by Tyler Cullis
On Jan. 22, 2014, the long-promised Geneva II conference will begin, with close to 30 countries sending delegations in a last-ditch bid to end the violence in Syria. The talks, which will include both the Assad regime and parts of the opposition, hope to win support for a [...]]]>
by Tyler Cullis
On Jan. 22, 2014, the long-promised Geneva II conference will begin, with close to 30 countries sending delegations in a last-ditch bid to end the violence in Syria. The talks, which will include both the Assad regime and parts of the opposition, hope to win support for a mutual ceasefire and to forge a political settlement to nearly three years of civil war. Nevertheless, optimism is in short order. Below are critical questions the Geneva II conference will need to answer and address if peace is to prove possible.
Who does the Syrian opposition represent?
Syria’s opposition is split on attending the talks. The Syrian National Council has voiced its opposition to any negotiations with the Assad regime, threatening to leave the larger Syrian National Coalition should talks move forward under their aegis. Major parts of the opposition — including the Islamic Front and al-Qaeda-linked groups — have publicly stated that they will not be bound to any agreement reached during the conference. Thus, whether opposition representatives can uphold their end of any bargain reached in Geneva is an increasingly dim prospect.
That makes negotiation all the more difficult. Without a strong, unified opposition capable of binding all parties to an agreement, it is highly unlikely that the Assad regime will commit to a ceasefire — the obvious first step to a political resolution. In this way, a problem that has plagued Syria’s rebels all along — lack of cohesion — threatens to undermine the talks before they even begin.
Will Iran attend the talks in Geneva?
As of this posting Iran has yet to be formally invited to the Geneva II conference. According to the United Nations-Arab League envoy to Syria, Lashkar Brahimi, the UN welcomes Iran’s participation in Geneva, but the United States has blocked efforts to extend an invitation. Talks are said to continue on this matter, up to and until Jan. 22, but it is looking less and less likely that Iran will be permitted to formally attend the negotiations.
Nonetheless, Iran has proven a resilient partner to the Syrian government in the face of regional and international disapprobation, so it is highly unlikely that the Assad regime would consider any deal at Geneva without Iran’s direct input. Moreover, Brahimi has noted that he has a direct line of contact with Iran’s Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif. Even if not formal, then, Iran’s presence in Geneva will nevertheless be felt by conference participants.
What kind of political resolution is being considered?
A product of the Action Group on Syria, the Jun. 30, 2012 Geneva Communique, is ostensibly the basis for the Geneva II negotiations. The Communique, which assumes the continued “national unity and territorial integrity” of Syria, recognizes the need for a mutual ceasefire and for the establishment of a transitional governing body, which would be inclusive of all parties to the conflict. This body would then consider constitutional reforms.
However, the Geneva Communique is not the only available solution. In fact, viable alternatives are being widely discussed.
For instance, the Taif Agreement, which ended Lebanon’s 15-year civil war, is being considered as an alternative model. Just as the Taif Agreement ended the privileged status of the Christian Maronites and heralded an era of (unsteady) co-existence between the various Lebanese sects, so too must a political resolution to the Syrian conflict bring to a close the privileges of the Alawites and forge a power-sharing agreement between the contending parties. A political resolution à la Taif would be full of bumps in the road, as Lebanon can attest to, but would at least provide a mechanism to peacefully resolve political disputes when and as they arise.
What is the cost of failure?
Since the civil war intensified in the summer of 2012, tens of thousands of Syrians have died and millions more have been uprooted from their homes. This is the status quo, which will remain intact so long as the parties refuse a political compromise.
For the United States, there will be big questions in need of answers including how long it can endure a conflict that is proving fertile ground for al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Already, as Ryan Crocker’s recent remarks highlight, some U.S. policymakers are seriously considering a future with Assad and thus are urging the White House to open up a line of communication. U.S. policy might thus be forced to undergo a turnabout in the months ahead if no settlement is found.
The worst outcome of failure, however, is that the civil war will render permanent the disintegration of Syria, as the Assad regime, its opposition and the Kurds fight to a stalemate and exercise political autonomy within their respective territorial spheres of control. If this is the case, the United States, its European partners and the Middle East region might have a bigger problem on its hands than it ever have imagined.
]]>by Tyler Cullis
Few places deserve less optimism than Syria, where a civil war has raged unabated for more than two years. The situation on the ground continues to deteriorate at an appreciable rate, with close to 10 million people presently in need of food relief and medical assistance and 6.5 [...]]]>
by Tyler Cullis
Few places deserve less optimism than Syria, where a civil war has raged unabated for more than two years. The situation on the ground continues to deteriorate at an appreciable rate, with close to 10 million people presently in need of food relief and medical assistance and 6.5 million displaced from their homes. Even by conservative estimates, 126,000 people have fallen victim to the conflict since it began in March 2011. There is little to recommend the hopeful in Syria’s unending tragedy.
And yet for a conflict that has fallen into a kind of stasis, with neither the Syrian regime nor its opposition able to claim victory, there just might be a way forward if recent events are any suggestion. Last week, a date was finally set for the long-awaited Geneva II conference, although attendance — especially from the Syrian opposition — remains thus far unclear. The day prior, an interim deal was struck between the United States and its international partners and Iran concerning Iran’s nuclear program. The two followed so closely on the heels of one another that speculation was ripe — though empty — that the U.S.-Iran dialogue had reached as far as the Syrian conflict. Regardless, the interim deal augured well for the possibility that the U.S. extend an invitation to Iran for Geneva II and the pair compromise to realize mutual interests in ending the Syrian conflict.
This would, no doubt, require a change in the U.S.’s strategic calculus, which has thus far enacted a strict bar to Iran’s participation in the Geneva talks. But, as has long been recognized, without the Iranians at the table and without their interests adequately represented in Geneva, Iran can play spoiler to any kind of political resolution tabled there. The view in Damascus is that the Syrian regime is gaining momentum on the battlefield and can outlast the opposition, even if that means a decade or more of civil war. Without Iran’s commitment to a political transition, then, there is little end in sight.
Such a commitment is not a far-fetched idea any longer, either: Iran has good reasons to bring to a close the civil war in Syria, even if that means the removal of Bashar al-Assad. For one thing, the conflict has proved a significant drain on Iran’s own resources, as the Islamic Republic’s support for the Assad regime has required considerable expenditures in both money and manpower. While there is no clear sense as to the contribution Iran has made in terms of bodies on the ground, Iran has bankrolled a Syrian government that would have all but collapsed were it not for Iran’s financial benevolence. Further, the ongoing civil war has forced Hezbollah, Iran’s proxy, down from the mantle it once occupied in the Arab world following its July 2006 war with Israel. It is increasingly difficult to remember that, not long ago, Nasrallah, Assad, and Ahmadinejad were deemed the three most-admired world leaders in Arab public opinion. Clearly, the costs to Iran from a drawn-out conflict have been paid in blood, treasure, and reputation. Iran’s desire to staunch the bleeding should thus be obvious.
That is not to say that Iran is willing to sacrifice its interests in Syria, which are apparently deep enough to have warranted such costs in the first place. Whatever agreement is struck between the Syrian regime and its opposition will have to ensure that Iran maintains a healthy degree of influence in Damascus, or else Iran will undoubtedly favor the status quo, despite the overhead. But influence can come in many shades and certainly can be felt long after the passing of the Assad family’s reign.
In fact, by entertaining a political transition in Syria, Iran could well realize a broader set of interests. This includes the long-sought recognition that Iran is a regional power, armed with enough political influence to act as a broker between warring parties elsewhere. Should the U.S. overcome its stubborn refusal to permit Iran’s participation at Geneva II, the White House will have delivered to Iran what it has always sought: U.S. recognition that Iran cannot so easily be ignored. In doing so, however, the U.S. will turn the onus back on Iran, forcing it to live up to its promise and to deliver the political transition any deal to end the conflict requires. If Iran fails to do so, then it will have secured a narrow, perhaps fleeting victory in Syria, but lost the much larger battle for regional standing. Obviously, the pressure to deliver would be squarely on Iran’s shoulders.
Furthermore, at a time when the U.S. and Iran are speaking to each other, and the possibility exists for Iran’s reintegration into the world community after 34 years, Iran is incentivized to undertake such action as would reciprocate an American invitation to Geneva. Better than most, Iran appreciates the need to resolve the conflict in Syria. If doing so would likewise put Iran in the good graces of the U.S., then all the better, especially at such a sensitive point in the nuclear negotiations.
This all, of course, requires flexibility from the United States. As the International Crisis Group noted in a September statement, the U.S. needs to be “flexible with regards to timing and specific modalities [regarding Assad’s departure].” If Iran is willing to push Assad out, then the least the U.S. can do is accommodate the Iranians regarding the means by which the transition takes place. One possibility, entirely speculative, is that Assad depart office upon the end of his term, which, according to reforms he enacted early in the conflict, takes place next year. That would provide both the time for Geneva II participants to work out how exactly the transition will work, as well as a face-saving measure for Assad so that he can, however shamelessly, claim to be sacrificing himself to save a nation.
Is any of this, in fact, possible? That is entirely unclear. But until the U.S. includes Iran in the Geneva II process, one thing is absolutely certain: the Syrian civil war will continue on its interminable path.
– Tyler Cullis is a law graduate specializing in international law and U.S. foreign policy. Follow him onTwitter.
]]>How the White House Flung the Door Wide Open
by Tyler Cullis
It is a trope among foreign policy elites that the Obama administration lacks a coherent strategy for dealing with conflict and chaos in the Middle East and South Asia region. Few meanwhile seem to appreciate the most consequential of the [...]]]>
How the White House Flung the Door Wide Open
by Tyler Cullis
It is a trope among foreign policy elites that the Obama administration lacks a coherent strategy for dealing with conflict and chaos in the Middle East and South Asia region. Few meanwhile seem to appreciate the most consequential of the administration’s policies there — the U.S. targeted killing program and the way it is changing the rules of the game in war.
While the U.S.’s targeting guidelines have been a continuing source of controversy, not least among human rights advocates, the fact that the administration’s use of killer drones in Pakistan and Somalia are changing the rules on when force can be deployed in the first place has largely flown under the radar. However, it is this development that might prove most troubling, as dozens of States stand prepared to acquire killer drones in the coming years.
As reported in The Washington Times, the U.S. intelligence community estimates that 87 countries are in possession of drones, and 26 of those have either purchased or are in the process of developing a drone akin in scope to the Predator. It is expected that a dozen or so of these countries are seeking to weaponize their drones and will succeed in short order. Further proliferation like this is a striking concern, but even more disturbing is the fact that States will be deploying lethal gadgets in a legal order undergoing dramatic flux and change, largely thanks to the novel conceptions of law the White House has employed to justify its drone program in Pakistan.
Unable to rationalize the cross-border use of drones while toeing the line of the law, the Obama administration at first ignored the legal repercussion of its drone policy. When pressed, it took an ad-hoc approach to the legal concerns underlying its targeting killing program, without careful consideration of the costs of upsetting and throwing into turmoil the rules and regulations that have governed the use of inter-State violence for more than six decades.
Last month, the United Nations released two draft reports on drones and drone warfare, which spoke to this problem. Following a recitation of the law governing the use of force and implying, but not finding, that the U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan fell afoul of this law, the Emmerson report noted that the U.S. had taken the position that the law of self-defense provided far greater scope for States to undertake cross-border action against non-State armed groups than commonly believed.
Under the U.S.’s preferred approach, the use of killer drones in Pakistan’s tribal areas would be a legitimate form of self-defense so long as Pakistan proved “unable or unwilling” to combat the non-State armed groups within its own borders. This contrasts with the traditional rule that self-defense can be triggered only after an armed attack by the State itself, and that cross-border incursions of the American kind in Pakistan can only be warranted upon the consent of the Pakistanis. Needless to say, the U.S. position has not proven popular amongst other countries.
However, the U.S. rule is one ripe for adoption, especially as other countries acquire the drone technology to make cross-border attacks relatively cost-free. In arguing for a more permissive legal regime, then, the Obama administration has opened the door wide for other countries to pursue their own “counter-terrorism” policies under the stamp of law. It is entirely unclear whether the administration intended this result, or whether it is simply a by-product of the White House’s race to defend its drone program from legal attack. Regardless, the legal argument is ill-considered.
Nowhere will this prove to be a more of a problem than in the Middle East and South Asian region. With the U.S. set to depart Afghanistan by the end of next year, there will soon be an intensified competition over the country’s future from regional neighbors, including Pakistan, India, China, Russia, Iran, and Tajikistan. More than a few have or are at present developing weapons systems for their drones and will not be hesitant to use Afghanistan as training ground for their new gadgets, much in the same way the U.S. did. This bodes ill for the future stability, if not integrity, of the war-torn country.
Drones could see especial use in a number of low-intensity, inter-State conflicts as well. India, which has a limited set of armed drones at present but is looking to purchase vast fleets of them, might well be inclined to deploy drones on its border with Pakistan in order to target hostile groups in Kashmir. Pakistan’s response to this, which it would almost certainly regard as a provocation, is yet to be seen, but it takes little imagination to see how the appeal of the drone — as a limited, low-intensity weapon — could incite a much larger and much deadlier conflict.
These are just two examples, but they demonstrate the point that, absent a more restrictive legal regime governing the use of force, killer drones will be deployed by more countries, and more often, than at present, with unforeseeable consequences. It is thus unfortunate that the Obama administration has pushed the law to evolve in just the opposite direction.
When asked early in his first term whether the war in Afghanistan was winnable, President Obama replied:
I think about [the Afghan War] not so much [as] do you lose a war…? I think about it more in terms of, do you successfully prosecute a strategy that results in the country being stronger rather than weaker at the end of it?
It is ironic, then, that the linchpin of the administration’s strategy in Afghanistan — the targeted killing program — might well invite a world that is more conflict-ridden and chaotic than the one that preceded it.
– Tyler Cullis is a law graduate specializing in international law and U.S. foreign policy. Follow him on Twitter.
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