by Robert E. Hunter

Twenty-five years ago, on July 3, 1998, the USS Vincennes, operating in the Persian Gulf, shot down an Iranian commercial airliner, killing all 290 people on board. Debate continues about why this happened. Misidentification of the Iranian aircraft? A series of mistakes by senior officers on [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Robert E. Hunter

Twenty-five years ago, on July 3, 1998, the USS Vincennes, operating in the Persian Gulf, shot down an Iranian commercial airliner, killing all 290 people on board. Debate continues about why this happened. Misidentification of the Iranian aircraft? A series of mistakes by senior officers on board the Vincennes? Iran Air Flight 655 being in the wrong place at the wrong time given that a (minor) skirmish was then taking place between some US and Iranian surface vessels?

One explanation, to which I personally subscribed at the time (having, of course, no direct information) was that the psychology of demonizing all things Iranian had taken hold of those responsible on the Vincennes for the decision to shoot. I reasoned that the drumbeat of anti-Iranian sentiment that was affecting the general American public had spilled over to the Vincennes, leading to the expectation that Iran’s forces would act in a hostile manner — thus, when its radars lit up, a threat was on the horizon.

This debate will no doubt carry on (for a detailed point-counterpoint, see here). But the same climate of demonizing all things Iranian continues to hold much of the US government in its grip, virtually to the very top, as well as a large fraction of the “commentariate” in Washington and elsewhere.

This assessment is certainly accurate regarding a large fraction of responses, from inside and outside the Obama administration, to the June 14 election of Hassan Rouhani as president of the Islamic Republic of Iran. A chorus of US skeptics have predictably dismissed even the slight possibility that Rouhani’s win might produce a shift in Iranian behavior or its nuclear negotiating stance. The initial White House response was at best lukewarm, if not downright back-handed, though three days later, President Obama did express “cautious optimism that with a new election there, we may be able to move forward on a dialogue that allows us to resolve the problems with Iran’s nuclear program.”

Striking, however, has been the heavy emphasis in US commentary on maintaining all the current sanctions imposed on Iran, if not making them stronger — with nary a nod to the potential of the new Iranian president, however problematic at this point, by marking his surprising election with even tiny sanctions relief. Dennis Ross, Middle East advisor to the last three presidents, counseled in the New York Times “…it would be foolish to think that lifting the pressure now would improve the chances that [Rouhani] would be allowed [by the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei] to offer us what we need.”

Meanwhile, the House Foreign Affairs Committee called for even tougher sanctions, urging Obama “…to increase the pressure on Iran in the days ahead.”

So much for trying to test the new Iranian president or showing the Iranian people that the US understands the stress that US-led sanctions have put them under, along with any hope that the US will try something different to see if the long-running impasse with the Iranian government can be broken.

Policy thus confounds the White House spokesman’s “[congratulation of the Iranian people] for their participation in the political process, and their courage in making their voices heard.”

Of course, the negative — or at best indifferent — US government response to Rouhani’s election might just be tactics preceding any future negotiations as well part of the reality that the new Iranian president must respect the wishes (read: veto) of the Supreme Leader. But as a way of making successful talks with Iran more difficult, if not impossible, it’s hard to imagine a better deal-breaker than the cacophony of dismissals of Rouhani’s election and the calls for more sanctions.

Given what else is happening in the Middle East, it is also surprising that the Obama administration is not looking for at least some way to ease its regional problems.

Syria is in civil war, as part of a growing conflict across the region that is pitting Sunnis against Shias (politics and religion), with Iran, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Israel in a many-cornered tug-of-war for regional predominance (geopolitics). The first stage of the post-Mubarak era in Egypt has collapsed in violence and, while its peace treaty with Israel has not yet been called into question, what is happening in Cairo is not confidence-inspiring in Jerusalem. The US Secretary of State doggedly pursues the faint hope of significant progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front instead of tending to the other, more insistent crises, while US standing in the region and its reputation for effective leadership has not taken such a blow since the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

A major part of the problem is that the Obama administration, like its two predecessors, has not yet adjusted to the consequences of the Cold War’s end: the (relative) diminution of US power and influence, the rise of cultural, regional and religious factors that were largely suppressed during the US-Soviet confrontation, and the rising expectations of a new generation. It seems unable to consider all the elements of this complex region together and develop coherent policies that have a chance of succeeding.

For Washington and the US think-tank community, victory over the Soviet Union seemed to mean that there was less need to think strategically, when in fact, the opposite has proved to be true. A similar lesson has not yet been learned regarding the need for the US government, beginning in the White House, to recruit and employ a top-class team of experts, analysts, strategists and diplomats.

Until George W. Bush described Iran as part of an “axis of evil” in January 2002, the US and Iran had a common interest in trammeling the Taliban in Afghanistan. They could again, as the US and its allies now head towards an exit. Both countries have an interest in protecting the flow of oil in and from the Persian Gulf, including the Strait of Hormuz, as well as in stopping piracy in the Arabian Sea. No one can benefit from a war involving Iran over its nuclear program or for any other reason. And, whether we are prepared to realize it or not, a large majority of Iranians, all of whom are literate and a large fraction of whom are middle class and well-educated, are sick of the Islamic Revolution and would like to find an alternative so they can get on with their lives and be part of the outside world, including the Western world, with all its attractions.

The “first law of holes,” the old political saying goes, is that “when you are in a hole, stop digging.” The US is in a hole in the Middle East that is getting deeper by the day. While the Iranian election may not usher in — yet — an era when that corner of the region can be less of a headache for Washington, the US must “stop digging”. It’s time to explore what can happen with Iran’s next president instead of simply working to make matters worse with more of the same sanctions, isolation, opprobrium and once again reflexive demonizing of all things Iranian.

by Marsha B. Cohen

Appearances to the contrary, the narrative underlying much news coverage of Iran’s recent election is still unfolding. While media attention has been diverted to the George Zimmerman trial domestically and to events in Egypt internationally, efforts to malign Iranian president-elect Hassan Rouhani and to strangle any hopes for [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Marsha B. Cohen

Appearances to the contrary, the narrative underlying much news coverage of Iran’s recent election is still unfolding. While media attention has been diverted to the George Zimmerman trial domestically and to events in Egypt internationally, efforts to malign Iranian president-elect Hassan Rouhani and to strangle any hopes for an improvement in U.S.-Iran relations continue unabated. The vacuum at the highest levels of U.S. foreign policy analysis is being filled by an echo chamber of self-styled and mutually reinforcing “experts”.

Certain themes and talking points have been constant. They have been crafted and honed by AIPAC (the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, which published these talking points 4 days after Rouhani won) and its spin-off think-tank WINEP (the Washington Institute), the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD) and a host of other hawkish think-tanks and advocacy groups such as the American Jewish Committee (AJC), the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), the Heritage Foundation and the Gatestone Institute. Consider some examples:

1) Iranian elections are a farce and a fraud, controlled by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei:

“Make no mistake — the Iranian elections don’t matter. The presidency in Iran is more about style than about substance. Control rests firmly with the Supreme Leader — the “Deputy of the Messiah on Earth” — and he need not submit himself to ordinary mortals for affirmation.” – Michael Rubin, Resident Scholar at AEI, “The Iranian elections don’t matter. Here’s what does.”, May 20

“#Iran announces cleric Hasan Rohani won the presidential election. Rohani, like all 7 candidates, was vetted & approved by the SupremeLeader” – AIPAC, Twitter, June 15

“Rouhani hand picked by the Supreme Leader & Guardian Council. His rec of deception on the nuclear program is clear. http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB5.pdf …” – Sen. Mark Kirk, Twitter, June 18 (h/t Julian Pecquet, Politico)

“Let’s not forget that those who ran for the presidency, including Rowhani, had to be approved by the ruling mullahs.”- David Harris, Executive Director of the AJC, Press Release, June 16

“This election was an adept maneuver by Iran’s leader, Khamenei, to return control of the system to the clerical establishment. It is, thus, not at all clear that Khamenei chose genuine reform as a policy.” - Meirav Wurmser and David Wurmser, “A Tricky Power Play by the Religious Leaders, New York Times, June 17

“The presidential election didn’t offer much insight into what the Iranian people want. With a reported turnout of 72 percent of the country’s 50 million registered voters, informed sources in Iran charge that the regime exaggerated the actual turnout by a factor of 4 or 5. This election is almost certainly as fraudulent.” - Lee Smith, Visiting Fellow at the Hudson Institute, The Weekly Standard, “He’s No ‘Moderate’“, June 17

“Indeed, Rohani has close ties to the regime. Unelected Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in power for 24 years, cleared each candidate for the presidency, including Hassan Rouhani. He rejected nearly 99 percent of those who filed to run in the election, including former Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Every one of the eight candidates permitted to run was considered loyal to the regime and its interpretation of Islam.” - AIPAC, Memo, June 18

“First, to become a presidential candidate, Rouhani had to pass muster ideologically with Supreme Leader Ali Hosseini Khamenei and his entourage. Of scores of would-be candidates, only six made it to the ballot. That ought to say something about who Rouhani really is. If his positions deviated all that much from those of the regime, he would have been barred from running.” - David Harris, El Pais, “Iranian Elections”, July 1

2) There are no “good” or “better” candidates in Iranian elections. Candidates who are ideologically driven are messianic madmen; candidates who seem pragmatic are devious and therefore even more dangerous. Rouhani’s election is therefore bad news for the U.S. and Israel because his demeanor and pragmatism will make it harder to demonize Iran:

“…it’s better to have an aggressive Saeed Jalili than a sweet talking Hassan Rouhani, I am, despite myself, rooting for the vile Jalili.”- Daniel Pipes, Blog, June 14

“Now let’s see whether Khamenei allows Rouhani to play rope-a-dope & offer a 20 percent deal. If so, should tie up the West for 12+ months.” - Mark Dubowitz, executive director of the FDD, Twitter, June 15

“With time running out, the Senate should move forward with toughest sanctions possible – rope-a-dope talks not an option. #Iran” – Mark Kirk, Twitter, June 18

“Hassan Rowhani is no moderate or reformer, at least in the American sense of the word. The hardline Guardian Council, which vets candidates in Iran, allowed less than 2 percent of registered candidates to run. Rowhani may have been the most liberal candidate on the ballot, but to call him a moderate would be like calling Attila the Hun a moderate because he reduced prison overcrowding and was, relatively speaking, to the left of Genghis Khan.” – Michael Rubin, National Review Online, “Iran’s Moderate President” June 17

“It would be more than a little surreal to see the new president champion ideas that he’s spent most of his revolutionary life ignoring or crushing. Hope springs eternal, of course, which is one reason why so many Iranians, who have consistently shown their disgust for Khamenei, would vote for such a dubious man.” - Reuel Marc Gerecht, senior fellow at the FDD, New York Times, “Rowhani is a Tool of Iran’s Rulers,” June 17

3) Even the most moderate-seeming Iranian politician has a dark and sinister past waiting to be uncovered. Guilt by association or even speculation will suffice. If all else fails, just make something up:

“Rouhani is a supreme loyalist, and a true believer, who lived in Paris in exile with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and followed him to Iran. He was a political commissar in the regular military, where he purged some of Iran’s finest officers, and a member of the Supreme Defense Council responsible for the continuation of the Iran-Iraq War, at a great cost in Iranian lives, even after all Iranian territories were liberated. He rose to become both Secretary of Iran’s powerful Supreme National Council in 1989, and Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, under former Iranian presidents Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and his successor Mohammad Khatami.” - Mark Dubowitz, The Atlantic, “Why You Shouldn’t Get Too Excited About Rouhani,” June 17

“Rowhani didn’t really protest the crackdown on the pro-democracy Green Movement in 2009, and was enthusiastic in his praise of the crackdown on pro-democracy Tehran University students in 1999. In all probability, Rowhani supported Rafsanjani’s and Khamenei’s assassination of internal and external dissidents in the 1990s and other terrorist operations in Latin America, Europe and against the United States in Khobar, Saudi Arabia in 1996.” –  Reuel Marc Gerecht, New York Times, “Rowhani is a Tool of Iran’s Rulers,” June 17

“Iranian President-elect Hassan Rowhani was on the special Iranian government committee that plotted the 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, according to an indictment by the Argentine government prosecutor investigating the case. The AMIA bombing is considered the deadliest terrorist attack in Argentina’s history, killing 85 and wounding hundreds more. The Argentine government had accused the Iranian government of planning the attack and Iran’s terrorist proxy Hezbollah of carrying it out. Numerous former and current Iranian officials are wanted by Interpol in connection with the bombing.” - Alana Goodman, Washington Free Beacon, ”New Iranian President Tied to 1994 Bombing“, June 19

“Iranian president-elect Hasan Rowhani was allegedly involved in plotting the deadly 1994 attack on a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, according to the indictment filed in the case. The attack, attributed to Iran and carried out by the terrorist group Hezbollah, killed 85 people and injured hundreds…Rowhani’s name in the indictment was first reported by the Washington Free Beacon.” – Yoel Goldman, Times of Israel, “Iran’s President-Elect Implicated in 1994 Argentina Bombing,” June 20

“Rouhani has been an integral part of the post-1979 Iranian system, not a rebellious outsider. As one telling example, he is reported to have been present at a fateful 1993 meeting of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council—he was its secretary at the time—when the decision was made to bomb the AMIA building in central Buenos Aires. That meeting has been documented by the relentless Argentine prosecutor in the case, Alberto Nisman. The actual attack was carried out in July 1994. Eighty-five people were killed and hundreds wounded in one of the deadliest assaults in Latin America in decades. – David Harris, El Pais, “Iranian Elections“, July 1.

[Note: Alberto Nisman, the Argentine prosecutor in the AMIA case, informed Times of Israel editor David Horovitz by e-mail on June 24 that Rouhani was not under indictment or accused of any involvement in the AMIA bombing:

"Contrary to recent reports, Hassan Rouhani did not participate in the 1993 Iranian leadership council meeting that authorized the following year’s terrorist attack on the AMIA Buenos Aires Jewish community center building in which 85 people were killed, the Argentinian prosecutor in the case told The Times of Israel...Asked whether his investigations had found any evidence of Rouhani having a role in Iranian-orchestrated terrorism, Nisman replied, 'There is no evidence, according to the AMIA case file, of the involvement of Hassan Rouhani in any terrorist attack."]

4) Nothing can or will change for the better after Rouhani’s election: 

“Rowhani will have little power. Remember that a moderate already served eight years as president and accomplished nothing. Rowhani is clearly loyal to the regime or he wouldn’t have been the only reformist candidate who was approved for the election by the regime.” – Barry Rubin, Rubin Reports, “Reformist Candidate Wins Big in Iran’s Election“, June 15

“The election of Hussein Rowhani instilled hope in the West that Iran may be internally moderate and that an Iranian Gorbachev has been found. It is unlikely, however, that these hopes will be realized.” Meirav and David Wurmser, “A Tricky Power Play by the Religious Leaders“, New York Times, June 17

“What we are likely to see—in a best-case scenario—is a big tent that includes many, though not all, of the revolutionary establishment figures that Rouhani has grown up with. Others who’ve fallen away from Rafsanjani will likely be inside; and the conservative clergy, with its mixed feelings about the supreme leader’s theocratic hubris, may be there, too.  The only ones unlikely to be included are the serious reformers. They will remain unloved and unwanted, though Rouhani may try to cut down on their harassment.” - Reuel Marc Gerecht,  “Meet the New Mullah,” Weekly Standard, July 1

5) Sanctions, sanctions, sanctions! If sanctions are working, more will work even better. If they aren’t, it’s because they aren’t enough. Either way, we need more sanctions with increased and enhanced enforcement:

“The United States must persuade nations still buying Iranian oil to significantly reduce their purchases. Countries that violate U.S. law, including China and Turkey, must face consequences, including sanctioning financial institutions involved in oil purchases. Financial institutions and individuals conducting financial transactions with or providing services to the Central Bank of Iran or other sanctioned banks must be identified and sanctioned. The European Union must be persuaded to stop allowing Iran to conduct transactions in Euros. The United States should consider barring companies or individuals from doing business in the United States if they engage in significant commercial trade with Iran.” AIPAC, Memo, June 18

“As Members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, we appreciate your recent imposition of new sanctions and urge you to increase the pressure on Iran in the days ahead. An added positive action would be extending sector-based sanctions on the mining, engineering and construction-based sectors of Iran. We plan to strenthen sanctions with additional legislation approved nanimously by the Committee on Foreign Affairs and now pending in the House of Representatives.” - AIPAC-drafted Letter to President Obama signed by all but one member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, June 28, 2013.

“After July 1, new sanctions will blacklist metals trade with Iran including aluminum, coal, steel, gold, silver and platinum amongst others, and should include alumina.” - Mark Dubowitz, quoted in Reuters, Iran Importing Missile Grade Ore from Germany, France, July 2, 2013

6) Sanctions, although necessary, are insufficient without true threats of force:

“Unless the West is prepared to bring the regime to the brink of economic collapse combined with the credible threat of military force, we are unlikely to break the nuclear will of the regime.” – Mark Dubowitz, “Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei Stocks Election to Replace Ahmadinejad with Loyalists,“ Washington Times, May 27

“The United States must maintain a strong physical presence in the Persian Gulf and the broader Middle East as a deterrent to Iran and to give credibility to the president’s statements.” - AIPAC, Memo, June 18

“It’s also certainly worth doing what the Americans did in 2003: Scare the mullahs. After Saddam Hussein went down, the Iranian regime, according to the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, stopped experimenting with nuclear triggers and warhead designs. In 2004, Khamenei accepted, even if briefly, Rouhani’s suspension of uranium enrichment. Update the fear: Obama could declare that he intends to attack Iran by air and by sea but that Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards have the power to stop him. He could go to Congress and ask for authorization to strike. And he could tell his senior commanders to stop saying publicly that they neither foresee nor need to plan for another land war in Asia.” - Reuel Marc Gerecht, “Meet the New Mullah,” The Weekly Standard, July 1

“…the United States should hold exercises involving B-2 bombers (which can carry the 30,000-pound Massive Ordnance Penetrator, or MOP) and should encourage media reports that highlight ongoing military preparations. It should also publicize major milestones in the fielding and deployment of the upgraded version of the MOP, which was developed to deal with Iran’s deep underground uranium-enrichment facility at Fordow.” - Michael Eisenstadt, WINEP Strategic Report 13, “Not by Sanctions Alone“, July 2013

As Rouhani forms his cabinet, perhaps this taxonomy can serve as a useful guide…

Photo Credit: Mona Hoobehfekr

In a Wall Street Journal op-ed on Sunday, Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney outlined how the US can implement “A New Course for the Middle East”. The article was lacking in terms of substantive policy planning. Its most detailed commentary is reserved for US-Israel relations, but even then it does little [...]]]> via Lobe Log

In a Wall Street Journal op-ed on Sunday, Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney outlined how the US can implement “A New Course for the Middle East”. The article was lacking in terms of substantive policy planning. Its most detailed commentary is reserved for US-Israel relations, but even then it does little more than advance the campaign’s talking points:

The same incomprehension afflicts the president’s policy toward Israel. The president began his term with the explicit policy of creating “daylight” between our two countries. He recently downgraded Israel from being our “closest ally” in the Middle East to being only “one of our closest allies.” It’s a diplomatic message that will be received clearly by Israel and its adversaries alike. He dismissed Israel’s concerns about Iran as mere “noise” that he prefers to “block out.” And at a time when Israel needs America to stand with it, he declined to meet with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Aaron David Miller, who has been critical of the “daylight” between Obama and Netanyahu, wrote in Foreign Policy that the op-ed offers nothing to show what Romney would do differently from Obama if elected with Iran or other issues in the region:

Even by the standards of political silly season and in the heat of battle weeks before an election — when exaggeration, obfuscation, and willful distortion become the orders of the day — this article sets a new bar for its vacuity, aimlessness and lack of coherence. There’s nothing “new” in it, and it provides no “course for the Middle East.” If anything, it takes us back to the kind of muscular nonsense and sloganeering that has wreaked havoc on our credibility in recent years.