by Mitchell Plitnick
You have to admire the tenacity of J Street, the self-proclaimed “pro-Israel, pro-peace” lobbying group. Or maybe it’s the desperation born of running out of options. In any case, if there is to be any hope for a negotiated resolution to the Israel-Palestine conflict, J Street, however well-intentioned, [...]]]>
by Mitchell Plitnick
You have to admire the tenacity of J Street, the self-proclaimed “pro-Israel, pro-peace” lobbying group. Or maybe it’s the desperation born of running out of options. In any case, if there is to be any hope for a negotiated resolution to the Israel-Palestine conflict, J Street, however well-intentioned, is demonstrating precisely what we must not do.
Just days after the Obama Administration announced it was taking a “pause” in its efforts to broker an agreement, J Street sent out a message trying to rally the troops. In that message, they said that this moment “…is an opportunity to take stock and ask some tough questions.” Unfortunately, they make clear in the very same message that they are doing neither.
Here is what J Street refers to as “our plan”:
This plan reflects a sense of futility. There is nothing here that raises the question of why almost every round of talks for the past twenty years has ended in failure. The closest thing the U.S. can point to as a success during that period is the Wye River Agreement in 1998, when President Bill Clinton exerted personal pressure on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and, for his troubles, got Netanyahu to implement a redeployment that had already been agreed upon. Not a lot to show for over twenty years of work.
Yet J Street, in essence, advocates more of the same. The “toughest question,” and the one they don’t want to ask comes down to the internal paradox that J Street faces. On one hand, they are always advocating “robust diplomacy” on the part of the United States. On the other, J Street has consistently opposed any sort of material pressure on Israel, whether economically or diplomatically, to get them to change their policies. That they continue to hold this position goes a long way toward explaining why nothing, especially the results of Israeli-Palestinian talks, ever changes.
In 1998, Bill Clinton was able to put public pressure on Netanyahu, without having to resort to threatening U.S. military aid to Israel or really much else in the way of material pressure. But that was a different time. The reason Clinton was successful was because the specter of an Israeli Prime Minister alienating a U.S. President was a significant political problem in Israel. Indeed, it contributed significantly to Netanyahu’s defeat shortly thereafter by Ehud Barak (although, paradoxically, the right wing’s sense that Netanyahu had sold them out at Wye was at least as big a factor). In today’s Israel, as long as the people know the military relationship is intact, defying the U.S. can be a political plus, and Netanyahu has since proven that he can insult, humiliate, even spit in the proverbial face of a U.S. President without real consequence.
That’s why J Street’s prescription is so badly out of date. The rightward shift of the Israeli public since the beginning of the Second Intifada in 2000, along with the increasing clarity in recent years of the strength of virtually unconditional Congressional support for a wide array of Israeli policies, have emboldened Israeli prime ministers. They know that the United States will not exact any penalty for Israeli defiance on matters related to the Occupation (wider regional matters may be different). If further proof were needed, the opposition from within his own party to Barack Obama’s call for an Israeli settlement freeze in 2009 provided that. It is no longer sufficient for a U.S. President to make his wishes clear; Israel will not move on the ever-deepening occupation without significant, tangible pressure. But J Street opposes any such pressure.
The “tough questions” that J Street, and other groups seeking a reasonable and non-violent end to this conflict need to answer don’t stop there. The failure of not only the latest attempt by John Kerry, but of the entire process over twenty-plus years now raises a much bigger question.
To date, there has only been one path to that sort of a solution, the two-state version as envisaged by the Oslo Accords and the subsequent evolution of events. It hasn’t worked. After twenty years, the occupation is far more entrenched; the settler population has exploded and its growth will continue to accelerate; the PLO has fallen into disarray and has lost a lot of support, but no clear alternative has presented itself; the Israeli electorate has moved sharply to the right; and Washington’s ability to pressure Israel has grown weaker with each successive president since 1992.
The byword about this process has been that there is no other choice, but this is nonsense. Not long ago, Emile Nakhleh, a former Senior Intelligence Officer for the CIA suggested on this site that the two-state option was dead and new ideas, essentially variations on a one-state formula, would have to be devised.
I agree that those formulations need to be considered anew. I still don’t believe a single state will really work, but the moment demands that anyone who can make a case for any solution must be heard and taken seriously. What is most dangerous right now is falling into the comfortable trap of trying the same thing that has failed for twenty years. The only formulation that has ever been attempted was the Oslo formulation and it has failed. There is always another option. We need to find one that will work, not stubbornly cling to a fatally flawed plan that has finally died and pretend there is still even the remotest possibility that it will work.
It is precisely for this reason that I have been picking on J Street in this article: because I still believe that a two-state formulation must be found. I have nothing against a one-state outcome in principle; as long as that one state guarantees it will always offer safe sanctuary to Jews fleeing persecution– the kind that didn’t exist in World War II — I’m perfectly comfortable with it. But I have no faith that it can work, as we see all around the world the collapse of and/or violent conflicts within multi-ethnic or -confessional states (Iraq, Yugoslavia, and most recently Syria, South Sudan and Ukraine, just to name a few). Given that level of doubt, and the fact that there is currently no groundswell of political support anywhere for a one-state outcome, I cannot see how it would work. But I remain open to someone showing me how the difficulties could be dealt with, as we all must consider new options in the wake of Oslo’s death.
But a new two-state concept doesn’t really have the full advantage over one state that some may contend, if they base that contention on the idea that a two-state formulation has global acceptance. That’s because any two-state formulation must scrap Oslo and start from scratch, so it would have to be sold anew. In my view, in order to succeed, a two-state formula must include the following elements, few of which were characteristic of the Oslo Process:
That’s a basic framework that I see as workable for an equitable two-state solution. Lots of compromise on both sides, but also a practical approach that allows both Palestinians and Israelis to maintain their national identities.
Of course, I don’t expect a politically centrist, Washington-centric group like J Street to accept such a formulation. But I do expect that, if they are serious about wanting A two-state solution rather than stubbornly sticking to the failed experiment that has been referred to as THE two-state solution, they will start talking and thinking of new ideas about what such a solution will look like.
There are one-staters who advocate a secular-democratic single state. There are right-wing Israeli one-staters who advocate a single state that legally enshrines Jews as dominant above Palestinians. Those ideas are advancing today because any reasonable person understands that the Oslo process is dead and has been proven to be unworkable, and these ideas are beginning to fill that vacuum. If we want to see a two-state solution emerge, as I think we need to, we need to re-think the basis of that solution and build one that avoids all the bias and mistakes of Oslo.
J Street, as champions of the two-state solution, this is your time to show that you can truly lead. I hope you’ll take the opportunity to do so and not play scared by clinging to the only solution that has actually been tested and which led to a dead-end.
]]>by Shireen T. Hunter
Not long after the outbreak of the crisis over Ukraine and Crimea, many observers began asking the following question: what impact could renewed Russo-Western tensions have on the fate of the ongoing negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program? Will the Russians encourage Iran to become more obdurate [...]]]>
by Shireen T. Hunter
Not long after the outbreak of the crisis over Ukraine and Crimea, many observers began asking the following question: what impact could renewed Russo-Western tensions have on the fate of the ongoing negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program? Will the Russians encourage Iran to become more obdurate and change its current and more flexible approach to negotiations with the P5+1 countries (the US, Britain, France, China, and Russia plus Germany), stop complying with sanctions on Iran, or even help it financially and militarily, for example by delivering the promised-but-withheld S-300 air defense system or even shipping the more advanced S-400?
Other questions are also important. Notably, what impact has the West’s treatment of Iran had on Russia’s ability to pressure Ukraine and in general to regain its influence in independent states of the former Soviet Union, including the Caucasus and Central Asia? Indeed, the Western policy of containing Iran and excluding it from many regional and transnational energy and other schemes has facilitated Russia’s policy of consolidating its position in the former USSR.
A major tool that Russia has used in its quest to regain influence over its former possessions has been its vast oil and gas reserves. This is quite evident in Ukraine’s case, where Russia has switched the gas spigot on and off as a way of pressuring Kiev. Iran is only second to Russia in its gas reserves and could have been an alternative to Russia in many countries of the former USSR, including Ukraine. Yet the Western policy of preventing any foreign investment in Iran’s energy sector, coupled with preventing any transfer of Iran’s oil and gas to Europe via various pipeline routes, has meant that Russia has gained an excessive share of the European energy market. Iranian gas could have easily been transported to Europe, especially the East European countries, through Turkey, Bulgaria and so on. Even Ukraine could have satisfied some of its energy needs through Iranian gas.
The same has been true in the Caucasus. Both Georgia and Armenia have wanted more energy cooperation with Iran. However, they were discouraged by the West and, in the case of Armenia, also pressured by Russia. The result has been their greater vulnerability to Russian pressure.
Meanwhile, preventing any of the Central Asian energy sources to pass through Iran, the only country with common land and sea borders with these countries (with the exception of Uzbekistan, which is a land-locked country), has made it more difficult for countries like Georgia to get, for instance, Turkmen gas. In other areas, too, excluding Iran from regional energy schemes, and discouraging Central Asian and Caucasian countries from cooperating with Iran, has worked either in Russia’s favor or created opportunities for China.
Even in the areas of security and conflict-resolution, Iran’s exclusion and the West’s encouraging regional countries to adopt anti-Iran policies has had negative effects. This has even given rise to new tensions and problems, for instance, between Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan, as well as exacerbated sectarian tensions. For example, Azerbaijan’s resulting animosity to Iran has led it periodically to favor Sunni radical Islamists. Consequently, today Azerbaijan has a serious Salafi problem, and sectarian tensions in the country have been on the rise.
The experience described above provides important lessons for Western policy towards Iran and regional issues in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and South Asia. The first lesson is that a policy of containment on several fronts is not practicable, at least not in the long run. For twenty years, the US has tried to contain both Russia and Iran in these regions and to bar Iran’s interaction with these regions, while also looking askance at China’s progress.
A second lesson is that excluding Iranian oil and gas from global markets inevitably limited Europe’s and Central Asia’s energy choices, making both more vulnerable to Russian pressures since, with the exception of Qatar, the Persian Gulf oil giants are not major players in the gas market.
The last and the most important lesson is that the West should press forward with negotiations with Iran, toward a satisfactory conclusion to the nuclear dispute. This should be followed by lifting sanctions, encouraging the return of Western energy companies to Iran, and planning new networks of energy transport which would include Iran. In the long run, this kind of engagement would also translate into better political relations between Iran and the West and produce a positive impact on Iran’s political evolution and hence issues of human rights and other freedoms in Iran.
With regard to broader regional security issues, the West should work with Iran on a case-by-case basis wherever this serves Western interests, rather than making all aspects of relations with Iran hostage to its stand on the Palestinian question. As shown by the example of Afghanistan — where Iran supported US interests in toppling the Taliban, only to be deemed part of an Axis of Evil — isolating and excluding Iran harms the West as much if not more than it does the Islamic Republic. Right now, the only real winner is Vladimir Putin’s Russia.
]]>by Robert E. Hunter
What did the guy say? Truth is the first casualty in war. And that other guy? “If you don’t learn from history…” Both bromides apply to what is happening with regard to Ukraine, as US government officials (other than Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, the one calm voice) [...]]]>
by Robert E. Hunter
What did the guy say? Truth is the first casualty in war. And that other guy? “If you don’t learn from history…” Both bromides apply to what is happening with regard to Ukraine, as US government officials (other than Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, the one calm voice) and the commentariat are trotting out Cold War analogies. It’s always difficult in crises, especially with a certified Bad Guy on the other side, to step back, calm down, try to understand “how we got from there to here,” and then figure out an approach that has a chance of being successful, in terms of our interests and the values we hope are shared by others.
To start with, Crimea is Russian (Tatar, actually, but it is too late to do much about that). That is Fact One. (Fact two: Vladimir Putin is, indeed, a thug). It was given as a birthday present to Ukraine in 1954 by Nikita Khrushchev, himself a native-born Ukrainian. This administrative change didn’t mean much until 1991 when the Soviet Union broke up and Ukraine emerged as a sovereign state with this bit of Russia embedded in it. Crimea might have reverted to Russia then, as the Czechs and Slovaks agreed to their “velvet divorce.” But few people thought then in terms of tidying up borders and ethnicities where such an action might just make matters worse and so Ukraine became independent with what territory it previously had under the Soviet Union — on balance, in my view, the correct approach.
One theory in the early 1990s was that redrawing borders in Central and Eastern Europe to align ethnicities to sovereignties was a fool’s errand or worse. Much of the mess of ethnicities and borders was a product of the 1919 Paris peace negotiations, and there was no point in the 1990s of trying to sort out the puzzles that Woodrow Wilson, David Lloyd George, and Georges Clemenceau had been unable to solve. The theory further held that immersing these mixed-up countries collectively in NATO as well as in the EU would eventually lead peoples to value the resulting democracy and prosperity over ago-old ethnic hostilities. Thus Hungary was told it had to give up claims to Transylvania, which was transferred to Romania in 1921 in the Trianon Treaty, or it could forget about joining NATO. It was a no-brainer; even so, Hungary is one Central European country where memories of the “old days” of Empire still linger in many minds.
Hungary is a good analogue to Ukraine, but without the same result, in part because neither Ukraine nor Russia has been offered membership in either NATO or the EU. The former is too mixed up in terms of its population’s composition to be a “clean” fit, and including it fully in the formal Western institutions would be a clear provocation to Russia. For its part, Russia would be too big for NATO and the EU to swallow; it would totally distort those institutions and it isn’t interested anyway.
Historical missteps
One big Western mistake was declaring at the 2008 Bucharest NATO summit that Ukraine and Georgia “will become members of NATO.” These words were designed to placate those who wanted to set those two countries on a path of NATO membership without necessarily meaning it — like the often-made, cynical European promises that Turkey will join the EU. The statement was also designed to give something to US President George W. Bush, who was pushing the Ukrainian and Georgian causes, without meaning anything real. But it did. Saying that a country “will become a member of NATO” means that the allied countries making the pledge are — from that moment onward — prepared to extend to the country in question that critical Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, which provides that each ally will come to the rescue of any other ally attacked from abroad. Two leaders accurately read this declaration: President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia and President Vladimir Putin of Russia. Believing, incorrectly, that NATO “had his back,” Saakashvili poked at the bear, and the bear struck back. The net loser was Russia because Western trust in Russia’s willingness to be a real Western country plummeted. At that time, I wrote that Putin had chosen to attack Georgia to set an example, because no Western country really cared about it — indeed, no NATO allies that had expressed willingness to include Georgia as a member of the alliance lifted a finger to help it, thus showing that the Bucharest declaration was vacuous. But, I wrote, Russia had better be careful about Ukraine because, since it lies on a direct line between Russia and Western Europe, Russian pressure there would have much graver implications.
When Central European countries were considered for (serious) NATO membership, Ukraine and Russia were places apart. Thus instead of offering membership, NATO negotiated a “Distinctive Partnership” with Ukraine, with a Charter (which I negotiated for NATO) that was far less than membership; and it negotiated a NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997 and in 2003 that further extended NATO-Russia cooperation, including a NATO-Russia Council at NATO headquarters, with Russia present as an equal with the Western allies. Ukraine would not exactly be in limbo, but it would also not, at least for now, be a serious candidate for any form of membership in Western institutions that could legitimately be seen by Russia as drawing a line between it and the West. A delicate balance was struck, with Ukraine being offered a Western “vocation” and without Russian oversight, but also without damaging possibilities for Western cooperation with Russia.
A further premise of this approach was that the West and Russia would explore ways to work together and support Russia’s efforts to increase prosperity so that, in the fullness of time, Ukraine’s full sovereignty and independence would be acceptable to most, if not all Russians. Maybe this goal was out of reach, we shall never know. Maybe Putin (and his ilk) have all along been interested in recreating the Russian (Soviet) empire to the extent possible, by intimidating some neighbors and chopping into the sovereignty of some others.
But the moment for trying was lost. I argued at the time that Russia should immediately be brought into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), now the World Trade Organization (WTO), in order to hasten its economic engagement in the West and hence its prosperity but that was not done: Russia “had to meet the criteria for membership.” Criteria be damned, this was a political step. Similarly, the US Congress only repealed in 2012 the 1973 Jackson-Vanik Amendment limiting trade with the Soviet Union, which was originally designed to get it to permit Jewish emigration (an issue that died with the dissolution of the Soviet Union) and also designed to try killing US-Soviet détente.
Then there was the US decision to deploy elements of ballistic missile defenses in Central Europe, against today’s North Korean missiles and, in theory, those that Iran might have at some point in the future. Russia balked, arguing that this system would risk blunting its nuclear deterrent. The US has argued long and hard against this and it’s correct. The Russians obviously understand the point, as does any first-year student of nuclear strategy (I have worked on it for a half century). But that is not the issue. The missile defenses in Central Europe are an affront to Russia, demonstrating once again that it lost the Cold War; and, as the Russians argue, if a counter to future Iranian missiles were needed, that time is far in the future. At the same time, various Central Europeans see the missile defenses in the same light as do the Russians: a form of continued containment of Russia. Further, the missile defenses, like some other NATO military activities in new allied states, violate the spirit, if not the letter of precise commitments made to Russia at the time of the NATO-Russia Founding Act (I was present when the key US unilateral declaration on this point was drafted by a US official on a napkin in the NATO restaurant in Brussels).
What comes next
So, without repeating all the news of the last few weeks, “What is to be done?” as Nikolay Chernyshevsky said and Lenin repeated. This depends on the immediate possibilities of Putin’s three courses of action: to shift Crimea back to Russia and challenge anyone to do anything about it; to sit tight with his troops there (as he has done in disputed regions of Georgia); or to accept that he has made his point and agree to some face-saving formula to withdraw his troops, perhaps with UN monitors (so far rejected by Moscow) and perhaps some intensification of Crimea’s semi-autonomy within Ukraine that would benefit the Russians who live there.
The worst thing for the United States to is to draw red lines, especially ones that we cannot and will not honor. President Barack Obama came perilously close to doing so by saying that “there will be costs.” Sanctions have been trotted out (the standard “feel good” response when military action has to be ruled out), and some US hotheads are already talking about beefing up NATO defenses and holding military exercises in Central Europe. Secretary of State John Kerry has said that “all options are on the table,” a phrase from the playbook on Iran. All” options, Mr. Secretary? Yes, there will be ”costs,” in that Western trust in Russia, vital for it to have productive economic relations, has gone down even further, and Russia cannot pursue the autarkic policies of the Soviet Union. But what is most required now is coolness under pressure and serious thinking about the future.
It is long past time to complete the construction of the “Europe whole and free” and at peace that George H.W. Bush called for that — with Ukraine and Russia — has been so long delayed. That is in the realm of diplomacy, and it takes the following shape: to convene a series of efforts to sort out security and economic arrangements that attempt to achieve several principles and objectives. These include:
1) Ukraine is sovereign and will not have its future determined against its will by outsiders but the overwhelming Russian ethnicity of the Crimean people will get more recognition than heretofore;
2) Russia will have a proper and honored place in the security, political, and economic arrangements that are agreed as part of the process proposed here, provided it is prepared to “play by the rules” (“a voice but not a veto,” in NATO parlance);
3) NATO and the EU will be directly involved, beginning with the institutions for working with Ukraine and Russia that already exist;
4) the US and Russia will also deal directly with one another, in line with the broader diplomacy, as the two countries that, in the end, have to reach agreement on the future of European security;
5) ditto in regard to the European Union with Ukraine and Russia (and the two together);
6) in the process, various Russian proposals for European security need finally to be looked at seriously, but with the proviso that the Russian idea of replacing NATO is not on the table; yet some role for the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) can be considered.
Can such a process be properly developed and eventually be made to work? As with any such effort, doubts will be heavy. Putin’s appetite may be too great and he might allow Russia to be isolated; and US leadership and imagination may be lacking. But there is no way to judge since this necessary work has been postponed already for two decades. It has to begin with forbearance, now, by Putin; a calming influence from Washington; with discussions involving the US, Western Europeans (including NATO and the EU), Ukraine, and Russia; and with the recognition by all parties that the alternative is continuing crisis, instability, and human regression for all, with no winners and all losers.
“Leadership,” Mr. Obama?
]]>by Robert E. Hunter
Accidents happen, even to seasoned US diplomats. In this case, the Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia was caught in a highly sensitive conversation on Ukraine’s future with the US ambassador in Kiev. Not much out of the ordinary in their talk, conducted in diplo-speech, except [...]]]>
by Robert E. Hunter
Accidents happen, even to seasoned US diplomats. In this case, the Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia was caught in a highly sensitive conversation on Ukraine’s future with the US ambassador in Kiev. Not much out of the ordinary in their talk, conducted in diplo-speech, except for one almost inaudible expletive by Victoria Nuland.
The State Department turned it all into a joke, a kind of “boys [and girls] will be boys [and girls]” and blamed the leaking of the conversation on the Russians, a “new low in trade-craft” — more diplo-speech for spying. This barb at Moscow, although thousands of hackers around the globe could have picked up the phone call; and the Russians would naturally patrol the US embassy in Kiev (and everywhere else) listening for unguarded talk, just as (we hope) the US does likewise against them. And, if Moscow had been urging its ambassador in Kiev to try manipulating Ukrainian politics, as the State Department was doing, and if we had picked up one of their phone calls, we would broadcast it to the world, as part of the continuing struggle for Ukraine’s soul now being conducted by the old Cold War superpowers.
There is irony. The recently much-maligned National Security Agency spends huge amounts of money providing US diplomats with easy access and highly secure telephones; and every junior diplomat is trained never, ever to hold a conversation as sensitive as the one revealed except through classified email or on one of those NSA instruments.
With “egg on their faces” and a well-merited rebuke from the Federal German Chancellor, whose own phone calls were hacked by the NSA, what’s not to like in this B movie? Ambassador Nuland ‘fessed up; so let’s all have our laugh and move on.
Yet this accident has revealed issues that merit study. First was the expletive, directed against what the US diplomats — and much of Washington — see to be the European Union’s fecklessness, not just in regard to Ukraine — “a day late and a Euro short” — but also in getting its act together in general.
Not so fast. It’s not as though the United States had been consistently leading for the West in helping Ukraine define its future, a country pinioned by geography between the Russian Federation and Europe Proper, in an effort to provide Jeremy Bentham’s “greatest good for the greatest number.” Nor has the US been paying much attention to the European Union — or to Europe, for that matter. When he spoke at the Brandenburg Gate last year, President Obama made only a passing reference to NATO and referred to the EU only as “your union.” He will stop off for a brief summit meeting with the EU in Brussels next month, but for years these have been pro forma, a couple of hours of shop talk and then back on Air Force One to some place more important. There will be a NATO summit in Wales this September, but as of now it will focus on what should be done about Afghanistan after Dec. 31 when NATO troops in the International Security Assistance Force depart. Charting NATO’s future? So far an empty basket.
The fact is that for years Europe has been the low region on the US’ Northern Hemisphere totem pole. The one saving grace is the administration’s commitment to negotiating the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which has become the touchstone of transatlantic relations, now that NATO is in fast decline. But even TTIP may not make it, unless Congress gives the President so-called Fast Track Negotiating Authority, whereby he can sign a deal without Congress’ picking it apart. Even that is now in doubt, as those who oppose more open trade, mostly in the President’s own Democratic Party, are pushing back.
So, lesson 1. Mr. President and Secretary of State John Kerry: pay more attention to Europe, and if there is something as important as the future of Ukraine, get involved at a more senior level. As skilled as Ambassador Nuland is, negotiating this issue should be happening above her pay grade to show that the US is really serious. And as important as Mr. Kerry’s diplomatic heavy-lifting in the Middle East is to that benighted region, the US has to be able to “walk and chew gum at the same time.”
Lesson 2: stop looking at what is happening in Ukraine as though it is simply a replay of Cold War confrontation. It’s striking how much rhetoric, both in the US government and in the American commentariat, is reveling in the prospect of a return to the Good Old Days when the Russians were the bad guys. At the same time, it’s striking that, with all the efforts to load political issues onto the Sochi Olympics, however important LGBT rights and Syria may be, there has been no use of this moment to get President Vladimir Putin to understand that his Sochi glory also depends on controlling his ambitions in Central Europe, with all its geopolitical importance.
In the 1990s, the remaking of European security — George H.W. Bush’s grand strategy of a “Europe whole and free” and at peace — fell short in integrating the Russian Federation into the future. While it was brought into the Partnership for Peace and into a special relationship with NATO, it was too long kept largely isolated economically, so its people did not see that playing ball with the West pays dividends in their own lives.
Is it too late to try building an overarching political, economic, and security structure throughout Europe, in which the US, Canada, Western Europe, Central Europe, Ukraine, and Russia can all play legitimate parts, minus “spheres of influence because everyone gains something more important in terms of prosperity and, yes, respect? Maybe, maybe not. It is past time for the US, as the West’s leader, to start trying. And without ignoring — and stigmatizing — its indispensable partner, the EU.
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