by Tom Lippman*

The Middle East’s seemingly endless conflicts are diverting attention and resources from a graver long-term threat that threatens the whole region, the growing scarcity of water, and the situation will get worse before it gets better — if it ever does get better. Years of war, careless water supply [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Tom Lippman*

The Middle East’s seemingly endless conflicts are diverting attention and resources from a graver long-term threat that threatens the whole region, the growing scarcity of water, and the situation will get worse before it gets better — if it ever does get better. Years of war, careless water supply management, unchecked population growth, ill-advised agricultural policies, and subsidies that encourage consumption have turned a basically arid part of the world into a voracious consumer of water. The trajectory is not sustainable.

Those were the gloomy if unsurprising conclusions of a three-day conference on the subject in Istanbul last week. From Libya to Iraq to Yemen, too many people and too many animals have stretched water resources beyond their limits. Some countries where the urgency is greatest, including Syria and Yemen, are the least equipped to stave off serious water crises.

Jordan, always short of water, has been overwhelmed by a flood of refugees from Syria. Iraq, which once had ample water, has lost critical water supplies to war and to dams built by Turkey upstream on the Tigris and Euphrates. Egypt has twice as many people as it did 50 years ago, with no additional water resources. The isolated Gaza strip has been grappling with a water crisis for years. And Yemen’s scarce water supply is being gobbled up by the unchecked production of qat, a high-water crop with no nutritional value. Chewing the mildly narcotic qat leaf is Yemen’s national pastime.

“If you give them more water, they’ll just grow more qat,” one gloomy conference participant said.

Not all the news is bad. Stable countries with lots of money, led by Saudi Arabia, are making notable progress in supply, management and consumer education. Elsewhere, however, the prognosis is grim. No one predicted an outbreak of “water wars,” or armed conflict over water supply, a specter that has often been evoked but has never materialized. But at some point in the not too distant future, water shortages could provoke mass migrations, human hardship, crop failures and some form of “triage” among populations as governments are forced to allocate supplies, said conferees, who cannot be named due to conference rules.

It’s not as if all this has gone unnoticed. The Middle East’s water issue has been the subject of news articles, analyses by groups such as the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, and studies by think tanks and humanitarian groups for years. The Istanbul conference of scientists, policy analysts and academics from eight countries — conducted on an island in the Sea of Marmara under the title “High and Dry: Addressing the Middle East Water Challenge” by the Hollings Center and the Prince Muhammad Bin Fahd Strategic Studies Program at the University of Central Florida — is the latest of many such gatherings. But little has come of them because the region has never been stable enough, long enough, to make possible some comprehensive, multilateral solution.

According to analyses by the World Bank, the U.S. State Department and others, a majority of the countries defined as “water-poor” — those with access to less than 1,000 cubic meters per person per year — are in the Middle East and North Africa. The State Department also predicts that climate change will add to the problem by bringing “consistently lower levels of rainfall.”

No government or international agency can increase rainfall or snow runoff, but the Istanbul conferees heard that the example of Saudi Arabia — the world’s largest country without a river — shows that a lot can be done in countries with deep pockets and enough time to focus on this issue.

Saudi Arabia reorganized its government in the 1990s to centralize water planning and management. Most of the country’s water for personal and household use is supplied by massive desalination plants. The decision to build them, starting in the 1970s, was an obvious one for the kingdom, but the plants are expensive to construct and operate, leaving them beyond the financial reach of a country like Yemen.

Saudi Arabia meanwhile leads the region in the recapture and reuse of wastewater. Under a new regulation from last year, for example, its giant dairy farms are required to operate on recycled water purchased from the National Water Company rather than on groundwater as in the past. Once the world’s fifth- or sixth-largest exporter of wheat — the production of which requires massive amounts of water — Saudi Arabia has banned the cultivation of wheat as of 2016 and is refocusing its agriculture on greenhouse production of vegetables and fruit. Growing animal fodder crops such as alfalfa has been banned; owners of livestock are required to purchase imported fodder, conference participants said. Plagued by leaks in distribution pipes that drained off as much as 25 percent of the water it had, Saudi Arabia privatized its distribution network and encouraged foreign engineering and management companies to participate.

Saudi Arabia has raised the price of water for businesses and institutions, but it has not yet ended the subsidies for households that make water so cheap; there is little incentive to limit consumption. Doing so would be politically risky in a country where subsidies for water, gasoline, and electricity are expected by a population that has no vote or other influence over the government.

Egypt, by far the most populous country in the region, has a different consumer attitude problem. Egyptians have taken the availability of water for granted since completion of the Aswan High Dam in 1970. As a result, they use waster casually in the home and pump more irrigation water than is necessary onto their fields. But Egypt’s biggest concern now is Ethiopia’s plan to construct a giant hydroelectric dam on the headwaters of the Nile, reducing the flow and the amount of water stored in Lake Nasser, behind the Aswan Dam. Asked recently if negotiations over Nile water allocations were taking place between Egypt and the upstream countries, Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy replied, “No. I wish there were.”

Participants in Istanbul agreed that there is no single remedy for the water crisis. The available fixes range from the simple and obvious, such as consumer education and the installation of low-flow bathroom fixtures, to the aspirational, such as the development of desalination plants powered by solar energy, which are thus affordable. As usual with such events, the organizers will prepare a paper outlining recommendations. The fact is, however, that solutions, even if available, will be hard to implement until the shooting stops, refugees are resettled, and governments are sufficiently stable to address them. That won’t be soon.

*Any republication of this article must be authorized with IPS consent and sourced back to the original source link at www.lobelog.com. 

Follow LobeLog on Twitter and like us on Facebook.

Photo: Much of the Middle East is seen in this night-time image photographed by one of NASA’s Expedition 31 crew members aboard the International Space Station as it flew some 240 miles above the Mediterranean Sea on June 4, 2012. The Nile River Delta is easily recognizable in center frame, and city lights make it easy to see both Cairo and Alexandria, Egypt near the Delta. Two Russian spacecraft — a Soyuz (left) and a Progress — appear in the frame while they are docked to the station.

by Jim Lobe

As I’ve written in the past, I have massive amounts of newspaper, magazine, and other assorted clippings in file cabinets that stretch virtually from one end of the IPS office in the National Press Building to the other. Some of it dates back to 1975, the fateful [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Jim Lobe

As I’ve written in the past, I have massive amounts of newspaper, magazine, and other assorted clippings in file cabinets that stretch virtually from one end of the IPS office in the National Press Building to the other. Some of it dates back to 1975, the fateful year I started clipping about international events. While I’ve purged them from time to time over the years, I’m now doing so a bit more indiscriminately in anticipation of at least semi-retirement next year. It’s a sometimes wrenching  process, because each clipping is meticulously underlined, and many of them — there must be tens of thousands at least — actually evoke memories of periods when I thought I understood how the world — or some specific countries — worked.

In any event, as I was going through my “Congress-Demos” in my Iraq file drawer yesterday, I found a little gem of a quote by then-Rep. Mark Kirk from just after the passage of the notorious resolution that gave President George W. Bush the authority to wage war against Iraq. It’s from the October 12, 2002 edition of Congressional Quarterly Weekly:

by Emile Nakhleh

The State Department’s Inspector General’s report on the US Embassy in Bahrain, which I have been asked to comment on, has generated much reaction, both among the pro-government factions and within the opposition.

The opposition fears that a report critical of the US ambassador’s job and managerial [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Emile Nakhleh

The State Department’s Inspector General’s report on the US Embassy in Bahrain, which I have been asked to comment on, has generated much reaction, both among the pro-government factions and within the opposition.

The opposition fears that a report critical of the US ambassador’s job and managerial performance might denote a change in US policy toward Bahrain in favor of the ruling family and away from demands for a genuine dialogue with the opposition. The report also has caused some anti-Shia, pro-regime, Sunni talking heads in Bahrain, like Abd al-Latif Mahmud, head of al-Tajamu’, to be gleeful about the harsh criticism of Ambassador Thomas Krajeski’s performance.

Both feelings are misplaced. The report does not denote a change in American policy toward Bahrain, nor is it a rejection of US standing policy in favor of human rights, even if it is being spun in some circles.

Background

Every US government department (ministry, in the parlance of other countries) by law has an in-house Office of Inspector General (OIG), which is required periodically to inspect the operations of different entities in that department, domestically and overseas, and the job performance of key personnel in that entity. These reports are known around Washington as “IG Reports.”

The IG reports, by law must stay clear of politics and policy. The recent State Department IG report is no exception. Their primary purpose is “to promote effective management, accountability, and positive change” in whatever entity that’s being inspected.

The IG reports usually make key judgments and recommendations to the secretary (minister) or other senior leaders in the department relevant to the report. In this case, the recommendations are made to the secretary of state.

The department’s senior leadership is not bound to accept the report in toto; it can accept some recommendations, take others under consideration, and still reject others. When the State Department’s spokeswoman was asked at a March 28 daily press briefing about the report’s recommendations, she gave the following answer:

The State Department values the oversight provided by our inspector general and we take IG recommendations seriously and rely on them to make improvements in how we operate.  With regard to this specific inspection report, Department official are reviewing the report and its recommendations and will respond to the inspector general formally.  While we agree with some recommendations, we disagree with others… But we believe the report contains a number of factual inaccuracies and take issue with several of the report’s assertions.  Our ambassador in Bahrain is qualified, highly capable, and we have full confidence in his leadership of the mission.  He has served with distinction for over 35 years in some of our most challenging missions, including Iraq and as our ambassador in Yemen; has repeatedly been recognized for his service and leadership, including multiple Superior Honor Awards and the President’s Distinguished Service Award.

Takeaways

The first key judgment in the IG report states the following: “The embassy has two competing policies: to maintain strong bilateral military cooperation and to advance human rights. The Ambassador has forged strong relationships with U.S. military leaders based in Bahrain to promote common goals.”

On the other hand, the IG report has strongly criticized the ambassador’s management style within the embassy, his dealings with the staff, and his ad hoc management approach to the on-going human rights crisis in Bahrain. Due to the two diametrically opposed US goals in Bahrain, it is a no brainer for the IG report to assess that “Embassy Bahrain faces significant challenges balancing U.S. military interests with U.S. human rights policies.”

The IG report praised the ambassador for forging “a strong relationship with the heads of U.S. Naval forces Central Command and U.S. Marine Forces Central Command to promote consistent U.S. policy messaging.  He is respected by many Bahraini officials and is well liked by mission staff.” On the other hand, the ambassador’s “lack of access to some key government officials, his poor media image, and the lack of an effective strategy to address these issues have created friction with principal officials in Washington.”

Most of the recommendations focus on embassy operations regarding personnel, finances, housing, property, etc. but NOT on US policy toward Bahrain.

Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski is a seasoned, experienced, and distinguished diplomat who has served his country for over three decades. The report has failed to recognize the fact that the ambassador’s “lack of access to key government officials” in Bahrain has been caused by his strong stance on human rights and constant and justifiable criticism of the Al Khalifas’ dismissive attitude and repressive policies toward its Shia majority.

The report should have pointed out that the ambassador’s “poor media image” was primarily caused by the fact that most Bahraini media is either pro-government or government supported and directed. Some pro-government media outlets have even cancelled the ambassador’s appearance when he was planning to discuss one of his hobbies, gourmet cooking!

Since he went out on a limb in pointing out the damaging policies of the ruling family, he found himself in “friction with principal officials in Washington,” according to the report. The report, however, failed to identify who those “principal officials” were.

The ambassador serves at the pleasure of the president of the United States and the secretary of state. It stands to reason, therefore, that his continued service in Bahrain as head of the mission means he still commands the respect and confidence of both “key principals.” I have seen many of these IG inspection reports during my service in the government, and like the State Department spokeswoman, I accepted some of those reports’ recommendations and rejected others. That’s the nature of the beast!

My bottom-line judgment

The report was not written for, or driven by, political or policy reasons. It’s primarily an “Inside the Beltway” Washington report. Pro-government talking heads in Bahrain would be mistaken to take comfort from the report. The criticisms of the ambassador pertain primarily to his managerial style and the internal operations within the embassy, not to his rightful stance on human rights violations in Bahrain.

Abd al-Latif Mahmud and others should take another look at the report. If they continue to misread it, then they don’t understand Washington or the nature of the American political system. I hope Al Khalifa leaders do not make a similar mistake.

Photo: Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel meets with Bahraini Lieutenant General Sheikh Mohammed Al Khalifa, Minister of State for Defense Affiars, US Ambassador to Bahrain Thomas C. Krajeski and US Army General Lloyd Austin, upon his arrival in Bahrain on December 5, 2013. Credit: Erin A. Kirk-Cuomo

by Jasmin Ramsey

Raising expectations for a deal over its controversial nuclear programme, Iran’s chief negotiator Mohammad Javad Zarif has said that a joint statement on the framework of a nuclear deal could be issued as early as Friday here amid ongoing negotiations with the P5+1 group of world powers.

via IPS News

Geneva – Iran offered a new proposal in English during talks over its nuclear program here today in a meeting with the P5+1 negotiating team (the United States, Britain, France, Russia and China plus Germany).

In a closed-door morning session, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif presented [...]]]> by Jasmin Ramsey

via IPS News

Geneva – Iran offered a new proposal in English during talks over its nuclear program here today in a meeting with the P5+1 negotiating team (the United States, Britain, France, Russia and China plus Germany).

In a closed-door morning session, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif presented a 3-phased offer to the world powers in a PowerPoint presentation titled, “Closing an Unnecessary Crisis and Opening New Horizons,” according to Iranian press reports.

Few details, positive first takes

Iran’s proposal has only been made available to the participating negotiating parties, but both sides concluded the day with positive statements.

“For the first time, very detailed technical discussions continued this afternoon,” said Michael Mann, the Spokesperson for EU High Representative, Catherine Ashton.

A senior State Department official offered the same statement.

Mann later reiterated his positive first take while speaking to reporters but said “there’s still a lot of work to be done,” adding that tomorrow’s session would involve more detail-work.

Iran’s FM, who has been appointed by President Rouhani to lead the Iranian negotiating team, was only present during the morning session. The talks will continue through the 16th at the deputy ministerial level.

Zarif, who is reportedly suffering from intense back pain, did manage to have a bilateral meeting with Ashton following the afternoon plenary.

Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi later met bilaterally with lead US representative Wendy Sherman, the State Department’s Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

A senior State Department official said the discussion was “useful, and we look forward to continuing our discussions in tomorrow’s meetings with the full P5+1 and Iran.”

Sense of Iran’s new proposal

“We have explained our negotiation goals,” said Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in Persian to a swarming crowd of reporters before the afternoon session began.

“We want to guarantee Iran’s right to nuclear technology and assure the other side of the table that our nuclear program is peaceful,” said the Deputy FM, who will be Iran’s lead representative to the P5+1 during the remainder of the Geneva talks.

“The first step includes rebuilding mutual trust and addressing the concerns of both sides,” he said, adding that the “verification tools” of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could be utilized during the process.

The final step includes using Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s Fatwa (a religious ruling) against Iran building nuclear weapons as “the most important point,” stated Araghchi.

“Iran will use its own nuclear facilities including its nuclear research reactor for peaceful purposes,” he noted, adding that the last phase of Iran’s offer includes “the lifting of all sanctions against Iran.” 

Hope in Iran, roadblocks in the US

Inside Iran, people were hopeful for a resolution to the international conflict over Tehran’s nuclear program, which has resulted in rounds of unilateral and multilateral sanctions against the country.

Iran’s economy has suffered from a major reduction in its vital oil exports. Almost exactly one year ago, Iran’s currency, the rial, also dropped to more than half its dollar value.

Maliheh Ghasem Nezhad, a 65-year-old retired teacher, told IPS she had voted for Iranian President Hassan Rouhani in June and was “very hopeful that this new team can finish this issue soon.”

“We want a conclusion that is good for us and our economy,” she said.

“No one in Iran wants nuclear bombs but we have the right to safe energy. We just want less stress in our daily lives,” Nezhad told IPS.

After years of increasing isolation and economic pressure from the US and other world powers that intensified significantly during the final term of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, much of Iran seems at least open to a deal with the West.

Supreme leader Ali Khamenei raised more than a few eyebrows around the world when he said he wasn’t “opposed to correct diplomatic moves” during a Sept. 17 speech to commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), according to Iranian press reports.

“I believe in what was described years ago as heroic flexibility,” he said.

But some Iranians remain skeptical about the possibility of a deal.

“I do not think they can get to an agreement because from many sides there are a lot of pressures,” Bahman Taebi, a bank employee who’s 39 years old, told IPS.

“There are countries in our region that do not want Iran and the West to get close, so they try to do everything they can to impede an agreement,” he said, adding that he believed “Mr. Zarif and his team were very capable for the talks and much better than the previous teams.”

Still, the Iranian delegation’s trip to the United Nations General Assembly, which resulted in a historic phone call between Presidents Barack Obama and Hassan Rouhani and a private meeting between Zarif and his US counterpart John Kerry — the highest-level official meet between the two countries since Iran’s 1979 revolution — have left Iranians wanting more.

“All I want Dr. Zarif and his team do in Geneva is to continue with the same approach they had in New York,” Reza Sabeti, a 47-year-old private company employee told IPS.

“From what saw in New York, I guess this will be another diplomatic victory for the Rouhani government and also for the US because both sides need an agreement,” he said.

But Iran’s insistence that its right to home-soil enrichment must be recognized as part of any deal remains a problem for the US Congress.

In an Oct. 11 bipartisan letter sent to Obama, 10 senators said “Iran does have a right to a peaceful nuclear energy program; it does not have a right to enrichment.”

The senators, including traditional hawks Sen. Robert Menendez, Sen. Lindsey Graham and Sen. Charles E. Schumer, as well as more moderate Democrats, said they “prepared to move forward with new sanctions to increase pressure on the government in Tehran.”

“The administration has to do much more hard lobbying to prevent Congress from enacting measures that could spoil the chance for a sound agreement with Iran,” Paul Pillar, a former top CIA analyst, told IPS.

“The presence of names of otherwise reasonable members of Congress on such letters is evidence of the political power of those endeavoring to subvert the negotiation of any agreement with Iran,” he said.

Photo: Talks between Iran and the world powers including EU Foreign Policy Chief, Catherine Ashton and Iran’s Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif in Switzerland, Genevam on Oct. 15. Credit: European External Action Service/Flickr

Yesterday we charted the way Secretary of State John Kerry’s seemingly off-handed answer to a question about how Syria could deter a US strike morphed into what’s now being referred to as the “Lavrov Proposal“. As far as I can [...]]]> by Jasmin Ramsey

*This post has been updated

Yesterday we charted the way Secretary of State John Kerry’s seemingly off-handed answer to a question about how Syria could deter a US strike morphed into what’s now being referred to as the “Lavrov Proposal“. As far as I can tell, it was Kerry’s predecessor Hillary Clinton who first publicly described the proposal for Syria to turn in its chemical weapons to international monitors as a US-Russian initiative (before she talked about endangered wildlife), rather than Russia seizing upon a US slip of the tongue, which is what it really looked liked. Well, while the proposal was actually first brought up by then-Senator Richard G. Lugar a little over a year ago, more people are now pushing the notion that Kerry’s gaffe wasn’t one at all, including the Secretary of State himself. Kerry provided his description of what went down on Monday during his remarks at the House Armed Services Committee today (emphasis mine):

Yesterday, we challenged the regime to turn them over to the secure control of the international community so that they could be destroyed. And that, of course, would be the ultimate way to degrade and deter Assad’s arsenal, and it is the ideal weapon – ideal way to take this weapon away from him.

This is how Kerry “challenged” Bashar al-Assad to hand over his chemical weapons:

Kerry continued that Russia “responded” to his challenge by saying they would come up with a proposal and that President Barack Obama would take a “hard look” at it if it was produced within a limited time. (Interestingly, the President hasn’t ruled it out.) Kerry also argued something we’re hearing over and over again now: this potentially good outcome would not have been possible without a credible threat of US military force.

After Kerry announced this US “challenge” in London during the question/answer period of a press briefing and Russia announced it had a proposal within a few hours, former United States Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Philip J. Crowley tweeted why this could be a life preserver for Obama:

#Putin just offered #Obama a lifeboat, a diplomatic solution that allows the postponement of a vote on military action he may well lose.

— Philip J. Crowley (@PJCrowley) September 9, 2013

#Obama gains from the #Russian offer. If #Assad gives up the weapons, problem solved. If not, it strengthens the case for military action.

— Philip J. Crowley (@PJCrowley) September 9, 2013

Today, former New York Times executive editor Bill Keller repeated some of Crowley’s arguments while arguing that Kerry did not act as a “careless pawn”:

I’m told by a senior administration official that Kerry’s comment was not as offhanded as it seemed. According to this official, Kerry and his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, first discussed the idea back in the spring. They returned to it more seriously last week, and Putin and Obama talked about it in at the G20 summit in St. Petersburg. The official said the administration sees the danger that the Russians or the U.N. will make it a delaying tactic, but that “in Kerry’s mind and in the President’s mind, it can be a win-win:” either you disarm Syria of its chemical weapons quickly and verifiably, or by exhausting a credible diplomatic option you win support for tougher measures against the Assad regime.

Of course, that still doesn’t explain why this alleged US challenge was presented only after Kerry was prompted with a question from a CBS reporter and why the State Department initially categorically denied that Kerry had made a proposal. Here’s a reminder of yesterday’s Daily Press Briefing with Deputy Spokesperson Marie Harf (emphasis mine):

QUESTION: — did not make this statement until after he found about what the Secretary had said.

MS. HARF: Mm-hmm. But the Secretary was not making a proposal. The Secretary was making a –

QUESTION: How is that? Go ahead.

MS. HARF: Thank you. The Secretary was making a rhetorical statement and you read the whole quote, which I actually appreciate you doing. Look, he’s not about to do this. That was – that’s what the –

*Update: Al-Monitor also reports that this proposal was in the making before Kerry’s comments on Monday. It still seems like Kerry at least jumped the gun, which is understandable, considering that he’s probably been going on less than 3 hours of sleep. In any case, here’s why all of this could unfortunately be going nowhere.

by Mitchell Plitnick

Some days, it must be really difficult to be the State Department’s spokesperson. It doesn’t seem like a bad job to have at all, but on certain questions it’s impossible to not look like an idiot. A lot of those questions are connected to de facto policies which differ [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Mitchell Plitnick

Some days, it must be really difficult to be the State Department’s spokesperson. It doesn’t seem like a bad job to have at all, but on certain questions it’s impossible to not look like an idiot. A lot of those questions are connected to de facto policies which differ from de jure ones. And there is no better example of that than US policy on Israeli settlements.

Back in the early years after the 1967 war, the United States made it clear that the settlements were illegal according to international law. As recently as 1978, the State Department legal adviser confirmed that all Israeli settlements beyond the Green Line are illegal, and through the Carter administration, this was explicit US policy. That policy has never been explicitly revoked, but beginning with the Reagan administration, de facto policy has been ambiguous. Reagan began the trend when he stated that while the settlements were ill-advised, provocative and that further settlement was not necessary for Israel’s security “I disagreed when, the previous Administration refereed to them as illegal, they’re not illegal.  Not under the U.N. resolution that leaves the West Bank open to all people—Arab and Israeli alike, Christian alike.”

The problematic nature of Reagan’s statement — implying that “Arab” equals “Muslim” and “Israeli” equals “Jew”, and more importantly, citing the “U.N. Resolution”, which is not the basis for the illegality of the settlements (the Fourth Geneva Convention is) — notwithstanding, this was the beginning of the US’ refusal to label settlements illegal, terming them instead, at most, “illegitimate.”

The problem for spokespeople arises when they have to parse what that means. Last Monday, in Colombia, Secretary of State John Kerry made what turned out to be an interesting statement. “As the world, I hope, knows, the United States of America views all the settlements as illegitimate,” Kerry said. The use of the word “all” might have worked in Reagan’s day, even in Bill Clinton’s. But today, when the US has allowed Israel to assert that certain settlements are essentially guaranteed (the so-called “settlement blocs” of Gush Etzion, Ariel and Ma’ale Adumim) that little word carries heavy implications.

Israel insists that it’s okay to build in the settlement blocs and the Palestinians should have no problem with that because they’re going to keep them anyway. Israel bases its case on the fact that they have repeatedly stated this publicly without being contradicted and on George W. Bush’s letter to Ariel Sharon in 2004. While that letter did not explicitly state that Israel should keep the blocs, it profoundly altered the diplomatic landscape by promising that the borders between Israel and the envisioned Palestinian state would not be the same as those that existed in 1967 and that alterations would reflect the changed demographics in those, at that time, 37 years. Israel took that to mean it would keep the blocs, and no one, other than some Palestinians (and not the lead spokespeople at the time) said otherwise.

So, when Kerry said all the settlements were illegitimate, it prompted AP reporter Matthew Lee to enter into the following exchange with spokeswoman Jen Psaki:

QUESTION: He said the United States doesn’t see all of the settlement activity as legitimate. Is it correct that – is that correct, that all settlement activity is illegitimate? And I don’t want to get into this illegitimate or illegal, because as far as I’m concerned it’s a distinction without a difference. Does the United States believe that all Israeli settlement activity along – and we can include in that East Jerusalem construction – is all of it illegitimate?

MS. PSAKI: Well, our position on Jerusalem has been clear and has been consistent for some time, which is that we believe it is a final status issue in terms of the discussion of that – of Jerusalem, right?

QUESTION: Mm-hmm.

MS. PSAKI: That is part of the discussion. We have, of course, expressed concerns about construction in East Jerusalem. That hasn’t changed. Our position on settlements we have stated a number of times, and I just stated, and that has not changed either.

QUESTION: Okay. So you do not regard the construction in East Jerusalem as illegitimate. Is that correct?

MS. PSAKI: Well, I think I just stated what we – what our longstanding position has been on construction.

…

QUESTION: But it’s not – hold on, Said. But it’s not that it’s illegitimate?

MS. PSAKI: I don’t have anything more than what I just stated.

QUESTION: Because it is a final status issue?

MS. PSAKI: It is a final status issue that we discussed and worked through.

QUESTION: So one of the questions – okay. So one of the questions that I had that Marie said she would take yesterday –

MS. PSAKI: Mm-hmm.

QUESTION: – was about the 900 homes that were announced for construction in East Jerusalem. Is it fair to say you do not regard those as illegitimate?

MS. PSAKI: Well, we – in terms of those specific – that specific announcement –

QUESTION: Right.

MS. PSAKI: – you know we oppose any unilateral action. Certainly we would include this, that attempt to prejudge final status issues, including the status of Jerusalem. That’s where that building is taking place. That’s our view on it.

QUESTION: Okay. So you’re opposed to it, but you don’t say that it’s illegitimate?

MS. PSAKI: I think you know our position.

QUESTION: Okay. So in terms of illegitimacy then, this legitimacy issue, are existing settlements illegitimate in the eyes of the Administration in the West Bank? Settlements in the West Bank that currently exist now, are they illegitimate, meaning that they should not be part of Israel once there is a peace agreement?

MS. PSAKI: Well, obviously, the question of borders will be worked through and is part of the discussion that will take place and will be ongoing in the weeks and months ahead.

QUESTION: So are existing settlements illegitimate?

MS. PSAKI: Well, we have concerns about ongoing continued settlement activity.

QUESTION: Okay. Do you understand that there’s a serious problem here? Because if you talk about – if all you’re prepared to say is that you don’t accept the legitimacy of continued settlement activity, you are only calling illegitimate settlements that have not been announced, settlements that are, say, a twinkle in the Housing Minister or whoever’s eye. Once they are actually announced or built, you stop calling them illegitimate, and they – and you start saying that that’s a – that’s something to be decided between the parties. Okay?

MS. PSAKI: Well, this has been our position for a number of years.

QUESTION: That’s – well, right. But –

MS. PSAKI: So –

QUESTION: And I’m surprised that no one, and especially me, has picked up on this before, because you have essentially – you don’t oppose settlements at all, because once they’re built or once they’re announced, once plans for them – plans to build them are announced, you’re not opposed to them anymore, because it’s something for the parties to decide whether they’re legitimate or not.

MS. PSAKI: Well, certainly it will be – a big part of the discussion will be that process moving forward.

QUESTION: Right. Do you understand the problem? Do you understand the –

MS. PSAKI: I understand what you’re conveying, Matt. I’m happy to talk back with our team and see if there’s any more clarification we can provide.

QUESTION: Okay. So tell me, am I wrong in thinking that the United States has no position at all except that it is to be decided by the parties on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of settlements that exist in the West Bank today?

MS. PSAKI: I believe you are wrong, Matt. We’ll get you some more clarification.

QUESTION: You believe I’m wrong? Okay.

MS. PSAKI: We’ll get you some more clarification.

QUESTION: Jen –

MS. PSAKI: Mm-hmm.

QUESTION: – in fact, your longstanding position, going back all the way to 1967, and through George Herbert Walker Bush when he was representative at the United Nations, and on to Andrew Young, and on and on and on, that the settlement, that Jerusalem – East Jerusalem, the West Bank, all territory occupied is contrary to the Fourth Geneva Convention, and any alteration stands contrary to that, that you will not support. That is your position, not to reconcile yourself to the facts on the ground, as has been suggested.

Earlier, Lee said to Psaki “Back in 1978, President Carter said that, quote, ‘We don’t see these settlements as being legal.’ Why can’t you say that they aren’t legal?” Psaki, of course, had no answer.

Ultimately, the only people making the argument that the settlements are legal are the Israelis and a handful of apologists who try to bend and twist international law into an interpretation that fits their needs. Otherwise, there is virtually universal agreement that all settlements beyond the Green Line are illegal. Technically, that is also the US position, since there has never been any official statement from a government representative charged with understanding and interpreting international law to reverse the conclusion reached in 1978. But in reality, the political upheaval that would ensue from re-stating that position makes it impossible to do so.

This was made even more interesting when, on August 12, the Washington Post’s internet edition apparently misquoted Kerry saying that the settlements were illegal, rather than illegitimate. When I saw the original version I almost fell over. Had that occurred, it would have been a major game-changer. Quickly, however, the Post corrected the error. I’m sure it was, indeed, an error, because I cannot imagine Kerry actually saying that.

Yes, I cannot imagine the US’ Secretary of State stating what remains the official legal interpretation as set forth by the State Department’s legal adviser and which, outside the US and Israel, is nearly an absolute consensus view. Interesting, even the most pro-Israel of Presidents, be it Reagan, George W. Bush, Bill Clinton or Barack Obama, has seen the settlements as a serious problem. They would all have liked to see Israel put a halt to them. But when George H.W. Bush, who, during his time as Ambassador to the UN, explicitly stated the settlements were illegal and acted to slow them, he was called anti-Israel. And we can all recall what happened when Obama asked Benjamin Netanyahu to freeze settlements so peace talks could continue (and, no, despite Bibi’s statements, the freeze never really happened — as Lara Friedman of Americans for Peace Now explains here).

These are the results of a schizophrenic policy, where the policy as enacted nearly opposes official statements of it. Good luck to Jen Psaki trying to explain it.

Photo: A new neighbourhood under construction in the West Bank’s Ariel settlement. Credit: Pierre Klochendler/IPS 

via The National Interest

The State Department released last week the government’s legislatively mandated annual report on international terrorism. There is no doubt what headline the administration hopes will be taken away from the release of the report, which covers the calendar year 2012. In a  by Paul Pillar

via The National Interest

The State Department released last week the government’s legislatively mandated annual report on international terrorism. There is no doubt what headline the administration hopes will be taken away from the release of the report, which covers the calendar year 2012. In a background conference call for reporters on Friday, Senior Administration Official One got immediately to the main message being pushed: that “one of the most noteworthy conclusions” in compiling the report was a “resurgence of terrorist activity by Iran and Hezbollah.” In fact, activity by Iran and Hezbollah was the only subject of the press backgrounder, and Iran and Hezbollah were treated as two peas in a pod that jointly account for this “alarming trend.” The other briefer, Senior Administration Official Two, joined in the messaging with gusto, warning anyone who might look at Hezbollah as a political actor that it is “a terrorist organization, and not just a terrorist organization, but a broad organization that is morally bankrupt to its very core.”

Most of the incidents involving Iran that were cited as part of the “resurgence” were a set of largely unsuccessful attacks against Israeli personnel early in the year in places such as New Delhi, Tbilisi and Bangkok. Nothing was said, in either the report or the backgrounder, about why Iran would perpetrate such attacks at that particular time against those particular targets. The failure to address that question is all the more glaring because the answer to the question is clear. The attacks were tit-for-tat terrorism in response to (possibly in addition to other attacks on Iran) the serial assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists—five to date, through early last year. The Iranians made the retaliatory nature of their own operations all the more obvious by even mimicking the method of attack used against the most recent scientist to die: an explosive attached to the victim’s vehicle.

The killings of the scientists were just as much acts of international terrorism as were the retaliatory Iranian attacks. The legal definition that defines terrorism for purposes of the State Department’s report is “premeditated politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.” But don’t expect to find any mention of the assassinations in the report. They are not noted anywhere, including in the section on Iran or the section on Israel (which begins with the statement, “Israel continued to be a stalwart counterterrorism partner in 2012.”) The absence of any mention of the assassinations is certainly not due to any lack of awareness among U.S. officials about the international nature of the assassinations and who was behind them.

Terrorism is a condemnable, immoral activity, no matter where and when it occurs and no matter who perpetrates it. It should not be excused or overlooked no matter what stimulated or motivated it, what causes or objectives it was intended to advance, or what relationship one may have with the perpetrator.

Last week President Obama made a refreshingly sensible and honest speech about terrorism and the policies needed to cope with it. If any such policies are to have credibility, remaining terrorism must be called to account with honesty and consistency. This week the administration failed to do that.

by Jim Lobe

As Republican lawmakers and Fox News have been claiming that the Benghazi “cover-up” scandal will prove even bigger than the Iran-Contra and Watergate scandals combined, Elliott Abrams – who, faced with a slew of felony charges by the Iran-Contra special prosecutor while serving as Assistant Secretary [...]]]> via Lobe Log

by Jim Lobe

As Republican lawmakers and Fox News have been claiming that the Benghazi “cover-up” scandal will prove even bigger than the Iran-Contra and Watergate scandals combined, Elliott Abrams – who, faced with a slew of felony charges by the Iran-Contra special prosecutor while serving as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs (1985-89), quickly pled guilty to two counts of misleading Congress — seemed to be a particularly poor choice by the Wall Street Journal to comment on this week’s hearings by the House Oversight Committee and decry the partisanship and viciousness of “Washington politics.”

It’s not just that Abrams has a rather dubious reputation for truth-telling dating back to even before Iran-Contra, to his service as Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights (1981-5), when his efforts to downplay or cover up serious human rights atrocities (some of which certainly match or even exceed the worst attributed to Assad’s forces in Syria) committed by “friendly authoritarians” in South and Central America were routinely denounced by human-rights activists and their supporters in Congress. As for his lying about his role in the Iran-Contra scandal, it’s quite something when a lawmaker as gentle and bipartisan as former Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Claiborne Pell threatens to eject you from a hearing room if you even try to testify because of your performance at previous hearings. (During one exchange in Dec 1986, after Iran-Contra hit the headlines after it had become clear that Abrams had lied to Congress about his role in fund-raising for the Contras, Sen. Tom Eagleton ended an exchange with Abrams by saying “I’ve heard [your testimony], and I want to puke.”)

It’s also that if you’re going to complain about the “vicious political culture of Washington,” your own contribution to that culture and its conventions should somehow be acknowledged. It was Abrams, after all, who repeatedly argued recently that Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel was an anti-Semite (or, more precisely, has “a thing about ‘the Jews’”). During the Reagan administration, he, like Jeane Kirkpatrick, was not shy about accusing human-rights activists, pro-poor clerics, and sympathetic Democratic lawmakers with whom he clashed on Central America of being fellow-travelers or dupes. As noted by Jefferson Morley back in 1987, he also adopted a more-sophisticated PR strategy designed to

dominate the conventions of Washington debate — epitomized on talk shows with speakers pro and con. Knowing these shows need federal officials, Abrams regularly refused to appear with selected opponents of Administration policy. He usually got his way. In declining to appear, Abrams labeled his critics, including respected diplomats, as ‘vipers’ beyond ‘the borders of responsible criticism.’

“Vipers” was also a word he reportedly used to describe foreign service officers who he felt were insufficiently loyal to the Reagan administration’s policies. Which brings me to the passage that really stuck out in Abram’s op-ed in the Journal, entitled “Benghazi Truths vs. Washington Politics.” The article concluded:

This hearing did not ascertain where the buck should stop, but it was a step forward in getting the facts. And it was a reminder that in Washington we should not permit people with political motives to blight the careers of civil servants and blame them for failures of management and policy at the top.

Of course, I personally couldn’t agree more with this appeal. But I find Abram’s invocation of it particularly ironic (not only because of the fact that neo-conservatives, including Abrams, and other hawks who marched the U.S. to war in Iraq are now finding it ever-so-convenient to blame the intelligence agencies for what was the worst debacle in U.S. foreign policy since the Vietnam War). It was also ironic because, during the Reagan administration, Abrams did not hesitate to retaliate against career officers who, in his opinion, failed to align their views with his own political interests. Consider these excerpts from a March 7, 1987, New York Times article, entitled “Abrams Under Fire at Senate Hearing.”

Just before [Abrams] was questioned, the subcommittee heard testimony from Francis J. McNeil, a former Ambassador to Costa Rica and 31-year-veteran of the State Department, who acknowledged under questioning that he quit his job because he was ”fed up” with being undermined by Mr. Abrams.

Mr. McNeil said that when as Deputy Director of Intelligence he gave discouraging assessments of the ability of the Nicaraguan rebels, Mr. Abrams translated that into ”not being on the team.” He said Mr. Abrams then made clear his belief that ”I was untrustworthy and a leaker.”

He said that Department investigators cleared him of the charge that he leaked a document to The Washington Post and that on resigning he wrote Mr. Abrams saying he had conducted an ”exercise in McCarthyism.”

When Mr. Abrams replaced Mr. McNeil at the witness chair, he appeared to try to face him as if to nod in recognition. But Mr. McNeil sought to avoid that by walking away with his head averted.

Under questioning from Senator Paul Sarbanes, a Maryland Democrat, Mr. Abrams acknowledged that the investigators were unable to show that Mr. McNeil had leaked any documents. ”Well, they never discovered any leaker,” Mr. Abrams said.

Mr. Abrams characterized Mr. McNeil’s letter of resignation as ”character assassination” and said he did not respond because ‘I consider it to be a nasty note of a personal nature.”

He acknowledged interceding to prevent Mr. McNeil from being named Ambassador to Peru. He said that when assistant secretaries take such actions, Foreign Service officers object. ”They hate our guts,” he said.

I don’t know if Abrams’ views of foreign service officers and other career civil servants have changed since then, although the neo-conservative disregard for — not to say hatred of — “Arabists” in the State Department and the intelligence community was certainly evident during the Bush administration in which Abrams served as the senior Near East staffer on the National Security Council. Who can forget Pat Lang’s retelling of his interview with Doug Feith, an Abrams protege, to head up the Pentagon’s Office of Special Operations?

So, it’s especially ironic to read Abrams’ denunciation of the “chasm between the culture of career civil servants ready to risk their lives and the vicious political culture of Washington” to which he has contributed so much over the past several decades.

But for more on what Abrams’ really thinks about the relationship between politics and the career civil service (and their feeding and care), you should read his recent essay, “The Prince of the White House.“

via al Shabaka

Whenever Middle East tensions rise, observers wonder whether the Camp David accords between Israel and Egypt will weather the storm. It is no different this time. Asked at last Friday’s daily briefing if the peace treaty was “in jeopardy”, State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland, assured correspondents that the [...]]]> By Nadia Hijab

via al Shabaka

Whenever Middle East tensions rise, observers wonder whether the Camp David accords between Israel and Egypt will weather the storm. It is no different this time. Asked at last Friday’s daily briefing if the peace treaty was “in jeopardy”, State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland, assured correspondents that the U.S. had no indications from Egypt there was “any difficulty on that question” and believed it “very important for Egypt to live up to its international obligations.”

The newly invigorated Egyptian street would beg to differ with Ms. Nuland. True, the last thing Egyptian president Mohammed Morsi needs is a definitive break with Israel or – more importantly – its U.S. patron. But he may find it hard to sustain even a cold peace in the face of the already great devastation and bloodshed Israel has visited upon the besieged Gaza Strip, whose deliberately impoverished Palestinian population has nowhere to run from the bombing and was only just beginning to recover from Israel’s 2008-9 assault.

Israel’s decision to launch a full-scale military operation that risked spiraling out of control will have fallout not just on the battlefield but also in the political arena, putting at risk its two greatest geopolitical gains of the past 30 years – the Camp David Accords with Egypt and the Oslo Accords signed with the Palestinians.

The value of these accords to Israel has been immeasurable. With Egypt definitively out of the Arab-Israeli military equation, Israel has been able to dominate the Middle East without fearing all-out war on multiple fronts.

And with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA) domesticated, Israel has been able to aggressively colonize the occupied territory with minimal obstruction, while the PA security forces – financed by the United States and European Union – play a lead role in ensuring the security of Israel’s occupation. Israel was also able to nurture new relationships in the Arab world, particularly in the Gulf.

Israel presumably factored the risks of undermining these accords into its calculations. It excels at scanning the political environment, and recalibrating its strategies accordingly, even if its policies often backfire over the longer term. Yet in the changing regional context of 2012, Israel would be foolish to presume that it alone is in a position to capitalize on opportunities produced by such dynamics.

Palestinian and Egyptian activists have for months been demanding a break with Camp David and Oslo, and similar voices are heard in Jordan regarding the Wadi Araba agreement. The Israeli offensive against Gaza gives them an opening to push further, while making it harder for the rulers of these three nations to resist calls for a clean break.

That is not to say that such activists necessarily want war with Israel. They simply want to terminate agreements that have brought neither peace nor justice, and that have tied their nations’ hands politically as well as economically. Think, for example, of the deal that obliged Egypt to sell gas at cut-rate prices to Israel. Or the Paris Protocol that gave Israel the right to collect Palestinian tax revenues and then hand them over, or not, at will. Or the Jordanian market compelled to open its doors to Israeli produce while Jordanian farmers’ products spoil.

The Egyptian response has been quick and visible. Morsi recalled his ambassador to Israel and sent his prime minister to visit Gaza. He was spared having to expel Israel’s ambassador by the fact that the latter quietly fled before Israel’s commenced its assault. Egypt worked intensely to secure a ceasefire, even though Israel assassinated its main Hamas interlocutor, Ahmad Ja’abari, after a two-day Egyptian-mediated truce that was respected – in part due to Ja’abari’s efforts – by all Palestinian factions. The inevitable Hamas response provided the pretext for Israel’s Operation Pillar of Defense.

The PA/PLO response has been less visible than that of Egypt, but perhaps more dramatic when compared to its stance during Israel’s Operation Cast Lead in December 2008 – January 2009. At that time, the PA/PLO resisted attempts to bring about an immediate ceasefire largely to please the U.S. It still had hopes that the U.S. support would give Palestinians a fair two-state solution. It also hoped that Israel might terminally defeat Hamas and that Fatah could regain control of the Gaza Strip – lost to Hamas in June 2007.

The PA/PLO’s foot-dragging during Operation Cast Lead was so pronounced that the then-president of the UN General Assembly, the Nicaraguan priest Father Miguel d’Escoto Brockmann, effectively accused it of complicity in damning words: “I wanted to help Palestine, but those who should supposedly have been most interested denied their support for reasons of ‘caution’ that I was incapable of understanding. I hope that they were right and that I was wrong. Otherwise, we face an ugly situation of constant complicity with the aggression against the rights of the noble and long-suffering Palestinian people.”

By contrast, during the latest assault PA/PLO head Mahmoud Abbas loudly urged Arab and international action to bring about an end to the fighting and spoke of reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. True to form, the PA/PLO security forces began by brutally cracking down on some of the West Bank demonstrations protesting Israel’s assault on Gaza, particularly those that looked as though they might reach nearby Israeli forces. But they were forced to change their tactics as the conflict escalated and demonstrators repeatedly clashed with Israeli soldiers.

Moreover, as the conflict raged the PA/PLO had to live with a major demonstration in Ramallah largely made up of Hamas forces, whose green flags dominated the event. And neither Palestinian nor Israeli forces were able to stop determined Palestinian activists from getting into the illegal Israeli West Bank settlement of Beit El despite beatings and arrests by both Israeli and Palestinian forces. Eight Palestinian women even managed to scale the settlement wall.

There is no question that Pillar of Defense has further weakened the Fatah-led PA/PLO. It has nothing to show for its participation in the U.S.-led Oslo-framed peace process that, as revealed by Al Jazeera’s Palestine Papers, reached almost slavish subservience. The aid-dependent economy that was booming in the West Bank at the time of Cast Lead is now practically on life support.

Abbas and Fatah still have control of the PLO, which is internationally recognized as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people – and, of course, they still have those well-armed security forces. Abbas’ bid for non-member observer state at the United Nations on November 29 will help keep him and his allies in the picture, but the weaker they get, the harder it will be for them to hold the line in defense of the Oslo Accords, which Hamas refuses to recognize, at least explicitly.

Moreover, the PLO will soon be placed in the position of having to show the value-added of its upgraded UN status by seeking membership in the International Criminal Court so as to hold Israel accountable for its violations of international law, including in Gaza. This would be a major departure. Abbas’ team made no use of an important legal victory, the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, which could have been used to stop other states from dealing with Israel’s settlements and put a brake on its colonization, among other things. And they deliberately undermined the Goldstone Report – the UN Human Rights Council fact-finding mission findings on Cast Lead.

Meanwhile, no matter how great Palestinian losses in life, limb, and infrastructure in the Gaza Strip, Hamas will emerge strengthened simply by surviving, as Hizballah did after Israel’s 2006 attack on Lebanon, when Israel developed its Dahiya Doctrine of using disproportionate force to crush its enemies without heed to civilian casualties. Hamas has in addition won important shows of support from Arab states, some of whose envoys joined Egypt in visiting Gaza during Israel’s offensive. And, of course, it still has its own powerful security forces.

Hamas can taint its “victory” by transforming it into a partisan show of strength with Fatah, as its supporters were quick to do in the recent Ramallah demonstration. Such an attitude flies in the face of the resurgent movement to redefine the Palestinian national struggle as one that transcends factionalism in the quest for self-determination, freedom, justice and equality.

Hamas may use its stronger position vis-à-vis Fatah to push for full PLO membership, breaking Fatah’s longstanding stranglehold on the umbrella movement. Indeed, Fatah may find that the only way it can stay relevant is by bringing Hamas into the PLO fold while Fatah can still negotiate a significant share of seats in the Palestinian National Council and on the PLO Executive Committee. If Hamas joins the PLO while maintaining its refusal to recognize the Oslo Accords, that will be a further nail in Oslo’s all-but-sealed coffin.

Thus, Israel may find that it emerged from Operation Pillar of Defense with its military reputation relatively unscathed – only relatively because rockets that can hit Tel Aviv will never completely disappear and Iron Dome is not 100% secure – but with its ability to manage its neighborhood seriously weakened. Without a PA/PLO to mediate its West Bank occupation, Israel will have to manage it directly. Israel may also find its hitherto unfettered colonization of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) severely constrained by determined Palestinian activism – an own goal for Benjamin Netanyahu who made settlement building a priority of his current premiership.

This is how, by pursuing military victory at any cost in the short term, Israel sets itself up for political failure in the longer-term. Its options are bleak: to maintain the present apartheid system of rule over the OPT and within Israel itself, while “thinning out” the Palestinian population to the extent possible.

In so doing, Israel faces growing world opprobrium and isolation in the Arab and Middle East regions – an Arab League meetingon Gaza called for “a moratorium” on normalization with Israel. It also faces possible PLO-led legal action against its occupation policies, continuing demonstrations and instability in the OPT and Israel, an increasingly effective campaign for boycott, divestment and sanctions that is exacting a moral and economic price, and, potentially, a movement for full civil and political rights in the part of Palestine that became Israel in 1948 as well as the Palestinian territory occupied in 1967. These are the openings Palestinians will be using to scale up the fight for their rights.