by Robert E. Hunter

“Victory has a thousand fathers; defeat is an orphan” — John Kennedy’s pithy phrase also has its opposite. We have seen this since last weekend’s failed effort to reach an accord on nuclear matters between Iran and the so-called “P5+1”, the five permanent members of the UN Security [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Robert E. Hunter

“Victory has a thousand fathers; defeat is an orphan” — John Kennedy’s pithy phrase also has its opposite. We have seen this since last weekend’s failed effort to reach an accord on nuclear matters between Iran and the so-called “P5+1”, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany. Did Iran scuttle the talks in Geneva on the future of its nuclear program?  Did the French Foreign Minister? Or was it a gremlin in the system, a mutual recognition that the issues remain in the “too tough to solve right now” category?  It is hard to judge, given the vow of silence imposed by the negotiators on their talks, but most of them have presented their individual version of events in the media.

The prize for being cute goes to the British Foreign Secretary, William Hague, who said, “It was a completely united position [by the P5+1] that was put to the Iranians at the close of our discussions.” No open dishonesty in that sentence. The operative word is “our,” which refers to the outcome of an intense, late-night struggle, not involving the Iranian Foreign Minister, but rather taking place on the non-Iranian side of the bargaining table, almost surely to give France what it was demanding, lest “the West” look disorganized. That Iran rejected a position significantly revised from that ready to be launched before French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius arrived in Geneva is carefully hidden from view.

Truth, it seems, is not only the first casualty of war, but also of multilateral diplomacy.

All is not lost, many commentators have said, given that the negotiators, albeit at a “lower level,” will get back to work on Nov. 20 — assuming that there is no intervening putsch in Tehran by its hardliners against the Iranian negotiating team.

It is true that the diplomatic “process” now taking place has effectively taken the “military option” against Iran off the table, unless some new external factor puts it back again.  Who remembers, now, that only a few weeks ago the Syrian government’s defiance of the US President’s “red line” against the use of chemical weapons almost led America to engage in its third Middle East war since 2001? The Syrian chemical weapons are still there; how to get rid of them has not been solved; but war is off this table, as well, to President Obama’s relief (and, one hopes, that of the rest of the civilized world).

In putting the best face on failure at Geneva, US Secretary of State John Kerry has also stressed unity among the Western representatives, perhaps with his fingers crossed behind his back. He had a choice to make: to allow it to look like the US had drifted onto Iran’s side of the argument — something totally unacceptable, certainly in US politics — or to reinforce allied “solidarity” at the price of fostering incredulity. He was in fact given a Hobson’s choice. Either M. Fabius had blind-sided the United States (and stiffed President Obama) — which France vigorously denies, claiming that it had made its concerns clear weeks ago, as a “matter of principle;” or Mr. Kerry had been let down by his State Department negotiating team. Indeed, in the absence of French perfidy, the US team should never have allowed him to put his prestige (and that of the United States) on the line by rushing to Geneva for a bit of last minute, pro forma deal-cutting (a traditional diplomatic practice to show that the boss is really in charge), followed by a formal accord-signing, without first sounding out all the other parties to be sure that nothing could come unstuck at the last minute. Otherwise, the US negotiators should have given Mr. Kerry a clear message to keep his distance.

There is no third possibility to explain what happened.

Nevertheless, with the diplomatic process now clearly underway, the chances are probably greater for success than failure in the bargaining over the Iranian nuclear program — though in the Middle East, counting chickens prematurely is always dangerous. For the proponents both of preventing an Iranian nuclear bomb and of a new conflict in the region, that should be good news.

But that category does not include everyone. Israel is understandably worried about its security and wants any deal drawn so tightly that Iran could not possibly get the bomb. The French have commercial interests with Arab states in the Persian Gulf to be served by their current obduracy. Along with other Sunni states, plus Israel, Saudi Arabia is desperately concerned that the US and Iran could become reconciled, with, perhaps in time, Iran’s becoming a rival for US affiliation (though not affection) as it was before 1979. Indeed, the first true and open US-Iran diplomatic engagement in three decades has already caused a geopolitical earthquake in the region of a magnitude rivaling the social-political earthquake of the so-called Arab Spring.

It is not surprising, therefore, that several American Middle East allies oppose a resolution of the Iranian imbroglio – opposition going far beyond fears that Iran might lead the US down the garden path and still get the bomb. For Israel, notably, an end to the valid perception of a potential nuclear threat from Iran would bring the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict back to the front-burner, an issue on which Israel has almost no supporters outside of the United States.

Yet the intense — indeed strident — efforts by Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, to squelch US diplomacy with Iran carries with it potential risks for Israel. Until now, there has rarely been daylight between US and Israeli strategic interests in the region: Iran’s stance against both the US “Great Satan” and the Jewish state went a long way to provide the glue. But with the possibility that Iran’s revolutionary era and related anti-Western activities are beginning to run their course, Mr. Netanyahu’s approach is no longer necessarily consonant with all US strategic interests in the region. Will the US protect Israel’s security? Yes, including against the possibility of Iranian nuclear weapons. But Israel needs to be chary of undercutting the US desire to explore whether Iran can be drawn back into the international system and, as a potential side benefit, whether the region’s Sunni-Shiite civil war can be damped down if not stopped.

Netanyahu has welcomed France’s scuttling, at least temporarily. But the Israeli Prime Minister is not necessarily acting in Israel’s best long-term interests. At the tactical level, he is not wise to align Israel with some of the US president’s most strident domestic political enemies. At the strategic level, it does not help Israel if America’s capacity to be effective and influential in the Middle East and in the Western Alliance is reduced: the US, after all, is Israel’s only true friend and supporter. This is an asset that shouldn’t be casually eroded.

Such considerations have no doubt contributed to Netanyahu’s increasing isolation from much of the Israeli strategic, intelligence, and military elite, the backbone of Israel’s security since its inception, and which steadfastly opposes any gap — real or just perceived — in US and Israeli strategic orientation.

Provided that Obama sticks to his current course and assuming that Iran’s political leadership does not fall prey to its own domestic opponents of successful negotiations, there is not yet reason for pessimism to prevail.

But what happened in Geneva last week will impose serious costs. Opponents of an agreement between the US and Iran — in the Middle East and in the US — now have extra time to marshal their efforts. France, which for some years has sought to be one of America’s favorite allies, is unlikely to find the welcome mat on the White House doorstep. President Obama is likely to think even less than he does already of the virtues of multilateral diplomacy and the utility of the Atlantic Alliance for advancing US strategic interests beyond Europe. And while Israel will still be able to count on US commitment to its security, strategic alignment with the US on other matters cannot, at least for the time being, be taken for granted.

These are heavy prices to be paid for the pursuit of tactical advantages at Geneva last week.

Photo Credit: U.S. Mission Geneva / Eric Bridiers

by Jasmin Ramsey

by Jasmin Ramsey

The US and Iran made history today here in New York City. While many prominent American members of the press, academic, business and think tank worlds were listening intently to President Hassan Rouhani give a speech at a Asia Society/ via LobeLog

by Jasmin Ramsey

by Jasmin Ramsey

The US and Iran made history today here in New York City. While many prominent American members of the press, academic, business and think tank worlds were listening intently to President Hassan Rouhani give a speech at a Asia Society/CFR-hosted event at the Hilton Hotel (where Jim and I were in attendance) and answer questions on some controversial issues later on (including one from yours truly), Foreign Minister Javad Zarif was talking to Secretary of State John Kerry at the UN in the highest-level organized meet between the two countries since the first year of Iran’s 1979 revolution.

Many were wondering what President Obama’s surprising announcement during his UN General Assembly speech about Kerry being directly involved in nuclear talks with Iran and the 6-world power P5+1 would boil down to. As of today it’s resulted in a handshake, a 30-minute meeting, positive reactions from both sides and suggestions of much more to come — hardly a bad start.

Laura Rozen and others have already reported on some of the details, including, for example, the fact that Kerry suggested to Zarif that they chat alone, which Zarif agreed to do. “We had a constructive meeting, and I think all of us were pleased that Foreign Minister Zarif came and made a presentation to us, which was very different in tone and very different in the vision that he held out with respect to possibilities of the future,” said Kerry in his post-meeting remarks. “Now it’s up to people to do the hard work of trying to fill out what those possibilities could do,” he said.

Rouhani seemed happy to see a smiling Zarif enter the Ballroom where around 200 people were seated shortly before the president finished answering a collection of the 40 or so questions that were posed to him. I’m sure the audience was also pleased after Asia Society president and moderator Josette Sheeran convinced Zarif to provide a briefer of the historic ministerial meeting that was hosted by EU foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton.

Zarif said that during the “very good and substantive meeting” it was agreed that Iran and its negotiating partners would “jumpstart the process” in moving forward by agreeing first to the “parameters of the endgame”; where Iran’s nuclear program will be in a year; deciding on steps that need to be taken to address each side’s concerns; and work towards finalizing them (he may have been referring to the entire negotiation process here) “within a year’s time” — a pleasant surprise for Zarif, who was apparently worried that the quickened timeline that Iran’s new government wants to operate on would have received a different response.

Zarif described his short bilateral meeting alone with Kerry (Rozen tweets that US P5+1 representative Wendy Sherman chatted with Iranian diplomats in the hall during this time) as “more than a chat”, by the way, which contrasts with the “moment” description used by Kerry. We don’t know yet exactly what they discussed during this time, but Zarif did seem very positive about Kerry’s “readiness” to work together, adding that “we now have to match words with actions”, which he hopes will be an “opportunity” rather than a “challenge.”

While the Kerry-Zarif meeting was tonight’s show-stopper, I was impressed by the question/answer period with Rouhani as well. All invitees were given an opportunity to write their questions down on paper upon entering the venue and as far as I can recall, everything that was put forward by Sheeran (the Iranians apparently had no say in what could and couldn’t be asked) focused on Iran’s most controversial issues, including Iran’s political prisoners, women’s rights and the Holocaust (see Mitchell’s post on this topic yesterday).

From what I could see, Rouhani was listening to everything in English and answering in Persian (all attendees had access to headphones broadcasting the audio in English and Persian). The entire 1.5 hour event posted above is worth watching, and I may write about it more before Monday (I have to trek back to DC tomorrow!) but I’m going to focus on my question now, since I’m feeling grateful that it was put forward along with my name. I asked Rouhani how he plans on navigating through domestic opposition to any kind of rapprochement between the US and Iran (at around 54:33), to which he responded:

Well, the government, after all, has actually witnessed a new era, a new environment that has been created by the people, I would say. So given that it’s created by the people, has brought about new conditions inside the country, and just as we are active in social, political and cultural fields, we — and the more we do in those fields, the more we will realize that this way of thought that is beginning to shape based on moderation will get stronger, and this can advance further, as time advances, and those who oppose it will normally just weaken in the process. But this is a long path, having said that, and we are just taking the initial steps here.

I can guess why his answer was not as in-depth as I hoped it would be. You probably can too.

Laura Rozen reports that the six world power negotiating team may not be revamping its package to be more generous with Iran as many were hoping (Russia has not even signed on to the new version yet) ahead of resumed talks which likely won’t take place until January.

Further to Jim’s post on Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s explicit statement on Friday that Washington wants bilateral talks with Iran, are similar comments she made on Nov. 30 at the Foreign Policy Group’s “Transformational Trends 2013″ Forum:

QUESTION: Robin Wright.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Hi, Robin.

QUESTION: I want to ask you [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Further to Jim’s post on Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s explicit statement on Friday that Washington wants bilateral talks with Iran, are similar comments she made on Nov. 30 at the Foreign Policy Group’s “Transformational Trends 2013″ Forum:

QUESTION: Robin Wright.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Hi, Robin.

QUESTION: I want to ask you about Iran, and to speak with the same kind of candor you did about Syria. This morning, Dennis Ross said that he thought this year was going to be a decisive year. Apparently, one of the U.S. representatives in Vienna today said that we’re talking about a March deadline – if you could explain that a little bit further.

And tell us realistically what prospects you think there is for compromise with Iran, given the past year of efforts by the United States.

And also, if you believe that Israel is fully on board in letting the United States take the lead and not going off on its own path.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, as to the last question, I’m not going to speak to any country’s security decisions other than our own. Obviously, that’s up to Israel to decide. However, I will say that we continue to believe that there is still a window of opportunity to reach some kind of resolution over Iran’s nuclear program. Now, I’m not a wild-eyed optimist about it, but I think it’s imperative that we do everything we can – unilaterally, bilaterally, multilaterally – to test that proposition.

I think what was meant about the March reference was either about the IAEA and its continuing work or the fact that we finished our election and now would be a good time to test the proposition that there can be some good-faith serious negotiations before the Iranians get into their elections, which are going to heat up probably around the March period, heading toward a June election.

I think that it’s a difficult matter to predict, because it really depends upon how serious the Iranians are about making a decision that removes the possibility of their being able to acquire a nuclear weapon or the components of one that can be in effect on a shelf somewhere and still serve as a basis for intimidation.

We get differing reports, as I’m sure you have seen, as to how serious the Supreme Leader is about that, but we want to test the proposition. This President came into office saying he was prepared to engage with Iran, reached out to Iran, without much reciprocity. We put together this unprecedented coalition to impose these very tough sanctions on Iran. We know they’re having an effect internally. But I think that we’ll see in the next few months whether there’s a chance for any kind of a serious negotiation. And right now, I’m not sure that it can happen, but I certainly hope it does.

With President Barack Obama winning re-election, foreign policy analysts here are pondering whether his victory will translate into major changes from the rather cautious approach he followed overseas in his first term.

For now, speculation is focused primarily on the Middle East, the region that has dominated the international agenda [...]]]> via IPS News

With President Barack Obama winning re-election, foreign policy analysts here are pondering whether his victory will translate into major changes from the rather cautious approach he followed overseas in his first term.

For now, speculation is focused primarily on the Middle East, the region that has dominated the international agenda since 9/11, much to the frustration of those in the Obama administration who are hoping to accelerate Washington’s “pivot” to the Asia/Pacific, especially in light of growing tensions between China and Japan and the ongoing political transition in Beijing.

Others are hoping that Obama will be willing to invest a fair amount of whatever additional political capital he gained from his victory on reviving international efforts to curb global warming, a challenge that thrust itself back into public consciousness here with hurricane-force winds as “Super-Storm Sandy” tore up much of the northeastern coast, including lower Manhattan.

Indeed, long-frustrated environmental groups seized on Obama’s allusion to the “destructive power of a warming planet” in his Chicago victory speech early Wednesday’s morning as a hopeful sign that the president, who hardly mentioned the problem during the campaign for fear of key coal-producing swing states, notably Ohio, may make climate change one of his “legacy” issues.

“President Obama’s legacy will be shaped by his ability to take on big challenges, including climate change, clean energy, environmental protection, and sustainability,” said Andrew Steer, president of the World Resources Institute (WRI).

As with climate change and other issues with major domestic implications, however, Obama will be constrained by certain political realities, most notably the fact Republicans will still hold a solid majority in the House of Representatives and 45 seats in the Senate, enabling them to effectively block any legislation to which they are strongly opposed.

“You’ve had an election that more or less preserves the status quo in the House,” noted Charles Kupchan, a foreign policy expert at the Council on Foreign Relations. “At a time when Obama’s top priority is getting the economy going, I’m not sure we’ll see a major initiative on climate change.”

And, while Obama won a sturdy majority of the electoral vote, his margin in the national vote is unlikely to exceed three percent when all the votes are counted. As a result, the institutional and partisan balance of power remains much the same as before the election.

Moreover, the fact that foreign policy did not play much of a role in a campaign dominated by the economy – only five percent of voters told pollsters as they left the voting booth that foreign affairs was the most important issue facing the country – suggests that Obama cannot claim a clear mandate for major policy changes.

Still, the fact that his Republican challenger, Mitt Romney, dropped his earlier hawkish, neo-conservative rhetoric as the election approached and essentially embraced Obama’s general policy approach, including even in the Middle East, in the closing weeks of the campaign was taken by some as a green light, if not a mandate, to pursue the president’s instincts.

“The election campaign, and not only the outcome, should be seen as the rout of the neo-conservatism of the disastrous 2001-2006 period of the Bush administration and the consolidation of a broad, bipartisan foreign policy consensus,” wrote Middle East analyst and occasional White House adviser Marc Lynch on his foreignpolicy.com blog Wednesday.

He predicted that what he called Obama’s “caution and pragmatism” in the region, particularly with respect to generally supporting democratic transitions, seeking ways to convene Israelis and Palestinians, engaging moderate Islamists, and pursuing Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, is unlikely to change, although he suggested that bolder approaches in some areas were called for.

In particular, the administration should begin “serious efforts at real talks with Iran” on its nuclear programme and “be prepared to take yes for an answer,” he wrote, echoing a consensus among realists in the foreign policy establishment that Obama will have greater flexibility to strike a deal with Tehran now than at any time in the last two years.

Reports of back-channel talks between the U.S. and Iran in preparation for a new round of negotiations between Tehran and the so-called P5+1 powers after the election have been circulating for two weeks.

Lynch also called for Washington to get behind a major push to unify the two main Palestinian factions and “encourage the renewal of a peace camp in the upcoming Israeli election” in hopes reviving serious efforts to achieve a two-state solution – a recommendation that also been urged by many analysts disappointed by Obama’s failure over the last two years to apply real pressure on Israel to halt the growth of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

Since 2010, Obama and his fellow Democrats have avoided confronting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu – who made little secret of his support for Romney – on either issue in major part because they felt their re-election chances depended heavily on the neutrality, if not the goodwill of the powerful Israel lobby.

Remarkably, however, those fears appear to have proved largely unfounded. Despite the expenditure of tens of millions of dollars in swing states on ads by the hard-line neo-conservative Republican Jewish Coalition and the Emergency Committee for Israel, as well as repeated charges by Romney that Obama had “thrown Israel under the bus,” 70 percent of Jewish voters opted for the president – a result that suggested that at least those hard-line neo-conservative elements of the lobby most closely tied to Netanyahu and the settler movement were not nearly as powerful as generally believed.

If so, Obama may have more room for manoeuvre on both Israel-Palestine and Iran, if he chooses to exercise it, than he himself previously thought.

Indeed, the election results were greeted with some considerable anxiety by Netanyahu’s supporters both here and in Israel.

“(R)emember that Obama is deeply committed to three things: global nuclear disarmament, rapprochement with the Islamic world, and Palestinian statehood,” wrote David Weinberg Wednesday in Israel Hayom, an Israeli newspaper funded by U.S. casino billionaire Sheldon Adelson, a major Netanyahu backer who also funded the election ads against Obama.

“I believe that he will forcefully act to progress on all three fronts, and this could bring him into conflict with Israel,” he added. “So start filling your sandbags. We’re in for a rough ride.”

Moreover, surveys of Jewish voters nationwide and in the swing states of Ohio and Florida commissioned by J Street, a “pro-peace” Zionist group, found that Obama’s tally among Jewish voters was only four percent less than in 2008 – roughly the same proportionate loss he suffered among virtually all demographic groups, except Latinos, who increased their support for the president significantly compared to four years ago.

The surveys also found overwhelming (79 percent) support for the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza and East Jerusalem, 76 percent support for an active U.S. role in negotiating a settlement, as well as a significant plurality for continuing diplomacy with Iran.

Still Kupchan believes Obama is unlikely to aggressively challenge Netanyahu, especially on the Israel-Palestinian issue.

“I think the chances of a major push on the peace process are slim,” said Charles Kupchan, a foreign policy expert at the Council on Foreign Relations. “That would happen only if there is an opening of sorts in the region or if it comes primarily from within Israel and a shift in the electoral landscape there that gives it Netanyahu an incentive to do something bold.”

But he, too, predicted that Obama will try harder to reach some agreement with Iran in the coming months while continuing to resist intervention – especially military intervention – amid the continuing turmoil in the Arab world.

“The one place you’ll see a growing footprint and presence and growing activism,” he said, will be in Asia, especially if “things heat up more over territorial disputes between China and its neighbours. And the new Chinese leadership may pursue a more confrontational stance which could in turn invite an American response in kind.”

This week Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton indicated they wanted talks with Iran to resume even as the US’s dual-track policy of pressure and diplomacy (translation: more sanctions) continues:

HIGH REPRESENTATIVE ASHTON: As you know, in New York, I was feeding back to the P-5+1/E-3+3 ministers [...]]]> via Lobe Log

This week Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton indicated they wanted talks with Iran to resume even as the US’s dual-track policy of pressure and diplomacy (translation: more sanctions) continues:

HIGH REPRESENTATIVE ASHTON: As you know, in New York, I was feeding back to the P-5+1/E-3+3 ministers on the discussions I’d been having with Dr. Jalili, who is the chief negotiator for the Iranians, on how to move forward. It is, as you know, my view that we have a twin-track approach of pressure and negotiation. The pressure you’ll have seen most recently in new rounds of sanctions from the European Union, and we continue to try and find ways to move forward on our negotiations.

Over the weekend, there was a contact between my deputy and Dr. Jalili’s deputy, and I will be making contact with Dr. Jalili in the near future. And I will continue to do everything I possibly can to move these negotiations forward, and I am pleased to do so with the full support of the ministers from the P-5+1/E-3+3, which is enormously important if we’re to make the progress I’d like to make.

MODERATOR: Thank you.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Let me just add that we so appreciate Cathy’s leadership in a unified P-5+1 approach, our dual-track approach, as she mentioned. So our message to Iran is clear: The window remains open to resolve the international community’s concerns about your nuclear program diplomatically and to relieve your isolation, but that window cannot remain open indefinitely. Therefore, we hope that there can be serious, good-faith negotiations commenced soon.

I reckon any kind of change in bilateral relations between Iran and America impractical and precluded until the holding of Iran’s presidential election. If they have understood well that the subject of foreign relations falls under the scope of the highest authority of the Islamic regime, namely the Supreme Leader, why weren’t they ready and aren’t ready to negotiate with Mr. Ahmadinejad and to solve the issues with his government? The government and president whose days left are ending fast and who enjoys a negative position inside the American political system because of some of the slogans he has offered.

“There is the possibility of progress in the next round [of Iran nuclear talks], but it’s going to require that both sides be more flexible and a little more creative,” says the Arms Control Association’s Daryl Kimball in an interview with the Council on Foreign Relations.

“Whatever happens after [...]]]> via Lobe Log

“There is the possibility of progress in the next round [of Iran nuclear talks], but it’s going to require that both sides be more flexible and a little more creative,” says the Arms Control Association’s Daryl Kimball in an interview with the Council on Foreign Relations.

“Whatever happens after the election, the most important thing is that the P5+1 process resumes and that it be a much more dynamic negotiation that is not simply a reiteration of previous well-understood positions,” he said.

Iran expert and Lobe Log contributor Farideh Farhi also warns that inflexibility on both sides will impede a peaceful resolution to this decades-long dispute:

By contrast, a nuclear deal that gave something to both sides and promised both sides a significant stream of future benefits would give both actors an incentive to stick to the terms. It would also tend to silence the hawks in both camps who push for hardline solutions (i.e., those Americans who favor military force and those Iranians who might favor actually getting a bomb). The problem here, as my colleague Matt Bunn reminded me yesterday, is that the current level of mistrust makes it hard for either side to convince the other that it will actually deliver the stream of benefits that will have to be part of the deal.

The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) has released a brief report emphasizing that Iran continues to move toward nuclear weapons capability and the international community must halt further progress. ISIS’s latest concern centers around Iranian lawmaker Mansour Haqiqatpour’s October 2 comment that Iran could enrich uranium to 60 percent [...]]]> via Lobe Log

The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) has released a brief report emphasizing that Iran continues to move toward nuclear weapons capability and the international community must halt further progress. ISIS’s latest concern centers around Iranian lawmaker Mansour Haqiqatpour’s October 2 comment that Iran could enrich uranium to 60 percent if diplomatic talks fail. From Reuters:

“In case our talks with the (six powers) fail to pay off, Iranian youth will master (the technology for) enrichment up to 60 percent to fuel submarines and ocean-going ships,” Haqiqatpour said.

The powers should know that “if these talks continue into next year, Iran cannot guarantee it would keep its enrichment limited to 20 percent. This enrichment is likely to increase to 40 or 50 percent,” he said.

The US and international community should prepare for an official Iranian announcement of such high-grade enrichment, warns ISIS, adding that Iran has “no need to produce highly enriched uranium at all, even if it wanted nuclear fuel for a reactor powering nuclear submarines or other naval vessels, or for a research reactor”. The move would also “significantly shortens Iran’s dash time to reaching weapon grade uranium,” the report said.

ISIS’s conclusion:

Taken in this context, any official Iranian announcement to make highly enriched uranium should be seen as unacceptable. Many will view such a decision as equivalent to initiating a breakout to acquire nuclear  weapons, reducing any chance for negotiations to work and potentially increasing the chances for military  strikes and war. Before Iran announces official plans to make highly enriched uranium, the United States and  the other members of the P5+1 should quietly but clearly state to Iran what it risks by producing highly  enriched uranium under any pretext.

No details are provided as to what exactly needs to be done to make Iran understand that such a move would be “unacceptable”, but we are informed that Iranian enrichment of high-grade uranium would increase the chances for military conflict.

The fact that Iran is still years aways from being able to test a device, and according to US and international official assessments has still not made the decision to do so, is also absent from ISIS’s report. Indeed, according to the bipartisan Iran Project report on the benefits and costs of military action on Iran (emphasis mine):

After deciding to “dash” for a bomb, Iran would need from one to four months to produce enough weapons-grade  uranium for a single nuclear device. Additional time—up to two years, according  to conservative estimates—would be required for Iran to build a nuclear warhead  that would be reliably deliverable by a missile. Given extensive monitoring and  surveillance of Iranian activities, signs of an Iranian decision to build a nuclear  weapon would likely be detected, and the U.S. would have at least a month to  implement a course of action.

Sunday’s New York Times story that the US and Iran have agreed in principle to direct bilateral negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program provides opportunity for a more honest conversation on Iran than the presidential candidates have had so far. Well, at least this is my hope.

I know the NYT [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Sunday’s New York Times story that the US and Iran have agreed in principle to direct bilateral negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program provides opportunity for a more honest conversation on Iran than the presidential candidates have had so far. Well, at least this is my hope.

I know the NYT report has already been rejected by the US and Iran. But the rejections on both sides have a similar quality. Despite the Iranian refusal to meet with the US in the talks that began in Istanbul last April, neither has rejected the possibility of bilateral talks as an outgrowth of the P5+1 process. And both have said that talks within the P5+1 frame will begin in late November (time and place to be determined). In any case, the P5+1 frame has increasingly become a venue dominated by US demands.

But the value of the NYT revelation or leak is not in the reporting of an agreement on a potential meeting but in the impact it may have on the nature of the conversation about Iran’s nuclear program. The reality is that the presidential race has so far managed to avoid the real Iran question. Certainly there has been grandstanding and threats. There was the frenzy over the need to set red line or deadline for Iran which was thankfully calmed — at least temporarily — by Prime Minister’s Benjamin Netanyahu’s inane performance at the UN.

The campaign has also been full of sounds bites regarding the seeming contrast between “having Israel’s back” and “not allowing daylight between Israel and the United States”. But there has been no conversation regarding the rapidly approaching decision time regarding Iran. No conversation regarding whether the United States, after years of offering what it knew would be refused, is willing to offer something that Iran can accept.

Everyone knows what the elements of the offer are: limits on levels of enrichment combined with a more robust inspection regime in exchange for calibrated reduction of some of the sanctions. There are many details to be worked out in difficult negotiations, but these details cannot even begin to be addressed without public acceptance of some enrichment in Iran or the acknowledgment of Iran’s proverbial “inalienable right.”

Why do I say that there is a rapidly approaching decision time for which direction to go in? Well, sanctions have worked to create economic havoc in Iran. No doubt both President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Leader Ali Khamenei are primarily responsible for the deteriorating conditions. But their responsibility lies not in their incompetence in managing the economy per se but in their miscalculation. Khamenei, in particular, suspected negotiations would not go anywhere (at least, this is what he keeps saying) but he failed to prepare the country for his publicized “resistance economy.”

A resistance economy cannot be created overnight; certainly not when the economic helm of the country is in the combined hands of a populist president who underestimated the force of sanctions and a cantankerous Parliament caught between the demands of higher ups and pressures from lobbies and constituencies.

Not that Khamenei does not want a deal. He does and the encounters of the past four years have exhibited his openness to talks whenever there was hope in or detection of a degree of flexibility in the US position. But these encounters have also shown that he perceives himself as standing at the helm of a highly contentious political terrain that demands addressing certain bottom lines for Iran.

With the draconian economic measures imposed on Iran in the past year, the same political terrain makes quite impossible the acceptance of a deal that does not bring about some immediate, palpable, even if small, relaxation of the sanctions regime.

Some would say that this is precisely why this is no time for flexibility on the part of the United States. It will be throwing a lifeline to Khamenei and “them,” whoever they are. Now that sanctions are working, going for the throat is the right thing to do, they say. In response to this argument, which is also prevalent among some in the Iranian Diaspora who yell hard, accusing any country negotiating with Iran of being a traitor to the cause of the Iranian people, I would say that they are not adequately aware of the social and ideological forces than can be mobilized inside Iran to maintain a defiant, albeit limping, country.

Unless Khamenei and company are given a way out of the mess they have taken Iran into (with some help from the US and company), chances are that we are heading into a war in the same way we headed to war in Iraq. A recent Foreign Affairs article by Ralf Ekeus, the former executive chairman of the UN special Commission on Iraq, and Malfrid-Braut hegghammer, is a good primer on how this could happen.

The reality is that the current sanctions regime does not constitute a stable situation. First, the instability (and instability is different from regime change as we are sadly learning in Syria) it might beget is a constant force for policy re-evaluation on all sides (other members of the P5+1 included). Second, maintaining sanctions require vigilance while egging on the sanctioned regime to become more risk-taking in trying to get around them. This is a formula for war and it will happen if a real effort at compromise is not made. Inflexibility will beget inflexibility.

An additional benefit from directing the conversation away from whether to attack Iran and how to sanction it further is the positive impact on the nuclear debate inside Iran. There is no doubt in my mind that the conversation that has focused on attacking or sanctioning Iran until it kneels or submits has had the effect of making the hardliners defiantly louder and silencing those pushing for the resolution of the “Amrika issue.”

The loudness of the defiant folks rests on a simple argument again articulated last week in no uncertain terms by Khamenei himself: America’s problem with Iran is not the nuclear issue and talks for the US are not intended to resolve the nuclear standoff; they are a means to extract surrender from Iran.

If Khamenei is not correct, then a clearer public articulation of the extent of compromises the United States may be contemplating in order to resolve the nuclear standoff can encourage a conversation inside Iran as well. My bet is that it will also empower those pushing for Iran to show a bit more flexibility in its bottom line.

The former ambassador and key Iranian nuclear negotiator, Seyed Hossein Mousavian, writes:

The United States and Iran should aim for the kind of sustained and comprehensive talks that have not been seen for the last three decades. It would be prudent for Washington and Tehran to engage in [...]]]> via Lobe Log

The former ambassador and key Iranian nuclear negotiator, Seyed Hossein Mousavian, writes:

The United States and Iran should aim for the kind of sustained and comprehensive talks that have not been seen for the last three decades. It would be prudent for Washington and Tehran to engage in direct talks, at the expert level, prior to the U.S. presidential election in November and the subsequent Iranian presidential election in June 2013. This would allow both sides to prepare the groundwork and strategy for the postelection era. Historic precedent indicates that following their respective presidential elections, both capitals have attempted rapprochement, yet failed in their efforts since there was no prior preparation or coordination.

In response to the far-reaching overtures Iran has made, Washington must put far-reaching proposals of its own on the table. The United States must be ready to recognize Iran’s right to civil nuclear power, including peaceful enrichment, in return for assurances that Iran would remain a non-nuclear state forever. Furthermore, the United States should begin practical cooperation on areas of common interest such as Afghanistan. Issues that matter to both countries should not be held hostage to tensions over Iran’s nuclear program.

If the United States makes the right offer, it is possible to strike a deal that ensures Iran would remain free of nuclear weapons forever. However, Netanyahu continues to assert that Iran is determined to acquire a nuclear weapon and that the diplomatic track has failed. Such allegations are aimed at forcing the international community to decide whether to “bomb Iran” or live with an “Iranian bomb.”—in this formulation, the only options are war or containment and deterrence. Both are terrible choices for the United States and the West.