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IPS Writers in the Blogosphere » shale http://www.ips.org/blog/ips Turning the World Downside Up Tue, 26 May 2020 22:12:16 +0000 en-US hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.5.1 It’s Egypt That Needs Higher Oil Prices http://www.ips.org/blog/ips/its-egypt-that-needs-higher-oil-prices/ http://www.ips.org/blog/ips/its-egypt-that-needs-higher-oil-prices/#comments Tue, 16 Dec 2014 07:08:36 +0000 Thomas Lippman http://www.lobelog.com/?p=27417 by Thomas W. Lippman

The country that could ultimately suffer the most damage from a sustained depression in the world price of oil could be one that is not a major producer: Egypt.

Unable to sustain itself, Egypt is being propped up by big infusions of cash from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Those two oil states, closely aligned with the Cairo government headed by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, could afford to be generous in their commitments when they were taking in $100 a barrel, just a few months ago.

With the price now down to about $60 and unlikely to rise much over the next year at least, it becomes an open question how long it will take for the two Gulf states’ domestic needs to overtake their support for Egypt.

The Saudis and the Emiratis understand that Egypt is an economic “bottomless pit,” according to Gregory Gause, a specialist in the Gulf monarchies at Texas A&M University. There have been no indications so far that they are contemplating a pullback from Egypt, but it becomes more likely the longer lower prices squeeze their oil revenue, Gause said.

Saudi Arabia’s equanimity so far in the face of the plunging price of the commodity that supports most of its public spending reflects multiple policy interests. If the falling price discourages further development of high-cost new oil sources such as shale in the United States, deep-sea wells off Brazil’s coast, or new fields in the Russian Arctic, that helps Saudi Arabia maintain its market share, a declared objective.

And the Saudis seem quite content as the price contraction inflicts economic damage on damage on Iran, their great regional rival, and on Russia, which has incurred Riyadh’s displeasure by supporting the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, to whose ouster the Saudis are committed. Egypt, however, is another matter because Sisi has become a major ally of Saudi Arabia and the Emirates in the regional struggle against the Islamic State and other extremist groups.

In a paper distributed last week, Fahad Alturki, head of research at Jadwa Investment Group in Riyadh, predicted that Saudi Arabia will maintain its current levels of spending at least for a while because it has “foreign reserves of more than 95 percent of GDP and a public debt of less than 2 percent of GDP.” Even at today’s prices, he said, the kingdom is likely to show a balance of payments surplus next year and fall into deficit only in 2016.

If the Saudi government did decide to cut spending, however, external aid would probably be one of the first targets, Alturki said.

Oil prices were already descending rapidly because of declining global demand and inventory surpluses when the members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries decided last month not to reduce their production to stabilize the price. That decision sent the price down still further to the apparent satisfaction of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which have very deep pockets. Platts Oilgram, a trade journal, reported that “Saudi oil minister Ali Naimi left the summit all smiles, telling reporters that rolling over the 30 million b/d production ceiling was ‘a great decision.’”

The most immediate losers from the price decline are the large producing countries that need the cash to sustain their current operations. According to Alturki’s paper, these include Russia, which needs a price of $107 a barrel to support its budget; Venezuela, which needs $120; and Iran, which needs $127. Alturki’s “baseline” price projection for the next two years is $83 to $85 per barrel. Oil prices are notoriously hard to predict, but his figures are in line with several other analyses that have been published in the past few weeks.

Egypt’s problem is different, and harder to solve. The country produces about 700,000 barrels of oil a day, and its output has declined steadily from a peak of 900,000 barrels in the 1990s, according to the US Energy Information Administration. (Worldwide production is about 92 million barrels.) Almost all of Egypt’s output is consumed domestically by its population of about 80 million.

Because it is not an oil exporter, Egypt depends on other sources of hard-currency revenue to support itself; mostly Suez Canal tolls, cotton exports, and tourism. The tourist trade, however, has dwindled to a trickle over the past few years because of the country’s political upheavals, leaving the country short of cash to pay for imported food and other necessities.

According to Arabian Business magazine, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia committed aid with more than $12 billion in cash grants, no-interest loans, and refined petroleum products in 2014 alone. Kuwait, another major Gulf oil exporter with a small population, kicked in another $4 billion, the magazine reported.

Saudi Arabia pledged to support Sisi almost immediately after he ousted the former president, Mohamed Morsi, in 2013. Morsi had been elected as the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood, which both Egypt and Saudi Arabia have since outlawed. In June, Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah reportedly declared that any country that did not join in supporting Egypt would “have no future place among us.” But the king is also doling out tens of billions of dollars in salary increases, new social benefits and housing programs that he extended to his own citizens during the regional uprisings of 2011. He is also paying for massive infrastructure projects such as a new metro rail network for Riyadh and a mammoth new port on the Red Sea. Even Saudi Arabia can’t keep it up indefinitely at $60 a barrel.

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Explainer: The Oil Price Plunge http://www.ips.org/blog/ips/explainer-the-oil-price-plunge/ http://www.ips.org/blog/ips/explainer-the-oil-price-plunge/#comments Thu, 16 Oct 2014 13:29:19 +0000 Sara Vakhshouri http://www.lobelog.com/?p=26600 via Lobelog

by Sara Vakhshouri

In the past several days—despite the conflicts affecting Iraq, Syria, Iran and Russia—oil prices have been on a downward trend, hitting their lowest number in the past four years. As of October 2014, oil prices are more than 20 percent lower than June. This trend started with Saudi Arabia reducing its crude oil prices without cutting its production—the result of a strategic shift in Saudi policy. Previously, the swing producer in the market would maintain a general higher price range. Now it has shifted to increasing market shares by offering lower prices to its customers. Iran, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Iraq also followed the kingdom’s lead and offered discounts on their crude oil in order to maintain their market share.

This raises a number of interesting points. On the one hand, the acceleration of higher energy efficiency, combined with higher energy prices, the economic crisis in Europe and lower economic growth in China have all put pressure on overall energy demand growth. On the other hand, the global energy supply has had a bullish growth mainly because of the shale oil boom in North America and Iraqi oil output. Yet the lower growth of demand and the higher rate of supply growth have both altered concerns over energy security paradigms, shifting from the security of supply to concerns about the security of demand and the profitability of oil production (in the case of unconventional oil). Keen competition among producers to maintain market share, concerns over the unconventional oil production’s profitability, and the effect of lower oil prices on oil dependent economies are all consequences of this broader change in the balance between supply and demand in global energy markets.

Stabilizing the Demand

Although it might take longer to see the real effects of lower oil prices on global oil demand growth, lower oil prices will have a positive effect on the demand side. Lower prices could particularly strengthen the demand in countries that lack fuel subsidy regimes as price fluctuations may have a more tangible effect on consumers.

Oil Dependent Economies

The economies of conventional oil producing countries (particularly OPEC producers such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq) are highly dependent on oil for around 80 percent of their national budgets. There is a close correlation between oil prices and their fiscal maneuverability. For example, Russia, Nigeria, Bahrain, Venezuela and Iran have national budgets that work under a scenario of $100 per barrel of oil. Saudi Arabia’s budget for 2014 is meanwhile based on oil at $90 per barrel, and remaining OPEC members have set their 2014 budgets according to a $70 per barrel range. The current drop in prices has the potential to negatively affect some of these countries’ economies. But on the flip side, it could also encourage them to reduce their dependency on oil revenue in the medium to long-term. Lower oil prices also reduce the gap between global market prices and local prices, decreasing the amount of subsidies these countries have to pay for domestic fuel consumption.

Unconventional Oil Production

The extraction of unconventional resources does not only require a high level of technological proficiency, it is also very costly compared to conventional production. For most of the United States’ tight oil resources to be economically developed and produced, oil prices should remain at least around $70 per barrel in the long-term. With current costs, it is expected that the overall tight oil production will drop to about 20 percent with a downturn of oil prices below $70 per barrel. If oil prices drop below the range of economically profitable production, the drilling of new wells, for maintaining production levels, will mostly stop and tight oil production will reduce significantly within a period of between three to six months. The more recent price drops have reduced the profit margin of investment in US unconventional oil resources and have reduced the gap between current global oil prices to shale oil production costs to about only $20 per barrel. This has raised concerns for investors and could affect the likelihood of their further investment in unconventional oil extraction.

Back to Iran?

As I mentioned earlier, the costs of unconventional oil extraction are much higher than conventional oil production, particularly in the Persian Gulf region. Lower profit margins due to lower oil market prices could divert investor attention and interest back to conventional oil production in the Persian Gulf. Sanctions aside, Iran could possibly benefit from this situation due to the political and security crisis in Iraq. Indeed, due to the ongoing attacks by Daesh (ISIS or ISIL) in Iraq, most international investors have left the country. Iran, with its new investment regulations, could accordingly attract foreign investors to its energy industry once again. However, lower oil prices and high competition among the major oil producers to maintain and increase market shares could increase the stakes in maintaining the limitations on Iran’s oil exports and prevent this country from increasing its production.

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Russia, China Finally Sign $400 Billion Energy Deal: Why Now? http://www.ips.org/blog/ips/russia-china-finally-sign-400-billion-energy-deal-why-now/ http://www.ips.org/blog/ips/russia-china-finally-sign-400-billion-energy-deal-why-now/#comments Thu, 22 May 2014 12:02:41 +0000 Sara Vakhshouri http://www.ips.org/blog/ips/russia-china-finally-sign-400-billion-energy-deal-why-now/ via LobeLog

by Sara Vakhshouri

After almost a decade of negotiations, Moscow reached a 400 billion dollar energy deal with Beijing yesterday, allowing the Russian state-controlled Gazprom to export gas to China for 30 years.

The key agreement guarantees long-term market access for Russian gas in the Asian market, where Russia has historically had [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Sara Vakhshouri

After almost a decade of negotiations, Moscow reached a 400 billion dollar energy deal with Beijing yesterday, allowing the Russian state-controlled Gazprom to export gas to China for 30 years.

The key agreement guarantees long-term market access for Russian gas in the Asian market, where Russia has historically had a negligible market share. The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) will meanwhile receive discounted gas prices for the duration of the contract.

Yet the logistics are daunting. For Russian gas to actually arrive in China, Russia has to invest $55 billion in exploration and pipeline construction. For its part, China has to provide $20 billion for gas development and infrastructure. Ultimately, the gas will be transported to China through a pipeline in the Siberian gas field. The flow of gas to China is scheduled to start in 2018, and will gradually increase to 38 billion cubic meters (bcm) a year. The exported volume could be increase to 60 bcm a year.

There has been much speculation as to why the two countries finally agreed to the mega-deal after so many years of not being able to find common ground. Analysts have pointed to a Russian desire to counter the growing Western pressure it faces, to a China that’s now desperately seeking long-term access to clean and discounted energy.

The agreed gas prices have not been announced yet, but the pricing method is similar to the European price formula, which is tied to crude oil prices. Russia obviously would not want to sell its gas at prices that are lower than those it offers Europe, between $350-$380 per thousand cubic meters. But China would not agree to higher prices; this is a long-term deal, and with expected growth in North American shale gas production, markets generally expect a downward price trend.

Another reason China expects lower prices is that it is in the early stages of producing gas from its own shale reserves, particularly from the three basins of Sichuan, Yangtze Platform and Tarim.

In 2013, the Energy Information Agency (EIA) estimated that China possessed 1,115 trillion cubic feet (31 trillion cubic meters) of technically recoverable shale gas. That same year China produced 7.1 billion cubic feet (200 million cubic meters) of natural gas from shale formations. This puts China in the third place of shale gas producing countries after the US and Canada.
Russia, however, sees things differently. Although Russian gas prices in Europe are too low to be replicable with other alternatives, this deal still undermines broader Western attempts to isolate Russia’s economy. President Vladimir Putin knows very well that low gas prices to Europe make it a relatively unattractive destination, particularly for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) shipments. But American LNG cannot be shipped to Europe at the same prices Russia offers — here again, logistics is the main issue.

Iranian natural gas is also not an option for Europe at present. Iran’s low natural gas export capacity makes it impossible for Tehran to be able to compete with Moscow in this market.

All this explains Putin’s plan for the Asian market: securing market share and access in Asia for the long-term by offering low gas prices. Russia is preparing to compete with US supplies in Asia, a region that potentially could become a major market for US shale gas and condensate. Indeed, the 30-year gas export deal between Gazprom and CNPC not only ensures the security of demand for Russian gas, it also allows Russia to compete with the US by sending its gas to Asia via pipeline at a time when the prospects of LNG exports from this country do not look very promising.

This landmark deal will also help Russia recover from its budgetary issues and partial revenue loss from the European market in the short- and long-term. In other words, Russia’s geopolitical influence in Asia will increase at a time when, due to Moscow’s actions in Ukraine, Europe has lost its trust in Russia as a long-term and reliable energy supplier.

For the Chinese, promoting natural gas is a top priority for their economic and energy policy strategies. Securing long-term access to Russian discounted natural gas therefore occupies an important place in Beijing’s energy security plan. Access to natural gas transferred via pipeline not only offers price advantages in comparison to LNG imports, it also reduces Chinese dependency on international waters. This will significantly reduce the transportation risks of energy flow to this country.

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