by Wayne White
Sen. John McCain’s berating of former Sen. Chuck Hagel for “yes or no” answers as to whether the latter would support intervention in Syria or providing arms to anti-regime fighters reveals just how little McCain understands about how agonizingly complex these issues have been — and remain — [...]]]>
by Wayne White
Sen. John McCain’s berating of former Sen. Chuck Hagel for “yes or no” answers as to whether the latter would support intervention in Syria or providing arms to anti-regime fighters reveals just how little McCain understands about how agonizingly complex these issues have been — and remain — for the US and other Western governments. In fact, perhaps the most profoundly basic need confronting the US and most of its allies (finding a credible Syrian opposition counterpart with which to work) has been elusive.
The Syrian opposition remains in disarray. All along, there have been disconnects between the new National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (more commonly referred to as the Syrian National Coalition) in exile, and the older, now associated, Syrian National Council (SNC) as well as what seems to be quite a few of the various armed rebels operating against the Assad regime inside Syria. Indeed, the National Coalition and its predecessor, the SNC, who now purportedly represent the overall Syrian resistance to the outside world, appear to most experts to be somewhat more moderate than many of the armed elements of what has been collectively known as the Syrian Liberation Army (SLA) fighting within Syria. Consequently, governments considering options as serious as those backed by Sen. McCain lack confidence that they have a reliable partner in the new Coalition.
Late last year, the Istanbul-based SNC was pressured by the US, the West, and many moderate Arab states to formulate an expanded and more thoroughly representative organization (because even some groups in exile remained outside the SNC). Leaders of the various factions in exile met in Doha, Qatar in November 2012 to attempt just that, and a new line-up, the National Coalition, emerged from that conference. If the succession of names and acronyms for the Syrian opposition outside Syria seems a bit confusing to the reader, this comes as no surprise; the opposition remains a disparate, in some cases only loosely associated, and quarrelsome grouping. And most informed observers feel that genuine unity within the Syrian opposition in exile, let alone between its many and varied elements fighting within Syria, had not even been achieved in Doha. Consequently, the US, (which was a key party pressuring the opposition to meet and reorganize in the first place), ironically withheld its recognition.
Further divisions within the council became evident just this weekend when senior opposition leader Moaz al-Khatib not only conferred with Russian and Iranian representatives in Munich, but also agreed to meet with Syrian Vice President Farouk al-Sharaa if the Syrian regime would work with the opposition toward a peaceful exit of President Bashar al-Assad. The offer conflicted with the Coalition’s recently reiterated position rejecting talks with the Assad regime, naturally producing grumbling from within the opposition in exile. The reaction on the part of many FSA fighters inside Syria was even more strongly negative, even though al-Khatib told the Russians and Iranians about the anger within opposition ranks over their support for the Assads.
An extremely troubling tendency for practically all outside governments supporting the Syrian opposition more generally has been the rising radicalization of FSA fighters on the battle lines throughout Syria. Indeed, extremist elements such as the al-Nusra Front (strongly suspected of being composed largely of al-Qaeda fighters) reportedly have consistently been in the vanguard of much of the toughest fighting in recent months, although it cooperates with armed rebel groups of differing beliefs out of necessity. So, al-Nusra, although seemingly the most effective anti-regime military force in Syria, was designated a terrorist organization by Washington in December 2012. Al-Khatib, on behalf of the exile Coalition, has urged the US to reconsider, but a change in US policy toward al-Nusra is unlikely.
Consequently, with its external leadership in some measure of flux, some rebel fighters still little known, and other elements battling in Syria considered dangerous, providing a large amount of lethal assistance has become even more problematic for most potential donors. Moreover, military intervention would be a far more difficult, militarily taxing, and costly proposition than it was in Libya for a variety of reasons. And Russia and China’s obstruction in the UN Security Council of any meaningful UN-sanction action against the Assad regime has been yet another major problem. Finally, there is the wide-ranging issue of various uncertain (and several potentially unwelcome) post-Assad scenarios to further complicate decision-making by governments toward providing lethal assistance to an opposition movement with which they otherwise share the goal of toppling Assad & Co. and ending the ongoing bloodshed and destruction.
With 60,000 Syrians already dead and more dying by the day, providing robust military aid to the opposition would appear, at least at first glance, a proverbial “no brainer.” But this abbreviated tour through the complexities of US, Western and moderate Arab considerations concerning this far more vexing issue should underscore why demanding instant “yes or no” answers from Chuck Hagel as to whether the Administration should move boldly toward either military action in Syria or the arms supply business was so inappropriate.
Yet, although unrelated to Hagel, it may have been a mistake for key governments supporting the Syrian opposition not to have started at least supplying greater quantities of arms to the FSA well over a year ago, despite some of the risks at that time too. This could have hastened the fall of the regime while minimizing what has now become widespread anger within the FSA (and among many anti-regime Syrians in general) over the West’s failure to do so. Moreover, at that point, fewer extremist elements of the FSA had emerged as strongly as they are now as the ongoing, savage struggle has radicalized ever larger numbers of opposition fighters. Viewed in hindsight, although this was a very difficult call even back then, it might have been a missed opportunity.
]]>The Syrian National Coalition, formed in Qatar last week through a US-led international initiative, has gained two important diplomatic victories in the past few days. NATO member Turkey has formally recognized the body as Syria’s legitimate government, while the BBC reports that France — one of the leaders of [...]]]>
The Syrian National Coalition, formed in Qatar last week through a US-led international initiative, has gained two important diplomatic victories in the past few days. NATO member Turkey has formally recognized the body as Syria’s legitimate government, while the BBC reports that France — one of the leaders of NATO intervention in Libya last year and now with a change in leadership — wants the EU to rethink the arms embargo imposed on Syria to allow “defensive weapons” through and recognize the Coalition.
The Gulf Cooperation Council has again promised more substantive aid plus military hardware, but it is not clear how much of that has arrived at all beyond some small arms shipments: “We need arms. We need arms. We need arms,” the head of the Syrian National Council, now part of the new group with 22 seats, demanded of the international community last weekend. One dissident also told The Economist that the main task for the new body is to effectively secure aid for the fighters and nonviolent activists on the ground.
The State Department, according to the New York Times, put a great deal of effort into organizing the new opposition group in Qatar, and its diplomats proved demanding too, with one telling Foreign Policy “…if you want to work with us you are going to work with this plan and you’re going to do this now.” But Washington cannot ignore the serious pitfalls of the Council. “[T]he influence of the exiled Syrian National Council over fighters on the ground,” Dan Murphy of the Christian Science Monitor notes, ” is near zero.”
The US also wants the new body to ”to get [the internal opposition] to bless the new political leadership structure,” suggesting a desire to more substantively engage with “vetted” anti-Assad forces who have so far received only limited communications and humanitarian aid from the US and EU. However, according to Syrian-American intellectual Dr. Amr al-Azm, writing at Syria Comment, the Local Coordinating Committees (LCCs) running the towns and cities that rebel forces occupy are voicing displeasure with the paucity of seats set aside for them: 14 versus 22 for the emigre-heavy Syrian National Council.
But the most important endorsement, that of the United States, is still missing. McClatchy reports that one reason for US concern is that Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood will rise to dominate the opposition and the Administration will be blasted for it, even despite initial Republican calls to arm the rebels:
Questions have arisen about the views of the head of the group, moderate cleric Moaz al Khatib, and the influence of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood on the new organization …
…. While the United States and other western powers want the new Coalition to supplant the Council, the Brotherhood is sure to retain its influence. A leading Brotherhood member told McClatchy that no more than six of the 63 in the Coalition’s membership are from his group. Yet with 22 of the Coalition seats occupied by members of the Council, and given that the Brotherhood has a significant influence on the Council, it seems likely to retain a substantial role in émigré politics.
The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood’s Deputy Speaker responded to such concerns by announcing that the group had no designs to “monopolize” politics in the country, but hoped to reach a “consensus” on Islamic law down the road.
While the Brotherhood may benefit from a receptive international climate in the region and access to rebel groups seeking weaponry, for many Syrians, the organization is still synonymous with the brutal counterinsurgency campaign that was waged from 1976 to 1982 between the Brothers and the Ba’athist state. Moreover, the Wall Street Journal has reported in the past few months that it’s the local “Islamists” who’ve risen independently of the distant Brotherhood-in-exile that are carrying the revolt forward into the countryside.
]]>Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi’s statement yesterday that the Islamic Republic is prepared to host talks between Bashar Al Assad’s government and the opposition should be regarded as an indication of Tehran’s inability to influence events in Syria. His public declaration was more like a futile public relations [...]]]>
Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi’s statement yesterday that the Islamic Republic is prepared to host talks between Bashar Al Assad’s government and the opposition should be regarded as an indication of Tehran’s inability to influence events in Syria. His public declaration was more like a futile public relations effort to sell Iran’s potential as a constructive regional player than a plan offered with any hope of its acceptance.
It is worth remembering that Salehi’s words come after calls from Russia and Kofi Annan for Iran to be included in Syrian crisis resolution efforts, followed by the Obama Administration’s categorical rejection of such an inclusion. Iran is apparently part of the problem and hence cannot be part of the solution. Susan Rice, the US ambassador to the United Nations, said yesterday that Iran “is supporting, aiding and abetting the Assad regime materially and in many other ways” and that “it has shown no readiness to contribute constructively.”
Exactly why Iran is distinguished from Russia regarding the distribution of material aid to the Syrian regime is not clear. One reason for the singling out of Iran could be because it is not a member of the UN Security Council. Or, it may be that the regional and international struggle over the fate of Syria is not geared towards delinking that country from Russia but rather about breaking its alliance with Iran. Iran cannot be permitted to take part in a process wherein the intention of several participants is to weaken its regional position.
But does Iran have an independent and coherent strategy for changing the calculations of the US and regional players like Saudi Arabia and Turkey? Or, for that matter, does Iran have a strategy to deal with the deteriorating situation in Syria? Not really!
Recent statements and slight shifts from Tehran suggest that Iran is towing the Russian line. In fact, Salehi’s offer of facilitating dialogue comes just a few days after Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov once again called on the Syrian government and all of the opposition groups to embark on a dialogue.
Iran also seems to have absorbed Moscow’s interpretation of the June 30th Geneva agreement regarding a Syrian political transition based on “mutual consent.” While for the Syrian National Council and Washington the first step of such a transition requires Assad’s departure, Tehran, like Moscow, wants Assad’s fate to be on the negotiating table. This implies that if there is a Russian decision to lean on Assad more forcefully, regardless of whether it will work or not, Tehran will follow.
Like other countries with a stake in Syria’s future, Iran is now faced with an ally that’s essentially in the throes of what will likely be a long, drawn out and worsening civil war. Various voices are warning about what could lie head. The prospect of Syria repeating the gruesome Algerian civil war of the 1990s has been raised, while for Mohammad Ali Sobhani, Iran’s former ambassador to Lebanon, the fear is more about Syria’s disintegration along the lines of the former Yugoslavia. Others worry about a spill over into and further destabilization of Iraq, particularly into the adjacent Iraqi provinces of Anbar and Ninewa. But expressions of fear do not make up for the lack of a visionary policy.
The Iranian government is undoubtedly aware that Syria is in a mess. But in the coming months expect Iran’s response to be more reactive than proactive despite proclamations and posturing that suggest otherwise.
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