Iranians are open to a nuclear settlement along the lines of what their government has already proposed in ongoing negotiations with world powers, according to a survey of Iranian public opinion jointly conducted July 11-17 by the University of Tehran Center for Public Opinion Research (UTCPOR) and the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM). However, their willingness to accept further Iranian concessions for an agreement is limited by the belief that Iran’s nuclear program is important for the country’s future advancement, a sense that Iran should not be singled out on the issue of nuclear power, and deep mistrust of US motives in its dealings with Iran.
With respect to the ongoing negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 (US, UK, Russia, France, China plus China), the survey gave the more than 1,000 respondents a list of nine hypothetical concessions that Iran could offer toward reaching a deal and asked whether they believed each concession “is acceptable,” “could be acceptable,” or “is not acceptable.” A majority said that four either were or could be acceptable: 1) giving the P5+1 assurances that Iran will never produce a nuclear weapon (79% acceptable); 2) allowing current international inspections to continue (76%); 3) permitting more inspections (62%); and not enriching any uranium above 5% for an agreed-upon period (57%).
Two concessions, however, were deemed unacceptable by the majority: 1) dismantling “about half” of Iran’s currently operating centrifuges (70% unacceptable); and 2) limiting nuclear research (75% unacceptable). Feelings about the remaining three concessions were mixed: limiting stockpiles of enriched uranium for an agreed-upon period (49% acceptable vs. 44% unacceptable), freezing the number of active centrifuges for an agreed-upon period (46% vs. 45%), and not upgrading centrifuges for an agreed-upon period (42% vs. 47%).
While the devil is always in the details, the findings suggest that the Iranian public is open to, or will at least tolerate a deal that puts temporary limits on Iran’s uranium enrichment program (even freezing it at current levels, as Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif recently suggested) and that includes substantial international oversight. But they will not accept a deal that rolls back that enrichment program or hinders Iran’s nuclear research.
Feeding into these sentiments is a deep Iranian mistrust of the P5+1’s motives—or really U.S.’s motives—in targeting Iran’s nuclear program in the first place. When asked why America is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, 75% responded agreed with the statement “Iran’s nuclear program is only an excuse and the U.S. is pursuing some other goals.” Asked what those goals are, 53% cited an American desire to “dominate Iran or block its development,” while 11% said the U.S. “is trying to change Iran’s domestic political order.”
The Iranian people seem particularly concerned with the importance of nuclear research to Iran’s scientific development (94% say a peaceful nuclear program is “necessary,” and limiting nuclear research activities is the least popular possible Iranian concession). There could be an opening for a deal along the lines of the one proposed earlier this week by the Arms Control Association, which would allow Iran to continue its nuclear research while delaying the deployment of whatever advances it makes, but the Iranian public seems unlikely to accept the ACA’s requirement that Iran scale back its existing enrichment program.
Iranians also do not trust that the United States will actually follow through on promises to lift sanctions if Iran complies with its obligations under a final agreement—74% believe that America would maintain the sanctions and simply change the rationale behind them.
During a Sept. 17 event to unveil the poll’s findings, the CISSM’s John Steinbruner pointed out that “our prime problem is conveying to [the Iranians], in a credible way, that we do not intend to overthrow the Islamic Republic,” a task that (as he noted) is complicated by the fact that, well, some of “us” actually want to do precisely that.
The data, as former diplomat Hillary Mann Leverett noted, also suggests (in line with what Adnan Tabatabai wrote here in July) that Iranian President Hassan Rouhani does not “need” a nuclear deal to ensure his political future. Study co-author Ebrahim Mohseni reported that, when asked who they would blame most if the nuclear talks fail, 40% of respondents named the US and another 20% cited the P5+1. Only 9% said that they would primarily blame the Iranian government for a failure. And only 28% would place any blame at all on Iranian officials if the talks were to collapse, compared with 59% who would not blame them at all. This suggests that, as Leverett said, “there is no significant constituency in Iran” that would support a nuclear deal concluded entirely on Washington’s terms just for the sake of making a deal.
Moreover, the survey found that only 18% of Iranians expect Rouhani will be “very successful” in concluding a nuclear agreement, and only 14% expect him to be “very successful” in getting economic sanctions against Iran reduced. Yet 85% of Iranians have a favorable opinion of him (51% “very favorable”), and 68% credit him with improving Iran’s economic situation even with most of all the sanctions still in place. When it comes to those sanctions, 85% agree they have had a negative impact on Iran’s economy, but a slight majority, 53% say that the economy is “good,” suggesting that the pain of the sanctions isn’t driving Iranian public opinion. Rouhani’s domestic support appears strong and is unlikely to be heavily affected if the talks fail, since Iranian expectations on that front are not especially high.
Panelists at the CISSM event also emphasized the degree to which Iranian attitudes are dictated by their sense of fairness under international law, and of Iran’s rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Mohseni noted that there is “a great deal of eagerness [for Iran] to be a cooperative member of the international community,” but not if that membership comes at the cost of Iranian sovereignty or its nuclear rights. Iranian officials have said that they will not accept what they term “nuclear apartheid,” an outcome where Iran’s nuclear program is subject to international scrutiny and requirements that are not placed on other NPT signatories.
Ultimately, the results of the UTCPOR/CISSM survey suggest that the Iranian public will accept some level of extra scrutiny and requirements for a defined period of time, but there are limits to what they will tolerate.
]]>The recently extended nuclear negotiations with Iran have had to compete for front-page attention with acute crises elsewhere. The agreement to extend both the negotiations and the interim commitments associated with them for another four months has nonetheless provoked comments from the usual quarters, including those who have never wanted any agreement [...]]]>
The recently extended nuclear negotiations with Iran have had to compete for front-page attention with acute crises elsewhere. The agreement to extend both the negotiations and the interim commitments associated with them for another four months has nonetheless provoked comments from the usual quarters, including those who have never wanted any agreement with Iran and continue to try to sabotage the negotiations. Here are some key facts to bear in mind about the extension itself:
The extension makes possible a continuation of major negotiating progress. The progress to date has been remarkable. Few would have predicted it even a year ago. As Secretary Kerry commented in a statement on Friday, it was less than a year ago that a U.S. secretary of state and an Iranian foreign minister met for the first time in more than three decades. The key events making this possible were the advent of a new Iranian president with a much different orientation from that of his predecessor, and the willingness of the United States and its negotiating partners to seize this opportunity. The negotiations have gone from a standing start with no communication to an important interim agreement and a common text for a final agreement, with some remaining bracketed language and gaps yet to be negotiated.
The need for an extension is not surprising. In fact, the interim agreement, known as the Joint Plan of Action, that was reached last November specifically provided for the possibility of an extension beyond the original target date. The matters being negotiated are complicated and highly technical, from the design of nuclear reactors to the details of international financial transactions.
Both sides are negotiating seriously. The Iranian side has demonstrated its seriousness through its compliance, as confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency, with all of its commitments under the Joint Plan of Action. It also has demonstrated its seriousness through its acceptance already of lopsided concessions while gaining little so far in return (see next key fact). Nothing in the history of these talks, or of the history of the Iranian nuclear issue before the talks began, suggests that Iran needs to be squeezed harder to get it to negotiate earnestly and flexibly.
Iran already has the biggest motivation to conclude the negotiations swiftly. The P5+1 (the United States and its negotiating partners) clearly got the better deal in the interim agreement. The Joint Plan of Action froze or rolled back the aspects of Iran’s nuclear program with the most concern regarding possible weapons proliferation, as well as introducing international inspections more intrusive and frequent than what any other nation undergoes. In return Iran got only minor sanctions relief, involving peripheral matters such as airplane parts and access to a small fraction of its overseas financial assets to which it has been denied access. This pattern continues under the additional agreement struck as part of last week’s extension of the talks. Iran has committed to hasten the conversion of its remaining supply of medium enriched uranium into reactor fuel plates, which would make it even more difficult to use the material in weapons. In return it gets access to only a small additional slice ($2.8 billion out of more than $100 billion) of its frozen overseas financial assets. The main, debilitating sanctions regarding oil and banking remain in place. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani directly, and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei indirectly, have a big economic and political stake in reaching a final agreement promptly.
Diplomacy remains the surest way to preclude an Iranian nuclear weapon. The extension does not change this reality. With a negotiated agreement, Iran’s nuclear activities would be subject to the most extensive international inspection and monitoring arrangements ever implemented, and Iran would have multiple major motivations not to let the agreement break down. Without an agreement, there would be far less comprehensive inspections, much less of an Iranian stake in keeping its program peaceful, and a political swing in Tehran away from those most determined to keep it peaceful.
This article was first published by the National Interest and was reprinted here with permission.
Photo: US Secretary of State John Kerry sits across from Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif in Vienna, Austria, on July 13, 2014, before they begin a bilateral meeting focused on Iran’s nuclear program. Credit: State Department
]]>With the rumored extension of the negotiations in Vienna on Iran’s nuclear program hanging in the air, a group of legislators and right-wing thinkers gathered on Capitol Hill yesterday to talk about what they believe a comprehensive deal with Iran should entail.
Senator Dan Coats (R-IN) told the assembled crowd that he was there [...]]]>
With the rumored extension of the negotiations in Vienna on Iran’s nuclear program hanging in the air, a group of legislators and right-wing thinkers gathered on Capitol Hill yesterday to talk about what they believe a comprehensive deal with Iran should entail.
Senator Dan Coats (R-IN) told the assembled crowd that he was there to “ring the alarm” about the danger of a nuclear-armed Iran, and, indeed, that alarm rang over and over again throughout the event. The afternoon’s speakers were clear on one thing: nothing short of total Iranian capitulation would be an acceptable outcome to the talks, and even that would really only be acceptable if it came in the aftermath of regime change in Tehran. They were decidedly less clear as to how that outcome might be achieved.
The forum, “High Standards and High Stakes: Defining Terms of an Acceptable Iran Nuclear Deal,” was sponsored by the Foreign Policy Initiative (FPI) (successor to the now-defunct Project for the New American Century), the neoconservative Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), and the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC), which specializes in finding Democrats who agree with the neoconservative agenda when it comes to Iran. The speakers broadly agreed on the need to maintain and even increase sanctions to encourage the Iranians to negotiate, which seemingly ignores the fact that the Iranians are already negotiating and that the sanctions are in place precisely so that they can be traded away in exchange for Iranian concessions.
Among the materials distributed at the session was a paper by a group called the “Iran Task Force,” which has a few members in common with the “Iran Task Force” formed within the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs but nonetheless seems to be a different group. The paper was titled, “Parameters of an Acceptable Agreement,” though it might better have been called “Parameters of a Deal That Would Certainly Be Rejected by Iran.”
The task force’s “acceptable agreement” requires, among other items, the complete dismantling of Iran’s enrichment capabilities and extraordinary monitoring requirements that would remain in place permanently. Again, this would not be a deal so much as it would be unconditional surrender by the Iranians, and would impose restrictions on Iran that even retired Israeli generals don’t seem to believe are necessary. If this is how the “Iran Task Force” defines an “acceptable agreement,” it seems fair to ask if they want any agreement at all.
One of the legislators who spoke at the forum was Brad Sherman (D-CA), who has endorsed the Iranian opposition group, the Mujahedin-e Khalq, (aka MEK, MKO, PMOI and NCRI), which lobbied itself off the US terrorist organizations list in 2012, and whose desire for regime change is quite explicit.
Congressman Sherman offered some of the most colorful (or maybe terrifying) remarks. For example, he declared that Iran’s “breakout” period must be “years,” which would presumably involve subjecting all of Iran’s nuclear scientists to some kind of amnesia ray to make them unlearn what they already know about enriching uranium. He then argued that Iran’s ultimate goal was not a nuclear missile, but a device that could be smuggled into a major city and detonated without directly implicating Tehran. Most Iran hawks assume (based on questionable evidence) that Iran’s nuclear program is ipso facto a nuclear weapons program. But Sherman apparently believes that Iran doesn’t only crave a nuclear weapon, but will obviously use that weapon once it’s built to bring destruction upon the world. Sherman closed by proposing that the United States arm Israel with advanced “bunker buster” bombs and surplus B-52 bombers, which would surely ensure peace in that region.
After the legislators had their say, it was time for the expert panel, featuring FDD’s Reuel Marc Gerecht, Ray Takeyh from the Council on Foreign Relations, and Stephen Rademaker from the BPC. Gerecht argued that Iran has a “religious” need to acquire nuclear weapons, which might come as a shock to the Iranian religious establishment, and criticized the Obama administration’s unwillingness to apply “real” economic pressure to force Iranian concessions. He never got around to describing what “real” economic pressure looks like, or how much different it could be from what Iran is currently experiencing. It was also unclear why, if Iran does have such a strong need to develop a nuclear weapon, and if it hasn’t yet felt any “real” economic pressure, it agreed to, and has by all accounts complied with, the terms of the interim Joint Plan of Action reached in Geneva last year.
But it was Rademaker who came closest to openly admitting the theme that underpins the hawks’ entire approach to these talks: that no nuclear deal will ever be acceptable without regime change. He criticized last year’s historic deal for its promise that a comprehensive deal would remain in place for a specified, limited duration, and that Iran would be treated as any other Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatory at the conclusion of the deal. Rademaker later compared Iran to Brazil and Argentina, whose nuclear programs were both abandoned after their military regimes gave way to democratic governments. At that point the suggestion that regime change, which didn’t exactly work out the way the US envisioned in Iran (1953) and Iraq (2003), must precede any normalization of Iran’s nuclear program was obvious.
]]>Most of the recent discouraging news about the talks between Iran and world powers has focused on the substantial disagreement regarding Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity. The two sides differ sharply on how much enrichment capacity Iran requires, how much it should be allowed to maintain once [...]]]>
Most of the recent discouraging news about the talks between Iran and world powers has focused on the substantial disagreement regarding Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity. The two sides differ sharply on how much enrichment capacity Iran requires, how much it should be allowed to maintain once a comprehensive agreement is reached, and how quickly it should be allowed to expand that capacity over the agreement’s timeframe (the length of which is itself another contentious point).
However, while this dispute could sink the chances of reaching an agreement on its own, the focus on enrichment masks another and perhaps equally volatile issue: the process through which Iran will receive sanctions relief if a deal is reached. This question not only factors into the terms of any comprehensive accord, but also carries enough uncertainty to potentially cause any final deal to break down in the future if expectations on either side are violated. This issue was the focus of a July 8 panel discussion at the US Institute for Peace (USIP), “Iran Sanctions: What the US Cedes in a Nuclear Deal,” moderated by the USIP’s Robin Wright and including Suzanne Maloney of the Brookings Institution, Kenneth Katzman of the Congressional Research Service, and Elizabeth Rosenberg of the Center for a New American Security.
The duration of a final deal is, as Maloney pointed out, a “sleeper issue” in the negotiations, which are quickly approaching the July 20 deadline. Negotiators from the P5+1 (the US, UK, France, China, and Russia plus Germany) want to maximize the length of time that Iran’s nuclear program will remain under international monitoring while delaying sanctions relief for as long as possible. Iran, understandably, wants considerable immediate sanctions relief and a minimum duration final deal. The two sides will surely compromise on a deal that lifts sanctions progressively, with relief tied to specific Iranian activity under the terms of the accord. But the devil is always in the details, and working out the specific timetable for sanctions relief and the steps to which it will be pegged is certainly among the more difficult challenges the negotiators are facing in Vienna. This process is made all the more complicated by the fact that the US has been imposing sanctions on Iran since its 1979 Islamic Revolution, for reasons that have had nothing to do with Iran’s nuclear program. For example, Iran’s support for the militant Lebanese group Hezbollah was used as the justification for some of the earliest and strongest US sanctions against Iranian banks, and those sanctions are unlikely to be altered if a final deal is reached.
The issues of uncertainty and misunderstandings regarding sanctions relief, and the potential for this to threaten the stability of a final deal, were widely discussed by the panelists. Iran wants, and President Hassan Rouhani needs, substantial sanctions relief to boost an economy that continues to suffer from high inflation and high unemployment as well as economic sanctions. In a practical sense, as Katzman noted, the initial round of sanctions relief will have to be fairly sizable; there is no benefit to Iran if, for example, the deal lifts caps on Iran’s oil exports without also allowing Iranian companies and banks to properly access the international banking system. In a strictly legal sense, American sanctions against Iran could be quickly suspended via executive waiver, which must be renewed every six months but does not require Congressional approval in the way that a permanent lifting of sanctions would.
However, the actual speed with which companies would do business with Iran will likely be slowed by a number of complicating factors. These include concerns over the sustainability of the agreement, the stability of the Iranian regime, and the ability of Rouhani’s administration to reduce corruption, according to Rosenberg. But the primary complication will undoubtedly be uncertainty over the precise nature of the sanctions relief and the different sanctions regimes that countries, chiefly the US, will continue to levy against Iran. Rosenberg noted that there will be a period in the wake of a final deal in which companies will need to figure out the limits of sanctions relief to Iran, particularly navigating the differences between European and US law.
It may prove difficult or impossible to separate American sanctions that were put in place specifically as a result of Iran’s nuclear activity, which would be dealt with under the terms of a comprehensive accord, from those related to other issues like Iran’s support for Hezbollah, which would be untouched by such a deal. Iranian negotiators will likely be satisfied with a deal that allows European firms (especially banks) to do business in Iran again, but if those firms are still wary of other remaining sanctions, they will remain reluctant to pursue opportunities in Iran. In practical terms, then, sanctions relief will be a slow process. For an Iranian public that, as Wright pointed out, expects a deal and wants benefits quickly, such a delay could damage both US credibility and the Rouhani presidency, and could even collapse the overall framework of a final deal.
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