Two must-read analyses of the Iran portion from last night’s final presidential debate are brought to us by TIME’s Tony Karon and the Arms Control Association’s Greg Thielmann. (This TPM headline also sums up the entire debate quite nicely: “Romney’s Final Debate Message: I’ll Be A Better Obama”.)

Karon via Lobe Log

Two must-read analyses of the Iran portion from last night’s final presidential debate are brought to us by TIME’s Tony Karon and the Arms Control Association’s Greg Thielmann. (This TPM headline also sums up the entire debate quite nicely: “Romney’s Final Debate Message: I’ll Be A Better Obama”.)

Karon writes that regardless of who wins the 2012 presidential election, the United States will consider direct talks with Iran:

“It is essential for us to understand what our mission is in Iran,” Romney said in Monday’s foreign policy debate, “and that is to dissuade Iran from having a nuclear weapon through peaceful and diplomatic means.” His leverage of choice: “crippling sanctions” with the threat of military action as a last resort should Iran cross a red line toward developing “nuclear-weapons capability.” That’s broadly the same policy the Obama Administration has followed. Asked to differentiate himself, in the debate, Romney didn’t even raise the ambiguous question of where to draw the red line. (Obama sets his red line for action at Iran moving to acquire a nuclear weapon; Romney uses the phrase nuclear-weapons capability – although it’s not exactly clear whether this means the capability to build nuclear weapons, which Iran perhaps already has in latent form, or the capability to rapidly assemble and deploy nuclear warheads atop missiles.) Instead Romney simply insisted he’d have imposed tighter sanctions sooner.

But inflexibility from both sides may prevent a peaceful resolution to the Iran-US impasse:

While he may be open to a genuine compromise, Khamenei can’t be seen to surrender on “nuclear rights” for which Iran has fought and suffered growing isolation over the past decade, notes University of Hawaii Iran scholar Farideh Farhi. “With the draconian economic measures imposed on Iran in the past year, the [domestic] political terrain makes quite impossible the acceptance of a deal that does not bring about some immediate, palpable, even if small, relaxation of the sanctions regime,” says Farhi. Imagining sanctions as an alternative to military action may be misleading, she argues, because Khamenei believes their purpose is regime change, and mounting economic pain could prompt the regime to become more reckless in its effort to break out of the noose.

(Interestingly, Romney previously dodged questions about meeting directly with Iran, but Benjamin Armbruster reports that Paul Ryan was on network morning shows today saying that Romney would engage in bilateral talks without preconditions [from the Iranians?]).

Thielmann, a former senior State Department intelligence analyst, meanwhile clarifies the candidates’ positions on Iran:

Obama concluded last night that: “There is a deal to be had, and that is that [the Iranians] abide by the rules that have already been established. They convince the international community they are not pursuing a nuclear [weapons] program. There are inspections that are very intrusive. But over time, what they can do is regain credibility. In the meantime, though, we’re not going to let up the pressure until we have clear evidence that that takes place.”  At the same time, he warned that “the clock is ticking” and that he would not allow negotiations “to go on forever.”

For his part, Governor Romney appeared to tack away during the debate from his previous posture on Iran. Earlier, he had followed the lead of Israel’s prime minister, appearing more skeptical that any acceptable compromise could be reached with the current regime in Tehran and more willing to imply that unilateral military action would be taken sooner rather than later. Last night, Romney’s martial alarm was barely audible. Yet his avowed interest in diplomacy was belied by his call for treating Iran’s diplomats “as the pariahs they are.” It is difficult to negotiate constructively with those you are simultaneously labeling “pariahs.”

Both candidates appeared united in making one point about Iran policy options. Whatever the consequences of exercising the military option, they each signaled willingness ultimately to launch a preventive attack against Iran. This in spite of a near consensus among experts that, short of invasion and occupation, such an attack would not prevent but would bring about a nuclear-armed Iran.

Former AIPAC spokesman and Progressive Policy Institute senior fellow Josh Block backed down this afternoon from his earlier accusation that ThinkProgress and its institutional home, the Center For American Progress (CAP), are anti-Semitic — a smear that was picked-up by, among others, Jennifer Rubin at the Washington [...]]]> Reposted by arrangement with Think Progress

Former AIPAC spokesman and Progressive Policy Institute senior fellow Josh Block backed down this afternoon from his earlier accusation that ThinkProgress and its institutional home, the Center For American Progress (CAP), are anti-Semitic — a smear that was picked-up by, among others, Jennifer Rubin at the Washington Post. (Tell the Post to retract that standing accusation here.)

Speaking to Politico’s Ben Smith for an article released on Wednesday, Block said that CAP “allow(s) people to say borderline anti-Semitic stuff.” In an effort to coordinate and “AMPLIFY” smears of ThinkProgress and CAP based on this claim and others, Block enlisted members of a secretive right-wing e-mail list serve. Salon’s Justin Elliott obtained and published a copy of the e-mail, where Block said CAP engages in “vilification of… Jews.” In the same document, he insinuated that CAP and ThinkProgress’s work constitutes “the words of anti-Semites.”

CAP and ThinkProgress categorically deny these allegations, and took exception to the mischaracterizations of our work.

Now, again speaking to Politico’s Smith, Block says he never claimed CAP engaged in anti-Semitism:

I’ve been accused of leveling the charge of anti-Semitism against the Center for American Progress. That is not true, and suggesting so is an attempt to distract from what I am actually saying.

As shown above, Block certainly did make such accusations about CAP. Nevertheless, his retreat from his initial charges against ThinkProgress and CAP is welcome.

Instead of engaging in divisive rhetoric aimed at silencing those who disagree with his approach, we look forward to having a substantive, rational discourse about the best ways to pursue the U.S. interests of a safe and secure Israel living side-by-side and at peace with her neighbors.

Lanny Davis, a leading lobbyist and former special counsel to President Bill Clinton, responded to the recent controversy surrounding Josh Block, a former American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) spokesperson who compiled thousands of words of opposition research on ThinkProgress and Media Matters bloggers and [...]]]> Reposted by arrangement with Think Progress

Lanny Davis, a leading lobbyist and former special counsel to President Bill Clinton, responded to the recent controversy surrounding Josh Block, a former American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) spokesperson who compiled thousands of words of opposition research on ThinkProgress and Media Matters bloggers and smeared the Center for American Progress as writing “borderline anti-Semitic stuff.” Davis, a business partner of Block’s, told ThinkProgress:

He’s done this all independently without any input from me. I respect Josh Block but I 100 percent disagree with much of his language. People can disagree about Israel’s policies without being anti-Semites. In fact I think it’s a terrible mistake to blur the two. We should be able to debate Israel’s policies. I am very pro-Israel. I believe the onus for negotiations is on the Palestinians but both Israelis and Palestinians share responsibility. However, that’s all fair debate. Israelis debate the subject. We debate the subject. Impugning motives of people at the Center [for American Progress] and impugning [that] those motives are driven by anti-Semitism is, in my opinion, wrong. I respect John Podesta and the Center greatly.

In our post yesterday on Block, we explained that Davis “represented business interests backing the 2009 coup in Honduras.” In an interview today, Davis responded, “I am on the record as having opposed the illegal and indefensible deportation of Mr. Zelaya. Suggestions that I supported a military coup are simply false.”

Davis also defended his lobbying work for the Ivory Coast, telling ThinkProgress, “The Ivory Coast Embassy in DC retained me, not Mr. Gbagbo. My mission, among other things, working behind the scenes for ten days before I quit, was to facilitate a phone call from the President of the United States to Mr. Gbagbo to bring about a face saving effort to avoid bloodshed.”

Ali Gharib of Think Progress joined Russia Today’s Thom Hartmann to discuss the Libyan revolution on August 22.

In a briefing yesterday, acting State Department spokesperson Mark Toner put an exclamation on this when he was asked if the Iranians “want a bomb or [...]]]> The official position of the U.S. on Iran is still – rightfully — that no one can be sure that the Iranians are bent on making a nuclear weapon.

In a briefing yesterday, acting State Department spokesperson Mark Toner put an exclamation on this when he was asked if the Iranians “want a bomb or not.” He redirected the reporter to somebody who might actually know: Iranian President Mahmood Ahmadinejad. “Ask Ahmadinejad,” Toner said. (The full exchange is below.)

On Tuesday, Foreign Policy‘s Josh Rogin reported that a new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran had been completed and circulated among some members of Congress– The Iran hawks who spoke to Rogin spoke with certainty about Iran’s desire for a bomb.

The ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA), who hadn’t yet seen the new NIE, told Rogin: “There can be no serious doubt that Iran wants to have a nuclear weapons capability.”

But a report in the Wall Street Journal by Adam Entous on Thursday suggested that, according to the latest NIE, while Iran has been working on various components that could be synthesized into a full-blown nuclear weapons program, the regime in Tehran seems to have split over whether to work toward that goal. Entous:

The NIE’s findings suggest that, in the U.S. view, at least some Iranian leaders are worried that economic turmoil fueled in part by international sanctions could spur opposition to the regime—though officials acknowledge it is impossible for outsiders to determine the precise effect of sanctions on decision-making in Tehran.

Noting that the NIE is a consensus opinion among U.S. intelligence agencies, Entous gets this quote from an unnamed U.S. official:

“The bottom line is that the intelligence community has concluded that there’s an intense debate inside the Iranian regime on the question of whether or not to move toward a nuclear bomb,” a U.S. official said. “There’s a strong sense that a number of Iranian regime officials know that the sanctions are having a serious effect.”

As Matt Duss at ThinkProgress has hammered home again and again, the current position — ‘We just don’t know!’ — tracks perfectly with the public stances of the CIA (pdf), the UN’s atomic agency (IAEA), and serious analysts everywhere. (The most vociferous dissenters from this conventional wisdom — in Israel — have proven themselves to be less than reliable on the matter.)

Duss spoke to an Iranian-Israeli analyst who, contra his compatriots in government, took a wholly responsible stand on the subject:

“No one, absolutely nobody, perhaps not even Khamenei knows whether they will field a weapon, yet. Its all assumptions,” said Israeli analyst Meir Javedanfar, via email.

At a conference earlier this month sponsored by the National Security Network and the Center for American Progress, former intelligence analyst and Georgetown professor Paul Pillar concurred with the assessment that no decision has been made by the Iranians.

He said this supported the notion that a deal to avert the current crisis is still possible: that with real inducements of the sort not yet offered by the West, Iran could decide not to pursue weapons.

“[A deal] is still feasible,” he said. “We’re talking about an Iranian decision not yet made and influenceable by the West — including the United States — and what it does.”

***

Here’s State spokesperson Mark Toner’s full exchange on Iran’s intentions during the Feb. 17 daily press briefing:

QUESTION: Mark, is there any evidence that the –

MR. TONER: Yeah, go ahead.

QUESTION: — of a – some kind of split within the Iranian regime about the wisdom of proceeding forward with its nuclear program – the impact of economic sanctions, et cetera – is there any evidence of a schism within the regime?

MR. TONER: It’s a fair question. I don’t know or can’t speak to it authoritatively today. We’ve seen some signs that the sanctions have had some impact, and the best we can do is offer Iran a clear path forward and one that involves coming clean with the international community about its nuclear program, which would then lead to greater engagement and easing of sanctions.

QUESTION: Has the Department observed any slowdown on the part of the Iranians’ efforts to achieve a nuclear weapons capability?

MR. TONER: I can’t speak to that.

QUESTION: So in – do you have any assessment as to the desire of the Iranians to pursue a nuclear weapons capability? Does it remain your view that they are determined to achieve a nuclear weapons capability? That is the still the U.S. view, correct?

MR. TONER: The U.S. view is that Iran – that the international community has serious questions about Iran’s nuclear ambitions and has asked repeatedly, through the IAEA, through the P-5+1, for Iran to come clean, to address those concerns in a transparent way. And we continue to call on them to –

QUESTION: You don’t affirmatively believe that they are seeking a nuclear weapon?

MR. TONER: We are asking them to – again, to address the international community’s concerns about their nuclear program, about the intention of their nuclear program. But I’m not going to go beyond that.

QUESTION: Do they want a bomb or not? Do they want a bomb?

MR. TONER: Ask Ahmadinejad.

Matt Duss, at Think Progress, has one such example with regard to David Frum‘s [...]]]> There’s a clear emerging pattern here — one that should not surprise us after the run-up to the Iraq war — of Washington-based hawks seeing exactly what they want (and nothing more) in everything that comes across their desks.

Matt Duss, at Think Progress, has one such example with regard to David Frum‘s reading of the WikiLeaks cables: That Arab leaders care only about attacking Iran and not about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Duss replies that “this is simply false. As I wrote last week, the cables contain abundant evidence that governments in the region do in fact care about the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.”

One could say the same thing about almost any hawk (including Frum), trumpeting the hawkish comments of a few Arab leaders about Iran revealed by WikiLeaks. The actual information in the cables was damning enough, but exaggeration nonetheless runs rampant throughout the neoconservative commentary on the subject.

You’d be hard pressed to find a neoconservative commenter who writes that there are some Arab capitals that do not support an attack on Iran, let alone acknowledge those who do advocate for military action may be speaking more from emotion rather than with candor. Marc Lynch has written about how hawks have completely ignored that some of the Arab leaders they fawn over have made contradictory statements about an attack on Iran.

Take the example of Foundation for Defense of Democracies “scholar” Michael Ledeen. In a video for Pajamas Media, Leeden lists countries with Arab leaders that have made hawkish statements on Iran: “Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Dubai — the Arab countries.” He claims they are imploring the United States to answer: “Why haven’t you bombed them?”

Ledeen bats 500 with his list. I’d challenge Ledeen to find a cable with hawkish comments from a Qatari or Omani official. The latter has even expressed concern about the hawkishness of its neighbors. Likewise, the official from Abu Dhabi who called Ahmadinejad “Hitler,” also complained that his “neighboring capitals” were too close to Iran. He’s probably referencing to Dubai, which along with Abu Dhabi, is one of the sheikdoms of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). But unlike its fellow sheikdoms, Dubai has especially strong trade ties to Iran. That Leeden can’t get this right is simple sloppiness — yet another indication that hawks select and contextualize bits of information to fit their ideological objectives.

This should come as no surprise. In the campaign for war with Iraq, many of these same ideologues were cherry-picking pieces of intelligence to fit their purposes, omitting dissent and critical context.

By the way, note the careful attention Leeden pays to facts in this piece. He calls the founder of WikiLeaks — Julian Assange — “Julius.”

Duss also takes note of another great point from Sadjadpour: [...]]]> Matt Duss at Think Progress picks up on Carnegie Endowment expert Karim Sadjadpour‘s Financial Times piece yesterday to point out that military containment won’t work against as a strategy against a country — Iran — that garners regional clout through political maneuvering.

Duss also takes note of another great point from Sadjadpour: Just as neoconservative Iran hawks can’t have it both ways — boosting the Green movement and calling for bombing Iran — those Arab leaders who call for a U.S. attack on Iran probably don’t care a whit about democracy in Iran either. (And why should they? Their countries aren’t exactly democracies nor do they care what their own citizens/subjects think).

In fact, a democratic Iran would probably be bad news for these Gulf dictatorships.

Sadjadpour (emphasis by Duss):

The WikiLeaks revelations make clear that Arab officials believe Iran to be inherently dishonest and dangerous. The feeling is probably mutual. But they hide perhaps a more interesting issue, namely what type of Iranian government would actually best serve Gulf Arab interests.

President Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad and the Islamic Republic may be loathed, but equally the advent of a more progressive, democratic Iran would enable Tehran to emerge from its largely self-inflicted isolation and begin to realise its enormous potential. In the zero-sum game of Middle Eastern politics, a democratic Iran would pose huge challenges to Persian Gulf sheikhdoms.

The irony that someone like Benjamin Wienthal, who’s at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, doesn’t recognize this in his National Review post says something about how the hawkish agenda drives neoconservatives — and not utopian notions of freedom and democracy.

Weinthal writes:

While Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, and Oman have long privately conveyed such warnings to diplomats, they never had the courage to flex their muscles in public.

Right! And that’s because these are dictatorships, and these Arab leaders are wildly out of step with their publics.

Neoconservatives, being neoconservatives, will gather allies in their campaign for war with Iran wherever they can find them.