by Shireen T. Hunter
In the past two weeks, relations between Tehran and Islamabad appear to have deteriorated again over border clashes and terrorist attacks in Iran’s Sistan and Baluchistan province located close to the Pakistani-Iranian border. Unlike past tensions, which were caused by the activities of the Sunni extremist Baluchi group, Jundallah, and later by some of its offshoots including Jaish ul-Adl, the current trouble, according to Pakistani officials, resulted from the killing of a Pakistani Frontier Corps member last week by Iranian border forces.
Beyond this particular incident, which has raised the temperature between the two countries, the latest efforts by Sunni militants to enter Iran has caused greater concerns than in past because, according to statements by Iranian authorities, some Pakistani sympathizers of the Islamic State (ISIS or IS) have been trying to join it by travelling through Iranian territories on their way to Iraq or Syria. Considering the fact that IS has declared its desire to attack Iran, the recent events have heightened Iranian fears.
Until recently, Iran contented itself by complaining to Pakistani authorities about the lax border security while demanding that the Pakistanis do a better job of preventing terrorist infiltration from their territory into Iran. However, after the abduction of several Iranian borders guards and the killing of one of them, some Iranian authorities warned that they may have to enter Pakistani territory in pursuit of the offenders—they have yet to do so.
This show of restraint by Iran occurred despite the fact that Jundallah, and its then-leader, Abdul Malik Rigi, who was responsible for killing hundreds of civilians and revolutionary guards through bomb attacks and abductions, had links with extremist Pakistani groups, and possibly even with Pakistani intelligence services.
For its part, Pakistan had, in the past, tried to placate Iran by saying that it did not have enough control in the border region and by promising to do a better job in the future—but without taking any real steps to prevent the infiltration of terrorists.
In response to the latest incident, however, Pakistan has reacted more strongly by summoning the Iranian ambassador to Islamabad and by publicly protesting the killing of a member of its Frontier Corps. Moreover, Pakistan has also demanded that Iran offer evidence that terrorists have infiltrated Iran form Pakistan or that they enjoy safe haven in Pakistan. Pakistani authorities have also said that Iran should not blame Pakistan for its problems in the Sistan-Baluchistan province.
Nothing New
Attacks on Iranian interests and personnel deep inside Pakistan and terrorist-operations orchestrated from within Pakistan against Iran have been occuring since at least the early 1990s, if not earlier. These attacks and the resulting tensions in turn reflect the fundamental political and cultural changes that Iran and Pakistan have undergone as well as the changing patterns in their respective international and regional alliances since the time that they were close allies in the 1950s-60s, and the early 1970s.
The earliest signs of strains in Iranian-Pakistani relations emerged during the summit meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in 1976. At that time, then-Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto—who after the separation of East Pakistan had turned to Islam as a way of consolidating the remaining state, and was also courting Arab petro-dollars—invited Muammar Gaddafi to the Summit. The shah, who had steadfastly stood by Pakistan throughout its troubles, indicated that he would not attend the summit if Gaddafi attended. Pakistan’s answer essentially was: too bad.
The trend beginning under Bhutto gathered steam under General Zia ul-Haq, who assumed power in 1978 and set upon the policies of greater Islamization of Pakistan and forging closer ties with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States, especially the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—ties that were further consolidated during the Soviet-Afghan war.
One result of these policies, and the Soviet-Afghan war, was the growing influence of Wahhabi/Salafi Islam in Pakistan, which is anti-Shia and thus detrimental to Iran. This was also accompanied by a degree of Arabization or even Saudization of Pakistan’s culture and its turning away from its traditional Mogul culture with its heavy imprint of Persian culture and language. Today, for example, the Persian poetry of Allama Muhammad Iqbal is not valued—only his work in Urdu is promoted. There have also been efforts to eliminate Persian words from day-to-day usage. Thus, for instance, many in Pakistan are now saying farewell with Allah Hafiz, instead of the traditional Khoda Hafez because Khoda is the Persian word for God. This may sound trivial, but it is symbolic of Pakistan’s cultural shift.
The Iranian revolution also strained relations with Pakistan. First, the birth of the Islamic Republic in Iran emboldened Pakistani Shias who were unhappy with Zia’s changes in the country’s legal system and the increasing discrimination against them to become more active and demand more rights. Unsurprisingly, the Pakistani elite and the Sunni majority did not view this development favorably.
Iran’s revolution also had a detrimental impact on Iranian-Pakistani cooperative relations, namely their joint friendly relations with the United States. Similarly, by causing tensions in Iran’s relations with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States with whom Pakistan shares close ties, the revolution further strained their bilateral ties. In fact, Saudi–Iranian animosity is a major cause of tension in Iranian-Pakistani relations especially under Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who is even closer to the Saudi monarchy than former PM Asif Ali Zardari. Indeed, Saudi Arabia supports Iran’s Sunni dissidents and is against increased economic cooperation between Iran and Pakistan. Saudi Arabia also reportedly gave Pakistan one billion dollars so that it would not implement the agreement for the import of Iranian gas, even though the country is desperate for energy.
Meanwhile, after the Soviet Union’s collapse and the onset of the Afghan Civil War, Iranian-Pakistani interests further diverged. For instance, in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan backed different groups and competed over pipeline routes. Even today, Pakistan wants to limit, if not block, Iran’s influence in Afghanistan. This is at least part of the reason why Pakistan and Saudi Arabia would not have allowed a member of the Northern Alliance to become Afghanistan’s president: it would have resulted in better relations between Afghanistan and Iran. In this respect the two Sunni countries also have Turkey’s support, as reflected by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s recent visit to Kabul.
The US policy of trying to destabilize Iran by encouraging internal dissent, especially under the George W. Bush administration, also emboldened Pakistan to ignore incursions from its territory into Iran and dismiss Tehran’s protests knowing full well that Iran cannot afford to engage in armed conflict with a nuclear-armed Pakistan.
In short, some of the causes of the strained Iranian-Pakistani relationship are rooted in cultural changes in Pakistan and broader regional and political shifts. However, Pakistan’s ability to ignore with impunity—or possibly even encourage—transgressions against Iran from its territory is ultimately the consequence of Iran’s adamant refusal to acknowledge the realities of regional and international politics and to correctly assess its own vulnerabilities.
Indeed, If Iran had not alienated major international actors, none of the regional countries could have treated it as they have done in the last three decades. Therefore, unless Iran changes the course of its foreign policy and its leaders put national interests—including territorial integrity and national unity—ahead of revolutionary objectives, not only Pakistan but all of its neighbors will continue to take advantage of Iran’s vulnerabilities.
]]>by Wayne White
In his Oct. 29 Foreign Policy article, “How We Won in Iraq”, General David Petraeus characterizes the 2003 US invasion and departure of US troops in 2011 as an American victory. This triumphant — though distorted — version of that searing saga seems acceptable to many Americans not [...]]]>
by Wayne White
In his Oct. 29 Foreign Policy article, “How We Won in Iraq”, General David Petraeus characterizes the 2003 US invasion and departure of US troops in 2011 as an American victory. This triumphant — though distorted — version of that searing saga seems acceptable to many Americans not only because it has been repeated so often, but also because it is so reassuring. Yet, despite the immense effort and sacrifice on the part of the US military and civilian personnel who served in Iraq, there are profound reasons to question such an upbeat conclusion.
Losers and winners
The Bush administration’s goal extended far beyond the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and initially focused on the destruction of his alleged Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). No WMD were found. The administration also planned to transform Iraq into a Western-style democracy that would function as a beacon to those suffering under nearby authoritarian regimes. Instead, even now Iraqis are saddled with an abusive, dysfunctional, non-transparent, corrupt, and sectarian-based government that resembles a democracy more in appearance than substance.
Rather than achieving a quick victory followed by a swift, orderly transition, the US became embroiled in a prolonged and bloody anti-insurgency campaign that cost well over 30,000 American casualties. The invasion also gave birth to al-Qaeda’s most damaging subsidiary, cost over $1 trillion, and for over five years diverted a huge amount of focus, military power, and spending from the important NATO effort in Afghanistan. Finally, instead of the US, the West, and moderate Arab states having considerable influence with Iraq’s new leaders, Baghdad’s most influential partner is Iran, and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is supporting the Assad regime in Syria.
As for the Iraqis, Sunni Arabs have been disenfranchised by the Shi’a-dominated successor regime, untold numbers of them have been killed, many of their communities have been ravaged by war, and well over a million were driven from their homes and businesses in the greater Baghdad area. A majority of Iraq’s roughly one million Christians have been forced to flee in the face of killings, church burnings and attacks on their businesses. Even the dominant Shi’a majority have suffered terrible casualties and great loss of property at the hands of the robust Sunni Arab insurgency back in 2003-2007, the depredations of their own rogue militias, and the drumfire of terrorist attacks and bombings on the part of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) to this day.
For Arab Iraqis, insurgent sabotage and waves of looting following the invasion have devastated most of the country’s state industries, large private businesses, and all government ministries save one. Universities, hospitals, schools, banks, archives, much of Iraq’s electrical and oil infrastructure and the country’s rich archaeological heritage have also been severely damaged.
If there is a relative winner, it could be Iraq’s Kurdish community. Separated from the rest of the country by their own militias defending the borders of the Kurdish Autonomous Region (KRG), the majority of predominantly Kurdish areas have been spared the high levels of casualties and damage experienced elsewhere. In fact, the KRG now enjoys considerable prosperity (and more autonomy than at any time since the creation of the modern Iraqi state) with a host of Arab Iraqis taking advantage of Iraqi Kurdistan’s booming tourist industry every year to seek a respite from life farther south. Nevertheless, from late 1991 until Saddam Hussein’s overthrow in 2003, most of the Kurds now within the KRG already had been largely protected from Saddam’s rule within a northern sanctuary with much the same borders as the KRG.
The troop surge myth
Frontloaded prominently in Petraeus’ discussion of the “Surge of Ideas” is the new strategic approach he brought to the table. Petraeus’ shift toward increasingly embedding US troops within Iraqi communities and other tactical innovations was indeed more enlightened than the approach of his predecessors. Nonetheless, he does suggest strongly that the additional 30,000 US troops made a substantial difference. Yet, of the latter, only 5,000 were sent outside Baghdad to address severe problems in mainly Sunni Arab areas, so only in Baghdad was that reinforcement of any real significance.
Buried far below and evidently rated second to Petraeus’ “clear, hold and build” strategy was the US decision to exploit the so-called “Sunni Arab Awakening.” His description of the emergence of this phenomenon — the most critical game changer from late 2006 through 2008 — contains some notable errors.
First off, the decision on the part of many Sunni Arab insurgent and allied tribal leaders to seek a deal with American forces did not “begin several months before the surge” when one “talented US army brigade commander” decided to work with one “courageous Sunni sheikh” at Ramadi. The first Sunni Arab offer to cooperate with US forces — and in a far more sweeping manner — was brought to Washington’s attention in mid-2004, over two years before the events outside Ramadi in 2006. Senior military officers in the field at the time told me that other offers at least as significant as the one Petraeus cites occurred as early as 2003.
Petraeus is correct in his assertion that in 2003 many Sunni Arabs, despite their association with the former regime, still hoped to play a constructive role in the new Iraq. However, their offers of help were cast aside by the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), Jerry Bremer, when he dismissed the entire Iraqi Army even while giving Petraeus writ to reach out locally in the latter’s northern 101st Airborne Division sector.
It is therefore wrong to place the blame for missing this opportunity exclusively on “Iraqi authorities in Baghdad” (who had precious little authority relative to Bremer’s at that point). In fact, senior US military officers on the scene acting on instructions (some pre-dating the invasion) recruited many thousands of Sunni Arab officers willing to remain in the Iraqi army to help maintain order; they also were waved off by Bremer.
Missed opportunities, lingering effects
In the summer of 2004, the US army and Marines fighting in various sectors west and northwest of Baghdad were approached by a number of insurgent and tribal leaders seeking a broad-based deal with US forces. They did not regard Iraqi forces as a significant foe, nor did they trust the largely Shi’a/Kurdish Iraqi central government. Yet, so serious were these Sunni Arab leaders about stopping the fighting with Coalition forces & turning against al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) that they agreed to meet with Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi in Tikrit, even though an agreement between the Sunni Arab leaders and Allawi could not be reached.
So, instead of grasping this outstretched hand that would have spared vast numbers of US and Iraqi casualties over the following two bloody years, the Bush administration deferred to an Iraqi government dominated by anti-Sunni Arab elements. Only when the uncontrollable maelstrom of bloodshed described by Petraeus erupted in early 2006 did the administration reluctantly decide to make the proverbial “deal with the devil.” This was driven by the need to gain some measure of traction in coping with a situation that had expanded to include the scourge of wholesale sectarian cleansing that displaced at least 1.5 million Iraqis and eradicated the once rich culture of mixed neighborhoods in Baghdad.
Once that decision had been made, the Sunni Arab “Awakening” deal took more than 100,000 insurgents off the battlefield and turned them into critical US assets against AQI. Only then could sufficient forces be freed up to crack down effectively on rampaging Shi’a militias — primarily Muqtada al-Sadr’s “Mahdi Army.”
Petraeus also wrongly paints al-Maliki as supportive of the deal with Sunni Arab combatants, albeit merely in Sunni Arab areas, in 2007. From my vantage point in US Intelligence, I watched as the Iraqi PM set about actively trying to torpedo the arrangement during 2007 — even going to the extreme of ordering a major Iraqi army attack on an Awakening force west of Baghdad (in a Sunni Arab area), thankfully headed off by US forces, in addition to other attempted attacks on specific “Awakening” commanders as well as the kidnapping of some of their relatives.
Petraeus rejects the notion that “we got lucky with the Awakening,” but that is, in fact, far closer to the truth because the “Awakening” emanated from Iraq’s Sunni Arab community — not from “a conscious decision” on the part of the US (save for a belated US decision to accept a deal that had been on the table for two years). Had the Bush administration instead continued to reject such a deal in 2007-08, US forces probably would not have had nearly such a decisive impact on the war — regardless of Petraeus’ otherwise more creative approach to the conflict. Conversely, had Washington allowed the deal to be accepted far earlier, Petraeus’ predecessor, Gen. George Casey, would have enjoyed a lot more success (despite a less savvy tactical approach).
Petraeus, nonetheless, is correct that welcoming — rather than spurning — Iraq’s Sunni Arabs is perhaps the only way out of the current escalating spiral of violence. Unfortunately, Maliki’s determination to minimize Sunni Arab political participation over the past four years especially has so poisoned the well of sectarian trust that it could be very difficult to achieve such a shift in policy so long as al-Maliki remains in power. It is, therefore, supremely ironic that after ignoring years of US entreaties to abandon his marginalization and persecution of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs and embrace reconciliation instead, al-Maliki should be meeting with President Obama today asking for American anti-terrorism assistance to address the violence he and his cronies have done so much to provoke.
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Much of this bloodletting could have been avoided had Maliki joined with the US in the deal the American military made with the vast majority of Sunni Arab insurgents between Fall 2006 through 2008. That arrangement (in response to Sunni Arab tribal and insurgent overtures known collectively as the “Sunni Arab Awakening”) was a defining moment in greatly reducing US and Iraqi casualties. It not only took the bulk of a formidable insurgency off the battlefield, it also enlisted it in a robust attempt to take down a good bit of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the source of most all bombings against the Iraqi Shi’a community and targets associated with the Shi’a-dominated Baghdad government to this day. Yet, since the departure of US forces and Maliki’s reluctant cooperation with — plus the continued marginalization, harassment and even killings of — former insurgents and their supporters, AQI has been on the rebound.
The latest demonstration of the power of both AQI and its new allied Syrian affiliate the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) was the carefully orchestrated, massive late July bombing of and prisoner break-out from Abu Ghraib prison. Hundreds of AQI cadres and many deeply embittered Sunni Arabs of various affiliations escaped to swell the ranks of Maliki’s armed enemies.
The Maliki government cannot mount an effective anti-insurgent effort aimed at Sunni Arab strongholds in Western Iraq because it lacks the means to crush its Sunni Arab tormentors. Even US forces found confronting the same challenge a difficult slog prior to their deal with the “Awakening.” But Maliki’s Iraqi military is far weaker; woefully short of tanks, heavy artillery and combat aircraft. Also, corruption within the army and security services is rampant, reducing their effectiveness and enabling insurgents to access vital information.
Making matters worse, Maliki recently has appointed a Shi’a hardliner to lead a renewed effort to rid the military, security services and government of personnel with pre-2003 links to the Ba’th Party. Tens of thousands of Sunni Arab army officers could be subject to expulsion, either making them more vulnerable targets for AQI & Co. or embittered enough to join with AQI and other hardline Sunni Arab armed elements conducting anti-Shi’a and anti-regime operations. And former government employees and officers that join with anti-government elements would carry with them a wealth of valuable training and insider information.
This is classic Maliki. At nearly every turn responding with greater mistrust and animosity toward Iraq’s Sunni Arabs, the current government feeds the very violence it seeks to eradicate.
Meanwhile, ironically, despite their exclusion from the political mainstream and Maliki’s shunning of much of the Sunni Arab community, a majority of Sunni Arabs inside Iraq may still wish to put an end to the confrontation and violence. In provincial elections held in late June in predominantly Sunni Arab al-Anbar and Nineveh Provinces, the largest grouping favoring regional autonomy, the Mutahhidun bloc, lost a considerable number of seats to relative moderates advocating dialogue with Maliki.
This suggests that despite the rise in violence and widespread anti-central government demonstrations, the percentage of Iraqi Sunni Arabs actively or passively supporting AQI and related resistance groups, despite the rise in bombings, remains relatively limited. Yet, the only signal from Maliki in the face of this sign of hope has been his initiation of another purge of Sunni Arabs from the government and the military.
It is difficult to fathom all aspects of Maliki’s motivations in pursuing such a damaging course. Some Shi’a within the general population have shown support for reconciliation with Iraq’s Sunni Arabs in order to reduce violence, but there is no reason to believe they speak for a majority. Many others are too angry (quite a few with relatives or friends who have been bombing victims) to contemplate a more conciliatory course. We must bear in mind that in addition to the horrific death tolls there have been even higher numbers of Shi’a wounded thrust upon an inadequate medical system as well as their extended families along with considerable private property damage.
Moreover, most Shi’a leaders around Maliki appear supportive of exclusionary policies. And of considerable importance has been Iranian opposition to concessions to Iraq’s Sunni Arabs (with the latter remaining generally hostile toward Iranian influence in Iraq). Maliki doubtless feels the need to retain the support of both his senior Iraqi Shi’a associates and Tehran in order to survive as prime minister.
For Washington, such dependency on the part of Maliki has translated into an inability to steer Iraqi policy toward a wiser course. Many observers have written about the steady loss of American influence over Iraqi governance since 2008 in terms of reduced US regional clout. Yet, for Iraqis, ignoring US advice has meant their leaders have moved in a direction that has undermined Iraqi stability and the safety of much of the country’s population from within.
Furthermore, ignoring US warnings not to aid the Assad regime in Syria (while helping Iran do just the opposite), has placed the Iraqi government in the crosshairs of still more trouble. If Assad prevails, much of eastern Syria would be flush with many hundreds (perhaps even thousands) of vengeful and battle-hardened Sunni Arab extremists (many of them Iraqis) driven there by defeats farther west, and a lot of them likely to move into Iraq. If, on the other hand, the rebels unseat Assad & Co., a hostile Sunni Arab regime in Damascus most likely would assist Iraq’s minority Sunni Arabs in an effort to keep Maliki and his Shi’a majority on the defensive.
]]>The special session of the Bahraini National Assembly held on Sunday Jul. 28 was a spectacle of venom, a display of vulgarity, and an unabashed nod to increased dictatorship.
Calling the Shia “dogs”, as one parliamentarian said during the session, which King Hamad convened, the Al-Khalifa have thrown [...]]]>
The special session of the Bahraini National Assembly held on Sunday Jul. 28 was a spectacle of venom, a display of vulgarity, and an unabashed nod to increased dictatorship.
Calling the Shia “dogs”, as one parliamentarian said during the session, which King Hamad convened, the Al-Khalifa have thrown away any hope for national reconciliation and dialogue.
The 22 recommendations approved during the session aimed at giving the regime pseudo-legal tools to quash dissent and violate human and civil rights with impunity. All in the name of fighting “terrorism”.
Watching a video of some of the speeches during the session, one is saddened by how low official political discourse has become. Students of Bahrain yearn for the days when parliamentary debaters were civil and when Shia and Sunni parliamentarians engaged in thoughtful, rational, and tolerant debates despite their political or ideological differences.
In the early 1970s when the Constituent Assembly debated the draft constitution, Bahrainis followed the speeches by their elected and appointed representatives with much respect and hope for the future of a modern, tolerant, and civil society.
Such parliamentarians as Rasul al-Jishi, Jasim Murad, Ali Saleh, Abd al-Aziz Shamlan, Ali Sayyar, Isa Qasim, Qasim Fakhro, and others made their countrymen proud with the quality of debate that characterised Bahrain’s first ever elected parliament.
Even such ministers as Muhammad bin Mubarak al-Khalifa, Ali Fakhro, and Yusif Shirawi participated in those parliamentary debates and worked jointly with elected members to chart a more hopeful future for all the people of Bahrain.
As I sat through those parliamentary sessions in 1973 and followed the lengthy discussions on a myriad of constitutional amendments, I envisioned a democratically prosperous Bahrain for years to come. The National Assembly, however, was dissolved two years later, and the constitution was suspended. Al-Khalifa ruled by decree ever since.
The parliamentary special session last Sunday showed a divisive, intolerant, and fractured country that is rapidly descending into chaos. It’s as if civility, rationality, and moderation have become relics from the past.
King Hamad and the Crown Prince welcomed the recommendations, and the powerful prime minister urged his ministers to implement them immediately; in fact, he has threatened to fire any minister who slows their implementation.
According to media reports, the recommendations were prepared before the meeting and were disseminated to the media a few minutes after the session ended. They were not even debated meaningfully or rationally during the session.
The regime’s fear that Bahrainis would have their own “tamarud” (rebellion) civil disobedience movement to confront the regime on Aug. 14, Bahrain’s actual independence day, drove the timing of the session. The Bahraini opposition hopes to emulate the Egyptian “tamarud”, which indirectly led to Morsi’s removal.
Like other autocratic regimes, whether under Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Egypt or Bashar al-Assad in Syria, Al-Khalifa justified the draconian recommendations against all forms of opposition and peaceful dissent in the name of fighting “terrorism” and incitement of “all forms of violence” (Recommendation #3). The regime will likely use these recommendations to ban all peaceful demonstrations and protests.
The regime is prepared, according to Recommendation #2, to revoke the citizenship of Bahraini citizens “who carry out terrorist crimes and those who instigate terrorism”. The regime defines a terrorist as any Bahraini who is suspected of being a dissident or actively advocating genuine reforms. In fact, Recommendation #6 bans “sit-ins, rallies and gatherings in the capital Manama”.
The regime does not seem perturbed by the fact that citizenship revocation violates international legal norms and the Bahraini constitution. In fact, this might be a sinister way for the Sunni al-Khalifa to alter the demographics of the country by depriving the Shia dissidents of citizenship.
Viewing the entire protest movement through the security prism, as the recommendations imply, the regime seems bent on escalating its crackdown against peaceful protest and freedoms of speech and assembly, according to the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights.
Under Recommendation #7, the country could soon be ruled under martial law or “National Safety”, as the regime euphemistically calls it.
The recommendations have put the country on a sectarian collision course, have dealt a major blow to peaceful dissent and civil rights, and have raised serious questions in Washington about Al-Khalifa’s commitment to genuine reform.
In a direct rebuke to U.S. Ambassador Thomas Krajeski, Recommendation #11 requests “that all ambassadors to Bahrain to not interfere in the kingdom’s domestic affairs.”
Some die-hard Sunni parliamentarians, with the support of the Royal Court, have urged the regime to expel Ambassador Krajeski from Bahrain, claiming he has been meeting with pro-democracy Shia dissidents. Others have threatened his personal safety.
Still others, with tacit regime support, are hoping the ambassador would be transferred out of Bahrain, much like what happened to political officer Ludovic Hood in May 2011.
At the time, according to the “Religion and Politics in Bahrain” blog, pro-regime Sunni activists demanded Hood’s removal because they claimed he offered “Krispy Kreme doughnuts to demonstrators who had gathered outside the American Embassy” to protest perceived U.S. support for Al-Khalifa.
Now pro-regime Sunni activists are feverishly campaigning against the U.S. ambassador’s public support for human rights and genuine reform in Bahrain. The recommendation curtailing diplomatic activities in the country is squarely aimed at Ambassador Krajeski.
According to Bahrain Mirror, some have advocated banning him from appearing on state media and in pro-regime newspapers, even if the subject he is discussing is gourmet cooking, one of the ambassador’s hobbies!
The anti-Shia and anti-reform underlying theme of the recommendations is a naked display of tribal family autocracy, which Al-Khalifa are determined to preserve at any cost, including tearing the society apart. Adopting these recommendations reflects the regime’s nervousness about the ever-increasing precarious nature of their rule and the unstoppable demands for justice, dignity, and equality.
According to a recently leaked audio recording, Crown Prince Salman was quoted as saying, “The current situation is unsustainable, and the policy we are pursuing cannot continue. People are getting tired, and conditions could worsen any moment. Bigger dangers are threatening our society, and the future is becoming more precarious.”
Washington and other Western capitals should work diligently to disabuse the king and the prime minister of the notion that “securitisation” is the answer to Bahrain’s domestic ills. Engaging with the public on the future of Bahrain, including the Shia majority and the pro-democracy youth movement, is the only way to bring the country back from the brink.
Washington should make it clear to Al-Khalifa that media attacks and threats against Ambassador Krajeski should stop. Whipping the flames of hatred against the U.S. embassy to preserve the regime’s dictatorial rule is a dangerous game, which Al-Khalifa cannot afford to engage in.
As a first and immediate step, King Hamad should muzzle the hotheads in his Royal Court and in the prime minister’s office. In the meantime, the U.S. should initiate serious discussions on how and when to move the Fifth Fleet out of Bahrain to a neighbouring country or over the horizon.
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