrine and force more conservative social practises on their compatriots.
Some Salafis do not believe in peaceful, gradual, political change and are actively working to undermine nascent political systems, including by terrorising and killing minority Shia, Alawites, and Christians.
Radical Salafis have recently committed violent acts in Mali and other Sahel countries in Africa, as well as in Nigeria, Uganda and Kenya. Salafis also have committed violent acts in the name of “jihad” in Egypt, Sinai, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and elsewhere in the Middle East.
As the Arab Spring touches more countries and as more regimes—for example, in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Sudan and the Palestinian authority—come under pressure from their own citizens, they begin to use sectarianism and promote radical elements within these sects for their own survival and regional posturing. Salafi “jihadists” are more than happy to oblige. Unfortunately, average Muslim citizens bear the brunt of this violence.
Where did modern day Salafism come from?
Since the late 1960s, when King Faisal declared exporting Islam a cardinal principle of Saudi foreign policy, Saudi Arabia has been spreading its brand of Wahhabi-Salafi Islam among Muslim youth worldwide.
At the time, Faisal intended to use Saudi Islam to fight “secular” Arab nationalism, led by Gamal Abd al-Nassir of Egypt, Ba’thism, led by Syria and Iraq, and atheist Communism, led by the Soviet Union.
The Wahhabi-Salafi interpretation of Islam, which has been a Saudi export for half a century, is grounded in the teachings of 13th century Islamic scholar Ibn Taymiyya and 18th century Saudi scholar Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. It’s also associated with the conservative Hanbali school of Sunni jurisprudence.
In a nutshell, the Wahhabi-Salafi religious doctrine is intolerant of other religions such as Christians and Jews and of Muslim sects such as the Shia and the Ahmadiyya, which do not adhere to the teachings of Sunni Islam. It also restricts the rights of women as equal members of the family and society and uses the Wahhabi interpretation to quell any criticism of the regime in the name of fighting sedition, or “fitna”.
Even more troubling, Salafis view violence as a legitimate tool to fight the so-called enemies of Islam without the approval of nationally recognised religious authorities. Any self-proclaimed Salafi activist can issue a religious edict, or “fatwa”, to launch a jihad against a perceived enemy, whether Muslim or non-Muslim.
Usama Bin Ladin did just that in the 1990s, which, of course, started an unending cycle of violence and terrorism against Muslims and “infidels” alike, including the United States and other Western countries.
Many of the radical Salafi activists in Mali and other African countries have received their religious educations at Imam Muhammad University in Saudi Arabia, the hotbed of Salafi Islam and one of the most conservative institutions of Islamic education in the world.
The Saudi government and some wealthy Saudi financiers have been spending significant amounts of money on spreading Islam through scholarships, local projects and Islamic NGOs, as well as by building mosques and printing of Korans and other religious texts espousing Wahhabi-Salafism.
Since the early 1970s, Wahhabi-Salafi proselytisation has been carried out by Saudi-created and financed non-governmental organisations, such as the Muslim World League, the International Islamic Relief Organisation, the World Association of Muslim Youth, and al-Haramayn.
Some of these organisations became involved in terrorist activities in Muslim and non-Muslim countries and have since been disbanded by the Saudi government. Many of their leaders have been jailed or killed. Others fled their home countries and forged careers in new terrorist organisations in Yemen, Morocco, Iraq, Somalia, Indonesia, Libya, Mali and elsewhere.
For years, Saudi officials thought that as long as violent “jihad” was waged far away, the regime was safe. That view changed dramatically after May 12, 2003 when terrorists struck in the heart of the Saudi capital.
Wahhabi proselytisation has laid the foundation for today’s Salafi “jihadism” in Africa and in the Arab world. Saudi textbooks are imbued with this interpretation of Islam, which creates a narrow, intolerant, conflict-driven worldview in the minds of youth there.
Unlike the early focus of King Faisal, today’s proselytisers target fellow Muslims, who espouse a different religious interpretation, and other religious groups. The so-called jihadists have killed hundreds of Muslims, which they view as “collateral damage” in the fight against the “near and far enemies” of Islam.
While mainstream Islamic political parties are participants in governments across the Islamic world, and while Washington is beginning to engage Islamic parties as governing partners, radical Salafis are undermining democratic transition and lawful political reform. They oppose democracy as understood worldwide because they view it as man-made and not God’s rule, or “hukm”.
And what to do about it?
The raging violence in Syria and the regime’s clinging to power provide a fertile environment for Salafi groups to establish a foothold in that country. National security and strategic interests of the West and democratic Arab governments dictate that they neutralise and defeat the Salafi project.
As a first step, they must work closely with Syrian rebels to hasten the fall of the Assad regime. This requires arming the rebels with adequate weapons to fight the Assad military machine, especially his tanks, bulldozers and aircraft.
Washington and London must also have a serious conversation with the Saudis about the long-term threat of radical Salafism and the pivotal role Saudi Wahhabi proselytisation plays in nurturing radical Salafi ideology and activities. A positive outcome of this conversation should help in building a post-Arab Spring stable, democratic political order. In fact, such a conversation is long overdue.
For years my colleagues and I briefed senior policymakers about the potential and long-term danger of spreading this narrow-minded, exclusivist, intolerant religious doctrine. Unfortunately, the West’s close economic and security relations with the Saudi regime have prevented any serious dialogue with the Saudis about this nefarious export and insidious ideology.
The writer is the former director of the CIA’s Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program and author of A Necessary Engagement: Reinventing America’s Relations with the Muslim World.
]]>The economy is clearly the most important problem facing Egypt today. Unemployment and underemployment are vast. Tourism has been shattered by recent events and may take a long time to get back on track. Foreign investments have dropped and have even turned to a net outflow from the country rather than [...]]]>
The economy is clearly the most important problem facing Egypt today. Unemployment and underemployment are vast. Tourism has been shattered by recent events and may take a long time to get back on track. Foreign investments have dropped and have even turned to a net outflow from the country rather than a net inflow into the country. Many domestic investors have also become quite wary and are considering leaving Egypt. This is especially true of some of the major Coptic Egyptian and conservative Muslim investors who are anxious about what the future may hold with the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood. The liberal and “secular” investors are about as wary and anxious as some of the Copts. There are some younger investors who see this as an opportunity. Some of the Muslim Brotherhood people are considerable business people and view the anxiety of some as an opportunity.
Even so, foreign exchange reserves are hemorrhaging from the treasury. Most of the government run factories and firms are in dire need of reform, refitting or even shutting down. The economy in general is in need of great reform toward more international competitiveness. If this is not done, Egypt will be in even worse shape in the future. The privatization and structural adjustment programs of the 1990s are looked down upon by many in Egypt due to the massive corruption that was brought along with these programs. However, the last thing Egypt needs now is to go back to the time of Nasser, nationalizations, 95 percent tax rates and the destruction of the business and landowning classes.
Egypt has to find its way to a more prosperous future and the United States and others could be of some help if they become more practical partners for this change. The focus should be on jobs, investment, education, technological change, and the practicalities of getting things done – not on the misty and often unproductive goals of “good governance”. This term has a bad reputation amongst many Egyptians I met during my recent 6 week trip because, they say, the US talked about helping with good governance and really did nothing as Hosni Mubarak and company robbed and oppressed the country. Many Egyptians are also quite suspicious of non-governmental organization (NGOs) in general and governance NGOs in particular.
The US will need to try to develop some sort of relations with the new leadership of the country. In the past, there was little real contact at the strategic or any other level with the Brotherhood. Now the president of Egypt is from the Muslim Brotherhood, even if he said that he quit after he was elected. The new parliament and some of the new cabinet members – and even some of the future military leaders – could be Muslim Brotherhood or at least sensitive to the Brotherhood’s ideas and goals. Improving relations with the Brotherhood should be seen as a practical calculation, not as an acceptance of their principals. Egypt is an important country. We need to keep our relations going. President Mohamed Morsi is an example of the changes that are occurring in Egypt.
Building relations with the Salafists is another story altogether. I would be very careful with this. Their views of the US are dangerous, radical and extremist. Building relations with them should be geared more toward keeping potential enemies close to understand them better. I see very little hope in any real improvement in our relations with the Salafists.
The liberals, “secularists”, Nasserists and many others think we dropped them. Many also blame us for bringing the Muslim Brotherhood to power. Why, they ask, did we not help them more during the most difficult times? This is a tough question that our diplomats and others need to work on to develop future relations with these groups. They are splintered and weak compared to the much better organized Brotherhood, Salafis and others. However, they will be involved with Egyptian politics for some time and should not be discounted as potential future leaders.
The Egyptian revolution and the political churn from it are far from over.
The US has had very good relations with the Egyptian military. Friendships and long term understandings have been developed. The strongest relations we have with Egypt are still with the military even after the changes that lead to the retiring of many senior officers. The military needs to be handled in a more nuanced manner now given the power of the Brotherhood overall. However, the tensions and chess game between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military are not over. Those who think that President Mohamed Morsi checkmated the military with the recent retirements are clearly and plainly wrong. There will be a lot more to this story.
The most important relation that the US needs to develop in Egypt is with ordinary Egyptian people. Our diplomats, business people, professors and others need to reach out more to the regular folks. We need to understand them better and they could understand us a lot better. The farmers in the countryside, the tea people in Cairo and Alexandria, and the TukTuk drivers from all over are Egypt’s backbone.
Regular Egyptians could become very important arbiters for the future of Egypt, especially if a potential “Revolution of the Hungry and Poor” breaks out. If the economy is not fixed quickly, there is a good chance for this. There is another important reason to reach out more to the regular folks: they are mostly decent, good people. The US could help them and help itself at the same time by building more small clinics in the poor areas, building school houses, helping with infrastructure repairs, giving scholarships to poor Egyptians to US schools and colleges, developing cultural exchanges and more. We cannot distance ourselves from average Egyptians anymore.
Egypt is likely going to take on new roles for regional and global issues. Egypt’s relations with Israel are likely to change. This will depend on how the politics of the revolution and bread work out. Egypt’s relations with Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, Sudan, and many other places and groups that the US considers problematic could also change. We need to understand these changes as they happen and respond in more nuanced and strategic ways than how I think we will.
Egypt will also likely reach out more to China, India, Russia, Brazil, the Gulf Cooperation Council and others to diversify its support. It will likely rely much less on the US than at any time since Anwar Sadat if the Muslim Brotherhood acquires even greater power. President Morsi’s visits to China, Saudi Arabia and more are not just to get frequent flier points and to meet and greet. Morsi’s trips are mostly about diversifying Egypt’s international relations and its sources of economic and political support. The Chinese seem quite happy to oblige and I expect that the Chinese military’s relations with the Egyptian military will also change.
We need to be very careful as changes in the international relations of Egypt develop.
Egypt is an important country in overall US-Islamic and US-Arab relations. We need to move with great care and consideration of not just the first, but also the second, third and fourth order effects of any new moves Egypt makes – and what moves we might make in response. The building of Sunni-Shia tensions may also work into this situation.
Egypt is a relatively poor country with big ambitions. Maybe it is time for the US to rethink its posture towards Egypt as well. Many Egyptians in leadership and others I have met during the 20 years I have been associated with the country have told me about the condescension they have sometimes felt from visiting Americans. The perception becomes the reality no matter what may actually be occurring. Building relations is complex. Rebuilding them during a time of great political and revolutionary flux is even more complex and fraught with risks. We need to send the best, brightest and most intelligent people to represent us.
It is hard to tell where Egypt’s new path is going. What US relations with Egypt will be like in the years to come is anyone’s guess. There will be lots of internal changes in Egypt. There will be many changes across the region as the inherent instabilities and tensions work themselves out or get worse while US politics also evolve.
Fluid and complex situations require nuanced strategic thinking. This is an area where Americans can stand to improve with respect to the Middle East. It is time to develop these skills and understanding in our people or pay the much heavier prices that could be coming our way if we don’t.
]]>Emile Nakhleh is a retired Senior Intelligence Service Officer, a Research Professor at the University of New Mexico and a National Intelligence Council associate. Since retiring from the United States Government in 2006, he has been consulting with different US government entities and departments on national security issues, particularly Islamic radicalization, [...]]]>
Emile Nakhleh is a retired Senior Intelligence Service Officer, a Research Professor at the University of New Mexico and a National Intelligence Council associate. Since retiring from the United States Government in 2006, he has been consulting with different US government entities and departments on national security issues, particularly Islamic radicalization, terrorism, and the Arab states of the Middle East. At the CIA, Nakhleh was a senior analyst and director of the Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program and of regional analysis in the Middle East. During that time he and his analysts briefed policymakers on how Bashar al-Assad used repression to maintain stability.
In February, Nakhleh wrote in the Financial Times that intervention in Syria was “only a matter of time” and that Realpolitik should not guide the West’s approach to the humanitarian crisis that was unfolding. Seven months later, the fighting and divisions within Syria continue to worsen. An estimated 8,000 to 20,000 people have been killed and tens of thousands of Syrians have fled their homes into neighboring countries. The Obama administration has been reluctant to become directly involved in the conflict, but according to Nakhleh, a diplomatic solution is no longer possible and the longer the West waits to assist the rebels with NATO and Turkey’s lead, the bloodier the conflict will become. This following interview was conducted in Washington, DC and a shortened version was published in IPS News.
Q: What is your current assessment of the situation in Syria?
A: I wrote an article about Syria in the Financial Times in February and some of the things I wrote about then are happening now. Namely, there’s more talk about a security zone. The regime is basically fraying and is going to fall and the question is how it’s going to fall and what kind of chaos and instability will follow. I’m not that concerned about these fears of instability and Islamic extremist groups. These fears are being pushed by the regime to scare people. The regime is saying: we are providing security and stability and the alternative is insecurity and instability. There are some Jihadist and Al Qaeda elements, but the fact is that those were also in Libya and some of them were in Tunisia.
Q: Why then is the United States saying that one of the reasons it’s not directly supporting the rebels is because it’s unsure who they are?
A: That is a legitimate excuse. In fact, that argument was one of the reasons that delayed our recognition of even the Libyan rebels in Ben Ghazi and our action there. It was the same argument in Egypt, though not in Tunisia so much because we weren’t actually involved at all in Tunisia. But we used the same argument in Egypt and we kept hearing the word “leaderless”. Well, they are leaderless, we don’t know what leaders to deal with, and therefore we delay action. But I suggest that assistance now from the US and its NATO allies, especially Turkey, are very crucial and I’m not saying necessarily direct military participation but I consider the Syrian regime, as one Syrian expert recently said, as a Mafia. There’s no negotiating with them. They’re going to go down fighting and in the process destroy Syria and kill so many more.
Q: So what should support to the rebels look like?
A: My suggestion now, the regime is strong in air and tanks so the rebels, through Turkey perhaps, need to have RPGs against tanks and stringer missiles against planes. They need to even the playing field in those two areas. That is where now the opposition is frustrated. And they need ammunition.
We could recognize a geographic area, something like a safe haven contiguous to Turkey, and then we can deal with this unclear leadership a bit later. We can deal with something now; we can deal with the military, the Free Syrian Army, the political opposition in Turkey. But my point is once we recognize that, then through Turkey we can send humanitarian assistance, medical aid, and other logistical assistance. I say Turkey because then we can go around the Security Council by saying that this is a NATO thing. We are members of NATO and so is Turkey, which could argue it feels threatened by the growing insecurity on its border.
Turkey can act, but we should be wary a bit of Saudi and Qatari support.
Q: Why?
A: Because there is already suppression of the Saudi opposition in that country. They don’t have a clean record and we should not be aligned openly and strongly with a country that is already suppressing its own people and indirectly contributing to the spread of radical Salafism.
Q: But we already are, aren’t we?
A: We are, but to say that Saudi Arabia is supporting the march of democracy and freedom is a bit disingenuous.
Q: But aren’t Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar already assisting the rebels with Turkish logistical assistance and Gulf funds? Does Turkey have the capacity to take over that role or are the Gulf countries necessary financially?
A: No, Turkey can do it. Turkey can accept money from Saudi Arabia but the assistance for and management of the safety security zone should be by Turkey as a NATO member.
Q: What is everyone waiting for then?
A: They are waiting because the West is not pushing and the Russian and Chinese are strenuously objecting to any perceived military action against the Assad regime.
Q: So Turkey is waiting for an okay from the US?
A: Yes, but I’m not going to speak for anyone. But that’s why Turkey initially went to NATO as well and I think NATO’s role can be increased. I don’t mean flying there or doing a no-fly zone and protecting the people through NATO planes as they did in Libya. They’re not going to do that but what they can do is arm the opposition with anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons and the opposition can do the job. That’s an important distinction – it also will keep the Western and NATO powers more free to act.
Q: What about those who argue that best time to do what you suggest has already passed and arming the opposition now will only result in the government cracking down even harder?
A: That argument too is passé. That argument would have been acceptable before the regime began to employ heavy weapons. But the regime now is bombing cities and civilian neighborhoods haphazardly using heavy weapons, tanks, and airplanes.
Q: So a diplomatic resolution is no longer possible?
A: That too has passed because the regime is not interested in negotiating with the opposition. If you listen to their propaganda, the opposition is labeled as foreign terrorists, and yet, what about these thousands of people that have been killed? Most of them are Syrians, they’re not foreigners. Those who are still talking about diplomacy are using it as a delay tactic while providing their own form of assistance. But now it’s time to fully assist the rebels without necessarily putting boots on the ground.
Q: Would you agree that one of the reasons why the Libyan model is not being applied to Syria is because in Libya the assessment was that the intervention would be clean and that the government had close to no support, whereas the situation differs in Syria?
A: No, the Libyan model is not working because of Russian and Chinese opposition in the Security Council. Western powers, including Turkey, can’t get the Security Council to act in Syria. That’s the only reason. The Russians and the Chinese believe they were duped by the Security Council about Libya. They supported the UNSC resolution on Libya because in their view it was meant to protect civilians and then they found out that no, it was about regime change.
Another factor driving Russia’s objection to any action against the Assad regime is that Syria is the only foothold that Russia has in the Eastern Mediterranean. They have a naval base in Tartus. But the time will come when the Russians will decide to flush Assad down the drain. They will eventually realize that the regime has lost credibility among its people. They have lost legitimacy amongst most Arab countries.
What to do? First recognize a safe zone or security zone. Then, two, provide specific military gear, equipment, and appropriate weapons through Turkey, which could include anti-aircraft and tank weaponry.
Q: But just to be clear, what should the US’s role be in all this?
A: Encouragement and logistical and communications support. According to media reports, the US already has contacts with the opposition and is perhaps already providing covert support in the areas of control, command, intelligence, and communications. But basically I don’t expect the US, as we are heading toward the presidential election, to play a major open military role in Syria. Necessary weapons could be provided by Turkey, with NATO’s approval, to help the opposition save their own towns and save lives.
I was never really in favor of direct and massive military action in Syria. I have argued elsewhere that military action should develop gradually. The opposition already controls a safe zone and other geographic areas in rural and urban Syria. When I wrote the FT column, there were no geographic areas that were under the control of the opposition. Now there are areas that the regime does not control. The fact is, well, I don’t know if it’s exaggerated, but take the statement made by the Prime Minister who recently defected, speaking in Jordan, who said the regime now controls 30%. That’s difficult to verify, but most observers agree that there are areas that the regime doesn’t control, next to Turkey, and elsewhere. If that’s true, the opposition obviously controls these areas. So then we can recognize that territory, deal with the opposition that’s there on the ground—civilians and military leadership. We can engage Syrian politicians in Turkey or somewhere else and the Syrian National Council, and then start providing needed support—humanitarian, medical, food, fuel, munitions, etc. in order for the Syrian opposition to be able to defend their own people.
Q: But what about the fact that Syrians themselves are arguing that the politicians who are based in other countries are too disconnected from the uprising on the ground? If this is the case, whom should we deal with?
A: We can speak with opposition elements on the ground, including the Free Syrian Army, army officers who have defected and who are fighting, civilian fighters, including Islamist groups. We shouldn’t hesitate to engage different groups in the opposition because they all share the same goal namely to get rid of the regime. We should be able to have access to opposition groups through the territory they control.
Q: And a goal is to keep the military in tact?
A: Well, keeping the Syrian military in tact after the collapse of the regime is critical. We don’t want a repeat of what happened in Iraq. Two other goals include keeping national civil society institutions functioning and avoid draconian de-Ba’thification measures. In addition, the US can openly work with current and potential high-level defectors through Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.
Q: If the regime does fall, what will happen to groups that were aligned with the Alawite leadership?
A: The Christians have already moved away. It’s like what the Palestinians did with the Arab Spring. The Palestinians would not want to repeat what Arafat did in 1990 with supporting Saddam, which resulted in Kuwait kicking out almost half a million Palestinians. But the Christians have been very quiet and to me the change occurred when Aleppo exploded. In Aleppo, many of the business class tend to be Christians, Armenians, and Sunnis. Aleppo was safe for quite a while as far as the regime was concerned. After Assad’s fall, the new government, which presumably will be dominated by Sunni Muslims, should reach out and include representatives of the religious and ethnic minorities in governance. Inclusion in decision-making at the highest level will guarantee success in Syria, a country known for its cultural, ethnic, and religious mosaic.
Q: What about the Shia?
A: The Shia is a very small minority; I am afraid the major backlash will be against the Alawites. Not necessarily the poor Alawites, but the wealthy ones who have been the security and financial backbone of the regime. The backlash will also be directed against the ruling family. If the regime persists in its bloody crackdown, its fate will be similar to what happened to the Hashemites in Iraq in 1958. Leaders of the Hashemite monarchy were killed and dragged down the streets because of their perceived suppression of their people. The Assad family runs the country like a Mafia organization through repression, fear, corruption, patronage, and the security apparatus, much like what Saleh did in Yemen. So there will be violence after the regime collapses, including forced population flight and even ethnic cleansing, especially in rural areas.
Q: Will the push come after the US presidential election?
A: Possibly; I don’t think much will be done before the Presidential election until the administration receives information about movement or the use of chemical and biological weapons by the regime or agents of the regime. As the President indicated recently, he would use the military option against the regime should Assad become desperate and use chemical and biological weapons against his people. I don’t know how long the regime will last. I have always thought it won’t survive beyond the end of 2012.
Q: Where could they go though? Won’t Assad fight to the death?
A: There are very few places available to them unless it’s part of a deal. It’s not just one person. It’s a whole family. His brother – is the butcher of Damascus – cousins, in-laws, etc. the more besieged they feel, the more violently they act. But I don’t think Assad is going anywhere. His wife can go to the UK because she’s a UK citizen, but I don’t think he will go anywhere.
Q: So the rebels don’t have a chance unless they get a no-fly zone and more arms?
A: Well, the no-fly zone could have been a step in arming the rebels with weapons. So once the opposition is able to neutralize the regime’s massive force machine, they would be able to fight without overt outside help. This way you would be able to avoid the legal issues involved in officially declaring a no-fly zone. The assistance would then come from NATO, not the UN Security Council, which would sideline through Russian and Chinese objections.
Q: You say the regime won’t last beyond 2012, do you consider the high-level defections a main indicator of that?
A: I do. The regime is losing territory, legitimacy and even security. To see bombs explode in the heart of the security structure in Damascus is a clear sign the regime is losing control. It is being attacked and penetrated. Not even Syrians buy the regime argument that this is a foreign, terrorist-backed struggle. There may be foreign terrorists, but they didn’t start the struggle and they are not the ones who are keeping it going.
Q: If more is not done to assist the rebels do you think they will turn to those forces?
A: As a matter of fact, some rebels are already making this argument, namely that if they don’t get weapons from the West, they would accept them from any source, including terrorist groups. The point is that this regime is creating an environment that is conducive to terrorists and bringing in the Jihadists. And the Saudis are doing the same thing they did in Afghanistan in the 80s and in Iraq and Bahrain more recently. The Saudi and Bahraini governments are looking the other way when some of their own Salafis go to Syria. The head of a Bahraini Salafi group recently met with Syrian opposition in Syria. It’s a dangerous game that the Saudis are playing.
But the fact is, as Rami Khouri argued in a column last week in the Daily Star, Syrians have a civil society, they are educated, sophisticated people who have state structures, civil society structures. It’s not tribal like Libya, so they will be able to restructure after the fall.
The issue is really with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. However, to run a government, they would have to play a role like the Egyptian or Tunisian Muslim Brotherhoods. Other centers of power in Syrian society, and the Syrian MB will have to compete. I’m not really worried about this. Raising fears of Islamists and similar issues is more of an excuse not to act. That doesn’t mean there are no Salafis or Al Qaeda types in Syria. Unfortunately, the Saudis and other Gulfies have encouraged radical Sunni groups to enter Syria in the name of fighting Shia, Alawites, Iran, and Hezbollah.
A: But I’m still unclear as to why the US is even staying away from giving a go-ahead to Turkey.
Q: The US wants to have international legal legitimacy and that comes through the UN Security Council; they’ve tried time and again only to have resolutions vetoed by the Russians and Chinese. That’s why Ambassador Susan Rice gets so irritated in her comments against the Russians.
A: What can the US do to convince Russia to stop striking down those resolutions?
Q: Until Russia reaches a point where it’s convinced that Assad is finished, it’s not going to abandon him. It’s like when we were convinced that Mubarak was finished, we abandoned him. Russia hasn’t reached that point yet. And that’s a misreading of the situation because I am convinced that the regime is finished.
Q: Should Iran be involved with a solution for Syria?
A: I think the fall of Assad will produce the consequence of the breakdown of what I call the trilateral axis of resistance – Iran, Syria and Hezbollah. Iran shouldn’t necessarily be involved because it’s already not a neutral partner – it’s a major ally of the Syrian regime. And, it’s no longer about politics and negotiations; it’s about the precipitous fall of the regime. So what role could Iran play? They are propping up the regime, they’re not going to assist its fall.
Q: There was an article in the Washington Post last week arguing that sanctions against Syria were “hindering the opposition”. What’s your take on that?
A: Sanctions are only effective against individuals and it’s interesting how quickly the Syrian Prime Minister’s name was taken off the sanctions list after he defected. So that’s a weapon to encourage some of the top people to defect. But sanctions are not hindering the opposition. They are not getting financing through banking and so on. But if the regime is intent on continuing its current method of survival, sanctions aren’t going to affect the regime either way.
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