via IPS News
While some kind of U.S. military action against Syria in the coming days appears increasingly inevitable, the debate over the why and how of such an attack has grown white hot here.
On one side, hawks, who span the political spectrum, argue that President Barack Obama’s credibility [...]]]>
via IPS News
While some kind of U.S. military action against Syria in the coming days appears increasingly inevitable, the debate over the why and how of such an attack has grown white hot here.
On one side, hawks, who span the political spectrum, argue that President Barack Obama’s credibility is at stake, especially now that Secretary of State John Kerry has publicly endorsed the case that the government of President Bashar Al-Assad must have been responsible for the alleged chemical attack on a Damascus suburb that was reported to have killed hundreds of people.
Just one year ago, Obama warned that the regime’s use of such weapons would cross a “red line” and constitute a “game-changer” that would force Washington to reassess its policy of not providing direct military aid to rebels and of avoiding military action of its own.
After U.S. intelligence confirmed earlier this year that government forces had on several occasions used limited quantities of chemical weapons against insurgents, the administration said it would begin providing arms to opposition forces, although rebels complain that nothing has yet materialised.
The hawks have further argued that U.S. military action is also necessary to demonstrate that the most deadly use of chemical weapons since the 1988 Halabja massacre by Iraqi forces against the Kurdish population there – a use of which the US. was fully aware but did not denounce at the time – will not go unpunished.
Military action should be “sufficiently large that it would underscore the message that chemical weapons as a weapon of mass destruction simply cannot be used with impunity,” said Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), told reporters in a teleconference Monday. “The audience here is not just the Syrian government.”
While the hawks, whose position is strongly backed by the governments of Britain, France, Gulf Arab kingdoms and Israel, clearly have the wind at their backs, the doves have not given up.
Remembering Iraq
Recalling the mistakes and distortions of U.S. intelligence in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq War, some argue that the administration is being too hasty in blaming the Syrian government.
If it waits until United Nations inspectors, who visited the site of the alleged attack Monday, complete their work, the United States could at least persuade other governments that Washington is not short-circuiting a multilateral process as it did in Iraq.
Many also note that military action could launch an escalation that Washington will not necessarily be able to control, as noted by a prominent neo-conservative hawk, Eliot Cohen, in Monday’s Washington Post.
“Chess players who think one move ahead usually lose; so do presidents who think they can launch a day or two of strikes and then walk away with a win,” wrote Cohen, who served as counsellor to former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. “The other side, not we, gets to decide when it ends.”
“What if [Obama] hurls cruise missiles at a few key targets, and Assad does nothing and says, ‘I’m still winning.’ What do you then?” asked Col. Lawrence Wilkerson (ret.), who served for 16 years as chief of staff to former Secretary of State Colin Powell. “Do you automatically escalate and go up to a no-fly zone and the challenges that entails, and what then if that doesn’t get [Assad's] attention?
“This is fraught with tar-babiness,” he told IPS in a reference to an African-American folk fable about how Br’er Rabbit becomes stuck to a doll made of tar. “You stick in your hand, and you can’t get it out, so you then you stick in your other hand, and pretty soon you’re all tangled up all this mess – and for what?”
“Certainly there are more vital interests in Iran than in Syria,” he added. “You can’t negotiate with Iran if you start bombing Syria,” he said, a point echoed by the head of the National Iranian American Council, Trita Parsi.
“There is a real opportunity for successful diplomacy on the Iranian nuclear issue, but that opportunity will either be completely spoiled or undermined if the U.S. intervention in Syria puts the U.S. and Iran in direct combat with each other,” he told IPS. Humanitarian concerns and U.S. credibility should also be taken into account when considering intervention, he said.
Remembering Kosovo
Still, the likelihood of military action – almost certainly through the use of airpower since even the most aggressive hawks, such as Republican Senators John McCain and Lindsay Graham, have ruled out the commitment of ground troops – is being increasingly taken for granted here.
Lingering questions include whether Washington will first ask the United Nations Security Council to approve military action, despite the strong belief here that Russia, Assad’s most important international supporter and arms supplier, and China would veto such a resolution.
“Every time we bypass the council for fear of a Russian or Chinese veto, we drive a stake into the heart of collective security,” noted Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association. “Long-term, that’s not in our interest.”
But the hawks, both inside the administration and out, are urging Obama to follow the precedent of NATO’s air campaign in 1999 against Serbia during the Kosovo War. In that case, President Bill Clinton ignored the U.N. and persuaded his NATO allies to endorse military intervention on humanitarian grounds.
The 78-day air war ultimately persuaded Yugoslav President Milosovic to withdraw his troops from most of Kosovo province, but not before NATO forces threatened to deploy ground troops, a threat that the Obama administration would very much like to avoid in the case of Syria.
While the administration is considered most likely to carry out “stand-off” strikes by cruise missiles launched from outside Syria’s territory to avoid its more formidable air-defence system and thus minimise the risk to U.S. pilots, there remains considerable debate as to what should be included in the target list.
Some hawks, including McCain and Graham, have called not only for Washington to bomb Syrian airfields and destroy its fleet of warplanes and helicopter and ballistic capabilities, but also to establish no-fly zones and safe areas for civilians and rebel forces to tilt the balance of power decisively against the Assad government. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia, have urged the same.
But others oppose such far-reaching measures, noting that the armed opposition appears increasingly dominated by radical Islamists, some of them affiliated with Al Qaeda, and that the aim of any military intervention should be not only to deter the future use of chemical weapons but also to prod Assad and the more moderate opposition forces into negotiations, as jointly proposed this spring by Moscow and Washington. In their view, any intervention should be more limited so as not to provoke Assad into escalating the conflict.
Photo: Secretary of State John Kerry delivers remarks on Syria at the Department of State in Washington, DC, on August 26, 2013. Credit: State Department
]]>Watching the Syrian debate in Washington, one is dismayed by the focus on whether Sarin gas has been used or not. As if 80,000 dead and over two million refugees are not a sufficient reason for the administration to act.
Some foreign policy experts have publicly counseled President Obama to remain [...]]]>
Watching the Syrian debate in Washington, one is dismayed by the focus on whether Sarin gas has been used or not. As if 80,000 dead and over two million refugees are not a sufficient reason for the administration to act.
Some foreign policy experts have publicly counseled President Obama to remain steadfast against getting involved in Syria either because such involvement is fraught with uncertainty or because it could make things worse. Such advice reflects a lack of expertise in minority dictatorial regimes in the region or a callous adherence to Realpolitik.
Diplomacy and so-called negotiations have not and will not work because minority autocratic regimes—whether brutal as in Syria and or a bit less so as in Bahrain—have not shown any genuine interest in including their people in running the country. Power sharing usually equates with accountability and transparency, which neither the Syrian Alawite ruling clique nor the Bahraini Al-Khalifa family are eager to pursue.
Minority rulers in Syria and Bahrain view their respective countries as their fiefdoms. As such, they consider themselves immune from public scrutiny and are not required to consult with their people in the decision making process.
The Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi peace plans for Syria presumably based on negotiations have failed because Assad has refused to negotiate with “terrorists,” a word he uses to describe all opposition forces. On-going attempts by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and his Russian counterpart to start talks between the Assad regime and the opposition also are destined to fail because of Assad’s determination to fight to the finish.
The Bahraini anemic “dialogue” also has reached a dead end because of the monarchy’s lukewarm commitment to the whole process of dialogue. In a recent media interview, King Hamad described pro-reform activists in Bahrain as “terrorists.” He likened them to “those involved in the Boston bombings.” In the same interview, he denied the existence of weekly protests in Bahrain. With this mindset, it’s no wonder the much-touted dialogue has gotten nowhere.
The Obama administration must act now in Syria for moral and national interest reasons. Now, not till another “red line” is crossed by the regime. Such action does not necessarily mean involvement with boots on the ground. It does mean, however, helping level the playing field for the Free Syrian Army and other opposition groups in their uprising against the preponderant power of the regime.
In addition to non-lethal support, the US and its Western allies should provide the opposition with heavy weaponry to counteract the regime’s tanks and airplanes.
Hesitancy to act now threats American long-term strategic interests in the region and poses a serious moral dilemma for the Obama administration. It also raises a number of questions:
How many more thousands of Syrians must to be killed before the regime crosses the so-called red line? Why should the red line be determined by a few canisters of Sarin gas and not by 80,000 dead? Who has the moral legitimacy to decide which is which before the international community declares enough is enough? And why is death by conventional weapons less abhorrent than death by a chemical weapon, such as Sarin gas?”
From a national-interest perspective, the United States and its Western allies must help bring down the Assad regime sooner than later. Such an outcome will certainly result in breaking up the anti-Western tripartite axis of Iran, Syria, and Hizballah.
Some foreign policy experts who oppose any form of involvement have advanced the specious argument that getting involved in the Syrian conflict would make things much worse and would embroil the whole region in the conflict.
The fact is Assad’s brutality continues to kill more Syrians, and Iran and Hizballah remain deeply involved in supporting the regime. Turkey, Jordan, Israel, and Lebanon are already being affected by the conflict. Iran and Saudi Arabia seem to view the Syrian civil war as a proxy war between them.
What is even more alarming for the West is the recent public admission by Hizballah’s head Hassan Nasrallah that his organization is fighting on Assad’s side. Claiming that Hizballah would not allow the Assad regime to fall, Nasrallah indicated Assad would provide Hizballah with “game-changing” weapons. According to media reports, such weapons could refer to long-range rockets or chemical weapons.
Obtaining and potentially using such weapons would certainly drag Syria’s neighbors into the conflict regardless of whether or not the West would arm the opposition with more lethal weapons.
Equally disturbing is the growing role and presence of Sunni radical jihadists in Syria. Their significance will rise as the conflict remains unresolved. Many of these so-called jihadists are not Syrian. The longer the conflict continues, however, the more they are able to penetrate the country and fill the power vacuum caused by the brutality of the regime and its diminishing authority.
The West must act before al-Qa’ida and affiliated franchise terrorist organizations acquire a foothold in Syria and claim the country their own. By empowering the Free Syrian Army through advanced weaponry to face down the regime, the jihadists would become marginalized and their influence as the primary fighting force would wane.
The situation in Syria is already bad and promises to get much worse. Contrary to the advice of experts and talking heads, arming the opposition with adequate weapons to bring down the regime sooner rather than later arguably could improve the situation and save Syria from further destruction. It could also show Iran and Hizballah that banking on a discredited brutal dictator is a losing proposition.
For peace talks to have the slimmest chance of success, Assad and his closest senior supporters within the regime must leave the country. This is a necessary step before Syrian stakeholders could contemplate a post-Assad Syria. Unfortunately, however, the history of minority dictatorial regimes tells us that such regimes rarely if ever yield power voluntarily or peacefully.
Assad does not contemplate a “retirement” in the Saudi “Palace of the Deposed” in Jedda or in a Russian dacha by the Black Sea. With this in mind, any talk of a peaceful settlement leading to regime change in Syria is no more than a pipedream.
Photo: Boys in Al Raqqa, Syria, Apr. 11, 2013. Credit: Beshroffline/cc by 2.0
]]>by Wayne White
A sampling of the May 5 American Sunday talk shows demonstrated graphically the intense pressure mounting on the White House to move forward with potentially risky military options aimed at hastening the end of the crisis in Syria.
Embedded in much of the criticism of (or impatience with) [...]]]>
by Wayne White
A sampling of the May 5 American Sunday talk shows demonstrated graphically the intense pressure mounting on the White House to move forward with potentially risky military options aimed at hastening the end of the crisis in Syria.
Embedded in much of the criticism of (or impatience with) current US policy since last month’s accusations of Syrian chemical weapons (CW) use has been a misreading of the “red line” established by President Obama last August, flawed connectivity between the objective of Israel’s most recent air strikes vs. US concerns, and minimizing the unpredictability of the future course of the complex maelstrom in Syria.
One figure stands out among those pushing for robust US military action: Senator John McCain. On a talk show yesterday, Sen. McCain declared that the President’s CW red line on Syria “was apparently written in disappearing ink” (one of the harshest comments related to the red line to date). McCain and many others of varied political views essentially have been pushing the president to take strong action in response to two or, at most, three (as yet not fully confirmed) instances of CW use by the regime.
In fact, the President’s red line of August 2012 was defined as follows: “when we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized, that would change my calculus.” [emphasis mine]
By that definition, it would appear the administration’s critics, not the White House, have been attempting to reshape the original red line from a rather high bar to a considerably lower one.
Other canards circulating since Israel’s weekend airstrikes in the Damascus area have been assertions that they should increase pressure on Washington to act and to discredit comments by US Joint Chiefs Chairman General Martin Dempsey and other experts that Syria’s robust air defenses pose a far more serious challenge than did Libya’s.
Sen. McCain appeared dismissive of Gen. Dempsey’s remarks, commenting: “The Israelis seem to be able to penetrate” them “fairly easily.” Yet, there is quite a difference between a few isolated air strikes not very far into Syria and the establishment of a comprehensive no-fly zone or a far more ambitious prolonged campaign of rolling air strikes deep inside Syrian airspace.
Those interested in this debate also should bear in mind that Israel’s narrow military objective to date of blocking Lebanon’s Hezbollah from receiving long-range Fateh-110 missiles being shipped through Syria by Iran is quite different than US and NATO concerns relating to Syria’s sprawling CW arsenal and the issue of how best to assist the Syrian rebels to hasten the fall of the Assad regime.
While even a few isolated, small-scale instances of regime CW use would be ample reason for international concern, it could be that President Bashar al-Assad and other Syrian leaders currently are not under the same amount of pressure to resort to such extreme measures as they might have been a short while ago.
For reasons not quite understood, government forces have shown some renewed vigor in taking on the rebels with the regime’s formidable array of conventional weapons. It is this disturbing development on the broader Syrian battlefield that should be the principal driver behind any consideration of better arming the rebels. Doing so, however (something I also tended to favor over a year ago), has been complicated greatly since early last year by the increased role of al-Qaeda-affiliated Muslim extremists in the fight against the Assad regime.
To make matters worse, last month the direct affiliation between many of them and al-Qaeda was made public. A May 3 Reuters article states: “Israelis believe one in ten of the rebels is a jihadi.”
Nonetheless, one thing is certain: even if their numbers are that small, extremist rebels are providing a disproportionately large number of the opposition’s most effective combat units. It also could be true that their numbers are quite a bit higher than a mere tenth of rebel combatants.
Moreover, selectively arming only “vetted” rebel groups (those less extreme) is unlikely to be as easy or as useful as those pressing for such a course seem to be claiming. First off, there is the likelihood that some groups would succeed in persuading outside powers they are more moderate than they really are. Then there is what I have termed the Catch-22 aspect that would result even if such a selective arms distribution could be achieved: many groups moderate enough to qualify for arms are not nearly as important in altering the balance of power inside Syria more in favor of the rebels than are the extremists.
Finally, there are the unintended consequences of military intervention in Syria. If the result of Muammar al-Qadhafi’s fall in Libya has been continuing instability and violence driven home to Americans by the tragic events in Benghazi last September, post-Assad Syria could prove an even nastier place. Muslim extremists (al-Qaeda itself no less) would be among the key players.
Making matters worse, seething sectarian divides — with the very real danger of Sunni vengeance resulting in further bloodletting and possibly the flight from Syria of several million Alawite and Christian refugees — threatens to stain the aftermath quite darkly.
Still, that has not stopped Sen. McCain (who so fervently backed US intervention in Libya, but now rails on about the deadly events in Benghazi despite the uncertain challenge posed by post-Qadhafi chaos), from advocating US military involvement in the even messier situation in Syria.
It is no wonder, all other reasons aside, that the Obama administration might want to think long and hard about military intervention: many pushing so hard now for the US to wade boldly into such troubled waters probably would turn on the White House in a heartbeat should ill come of any aspect of American engagement in Syria (as it likely would in one form or another). Thus are the inevitable consequences of such a risky business — the unexpected.
]]>by Dina Esfandiary
In a letter to Congress last week, the White House confirmed “with varying degrees of confidence” that chemical weapons had been used in Syria. This has led to a flurry of assertions that something must now be done – Bashar al-Assad’s crimes cannot [...]]]>
by Dina Esfandiary
In a letter to Congress last week, the White House confirmed “with varying degrees of confidence” that chemical weapons had been used in Syria. This has led to a flurry of assertions that something must now be done – Bashar al-Assad’s crimes cannot go unpunished. But is there enough information to justify action? More importantly, can the US and the rest of the international community actually do much?
The quick answer to both questions is no.
The UK and France have obtained samples from inside Syria that have tested positive for traces of a Sarin by-product. Videos and pictures show victims suffering symptoms similar to those caused by certain chemical weapons (although foaming of the mouth is not usually a symptom of Sarin exposure). The information has been corroborated with witness testimonies. This is credible but not definitive.
There is no information about the exact location or timing of the alleged attack. The physiological samples show individuals were exposed but they do not clarify where, when or how. This makes it difficult to ascertain whether it was an actual attack or just an accidental release of agents from a broken or lost canister.
The samples and interviews do not point the finger at Assad in any definitive manner. It would be reasonable to assume the agents came from the regime — after all, Assad has spent the last four decades developing his chemical weapons arsenal into the biggest in the Middle East. But the evidence is not unequivocal. If intentional, it is possible the agents were released by a rogue general or rebels that have somehow come across Sarin canisters. Unlikely, perhaps, but not impossible.
The limited scale of the alleged attack also raises a number of questions. Why risk large-scale international retribution for such a small result? Chemical weapons are effective weapons of terror, but Assad is not short of means of terrorizing his enemies. Why run the risk of intervention for so little gain? Especially at a time when US policy priority has shifted from deposing Assad to ensuring Islamists do not come to power in Syria.
The uncertainty surrounding these allegations and the small scale of the alleged attack make it difficult to say for certain that Assad has crossed the US’ red line. “Suspicions are one thing; evidence is another”, said Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel last week.
But the problems do not stop there. If the allegations are proven correct, the options for responding are not attractive.
Some Israeli officials have called for military action to “curb” Syria’s chemical weapons. But this is different (and much more difficult) than military action in response to the use of chemical weapons. A military response to the alleged crossing of the red line could include air strikes on Syrian military installations (rather than just chemical weapons facilities) for example. But using air strikes to secure Syria’s chemical weapons is risky, especially when the location and size of the facilities are unconfirmed. More importantly, what if as a result of the airstrikes, some of the agents were released into the atmosphere? The consequences would be devastating. Add to that Syria’s robust air defences and the possibility that some munitions will survive and be open to looting, and doing nothing suddenly looks like a good idea.
The other option is to send troops in. But the lack of accurate intelligence on the location and size of Syria’s stockpiles makes this difficult. In a sea of uncertainty, the one thing the international community is sure of is that Assad’s stockpiles are large (the largest in the Middle East) and dispersed. In fact, so much so that in November, the Pentagon told the White House that upward of 75,000 troops would be needed to secure Syria’s chemical weapons. Is the US ready for another invasion of a Middle Eastern country and a treasure hunt to find all facilities and stockpiles in the context of civil war, where foreign troops would be a prime target?
It is difficult to idly sit by while the crisis in Syria escalates. But the US and the international community cannot jump into another war in the region based on assumptions. And given the existing circumstances and options, securing Syria’s chemical weapon stockpiles will require more persuasion and negotiation than brute force.
– Dina Esfandiary is a Research Associate and foreign affairs and security analyst focusing on Iran, the Middle East and nuclear issues at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).
Photo: Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel briefs the press in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, on April 25, 2013. Hagel announced that the White House released a statement that it has evidence that Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad has used chemical weapons against the Syrian rebels. DoD photo by Erin A. Kirk-Cuomo.
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