By Richard Javad Heydarian
The recent war in Gaza has been portrayed as a political dividend for the main protagonists, namely Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu, Egypt’s Mohammad Morsi, and the Hamas leadership in Gaza, despite the tremendous psychological, infrastructural and humanitarian costs borne by innocent civilians, especially the Palestinians.
As Hamas and [...]]]>
By Richard Javad Heydarian
The recent war in Gaza has been portrayed as a political dividend for the main protagonists, namely Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu, Egypt’s Mohammad Morsi, and the Hamas leadership in Gaza, despite the tremendous psychological, infrastructural and humanitarian costs borne by innocent civilians, especially the Palestinians.
As Hamas and other militant groups bombarded Israeli cities with rocket attacks, Prime Minister Netanyahu’s enormous show of force — by mobilizing all elements of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) against Gaza — allowed him to shore up greater support among a rattled Israeli populace, crucially ahead of the upcoming parliamentary elections. On the other hand, Hamas — and other militant groups such as the Islamic Jihad — were able to claim victory by not only circumventing Israel’s sophisticated ‘Iron Dome’ missile defense-shield system, and preventing a ground invasion by the IDF, but also because they may have finally gained enough leverage to end the Israeli-imposed siege on Gaza, which has resulted in a protracted humanitarian crisis in one of the most densely populated areas in the world. As for the Islamist president of Egypt, he was able to considerably boost his international profile and domestic popularity by leveraging the Muslim Brotherhood’s strong ties with Hamas and his country’s strong military ties with the US so as to strike a lasting truce.
After three decades of strategic irrelevance/acquiescence, Egypt has once again become an indispensable nation in the region.
Yet, what is missing from this mainstream narrative is how Iran — increasingly isolated in recent years — has actually been vindicated by the most recent Gaza crisis. While the first decade of the 21st century witnessed the dramatic rise of Iran as a regional power, largely precipitated by the US-led elimination of anti-Iranian rulers in neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan, the advent of the Arab uprisings — beginning with the late-2010 Tunisian revolution and the early-2011 Egyptian revolution — have presented a mixed package of some initial strategic gains, but steady and gradual decline overtime, most especially after the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in March 2011. Although Iran benefited from the downfall of leading US allies in Egypt and elsewhere, while sensing some opportunity in the Bahraini and Yemenis revolutions across the Arabian Peninsula, its image and popularity — especially among the Arab populace – took a nosedive when it threw its weight behind the embattled Baathist regime in Syria.
With leading regional powers such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar portraying Iran’s support for Bashar Al-Assad as a cynical attempt to maintain a sectarian, Persian-led ‘axis of resistance’, Tehran has been gradually sidelined, prompting the Sunni Hamas leadership — with strong ties to the dominant Muslim Brotherhood faction within the Syrian opposition — to seek patronage elsewhere, especially in Ankara and Doha. In effect, the Arab uprisings have not only overshadowed Iran’s 3 decade-old support for the Palestinian cause, and empowered rising powers such as Turkey and Qatar, but they have also ideationally relegated Tehran to a new pejorative status of a non-Arab, non-Sunni state, perceived to be standing against a democratic uprising in Syria.
However, the recent crisis in Gaza has brought the Palestinian issue back to the center of popular political discourse across the Islamic world. Thus, it has indirectly reminded everyone of Iran’s continuous support for the Palestinian resistance – a long-time basis of Tehran’s popularity among the Arab street. Also, the crisis has slightly diverted attention from the ongoing civil war in Syria, where Iran — in the eyes of many Arabs — has been heavily implicated due to its support for the Assad regime.
The fact that this time Israel balked from repeating its brutal 2008-2009 military campaign against Gaza is a testament to the shifting balance of forces on the ground. Sure, the advent of Arab uprisings — giving birth to more populist/pro-Palestinian post-revolutionary leaders — may have placed a new element of constraint upon Israel’s strategic impunity: its ability to re-shape the immediate strategic environment, through a combination of economic coercion, diplomatic obstructionism, and brutal military force, without considerable costs. It is also true that regional powers Turkey, Egypt, and Qatar have provided considerable economic and political support to Hamas, forcing Washington to exert growing pressure on Israel to cease military operations against Gaza. But, without Iran’s concrete military-logistical support, Hamas would have never been in a position to deter an all out Israeli invasion, especially under the current hawkish leadership in Tel Aviv. After all, no regional power, aside from Iran, has dared to directly support Hamas in military terms. Neither Qatar nor Turkey wishes to jeopardize crucial strategic ties with the West by doing so, while Egypt — the second largest recipient of US military aid – is still too vulnerable to take on Israel and/or jeopardize ongoing negotiations vis-à-vis Western economic assistance, either through bilateral mechanisms or international organizations such as the IMF. Iran’s position as the leading revisionist force in the Middle East has provided it a unique wiggle room to prop up Hamas-led resistance in Gaza.
It was the Iranian-designed/made Fajr-5 missiles — scoring an unprecedented success rate (reportedly ranging between 15 to 40 percent) against the Iron Dome system — that gave Hamas and other militant groups not only an element of deterrence against a total Israeli invasion, but also a crucial bargaining chip to force Israel back to the negotiating table to end the siege of Gaza – and perhaps even kick-start negotiations over the future of Palestinian statehood. Hamas’ ability to strike missiles as far as Tel Aviv is a major game-changer, thanks to Iran’s ballistic technology. No wonder, after the conclusion of a truce between Hamas and Israel, Khalid Mishaal, one of Hamas’ most important figures, formally thanked Iran for its role in arming and financing Gaza during the war.
This is perhaps why Iran stands as a major beneficiary of Israel’s recent truce with Hamas.
- Richard Javad Heydarian is a Philippine-based foreign affairs analyst, specializing on international security and economics. He can be reached at jrheydarian@gmail.com
]]>Okay, it seems I spoke too soon. Hamas is now back in the “Iranian-supported” camp according to this editorial in the New York Times, which identifies Hamas as both “backed by Iran” and pathologically “consumed with hatred for Israel.”
President Shimon Peres has also refocused on Iran, as [...]]]>
Okay, it seems I spoke too soon. Hamas is now back in the “Iranian-supported” camp according to this editorial in the New York Times, which identifies Hamas as both “backed by Iran” and pathologically “consumed with hatred for Israel.”
President Shimon Peres has also refocused on Iran, as shown by his response to a prompt by Piers Morgan of CNN. Morgan doesn’t beat around the bush and without displaying a modicum of impartiality asks: “If you believe Mr. President, that Iran is behind a lot of the Hamas terror activity, as you put it, then what action do you intend to take against Iran?”
Peres’ response?
Not that I guess so, I know that is the case. And we are not going to make a war with Iran but we are trying to prevent the shipping of long range missiles which Iran is sending to Hamas. And they are urge to Hamas to fire ….Iran is a problem, world problem. Not only from the point of view of building a nuclear danger, but also from the point of being a center of world terror. They finance, they train, they send arms, they urge, no responsibility, nor any moral consideration. It’s a world problem and you know it.
And what of the closure of the Hamas headquarters in Damascus, which according to many commentators supposedly created enormous strains with Iran and resulted in much less funding and material to Hamas than in the past? What of the recent visits by high profile non-Iranian regional leaders? Not much.
The Gaza problem, in the minds of the Netenyahu-Barak duo, is caused by Iran, according to Salam Masalha, writing in Haaretz: “[t]he current operation can be called “the little southern Iranian operation,” since it’s designed to paralyze Iran’s southern wing. The next operation will be “the little northern Iranian operation “: It will try to destroy Iran’s Lebanon wing.”
Israeli officials must be feeling like they’re losing their public relations war on Gaza. The meme of Hamas, the terrorist group, no longer seems sufficient. Hence “Hamas, the terrorist group supported by Iran” comes to the rescue.
Even the New York Times is noticing this problem and wants the “Arab leaders to speak the truth and stop ignoring the culpability of Hamas.” The unhappiness with the changed region and the difficulty it poses for the usual conceptualization of the disproportionate Israeli attacks on Gaza as self-defense and a fight against terrorism, is palpable. After all, it is not Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who is calling Israel a “terrorist state” these days, but Prime Minister Recept Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey.
The reality is that even the re-attachment of Hamas to Iran will neither resolve Israel’s occupation problem nor its public relations predicament. Israel is deemed the aggressor and out of control in the region not because it is unable to tell and re-tell its anti-terrorism narrative loudly enough, but because it cannot convince most of the world that its reckless bombing of a civilian population is a fight against terrorism (and its presumed chief sponsor, Iran).
As Sherine Tadros points out in her discussion of why reporting on Gaza is hard: “Hamas is not Gaza.” The reason Israel, after a few days of bombing, invariably loses its ability to sell the Iranian-backed terrorism meme in the court of regional public opinion — although not to US policy-makers who are its chief concern — is because most people know that no society and its livelihood can be reduced to its government, no matter how bad that government is.
To be sure, the current Israeli government can take the honest route and call for the punishing of the entire society in the way Gilad Sharon, son of former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, did when he said that “We need to flatten entire neighborhoods in Gaza. Flatten all of Gaza… The residents of Gaza are not innocent, they elected Hamas. The Gazans aren’t hostages; they chose this freely, and must live with the consequences.”
But this is not the route most Israeli leaders (excepting Interior Minister Eli Yishai who posited the goal of Pillar of Defense Operation as “sending Gaza back to the Middle Ages”) have taken. The route taken is to say that Israel had no choice but to respond disproportionately because of Hamas terrorism (now, again, supported by outside terrorists).
This is not a credible argument given the impact of Israeli actions — including the almost 6-year old embargo — on Gaza and not Hamas. And blaming or even militarily attacking Iran will not make Gaza go away.
- Farideh Farhi is an independent researcher and an affiliate graduate faculty member in political science and international relations at the University of Hawaii-Manoa.
]]>Mark Perry — who recently explained that the “chance for calm” has been assassinated by Israel in the past – on the current potential for a ceasefire (via CNN’s transcript):
MARK PERRY, MIDDLE EAST EXPERT: I would have said six hours ago if you had asked me that I [...]]]>
Mark Perry — who recently explained that the “chance for calm” has been assassinated by Israel in the past – on the current potential for a ceasefire (via CNN’s transcript):
]]>MARK PERRY, MIDDLE EAST EXPERT: I would have said six hours ago if you had asked me that I thought that a cease-fire was quite possible and that the principles were in place for a cease-fire. But as Arwa Damon said at the top of your broadcast that the two sides now seem to be drifting apart.
Listen, I think the principles for a cease-fire are in place. An end to the siege, that’s what Hamas wants. An end to the siege of the targeting of their leadership. What does Israel want? Israel wants Hamas to stop firing rockets, especially the Fajr-5 and the Fajr-3 long-range rockets, at their populations.
Certainly there’s a good exchange there. But what it’s going to take is Egyptians or somebody, Egyptians are going to be it, providing the security and the guarantees on such — on such an agreement. That’s very hard for the Egyptians to do. They don’t want to be responsible for Gaza. So we’re going to have to provide — somebody is going to have to provide inducement for them to do so. I think that’s the broad outlines of a cease-fire. A long-term cease-fire. And I think it’s very doable.