The Congressional Research Service (CRS) published a report on December 6 titled “Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs,” which the Federation of American Scientists has posted. It casts doubt on a long-held view by the US Intelligence Community that Iran could test-fly an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) by 2015 if [...]]]> via Lobe Log

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) published a report on December 6 titled “Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs,” which the Federation of American Scientists has posted. It casts doubt on a long-held view by the US Intelligence Community that Iran could test-fly an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) by 2015 if it received “sufficient foreign assistance.”

The report assesses that Iran has not been receiving adequate amounts of critical foreign assistance from China or Russia over the last decade while sanctions have made it increasingly difficult for it to obtain required components and materials to test fly an ICBM. It also states that without a workable nuclear warhead, which according to US intelligence Iran does not have and has not as of yet decided to build, ”the proliferation of Iranian ballistic missiles is arguably not an imminent significant threat.”

The CRS report also notes that Iran’s advancement in missile technology has developed alongside the sanctions regime imposed upon it. “Perhaps the irony of a restrictive nonproliferation regime is that Iran became largely self-sufficient,” writes report author Steven A. Hildreth, a specialist in missile defense. Elsewhere he states: “A determined adversary such as Iran has not shown that it is deterred or dissuaded by U.S. conventional military superiority, or by U.S. and international sanctions, or by the deployment of U.S. BMD capabilities.” In the absence of regime change, the report assesses that Iran is unlikely to change its behavior, hence the US has little option but to continue to on its “current apparent path”:

For the time being, however, Congress will likely continue to take a focused interest in Iran’s role in the region and in its missile programs. Beyond efforts to impose increasingly stringent sanctions, it is unclear whether there is more Congress itself can do to affect Iran’s commitment to its ballistic missile and space launch programs.

A December 7 CRS Reportby Kenneth Katzmann also assesses that “U.S. and U.N. sanctions have not, to date, accomplished their core strategic objective of compelling Iran to verifiably limit its nuclear development to purely peaceful purposes.”

According the the US government, Iran has the largest number of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, but the vast majority of Iran’s heavy artillery rockets and ballistic missiles are short-range of less than about 500 kilometers. These missiles “could not strike U.S. or allied bases in the region unless they were moved far from their operating base and launched from vulnerable positions along Iran’s Persian Gulf coastline,” writes Hildreth.

In what looks like a direct response to the report, the Times of Israel reported that Iran’s air force commander said Tuesday that Israel is Iran’s “longest-range target”.

“We don’t need missiles with more than a 2,000-kilometer range, even though have the technology to build them,” said Brig. Gen. Amir Ali Hajizadeh.

But according to the CRS report, Iran has “proven itself capable of misleading and deceitful statements regarding its ballistic missile and space launch programs” casting “serious doubt on relying heavily on Iranian statements about their ballistic missile and space launch programs.” Hildreth references a Washington Post article about “a photo-shopped “successful” test of a failed Iranian SRBM launch in 2008″ as an example of “Iranian misinformation” about its ballistic missile capabilities.

A new twist was added to the longrunning media theme of a threat by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to go to war with Iran when news stories seemed to suggest Monday that Netanyahu had ordered the Israeli military to prepare for an imminent attack on Iranian nuclear sites in [...]]]> via IPS News

A new twist was added to the longrunning media theme of a threat by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to go to war with Iran when news stories seemed to suggest Monday that Netanyahu had ordered the Israeli military to prepare for an imminent attack on Iranian nuclear sites in 2010.

Netanyahu backed down after Israeli Defence Forces chief of staff Gabi Ashkenazi and Mossad director Meir Dagan opposed the order, according to the reports.

But the details of the episode provided in a report by Israel’s Channel 2 investigative news programme “Truth”, which aired Monday night, show that the Netanyahu order was not meant to be a prelude to an imminent attack on Iran. The order to put Israeli forces on the highest alert status was rejected by Ashkenazi and Dagan primarily because Netanyahu and Defence Minister Ehud Barak had not thought through the risk that raising the alert status to the highest level could provoke unintended war with Iran.

All the participants, moreover, understood that Israel had no realistic military option for an attack on Iran.

Most stories about the episode failed to highlight the distinction between an order for war and one for the highest state of readiness, thus creating the clear impression that Netanyahu was preparing for war with Iran. The stories had to be read very carefully to discern the real significance of the episode.

The Israeli Ynet News report on the story carried the headline, “Was Israel on verge of war in 2010?” and a teaser asking, “Did Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak try to drag Israel into a military operation in Iran without cabinet approval?”

AFP reported that Netanyahu and Barak “ordered the army to prepare an attack against Iranian nuclear installations.”

The Reuters story said Netanyahu and Barak “ordered Israeli defence chiefs in 2010 to prepare for an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities but were rebuffed….”

And AP reported that the order from Netanyau was for a “high alert for a looming attack on Iran’s nuclear program” and that the episode “indicated that Israel was much closer to carrying out a strike at that time than was previously known.”

Washington Post blogger Max Fisher certainly got the impression from the press coverage that Netanyahu and Barak had “attempted to order the Israeli military to prepare for an imminent strike on Iran but were thwarted by other senior officials….” Fisher concluded that Netanyahu was “more resolved than thought to strike Iran….”

The coverage of the story thus appears to have pumped new life into the idea that Netanyahu is serious about attacking Iran, despite clear evidence in recent weeks that he has climbed down from that posture.

The details of the episode in the original Channel 2 programme as reported by the Israeli daily Yedioth Ahronoth suggest that none of the participants in the meeting believed that Netanyahu had decided on actual war with Iran.

The incident occurred, according to the programme, after a meeting of seven top cabinet ministers at an unspecified time in 2010. As Dagan and Ashkanazi were about to leave the meeting room, the programme recalls, Netanyahu ordered them to prepare the military for “the possibility of a strike” against Iran by putting the IDF on the highest level of readiness.

Netanyahu used the code word “F Plus” for the alert status, according to the Channel 2 programme.

Ashkenazi and Dagan reacted strongly to the order, and Netanyahu and Barak eventually backed down. But both Ashkenazi and Barak appear to agree that the issue was not whether Israel would actually attack Iran but the alert itself. Ashkenazi’s response indicated that he did not interpret it as a sign that Netanyahu intended to carry out an attack on Iran. “It’s not something you do if you’re not sure you want to follow through with it,” Ashkenazi was quoted as saying.

Barak sought to downplay the order for the high alert status, asserting that raising the alert level “did not necessarily mean war”.

“It is not true that creating a situation in which the IDF are on alert for a few hours or a few days to carry out certain operations forces Israel to go through with them,” the defence minister said.

Ashkenazi was not asserting, however, that Netanyahu would be forced to attack. Rather, he feared it would have the unintended consequence of convincing Iran that Israel did intend to attack and thus trigger a war.

The former IDF chief highlighted that danger in commenting, “This accordion produces music when you play with it,” according to “sources close to” Ashkenazi – the formula usually used when an official or ex-official does not wish to be quoted directly.

Barak also said Ashkenazi had responded that the IDF did not have the ability to carry out a strike against Iran. “Eventually, at the moment of truth, the answer that was given was that, in fact, the ability did not exist,” Barak is quoted as saying on the programme.

Significantly, Barak made no effort to deny the reality that the Israeli Air Force did not have the capability to carry out a successful attack against Iran. Instead he is blaming Ashkenazi for having failed to prepare Israeli forces for a possible attack.

Ashkenazi angrily denied that obviously political charge. “I prepared the option, the army was ready for a strike but I also said that a strike now would be a strategic mistake,” he is quoted as saying.

Israeli military leaders are still saying publicly that the IDF can carry out a strike. But while Ashkenazi is quoted as saying the army was “ready for a strike”, that is not the same as claiming that Israel had a military option that had any chance of success in derailing Iran’s enrichment programme. And in February 2011, he told then Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen that references to such a military option were “empty words”, because “Israel has no military option,” according to an earlier report by Yedioth Ahronoth.

Despite the public political feud between them, both Barak and Ashkenazi implied that the purpose of the high alert was to achieve a political effect rather than to prepare for an actual attack.

Both Ashkenazi and former Mossad director Dagan were apparently shocked that Netanyahu and Barak would be so irresponsible as to run the obvious risks of feigning preparations for a war with Iran. Dagan concluded that Netanyahu is unfit for leadership of the country – a point that he had made repeatedly since leaving his Mossad post in 2011.

Netanyahu sought to manipulate the supposed threat of military force against Iran to put pressure on U.S. President Barack Obama to adopt harsh sanctions against Iran and even get him to pledge to use force if Iran did not yield on its nuclear programme. The firm rebuff to that ploy by Obama last summer brought that phase of the Netanyahu military option ploy to an end, as indicated by his failure to include any implicit threat in his U.N. address in late August.

Netanyahu continues to insist publicly, however, that he is considering the military option against Iran. In an interview for the Channel 2 programme, he said, “We are serious, this is not a show. If there is no other way to stop Iran, Israel is ready to act.”

Israeli political observers have suggested that Netanyahu’s belligerent posture has now become primarily a theme of his campaign for reelection as prime minister. But as the coverage of the 2010 episode indicates, the news media have not yet abandoned the story of Netanyahu’s readiness to go to war against Iran.

*Gareth Porter, an investigative historian and journalist specialising in U.S. national security policy, received the UK-based Gellhorn Prize for journalism for 2011 for articles on the U.S. war in Afghanistan.

Lobe Log publishes Hawks on Iran every Friday. Our posts highlight militaristic commentary and confrontational policy recommendations about Iran from a variety of sources including news articles, think tanks and pundits.

Michael Rubin, Fox News: Missing from last week’s roundup was an op-ed by the hawkish via Lobe Log

Lobe Log publishes Hawks on Iran every Friday. Our posts highlight militaristic commentary and confrontational policy recommendations about Iran from a variety of sources including news articles, think tanks and pundits.

Max Boot, Commentary: The Council on Foreign Relations’ Max Boot allied with neoconservatives as an early supporter of the US’s war on Iraq and has agitated for war with Iran even while acknowledging that strikes would not set back its alleged nuclear ambitions by much. This week he writes that the West should not be deterred by Iranian threats to close the vital oil supply route, the Strait of Hormuz, and should proceed with the crippling sanctions game plan because that’s the only option left next to war:

This is yet another reason why the West should not be intimidated by Tehran’s bluster, and why we should proceed with even more punishing sanctions in a last-ditch chance to bring a peaceful halt to the Iranian nuclear program, which, as the chief of Britain’s MI6 warned recently, could result in the production of actual nuclear weapons by 2014.

John Bolton, Weekly Standard: Negotiations with Iran are futile according to John Bolton, George W. Bush’s ambassador to the United Nations and AEI fellow, who once again refuted high level US and Israeli intelligence assessments when he declared this week in William Kristol’s magazine that Iran is involved in a “decades-long effort to build deliverable nuclear weapons” while failing to provide a shred of supporting evidence. And here’s his pitch for military force:

In the race between the West’s sanctions/negotiations track and Tehran’s nuclear weapons track, the nuclear effort is much closer to the finish line. Since all other options have failed repeatedly, we must at some very near point face a basic question: Are we prepared to use force at a time of our choosing and through means optimal for us rather than for Iran’s air defenses, or will we simply allow Iran to have nuclear weapons under the delusion it can be contained and deterred? The clock is ticking, and the centrifuges are spinning.

Yesterday I picked up a copy of the July/August issue of Arms Control Today, the magazine of the non-profit Arms Control Association (ACA) that’s based here, in Washington, DC. Those who follow events surrounding Iran’s nuclear program and US-Iran relations will appreciate the ACA’s output, which, while not exclusively [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Yesterday I picked up a copy of the July/August issue of Arms Control Today, the magazine of the non-profit Arms Control Association (ACA) that’s based here, in Washington, DC. Those who follow events surrounding Iran’s nuclear program and US-Iran relations will appreciate the ACA’s output, which, while not exclusively focused on Iran, consistently provides a wealth of related expert analysis and resources.

There are three important articles in this year’s Summer issue (available in print or online), the most interesting of which seems to be a piece penned by Hossein Mousavian, a former member of the Iranian government and nuclear negotiator who is now a research scholar at Princeton. Mousavian, who is no friend of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (he was briefly imprisoned in 2007 under dubious-sounding charges of spying), is considered an authority on matters related to Iran’s nuclear program especially when it comes to explaining the Iranian perspective. He does just that in Arms Control Today while charting the “origins” of and “current options” for the nuclear dispute. Missed opportunities and the constant imposition of pressure and punitive measures against Iran by the West have resulted in Iranian advances of its nuclear program, argues Mousavian, before listing 7 points in support of his thesis including historical triggers for Iranian nuclear advances such as the West’s withdrawal from nuclear deals that were made during the era of Iran’s last Shah, US support for Saddam Hussein’s savage use of chemical weapons against Iranian forces during the bitter Iran-Iraq war and Western failures to take advantage of deals proposed by Iran that would have satisfied almost all of the outcomes being sought today. Counterproductive seems to be the word for summing up the West’s approach to Iran according to Mousavian:

At the time of [the June 18-19 talks in Moscow], Iran had not only mastered enrichment to the 20 percent level, it had achieved milestones few could have imagined: the domestic production of fuel rods for use in the Tehran reactor, about 10,000 centrifuges, more than 6,000 kilograms of LEU, and 150 kilograms of 20 percent enriched uranium. Yet, the West still is not ready to respect the right to enrichment to 20 percent or even 5 percent. Not only has the West pushed Iran to seek self-sufficiency, but at every juncture, it has tried to deprive Iran of its inalienable right to enrichment. This has simply propelled Iran to proceed full throttle toward mastering nuclear technology. The Iranians never intended to go this far and would have been content with the West or another country supplying their fuel. The irony is that the progress of Iran’s nuclear program is the product of Western efforts to pressure and isolate Iran while refusing to recognize Iran’s rights.

While Mousavian states that the West seems positioned towards limiting its options to embarking on a disastrous military campaign or implementing measures that will only compel the Iranians to make further nuclear advancements, he still sees “a way out”:

All is not lost, however. Iran and the P5+1 could agree on a face-saving solution under which Iran would adhere to all international nuclear conventions and treaties at the maximum level of transparency defined by the IAEA. Furthermore, Iran would be flexible on 20 percent enrichment, its stockpile of material enriched to that level, and every other confidence-building measure to assure the international community that the country would remain a non-nuclear-weapon state forever. This would ensure the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activity. In response, the United States and the other members of the P5+1 would agree to recognize Iran’s legitimate right to enrichment under the NPT and gradually lift the sanctions. This framework can be realized in forthcoming talks through a step-by-step plan based on the NPT, mutual confidence building, and appropriate reciprocity as agreed in the Istanbul talks in April.

Also in the magazine is an editorial by ACA Executive Director Daryl Kimball, a steadfast charter of Iranian nuclear developments, wherein he counters claims (most loudly made by hawkish commentators regularly tracked at Lobe Log) that all hope is lost over the possibility of resolving the current impasse peacefully:

A deal that ties Iran’s enrichment activities and its stockpiles to the actual needs of Iran’s nuclear power plants, combined with more extensive IAEA safeguards, could sufficiently guard against a nuclear-armed Iran. Pursuing such a course is difficult, but it is the best option on the table.

Finally, Harvard’s Olli Heinonen, who served for 27 years at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, lists Iran’s nuclear program advances, which he believes show that “Iran is positioning itself as a virtual or latent nuclear-weapon state”. But even Heinonen, a widely quoted expert who is never shy about shining a glaring light on worrying Iranian actions, says a “potential solution is still in sight”:

The involved parties already have charted the rough outlines of a long-term deal, comprising efforts by Iran to undertake practical steps to ensure that its nuclear program cannot be used for nuclear weapons and to give the international community confidence that this is the case. In return, Iran would receive cooperation with the West in a number of areas. These could include, as part of a comprehensive package, addressing Iran’s nuclear power needs, giving assurances of nuclear fuel supply, providing fuel for its Tehran Research Reactor to produce radioisotopes for medical and industrial purposes, replacing that reactor with a modern civilian reactor, and providing assistance in nuclear safety and security.

Heinonen concludes by urging continued participation in the diplomatic process with Iran:

The road of negotiations after Moscow will continue to be rocky, but it is crucial to keep diplomacy on track. This means focusing on the overall goal that would address the proliferation concern of preventing a nuclear-armed Iran, instead of becoming bogged down in the process itself.

Lobe Log publishes Hawks on Iran every Friday. Our posts highlight militaristic commentary and confrontational policy recommendations about Iran from a variety of sources including news articles, think tanks and pundits.

Michael Singh (WINEP), Washington Post: The managing director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (aka [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Lobe Log publishes Hawks on Iran every Friday. Our posts highlight militaristic commentary and confrontational policy recommendations about Iran from a variety of sources including news articles, think tanks and pundits.

Michael Singh (WINEP), Washington Post: The managing director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (aka the Washington Institute or WINEP), a think tank that was created by the American Public Israel Affairs Committee (AIPAC), calls for imposing more pressure on Iran while bolstering the military option:

Like any good pugilist, Washington should follow the heavy blow of oil sanctions with further unrelenting pressure.
…
Finally, Washington should bolster the credibility of its military threat. Recent steps to strengthen its force posture in the Persian Gulf are a good start. They should be accompanied by more serious statements about U.S. willingness to employ force and an end to statements exaggerating the downsides of military action.

Former top CIA middle east analyst Paul Pillar responds in the National Interest:

If the oil sanctions aren’t enough, what other pressure does Singh say should be used? One is “bolder” efforts, whatever that means, to oust the Assad regime in Syria, and regardless of whatever implications that may have for escalation of that conflict. Another is an ill-defined reference to “cultivating Iranians outside the narrow circle around” the supreme leader or “providing support to dissidents” in Iran. No mention is made of how to get around the inherently counterproductive aspect of outside efforts to manipulate internal Iranian politics, or how one more indication that regime change is the ultimate Western objective is supposed to make the current regime more interested in making concessions. Finally, Singh calls for more military saber rattling—as if the threat of a military attack is supposed to make the Iranians less, rather than more, interested in a nuclear deterrent to protect themselves from such attacks. That makes as much sense as pushing yet again on the “pull” door.

We probably should not take the purveyors of such advice at their word. Surely at least some of them, including probably Singh, are smart enough to understand the basics of Sanctions 101. Their objective evidently is not success at the negotiating table but instead the indefinite perpetuation of the Iranian nuclear issue for other reasons or the checking off of a box on a pre-war checklist.

Lee Smith (FDD), Tablet Magazine: Hawks on Iran regular Lee Smith of the neoconservative-dominated Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) quotes retired Army Gen. John Keane (see biographical note below) before undermining repeated warnings from high-level defense and administration officials that a military strike would only set back Iran’s alleged nuclear aspirations by a few years:

In contrast, the Obama Administration has pulled out of Iraq and will soon pull out of Afghanistan. Yet the White House continues to repeat the trope that the program can, at best, be delayed a few years. Just as politics informed the Bush White House’s insistence on the delay-not-destroy mantra, politics of a different sort are informing this White House: This administration is conducting a public diplomacy campaign with the purpose of undermining the capability of a U.S. attack because the administration has no intention of striking.

Note: Keane has close ties with U.S. neoconservatives and was one of the main architects of George W. Bush’s surge in Iraq. In 2006, Gen. George Casey and the chief of the U.S. Central Command, Gen. John Abizaid  recommended reducing troop levels in Iraq, but Keane and his neoconservative allies started looking for someone that would support escalation instead–ultimately General David Petraeus. As documented by Bob Woodward in the War Within, Keane ignored the chain of command while heavily promoting Petraeus. He also helped persuade Bush to reject the Iraq Study Group’s findings and recommendations by aggressively pushing an alternative strategy he wrote with Frederick Kagan at the American Enterprise Institute called “Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq.” That report led to the military buildup that followed.

Lee also uses Keane’s words to repeat his call for a ramped up military option:

…long before the United States decides to attack Iran, we need to communicate our seriousness to the regime. “There is only one guy you need to convince here to voluntarily give up the nuclear program and that is the Supreme Leader Khameini,” Jack Keane argues. “He must know we are dead serious about a military strike, as a last resort, and this is not just about the nuclear facilities—their military will be decapitated. This is the U.S. military. Believe me, we will destroy you.”

United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI): The neoconservative-aligned Iran sanctions-enforcement organization ramps up its pressure campaign against the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), the financial messaging system used to arrange international money transfers, aimed at further crippling Iran’s economy:

Said UANI CEO, Ambassador Mark D. Wallace:

Now is the time for a full banking blockade against the Iranian regime, and SWIFT needs to play its part. SWIFT made the right decision in February to deny access to Iran’s Central Bank and some other institutions, but it has thus far failed to cut off all Iranian banks and entities. SWIFT should immediately sever its ties with all Iranian banks, particularly the ten that have been sanctioned by the U.S. government but still maintain SWIFT access.

Every day that SWIFT permits these illegitimate banks to have continued access to its network is a day the Iranian regime will continue to circumvent international sanctions. As the world weans itself off of Iranian crude, there is not a need to maintain conduits for energy related payments, but a need for an international banking embargo against Iran.

Clifford D. May (FDD), Scripps Howard: The president of the FDD repeats colleague Mark Dubowitz’s recommendation of blacklisting the entire Iranian energy sector as a “zone of primary proliferation concern” and reiterates his own call for U.S.-assisted/backed regime change:

[President Obama] should announce his support for legislation introduced by Rep. Ted Deutch (D-Fla.), Rep. Robert Dold (R-Ill.) and Sen. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) that would blacklist the entire Iranian energy sector as a “zone of primary proliferation concern.”
…
Such a speech should be followed by other measures in support of Iranians willing to take the risks necessary to replace a regime that has failed domestically, a regime that has been at war with the U.S. since it seized our embassy in 1979; a regime that four years later instructed Hezbollah to suicide-bomb the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut; a regime that has facilitated the killings of hundreds of Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan; a regime that plotted to blow up a restaurant in Washington, D.C., just last year.

Alan Dershowitz, Times of Israel: The pro-Israel Harvard Law Professor who “met for 45 minutes one-on-one with US President Barack Obama to discuss Iran” criticizes the J-Street lobbying group for “undercutting American policy toward Iran” by not pushing the military option on Iran:

Dershowitz said that by “explicitly undercutting Obama on Iran,” it actually “makes it more likely that Israel will have to go alone. As George Washington said a long time ago, the best way to preserve peace is to be ready for war, and that’s been the Obama policy.” For J Street to undercut it and misrepresent prominent Israelis’ positions on it, he said, “takes it out of the pro-Israel camp. I don’t think it’s debatable that J Street is pro-Israel. It is not.”

Marsha Cohen, Lobe Log’s resident Israel-Iran relations expert, tells me that while the 11th Commander in Chief of the Israeli Air Force, Avihu Ben-Nun, is not an important figure in current Israeli foreign policy debates, his viewpoints are reflective of those held by influential people in Israel’s [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Marsha Cohen, Lobe Log’s resident Israel-Iran relations expert, tells me that while the 11th Commander in Chief of the Israeli Air Force, Avihu Ben-Nun, is not an important figure in current Israeli foreign policy debates, his viewpoints are reflective of those held by influential people in Israel’s security establishment. That’s why I’m highlighting comments he made in the Israeli daily Maariv’s Friday “Sofshavua” magazine on June 22nd that have been translated by Orly Halpern for American’s for Peace Now’s (APN) indispensable ”News Nosh“.

In sum Ben-Nun argues that Iran will ultimately acquire a nuclear weapon with or without a military attack; an Israeli military attack on Iran will result in more harm to Israel’s interests than good; the Israelis should lobby the United States to “advance all possible sanctions and actions” against Iran; and that an Iranian nuclear bomb is threatening not because Iran would use it against Israel, but because it would give Iran’s leaders serious regional deterrence.

Ben-Nun served in the Israeli air force for 35 years, the last 5 of which as its Commander in Chief, and according to this business information site currently holds a number of advisory positions in Israel, including the Vice President of the Tel-Aviv and Central Chamber of Commerce.

On public discussions about an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities:

I am completely against discussing this subject in the media or in the Israeli public. What’s happening here is just scandalous. Every public discussion about the Iranian nuclear project just gives the Iranians more ideas and information and teaches them about the decision-making process. We didn’t do anything yet, and already they want the State Comptroller to investigate. It’s unbelievable…

On alleged Iranian aspirations for a nuclear weapon (emphasis mine):

I don’t think for a moment that the political echelons will finish the Iranian story face-to-face. The prime minister and defense minister travel to Washington to update and be updates over every bleep on the subject. And still I think that the Americans need to do the act, not us. And also, that if something is done, it will postpone the bomb, but it won’t cancel the threat. In the end, with an attack or without one, Iran will have the nuclear bomb. We need to live with it. Today, it seems like we can’t, and so we need to advance all possible sanctions and actions, but only by the Americans. We need to keep a low profile and to take into account that we have an enemy which is not a child and not sterile, that will take advantage of the fact that it has a bomb to achieve a concensus with all the Arab oil-producing states. And since it will have a bomb, the Arab states will have to line up with it and in the future prepare their own bomb. If the Iranians get the bomb, the first to be harmed will be the gulf countries, which will follow Iran. 40% of the world’s energy is in the oil fields in those places, so it’s not just our problem.

On why Israel should be concerned about an Iranian nuclear bomb:

The Iranians wouldn’t dare send us a bomb because they know the response. The Iranian bomb was not meant for use, but to create the status of a country that has deterennce against its neighboring states. This status is no less dangerous than the use of a bomb, becuase it will make all the countries on Iran’s borders do as Iran demands of them. The opposition to the bomb is not becuase someone fears that they will drop it on us, but because of their ability to control with its help every possible area.

On what an Israeli attack will result in (emphasis mine):

An attack could cause a war of 10 years, like the one between Iran and Iraq. Israel cannot withstand continuous missiles, even conventional ones, for a long period. If a missile falls on Tel-Aviv every week, what would happen here without the nuclear bomb? We need deterrence, not attack. Much of the actions by the prime minister and defense minister and foreign minister is to make clear to all the countries that Iran is not only Israel’s problem, but of the whole West, which needs oil, and that if there will be an Iranian bomb, even if the Americans offer defense to the other Arab countries, it won’t help, because they will all break the sanctions.

On what the US should do to counter the threat it perceives from Iran (I write “the US” instead of Israel because Ben-Nun says above that Israel should get the US “to act”:

Make them hurt badly with regular weapons. Attack all their targets, they have at least 10 targets that could significantly slow down the enrichment of uranium. More economic and commercial sanctions. Iran has very high unemployment and an intelligent public. I became aware of this when I was the head of the organization for Ron Arad (the missing helicopter navigator), ‘Born to be free.’ We operated advanced internet systems in the whole Arab world so that whoever has information can pass it to us in exchange for a prize of $10 million. That’s how we became aware also of the Iranians. People there sit on the internet and information sources very intensively. They know how to crash social network systems and advanced computers because the regime harms their rights. One needs to know how to move them to make a new revolution.

Interviewer: They tried and failed.

So what? They should try again.

Lobe Log publishes Hawks on Iran every Friday. Our posts highlight militaristic commentary and confrontational policy recommendations about Iran from a variety of sources including news articles, think tanks and pundits.

Patrick Clawson and Mehdi Khalaji, WINEP: Patrick Clawson and Mehdi Khalaji of the Israel-centric Washington [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Lobe Log publishes Hawks on Iran every Friday. Our posts highlight militaristic commentary and confrontational policy recommendations about Iran from a variety of sources including news articles, think tanks and pundits.

Patrick Clawson and Mehdi Khalaji, WINEP: Patrick Clawson and Mehdi Khalaji of the Israel-centric Washington Institute for Near East Policy (aka Washington Institute or WINEP) argue that Iran may need to be shocked into submission with more crippling measures including a military attack:

Ultimately, changing this mindset may require a profound shock of some sort, be it remarkably tough sanctions, more-complete political isolation, or military action.

While claiming that sanctions alone are not enough, the authors recommend piling more on anyway:

Washington has long advocated sanctions as the key to spurring Iranian compromise, and the announcement of the latest round of financial measures certainly seemed central in getting Iran back to the negotiating table. At the end of the day, however, such measures have not persuaded Tehran to make even the minimum compromises that would be acceptable to the P5+1. Expecting the new sanctions alone to spur Iran toward a more favorable position may therefore be unrealistic — Washington and its allies would be well advised to plan additional sanctions.

Michael Eisenstadt, WINEP: The director of WINEP’s Military and Security Studies Program argues that the US should aggressively harden its stance against Iran by implementing increased pressure tactics and ramping up the military option through posturing and public preparation:

Successful diplomacy may well depend on the administration’s ability to convince Tehran that the price of failed negotiations could be armed conflict. To make this threat credible, Washington must first show Tehran that it is preparing for a possible military confrontation — whether initiated by Iran or a third country — and that it is willing and able to enforce its red lines regarding freedom of navigation in the Gulf and the regime’s nuclear program.

Jamie Fly, Lee Smith and William Kristol, Weekly Standard: While applauding a related bipartisan Senate letter that we noted last week, three of the most ardent neoconservative pushers of the Iraq War urge Congress to “seriously explore” an Authorization of Military Force against Iran:

Stephen Rademaker, one of the witnesses at a House Armed Services Committee hearing on June 20, testified that Iran has not been “sufficiently persuaded that military force really is in prospect should they fail to come to an acceptable agreement to the problem.”

The key to changing that is a serious debate about the military option. But even in the wake of the collapse of the talks, far too many otherwise serious people continue to hold out hope for a negotiated settlement brought about by increased economic pressure. All additional sanctions should be explored and enacted as soon as possible, but what the track record of more than a decade of negotiations with Iran tells us is that this is not a country about to concede. This is not a regime on the ropes or on the cusp of compromise, as many would have us believe.

This is a regime committed to developing nuclear weapons, despite the cost to the Iranian economy and the toll on the Iranian people. Time is running out and the consequences of inaction for the United States, Israel, and the free world will only increase in the weeks and months ahead. It’s time for Congress to seriously explore an Authorization of Military Force to halt Iran’s nuclear program.

Mark Dubowitz, Foreign Policy: The executive director of the hawkish Foundation for Defense of Democracies and influential sanctions-pusher Mark Dubowitz argues for more “economic warfare” to “to shake the Islamic Republic to its core” by “blacklisting Iran’s entire energy sector”, extending the sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran, targeting other areas of the Iranian economy and:

…if that’s insufficient to get Khamenei to strike a deal — and there is unfortunately no evidence so far that it will — the president needs to unite the country in moving beyond sanctions and preparing for U.S. military strikes against Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

Daniel Pipes, Washington Times: The aftermath of an Israeli attack on Iran wouldn’t be all that bad according to Daniel Pipes. From yesterday’s posting:

Mideast focused pundit Daniel Pipes has positively reviewed a report by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) that discusses “likely” Iranian responses to an Israeli “preventive strike”. Pipes, who in 2010 argued that President Obama should bomb Iran to “to salvage his tottering administration”, repeats Michael Eisenstadt and Michael Knights’ assessment of how Iran would react to an Israeli military attack before concluding that the consequences would be “unpleasant but not cataclysmic, manageable not devastating.” The underlying assumption in Pipes’ article is that Iran is actively pursuing a nuclear weapon rather than nuclear weapon capability, which is what the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) and US intelligence agencies have asserted. And according to Pipes’ line of reasoning, the consequences of striking Iran pale in comparison to the only alternative he provides: “apocalyptic Islamists controlling nuclear weapons“.

via the American Security Project

“It’s time to act before it’s too late”–the new ominous tagline featured in the Emergency Committee for Israel’s commercial trumpeting the need for action on Iran, rings with truth. It is time for the United States to act–act in a strategic way that will benefit [...]]]> By Derek Bolton

via the American Security Project

“It’s time to act before it’s too late”–the new ominous tagline featured in the Emergency Committee for Israel’s commercial trumpeting the need for action on Iran, rings with truth. It is time for the United States to act–act in a strategic way that will benefit its national security interests–and this means not undertaking a military strike against Iran.

The purely strategic implications of a U.S. strike on Iran will far outweigh any limited gains it may bring about and will be far more costly than many realize. It would also ultimately leave the U.S. in a much weaker and exposed position while creating a more volatile Iran that will be further inclined to gain nuclear weapons capability.

As Micah Zenko at the Council of Foreign Relations writes, “It’s true throughout history: there’s always the belief that the next war will go much better than the last war” and that when faced with a problem such as Iran, people “want to ‘do something,’ and nothing ‘does something’ like military force.” Thus, contrary to the simplistic ‘drop a few bombs and stop the bad guys’ viewpoint, the reality of this situation is far more complex, and any strike will ultimately lead to a broader and more devastating conflict.

Consider, for example, former DIA analyst and current defense fellow at the Washington Institute Jeffery White and his in-depth analysis on how a U.S. strike on Iran would play out. He writes:

While a war with Iran might begin in the military domain, it would likely expand to others, and while it might begin at the operational or tactical level it would soon encompass strategic and political levels as well.

There is no denying the U.S.’s technological or military superiority over Iran. However, one need only look to past and ongoing conflicts to see how this advantage can be outmaneuvered by enemies, and how the U.S. can find itself in a protracted conflict where by simply not winning, we lose.

Accordingly, should the U.S. attack Iran, even with the limited aim of striking its nuclear facilities, Iran would seek to expand and then protract the conflict in an attempt to erode the U.S.’s morale and commitment. One need only point to Iran’s conventional force structure, access to organizations such as Hezbollah, and strategic geographic positioning along the Strait of Hormuz, to highlight how Iran could widen the conflict.

As White surmises, the U.S. would quickly find itself, “involved in a “secret war” of terrorist attacks and special counter terror operations…a “political war” involving Iranian and allied diplomatic and information operations to weaken support from other states and actors … an “economic war” featuring Iranian efforts to disrupt the oil market… and a “social war” [that] would involve appeals to Islamic solidarity and attempts to weaken popular support.” White concludes that “[i]n such a broad and protracted contest, the United States might not enjoy a favorable balance of advantages”.

Focusing primarily on the military capabilities of Iran and its allies, one can forecast what an Iranian response may consist of. For starters, Iran has an arsenal of short-medium range ballistic missiles.

Short range missiles consist of the Fateh-110, Shahab-2 (also called the Scud-C), and CSS-8, though it should be noted that the “U.S. Air Force’s National Air and Space Intelligence Center estimates Iran has less than one hundred (PDF) short-range delivery systems”.

Meanwhile Iran’s medium range arsenal consists of the Shahab-3, believed to be ranged between 1,500-2,500 kilometers. In 2008 Iran also introduced the new Sajjil, which unlike the liquid-fueled Shahab-3, is solid fueled and can thus be launched in a matter of minutes instead of hours.

These missiles in turn would allow Iran to strike targets in Israel and Turkey, as well as U.S. instillations and forces in the region. Such attacks would have to be met with appropriate responses by the U.S. and its allies, expanding the scope of strikes from just nuclear facilities to military installations.

With regard to the Strait of Hormuz, a report from Harvard’s Olin Institute for Strategic studies has shown that should Iran close the strait with mines, missiles, and small boats,“it could take many weeks, even months, to restore the full flow of commerce, and more time still for the oil markets to be convinced that stability had returned.”

Iran also has first hand experience with naval engagement in the waters stemming from the Iran-Iraq war, and has tailored its current naval doctrine accordingly. Iran has access to small, mobile, and hard to detect systems and ships, easily deployable mine capabilities, and land based cruise missiles.

Having learned hard lessons from previous naval engagements with the U.S., Iran would in a future engagement focus on a passive defense or “a defense without weapons [that] comprises a range of measures that reduce vulnerability and increase endurance against foreign threats.” This would in turn allow Iran to conduct asymmetric naval operations against U.S. forces and disrupt or close the Strait of Hormuz.

Regarding Iran’s allies, Hezbollah now has access to far more advanced missiles and rockets than in the past. This arsenal is now accurate enough to pinpoint military installations and capable of launching 500-600 projectiles a day. Hezbollah also maintains its capacity to undertake terrorist operations against civilians and other targets. This would spread the conflict throughout the region.

There is also the possibility that in lieu of a conflict, Hezbollah could gain access to Syria’s P-800 Yakhont supersonic cruise missile system, allowing it to strike targets up to 300km from the Lebanese coast.

Table 5. Reported Hizballah Rockets and Missiles (source: Washington Institute)

System                    Type                 Range (km)             Warhead Weight (kg)         Supplier

Zelzal-2                  Rocket                    210                                          600                                             Iran

Nazeat                     Rocket                    100–140                      1300(6)/250(10)                          Iran

Fajr-3                      Rocket                    43                                            45                                                 Iran

Fajr-5                      Rocket                    75                                            90                                                Iran

302 mm                  Rocket                    75                                            100                                             Syria

220 mm                  Rocket                    70                                            unknown                                  Syria

122 mm                   Rocket                    20–40                                      30                                          Iran/Syria

107 mm                   Rocket                    6                                              unknown                                Iran/Syria

M600/Fateh-110 Missile                   210–250                                  500                                       Iran/Syria

Scud variant            Missile                   300–700*                                985                                        Syria

* Depending on variant: Scud-B, 300 km; Scud-C, 500 km; Syrian Scud-D, 700 km. The Scud system is not confirmed to be in Hizballah’s hands in Lebanon at present

Additionally, despite its technological inferiority compared to Hezbollah, one should not discount the role Hamas could play in a conflict. While its capabilities rest largely on mortars and rockets, Hamas is still capable of striking critical targets in Israel such as Tel Aviv, further aggravating the overall situation for the U.S. and expanding the scope and complexity of the conflict.

Syria too may feel compelled to intervene in some manner, though it is largely preoccupied with internal dissent and thus currently may be unable to play any sort of leading role in the conflict.

Iran is unlikely to use all the tricks in its bag at once. Being a rational actor, and one that does not seek its own demise, Iran will respond with appropriate levels of force. However, these actions will be geared towards expanding the conflict to a much broader field where U.S. military and technological advantage is reduced.

Any strike against Iran will likely require much more than we think. As a March 2012 Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) report notes:

Limited bombing campaigns are unlikely to destroy Iran’s main capability to produce weapon-grade uranium…. Iran has dispersed its centrifuge program across many facilities, several whose locations remain secret. More importantly, Iran has mastered the construction of centrifuges and has likely even secretly stockpiled an unknown number of centrifuges…

Many analysts accordingly believe multiple sorties will be required, thereby expanding the scope of a strike and in turn the Iranian response.

Following a strike the U.S. will find itself in a prolonged conflict that will include conventional forces that are geared towards asymmetric warfare, an economic downturn and high oil prices stemming from instability in the Strait of Hormuz and non-state actors conducting operations across the region.

Soon U.S. escalation will be required to counter these challenges and it will eventually be forced to admit its shortcomings or double down and undertake the now forsaken term ‘regime change’. Should the U.S. undertake the former, it will have to live with a further destabilized region, yet another military setback, and an Iranian nuclear program most likely delayed, but far from destroyed.

As the ISIS report concludes:

An ineffective bombing campaign that does not eliminate these capabilities would leave Iran able to quickly rebuild its program and would motivate it to launch its own Manhattan Project, resulting in a Middle East region that is far more dangerous and unstable.

White similarly concludes that

A beaten, humiliated but still defiant Iran with essentially the same political system and approach to the region and the world would be a long-term, growing danger similar to Iraq after the First Gulf War (or Germany after World War I).

In short, if the U.S desires another long term engagement that will lead to further destabilization, a huge  military and financial commitment and what will likely be Iranian commitment to nuclear weaponization, then it should start down the long road of ‘limited strikes against Iran’s nuclear facility’.

However, should the U.S.  like to ‘act before it’s too late’ and undertake strategically responsible actions, it should refrain from militarily attacking Iran and continue to engage with it instead.

–Derek Bolton is a Policy Analyst and Research Intern at the American Security Project. Find his complete bio here.

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