by Mohammad Ali Shabani
Most headlines on Iran’s launch of uranium-related sites on April 9th — its National Day of Nuclear Technology — linked it to the diplomatic deadlock in Kazakhstan. Tehran was regarded as pursuing escalation, perhaps in frustration with the situation. But was this really the case?
To answer [...]]]>
by Mohammad Ali Shabani
Most headlines on Iran’s launch of uranium-related sites on April 9th — its National Day of Nuclear Technology — linked it to the diplomatic deadlock in Kazakhstan. Tehran was regarded as pursuing escalation, perhaps in frustration with the situation. But was this really the case?
To answer this question, one needs to consider what Iran has previously done on this anniversary, the significance of the Islamic Republic’s new sites and its escalatory options.
The government of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad launched the National Day of Nuclear Technology in 2006. This was part of the push for a harder stance on the nuclear issue after the breakdown of talks with European powers, during which Iran voluntarily agreed to freeze enrichment-related activities.
As part of the first festivities in 2006, Iran announced that it would — in defiance of a UN Security Council warning — enrich uranium on an industrial scale. A total of 164 centrifuges at Natanz started to spin, churning out uranium enriched below 5%.
During the past seven years, the Islamic Republic has largely used its Nuclear Technology day to unveil new achievements, both for domestic and foreign audiences. As the occasion has repeatedly coincided with nuclear diplomatic developments, it has often been used to signal Iranian attitudes.
In 2007, Iran used the anniversary to announce that it had crossed the Western red line of 3,000 operational centrifuges. Back then, David Albright, head of the Institute for Science and International Security, asserted that “Ahmadinejad is trying to demonstrate facts on the ground and negotiate from a stronger position.”
The year after, Iran used the occasion to announce that it would begin installing 6,000 centrifuges and alluded to the testing of a new generation of centrifuges. Then in 2009, Ahmadinejad inaugurated the country’s first Fuel Manufacturing Plant in the central city of Isfahan. The Islamic Republic also said its number of centrifuges had increased to 7,000.
In 2010, as the UN Security Council convened to discuss fresh sanctions, Iran unveiled new “third-generation” centrifuges, said to have separation power six times that of first-generation centrifuges. Iran also declared that “considerable” uranium reserves had been found in Yazd province. That year, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iran had 8,610 centrifuges installed, of which 3,772 were operating.
In 2011, after dialogue over Iran’s production of 19.75%-enriched uranium had broken down, it opted to simply praise past achievements. Apart from this, it announced the resumption of fuel reloading at the Bushehr power plant. And last year, after the escalation of Western sanctions, Iran announced that local scientists had produced fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor containing uranium enriched to 19.75%.
This year, Iran announced on the anniversary that it had opened two uranium mines and a yellowcake processing plant named after an assassinated nuclear scientist. What’s the significance of these sites?
In terms of capacity, the yellowcake facility is insignificant. Its stated output of 60 tons a year is less than one third of what’s needed to fuel the Bushehr atomic power plant. Moreover, the discovery of the uranium deposits, which are now being extracted, was first announced years ago. Along the same line, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran had announced in February 2012 that the mines would be operational in about a year, that is, right around this time.
The most important fact to keep in mind, however, is that Iran has for a long time been projected to be close to exhausting its limited supply of yellowcake. Without feedstock to inject into its centrifuges at Natanz (in gaseous form), Iran’s uranium enrichment — at least to 3.5% — would grind to a halt.
In short, the new sites unveiled on April 9th are designed to ensure the status quo.
There are other factors which also signify Iran’s pursuit of the status quo rather than escalation. For example, considering the many powerful escalatory options in its possession — wider use of new-generation centrifuges, expansion of operations at Fordow, increases in enrichment levels and construction of long-promised, new enrichment sites — the announcements this year seem geared towards signaling restraint to a foreign audience without appearing empty-handed in front of a domestic public facing unprecedented sanctions.
Indeed, the Islamic Republic has little interest in escalating the situation at this point, especially as it faces its first presidential election since the disputed vote in 2009. The idea that Iran prefers to quietly kick the can down the road until it gets its house in order was also recently expressed by former top US non-proliferation official, Gary Samore.
Meanwhile, it could also be argued that the United States – or at least its Congress — is pursuing escalation.
Following the deadlock in Kazakhstan, US lawmakers have been pushing for fresh sanctions that would constitute something akin to an Oil-for-Food Program 2.0. The draft Senate bill states that the proposed embargo won’t be lifted until Iran releases political prisoners, respects the rights of women and minorities and moves toward “a free and democratically elected government.”
Moreover, last week, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) — a front for the until recently terror-listed Mujahideen-e-Khalq Organization (MEK) — opened an official office one block away from the White House. The group was put on the State Department’s terror list by the Clinton Administration. In the past, the MEK was behind a series of killings and bombings in Iran — one of which led to the permanent paralysis of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s right arm. The MEK, which sided with Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war, was also reportedly involved in the assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists. Among these men is Darioush Rezaeinejad, whom the new yellowcake facility is named after.
The signal that’s being sent to decision-makers in Tehran, regardless of whether the Obama Administration approves of the MEK’s new office, is that the sanctions have little to do with their nuclear program. Combined with the wording of the proposed embargo, the situation ominously fits into Ayatollah Khamenei’s narrative that even a nuclear deal won’t be enough to roll back American pressure.
All things considered, one should be careful about linking Iran’s latest announcements about its nuclear achievements to the continued deadlock in talks with the 6 world powers, or viewing Iran’s actions as deserving of the escalation pursued by at least one of these powers.
It is becoming ever clearer that both Iran and the United States need to get their houses in order before they can move in the right direction. More than ever, cool heads need to prevail.
]]>by Mohammad Ali Shabani
by Mohammad Ali Shabani
Iran and the P5+1 — the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany — are set to resume nuclear talks in Kazakhstan on 26 February, but little appears to have changed since their previous meeting in Russia last summer.
In [...]]]>
by Mohammad Ali Shabani
by Mohammad Ali Shabani
Iran and the P5+1 — the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany — are set to resume nuclear talks in Kazakhstan on 26 February, but little appears to have changed since their previous meeting in Russia last summer.
In terms of concessions, the P5+1’s “updated” proposal reportedly includes an “easing” of sanctions targeting exports of gold and precious metals to Iran. This is in addition to last year’s offer of selling Iran aviation spare parts and providing fuel for a medical reactor and other civil nuclear cooperation.
The P5+1 doesn’t seem to have changed its demands. Iran continues to be urged to stop enrichment to 19.75%, shut down its Fordow plant and ship out its stockpile of this grade of uranium. Speaking to Reuters on condition of anonymity, a Western official has said the P5+1 wants its demands to now “build in buffer time” to ensure that it would take Iran “more time to restart Fordow.” The same Western official insisted that “we use very careful wording such as decreasing readiness of Fordow”, emphasizing that “these are face-saving words.”
The only Iranian reaction specific to the reported P5+1’s demands so far has come from influential MP Alaeddin Borujerdi, who reportedly said that “Fordow will never be shut down.” Pointing to the site’s well-protected nature, Borujerdi added that “our national duty is to be able to defend our nuclear and vital centers against an enemy threat.” To be clear, parliament has little say over the nuclear issue. However, according to former chief nuclear negotiator Hassan Rowhani, members of the parliamentary national security & foreign policy commission (which Borujerdi heads) used to be invited to meetings of the foreign policy committee of the Supreme National Security Council. In short, while Borujerdi has little say over the nuclear issue, he likely has real insight into debates within the body in charge of the matter.
More broadly, Iran’s Supreme Leader said in a speech Saturday that the Islamic Republic doesn’t want atomic weapons, adding that if it “intended to possess nuclear arms, no power could stop us.” Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called on Washington to show “logic”, underscoring that “this is the only way to interact” with Iran. Crucially, he linked this argument to a portrayal of American-devised sanctions as the main obstacle to dialogue between Iran and the United States.
It is encouraging to see the P5+1 start recognizing the importance of saving face for Iran. However, from an Iranian point of view, the crucial element of reciprocity is still lacking in the group’s offers.
Iran started enriching uranium to 19.75% at its Fordow plant on February 9th 2010. It did so after failing to purchase fuel for its US-supplied Tehran Research Reactor, which produces medical isotopes used in the treatment of over 800,000 Iranians.
Ever since, the United States and the European Union have imposed unilateral sanctions targeting Iranian banks, shipping and insurance, oil sales, repatriation of crude export revenues, sales of gold and precious metals — the list continues.
Demanding Iranian acceptance of “stop-shut-ship” is tantamount to asking Tehran to turn back the nuclear clock to February 8th 2010.
From Tehran’s point of view, that might be a possibility — if the sanctions clock would be turned back three years, too.
That’s not what the P5+1 reportedly has in mind. US sanctions targeting Iran’s barter trade with gold came into effect on February 6th this year. Offering to “ease” such penalties in Kazakhstan on February 26th would amount to offering to turn back the sanctions clock three weeks.
The P5+1’s current posture can be viewed through two lenses. On one hand, the mainly Western members of the group may simply think it’s unnecessary to make any serious concessions, motivated by the belief that time is on their side. In this vein, the P5+1 might be preparing the ground for more pressure on Iran by starting to play the blame game.
On the other hand, the P5+1 may be ready for serious concessions, but consciously avoiding making Iran an offer it can’t refuse. As the Western officials who leaked the P5+1’s position underscored, the lack of flexibility is due to a belief that Iran won’t agree to anything before its crucial June presidential elections. This view is shared by most analysts. Thus, presenting an offer that’s designed to be rejected on fair grounds may in fact be a way to avoid putting the Islamic Republic in a position where it will face sole blame for a potentially continued deadlock. Implicit here is a signal from the P5+1 that it’s willing to wait for Iran to get its house in order before resuming serious negotiations.
Regardless of which of the two scenarios is most accurate, the six months from now until the inauguration of the next Iranian president in August need not be a waste of time. All sides must take the opportunity to examine common positions so the ground can be prepared for tangible progress on the nuclear issue when the time is right.
- Mohammad Ali Shabani is a doctoral researcher at the School of Oriental & African Studies, University of London and the Editor of Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs.
Photo Credit: European External Action Service
]]>via IPS News
Despite an agreement between Iran and the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) to resume long-delayed talks about Tehran’s nuclear programme in Kazakhstan at the end of this month, few observers here believe that any breakthrough is in the offing.
That belief was [...]]]>
via IPS News
Despite an agreement between Iran and the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) to resume long-delayed talks about Tehran’s nuclear programme in Kazakhstan at the end of this month, few observers here believe that any breakthrough is in the offing.
That belief was reinforced Thursday when Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei appeared to reject a U.S. proposal, most recently put forward by Vice President Joseph Biden at a major security conference in Munich last week, to hold direct bilateral talks.
While Iran’s foreign minister, Ali Akhbar Salehi, initially welcomed the offer, provided Washington desisted from its “threatening rhetoric that (all options are) on the table,” Khamenei said in a speech to air force officers Thursday that such talks “would solve nothing”.
“You are pointing a gun at Iran saying you want to talk,” he said. “The Iranian nation will not be frightened by the threats.”
“(I)t simply doesn’t lie in (Khamenei’s) nature to agree to talks from a position of weakness – and certainly not without the protection of having the talks be conducted by an Iranian President who he can …blame for any potential failure in the talks,” wrote Trita Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council (NIAC), on the ‘Daily Beast’ website Thursday.
“Khamenei would rather wait till after the Iranian elections, it seems, in order to both find ways to shift the momentum back to Iran’s side and to hide behind Iran’s new President in the talks,” according to Parsi, author of two award-winning books on U.S.-Iranian relations.
He was referring to the widespread notion here that the cumulative impact of U.S.-led international economic sanctions against Iran, as well as the raging civil war in Syria, Iran’s closest regional ally, has seriously weakened Tehran and “forced” it back to the table, if not quite yet to make the concessions long demanded by the administration of President Barack Obama and its allies.
Those include ending Tehran’s enrichment of uranium to 20 percent; shipping its existing 20-percent enriched stockpile out of the country; closure of its underground Fordow enrichment facility; acceptance of a highly intrusive inspections regime by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); and the clearing up of all outstanding IAEA questions related to possible past military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear programme.
In exchange for those steps, according to U.S. officials, Washington – and presumably the other P5+1 members — would be prepared to forgo further UN. sanctions against Iran; assure the supply of nuclear fuel for Tehran’s Research Reactor (TRR), which produces medical isotopes; facilitate services to Iran’s aging civilian aircraft fleet; and provide other “targeted sanctions relief” that, however, would not include oil- and banking-related sanctions that have been particularly damaging to Iran’s economy over the past two years.
Gradual relief from those more-important sanctions would follow only after full and verifiable implementation of Iran’s side of the bargain.
Until such a deal is struck, however, Washington is committed to increasing the pressure, according to U.S. officials who say the administration remains committed to a strategy of preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon by military means, if necessary.
Indeed, in what one official described as “a significant turning of the screw”, the administration announced Wednesday that it had begun implementing new Congressionally mandated sanctions that would effectively force Iran’s foreign oil purchasers into barter arrangements. To avoid sanctions, buyers would have to pay into local accounts from which Iran could then buy locally made goods.
It’s generally accepted that such so-called “crippling sanctions” are responsible, at least in substantial part, for the 50-percent decline in the value of the riyal, galloping inflation, and a major increase in unemployment in recent months.
At the same time, however, there is growing doubt here that the sanctions are achieving their purpose – forcing Iran to accept the stringent curbs on its nuclear programme demanded by the U.S. – or that they are likely to achieve that purpose within the next 18-24 months.
That is the time frame in which most experts believe Tehran could achieve “breakout capacity” – the ability to be able to build a nuclear bomb very quickly – if it decided to do so.
Indeed, in recent weeks, Iran began installing advanced centrifuges at the Natanz nuclear facility that, if fully activated, could significantly accelerate the rate of enrichment. The move was seen as an effort by Tehran to strengthen its position before the P5+1 meeting in Almaty Feb. 26.
Moreover, the assumption that the economic woes imposed by the sanctions would drive such a deep wedge between Tehran’s leadership and the population that the regime risked collapse is also increasingly in question.
While a majority (56 percent) of respondents said in December that sanctions have hurt Iranians’ livelihoods “a great deal”, according to a poll of Iranian opinion released by the Gallup organisation here Thursday, 63 percent said they believed Iran should continue developing its nuclear programme. Only 17 percent disagreed.
When asked who should be blamed for the sanctions, only 10 percent of respondents cited Iran itself; 70 percent named either the U.S. (47 percent), Israel (nine percent); Western European countries (seven percent); or the U.N. (seven percent).
“This may indicate that sanctions alone are not having the intended effect of persuading Iranian residents and country leaders to change their stance on the level of international oversight of their nuclear program,” noted a Gallup analysis of the results.
Its credibility, however, was questioned by some Iran experts who noted that increased security measures taken by the regime may affect the willingness of respondents to speak frankly to pollsters.
In light of the most recent developments, including Khamenei’s rejection of Biden’s offer and the installation of the new centrifuges at Natanz, Iran hawks here are urging yet tougher sanctions and moves to make the eventual use of force more credible – appeals that are certain to be greatly amplified next month when the powerful American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) holds its annual convention here
At the same time, however, there appears to be a growing conviction within the foreign-policy elite that ever-increasing sanctions and threatening military action are unlikely to work, and that Washington should offer be more forthcoming about sanctions relief to get a deal.
Indeed, the administration’s commitment to resorting to military action, if necessary, to prevent Iran from obtaining a weapon is also increasingly being questioned, as a growing number of foreign-policy “greybeards” are calling for a strategy of “deterrence” if and when Iran reaches breakout capacity.
“In the end, war is too costly, unpredictable and dangerous to be a practical option,” noted Bruce Riedel, a former top CIA Middle East and South Asia analyst who was in charge of preparing Afghanistan policy on Obama’s transition team in 2009 and remains close to the White House from his perch at the Brookings Institution.
The “stark choice” between a diplomatic solution and war that Obama’s commitment to prevention has created, he wrote to the “Iran Primer” this week, “is a mistake”.
“But there is a good chance that (Secretary of State John) Kerry and Obama will bail themselves out of this trap by re-opening the door to containment, although they would probably call it something else.”
Photo: President Barack Obama speaks at Cairo University in Cairo, Egypt, Thursday, 4 June 2009. In his speech, President Obama called for a ‘new beginning between the United States and Muslims’, declaring that ‘this cycle of suspicion and discord must end’.
]]>So one thing to be heartened by is just the fact that Iran and the P5+1 countries, including the U.S., are sitting [...]]]>
So one thing to be heartened by is just the fact that Iran and the P5+1 countries, including the U.S., are sitting down at the table in Turkey at all. It’s a crucial step in creating a process and, without a process, the two countries will continue on a long-term path toward confrontation. The technical difficulties of Iran’s nuclear program are merely a delay.
Here’s a piece I did with Jim Lobe at IPS on how there is a glimmer of hope, even if the talks only yield more talks, that something positive could eventually materialize. The point is that without talking, the hope can never be realized. Here’s to the slow, laborious process:
The most realistic hope among those who favour enhanced efforts to engage Tehran is that Iran and the so-called P5+1 – the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and Germany – will agree at this session to continue negotiations, possibly to broker a confidence-building measure, such as the aborted nuclear fuel swap deal that was first put forward in October 2009.
“Given the level of distrust between the sides and the problems we have had in the past with diplomatic engagement, I would regard the commitment to have another meeting to constitute success,” said Greg Thielmann, a former senior State Department intelligence analyst, currently with the Arms Control Association (ACA).
“I wish for other outcomes as well, including bilateral discussions between the U.S. and Iranian delegates,” he added, “but a commitment to continuing diplomatic engagement is sufficient for now.”
The U.S. delegation will be led by the undersecretary for political affairs, William Burns, who has taken part in all three previous meetings between the P5+1 and Iran dating back to the last months of the administration of President George W. Bush.
“We’re not expecting any big breakthroughs, but we want to see a constructive process emerge that leads to Iran engaging with the international community in a credible process and engaging and addressing the international community’s concerns about its nuclear programme,” said State Department spokesman Mark Toner Thursday.
While he ruled out the possible lifting of existing sanctions against Iran, he also stressed that Washington was open to reviving the October 2009 proposal to swap most of Iran’s low-enriched uranium (LEU) stockpile in exchange for more highly enriched rods that are needed to fuel the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), which produces medical isotopes.
See other good curtain raisers at the L.A. Times and McClatchy. And here’s Laura Rozen’s take on the first day at Politico.
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