by Mark N. Katz
U.S.-Russian relations have sharply deteriorated, to put it mildly, over Ukraine in recent months. There has been widespread talk about the re-emergence of a new Cold War between Washington and Moscow. Indeed, some have even argued that Moscow does not want to see American sanctions on Iran lifted because [...]]]>
by Mark N. Katz
U.S.-Russian relations have sharply deteriorated, to put it mildly, over Ukraine in recent months. There has been widespread talk about the re-emergence of a new Cold War between Washington and Moscow. Indeed, some have even argued that Moscow does not want to see American sanctions on Iran lifted because this would allow Iran to compete with Russia in exporting petroleum to the West and elsewhere. Yet Russia appears willing to cooperate with the U.S. on several issues, including the Iranian nuclear file. What could explain Moscow’s reasoning? At least four possible explanations stand out.
1) The government of President Vladimir Putin is willing to compartmentalize foreign policy issues. Dramatic disagreement with the U.S. on some issues does not preclude Moscow from cooperating with Washington on others where common interests are involved. Both the U.S. and Russia — as well as many other states — want to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, so it makes sense for Moscow to continue working with Washington in pursuit of this aim.
2.) Moscow is working toward a settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue in part to both limit and ameliorate international opposition toward Russian policy vis-à-vis Ukraine. There are quite a few governments that are far more concerned about the prospect of a nuclear Iran than about what Russia does in Ukraine. These include Israel, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and perhaps even some West European members of NATO. Moscow’s continued serious efforts toward a settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue may provide these states with a convenient rationale to avoid joining U.S.-led efforts to criticize Putin over Ukraine.
3) Moscow’s actual ability to scuttle a nuclear agreement with Iran might be limited. Washington and Tehran, of course, have never lacked reasons for disagreeing with each other in the past. But if a final agreement between the U.S. and Iran over its nuclear program is indeed attainable, neither of these states is going to back away from it at Moscow’s behest. Indeed, any Russian effort to prevent a nuclear accord reached by Iran on the one hand and America and its European partners on the other could backfire and result in Moscow looking weak and ineffective — exactly what Putin wants to avoid.
4.) Finally, Russia could make substantial profits following a final nuclear deal with Iran. While it is true that a final agreement and the reduction (if not elimination) of U.S. and international sanctions against Tehran would mean increased competition from Iran for Russia in exporting petroleum, reduced UN sanctions on Iran would allow Russian firms to invest more in the Iranian petroleum sector. Indeed, just like the Shi’a majority government that the U.S. helped bring to power in Baghdad, Tehran may actually see doing business with Russian petroleum firms as advantageous. A wealthier Iran would also be able to purchase far more nuclear reactors, weapons, and other goods from Russia than it can pay for now.
Of course, these explanations are not mutually exclusive. Moscow may continue to work toward a resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue for any or all of the reasons listed above. Moscow’s unwillingness to cooperate with Washington on Ukraine, then, does not mean that Russia will stop cooperating with America on Iran.
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Photo: U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (center) share a laugh at the signing ceremony of the interim nuclear deal reached with Iran on Nov. 24, 2013 in Geneva, Switzerland.
by Derek Davison
On February 27 gunmen seized control of government buildings in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in Ukraine and raised a Russian flag over the headquarters of the Crimean Parliament in the regional capital Simferopol. This began a series of events that has resulted in Crimea under Russian control and [...]]]>
by Derek Davison
On February 27 gunmen seized control of government buildings in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in Ukraine and raised a Russian flag over the headquarters of the Crimean Parliament in the regional capital Simferopol. This began a series of events that has resulted in Crimea under Russian control and furious diplomatic efforts underway between Ukraine, the European Union, the United Nations, NATO, Russia, and the United States. This primer will offer some background to the (rapidly changing) events currently taking place in Ukraine and some idea as to where things may proceed from here.
What is Crimea and why is it important to Russia?
Crimea is a peninsula that extends from the southern part of Ukraine into the Black Sea. Formerly controlled by the Crimean Khanate (whose Tatar subjects were forcibly relocated out of the peninsula by Josef Stalin in 1944), it was annexed into the Russian Empire in 1783 and immediately became home to Russia’s Black Sea naval fleet, based in the southern city of Sevastopol. The fleet was sunk during the Crimean War (1853-1856) when Sevastopol was besieged by a combined French, British, and Ottoman army, but was rebuilt after the war. In 1921 Crimea became the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, but in 1954, it became part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to streamline post-WWII reconstruction. Crimea briefly declared self-government when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1992, but agreed to remain part of the newly independent Ukraine.
Ukraine, including Crimea to the south (Credit: CIA World Factbook)
All of Ukraine has value to Russia, but Crimea is especially important. Crimea has only been part of an independent Ukraine for 20 years, a fraction of the time it was part of Russia, and ethnic Russians are actually almost 60% of the peninsula’s population, according to the most recent census (2001). More crucially, the Russian Black Sea Fleet is based at Sevastopol, part of a post-Soviet deal between the two countries to divide the former Soviet fleet and to lease part of the base to Russia, and so Russia has military/strategic reasons to ensure that it retains access to that base.
Why did Russian forces invade Crimea now?
Beginning in late-November 2013, a series of protests, known as Euromaidan, began in the Ukrainian capital, Kiev, against the government of then-President Viktor Yanukovych, a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Dueling pro- and anti-government protests, and clashes with security forces, continued through January 2014, when the Yanukovych government announced new draconian anti-protest laws. What had been an occasionally violent protest movement turned into a full-blown revolution, culminating in a series of clashes on February 18-20. Casualty reports vary, but as many as 100 people may have been killed in the violence.
On February 21, Yanukovych reached a deal with opposition leaders to end the violence, but the protesters refused to accept it, and the following day Yanukovych fled Kiev. Yanukovych has been impeached and removed from office by the Ukrainian Parliament, an act that he rejects, and is considered a fugitive for his role in the deadly February violence. After Yanukovych was impeached, officials in Putin’s government suggested that the Russian military could intervene in Ukraine if it was deemed necessary in order to “protect” Crimea. On March 1, the Federation Council, the upper house of the Russian Parliament, voted unanimously to give Putin authority to deploy Russian troops into Ukraine, and the Russian military seized near-total control of Crimea.
What were the Ukrainian protests about?
Ukraine’s economy has been in crisis for some time. Many Ukrainians supported the adoption of an Association Agreement with the European Union as a way to boost the economy, but Yanukovych’s government suspended talks over the proposed agreement and instead pursued entry into the Eurasian Customs Union, alongside Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Polls indicated that a slim plurality of Ukrainians favored the EU deal over the customs union. The name of the protest movement, “Euromaidan,” reflects its initial demand (closer integration with Europe) and the fact that it began in Maidan Nezalezhnosti (“Independence Square”) in downtown Kiev.
The dispute over whether to gravitate toward Europe or back toward Russia exacerbated an already existing ethnic and linguistic split between the largely Ukrainian, pro-Europe western half of the country and the more Russian-oriented eastern half. But this division has been overemphasized as a “cause” of the protests, when the principal causes were Ukraine’s weak economy and Yanukovych’s decisions to reject the EU and then try to violently suppress the initial protests. Even in the eastern, “pro-Russian” part of Ukraine, the majority of the population is ethnic Ukrainian and, according to a 2011 poll, a majority in every province (even Crimea) sees Ukraine as its mother country.
Does Russia have designs on the rest of Ukraine?
The Federation Council resolution authorizing Russian military intervention in Ukraine pointedly allows deployment anywhere in Ukraine, not just Crimea. There are several reasons why Russia wants to retain influence in all of Ukraine, if not to outright control it. Russian history and national pride is inextricably tied to Ukraine, since Russians trace their origins to the 9th-13th century Rus’ people, whose capital and principle city was Kiev. Economically, it would be a blow to Russia if Ukraine were to choose EU membership over joining the Eurasian Customs Union, and Russia also depends on Ukrainian pipelines to ship its natural gas to the rest of Europe. Pro-Russian protests have taken place in eastern Ukrainian cities outside of Crimea, with Russian flags also being raised in several places there.
On the other hand, Russia continues to deny that it has even sent troops into Crimea, let alone the rest of Ukraine, since the fighters who have taken control of Crimea appear to be Russian private paramilitaries rather than official Russian soldiers.
Do the Crimeans want (or need) Russian “protection”?
It does seem that Crimean Russians, worried that the new government in Kiev might be hostile to them, have welcomed the arrival of Russian troops. New Crimean Prime Minister Sergey Aksyonov refused to recognize Yanukovych’s removal from office and asked Putin to send Russian forces to help him “ensure peace” in Crimea. It is worth noting that one of the first acts of the new Ukrainian government was to abolish a 2012 law allowing Russian to be used as a second official language in some parts of the country, and it is also true that the Euromaidan movement included some far-right Ukrainian nationalist groups. However, Crimea is also home to large populations of ethnic Ukrainians and Tatars (who started returning to Crimea after the fall of the USSR), and these groups do not support the Russian invasion.
How have Ukraine and the rest of the world responded to Russia’s invasion?
The Ukrainian government has mobilized its military, though it seems to be on a purely defensive posture. At the UN Security Council, the United States and Ukraine accused Russia of violating Ukraine’s sovereignty, in particular the 1994 Budapest Memorandum in which the US, UK, and Russia pledged to honor Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Russia has countered that American and European involvement in Euromaidan (an accusation for which it has yet to produce any evidence) was itself a violation of Budapest and made Russian intervention necessary. Presidents Barack Obama and Putin held a “testy” phone conversation in which Putin asserted Russia’s right to defend ethnic Russians in Ukraine, while Obama called on Putin to draw his forces back. There are diplomatic levers that the US and the EU can push, including sanctions against Russia and Russian politicians, but there is likely nothing powerful enough to force Putin to withdraw. Kiev has options it can pursue as well; Crimea is, for example, dependent on the mainland for its water and electricity, and while Ukraine relies on Russia for its natural gas, Russia also relies on Ukrainian pipelines to get that gas to European markets, so Putin cannot punish Kiev by just turning the gas off. Still, these options are unlikely to force Russia to withdraw.
Russia may simply order its forces out of Crimea after extracting concessions from Kiev, something akin to the outcome of the Russia-Georgia War in 2008, but it is possible that Putin will attempt to carve eastern Ukraine and Crimea off into a new state, which could lead to a military confrontation.
]]>by Robert E. Hunter
Following the US-Russian agreement, the Syrian government’s chemical weapons must now be destroyed. To do this without putting UN employees at impossible risk, the Syrian civil war must also stop. To do that requires a plan by the Obama administration and others. To do that requires a realistic [...]]]>
by Robert E. Hunter
Following the US-Russian agreement, the Syrian government’s chemical weapons must now be destroyed. To do this without putting UN employees at impossible risk, the Syrian civil war must also stop. To do that requires a plan by the Obama administration and others. To do that requires a realistic goal — not just “victory” for the rebels — but which ones?
At best, last week’s diplomacy puts the Obama administration back at Square One before the major chemical weapons attacks on August 21. Still, there are differences. Firstly, the threat of force, strongly put forth by the president in his dramatic speech to the nation last Tuesday, is in fact off the table. For this to be otherwise would require some triggering mechanism of Syrian government “non-compliance,” and Russia would have to concur. It would also return President Obama to the dilemma of trying to get Congressional and public approval for US military force. Two non-starters.
In fact, the debate on the use of force is mostly about US domestic politics. The president should draw upon the famous quotation misattributed to Vermont Senator George Aiken during the Vietnam War: “Declare victory and get out.”
Secondly, the US can no longer ignore what has been happening in Syria and must ramp up its diplomatic efforts.
Thirdly, Russia is now directly involved in Middle East diplomacy. Getting it to “butt out” now is also a non-starter. Maybe President Vladimir Putin will see advantages in genuinely working toward a broader settlement in Syria and elsewhere in the region. The price: Russia will henceforth be “in” and will have to be recognized as more than just a successor to the country whipped in the Cold War.
Both Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan knew how to change bad news to good in foreign policy: the former by “going to China” and making possible withdrawal from Vietnam; the latter by proposing to Mikhail Gorbachev at Reykjavik that the US and USSR get rid of all nuclear weapons, an ice-breaker that helped end the Cold War.
For Obama, “changing the subject” in Syria and the broader Middle East should include the following components:
- Stop insisting that the possible use of force against Syria “remains on the table.” It has no further value and just keeps alive the debate over US “credibility.”
- Recognize that the Syrian government will not negotiate when the outcome is predetermined (the departure of President Bashar al-Assad). If President Obama can’t for domestic political reasons back off from this second “red line,” at least the Alawite community needs cast-iron assurances that it will not be butchered following a deal and can continue to play a major political role.
- Pursue a peace process relentlessly as an honest broker, with all other interested outside countries, co-chaired with Russia and under UN auspices.
- Tell US Arab allies whose citizens export Islamist fundamentalism or fund weapons for terrorists in Syria and elsewhere to “cut it out.”
- Help restrain the wider Sunni-Shia civil war in the region, in part through demonstrating that the US will remain strategically engaged, while acting as an honest broker.
- Take advantage of Iran’s new presidency to propose direct US-Iranian talks and pursue a nuclear agenda that has a serious chance of success, as opposed to past US demands that Iran give us what we want as a precondition. Recognize publicly that we respect Iran’s legitimate security interests, as we rightly demand that Tehran reciprocate.
- Explore possible compatible interests with Iran in Afghanistan, Iraq, freedom of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, an Incidents at Sea Agreement (as the US and Soviet Union did in 1972) – and perhaps even over Syria.
- Engage the Europeans more fully in both political and economic developments in the Middle East and North Africa, as part of a new Transatlantic Bargain.
- Start shifting the US focus in the region from military to political and economic tools of power and influence. Put substance behind the spirit of Obama’s 2009 Cairo speech that did so much for US standing with the region’s people.
- Propose a long-term security framework for the Middle East, in which all countries can take part; all will oppose terrorism (including its inspiration), all will respect the legitimate security interests of its neighbors, and all will search for confidence-building measures.
- Engage all interested states (including Iran, Russia, China, Pakistan, and India) in developing a framework for Afghanistan after 2014.
- Recognize that Israeli-Palestinian negotiations can only succeed when Israel’s security concerns (Egypt, Syria, and Iran) are addressed and the blockade of Gaza ends.
Other steps may be needed, but all elements in the Middle East must be considered together. The US must exercise leadership. It must primarily work for regional security, political and economic development, be the security provider of last resort, honor its commitments, act as an honest broker, and prove itself worthy of trust.
]]>by Mark N. Katz
The international relations of the Syrian conflict has taken center stage in recent days. President Obama first announced that he would launch a military strike against Syria in response to the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons against its internal opponents in August, but he also said that [...]]]>
by Mark N. Katz
The international relations of the Syrian conflict has taken center stage in recent days. President Obama first announced that he would launch a military strike against Syria in response to the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons against its internal opponents in August, but he also said that he would seek Congressional approval for doing so. And just last week, when it was becoming increasingly clear that Obama was unlikely to obtain Congressional approval, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov announced a dramatic initiative to place Syrian chemical weapons stockpiles under international control–which, despite much skepticism from its conservative opponents, the Obama administration quickly accepted. Progress on this initiative appears to be going forward.
What all this goes to show is that while Washington and Moscow have sharply differing approaches to the conflict in Syria–especially when it comes to whether Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad should remain in power–Obama and Putin also have some common interests there.
Neither Moscow nor Washington wants to see the further use of chemical weapons in Syria or elsewhere. At the same time, Putin does not want to see America use force against Syrian ally. And although Obama has threatened to use force against Assad, he doesn’t really want to have to do so. If he did, he would have gone ahead and done so without seeking prior approval from Congress.
Further, despite their differences over whether Assad should remain in power, neither Obama nor Putin wants to see his regime replaced by a radical Sunni one, which both Washington and Moscow have come to fear as being the most likely outcome to the violent downfall of Assad.
Obama’s desire not to get the U.S. too deeply involved in Syria also coincides with Putin’s desire not to see Russia lose influence there. Washington’s agreement to Moscow’s initiative on Syrian chemical weapons, then, gives each leader hope of achieving his goals.
For Putin, Obama’s acceptance of the Lavrov initiative on Syrian chemical weapons is the kind of Russian-American cooperation in resolving the world’s conflicts that Moscow had hoped would occur after the end of the Cold War but which the U.S. has rarely seen the need for.
Obama and Putin, then, have several common interests when it comes to Syria. Despite this, however, it is not clear that Russian-American cooperation on the Syrian chemical weapons issue will be sufficient to resolve it. Although he has verbally agreed to it, Assad might well not fully comply with this effort. Yet even if the Syrian chemical weapons issue is successfully resolved, this will not end the Syrian civil war nor motivate regional actors supporting different sides to stop doing so.
All this gives Obama and Putin an additional common interest in working together to resolve the Syrian chemical weapons problem: their failure to do so will demonstrate the powerlessness of both leaders–something neither can afford.
]]>by Wayne White
The main objective of the Russian chemical weapons (CW) initiative this week was to steer the US away from military action in Syria that might weaken the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Although Moscow also is concerned about CW falling into the hands of rebel extremists, it has less incentive [...]]]>
by Wayne White
The main objective of the Russian chemical weapons (CW) initiative this week was to steer the US away from military action in Syria that might weaken the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Although Moscow also is concerned about CW falling into the hands of rebel extremists, it has less incentive than Washington to pressure its Syrian ally amidst the latter’s war against the Syrian opposition. While much of the world looks to Russia and the US to chart a way to achieve international goals on Syrian CW peacefully, the Russians will be working closely with Damascus in parallel to fashion the disarmament mission to the Syrian regime’s advantage. In addition to stretching out the timeline, another Russian-Syrian objective could be to use the process to create a measure of external dependence and perhaps lend some badly needed legitimacy to Syria’s discredited dictatorship.
President Vladimir Putin’s bottom line in his New York Times editorial on Thursday is highly misleading: “We are not protecting the Syrian government, but international law.” Whatever emerges concerning the issue of Syrian CW, one must bear in mind that Syria is Russia’s only remaining Middle East ally, a major market for Russian weapons, and plays host to Russia’s only Mediterranean naval base.
Although claiming to defend international law against “ineffective and pointless” American style “brute force,” Putin has done most everything to assist the Assad regime’s widespread, often indiscriminate use of just that (reducing much of Syria to rubble) to suppress what was initially a reform movement, while opposing any use of force to punish the regime for what increasingly appears to have been a major violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol against chemical warfare. Finally, much of Putin’s rhetoric revolves around the extremist threat posed by the rebels, while skirting references to the Syrian regime’s own extensive barbarity. In fact, the regime’s ruthless repression since 2011 played a key role in driving many rebels toward greater radicalization.
The complex process of accessing, accounting for, seizing, and eliminating Syria’s huge CW arsenal might well be exploited by Damascus to assist its own cause against the rebels. The work at various CW sites, the sequencing of such access, as well as the inspectors’ need to move around other areas of the country to make sure CW has not been hidden elsewhere could be used to demand that the rebels cease fighting across broad stretches of territory (potentially providing any regime personnel accompanying the inspectors opportunities to collect information on rebel deployments). A telling signal of Putin’s desire to give the regime as much maneuvering room as possible in all this was Moscow’s immediate rejection of France’s proposal to include in the relevant UN Security Council resolution a tough enforcement clause.
Just the amount of time required to catalogue, transport and dispose of Syria’s CW arsenal (possibly years) is likely to provide the regime with respites it could exploit to revive its battered military. Meanwhile, to weaken the rebels, Assad might argue, for example, that all lethal aid to them (on the part of the US, reportedly just getting under way) cease, or demand certain local rebel withdrawals to supposedly facilitate the work of the inspectors. During this lengthy process, Assad could at times halt cooperation unless his demands are met (such as his latest: the US must renounce any potential use of force against his regime). Absent a tough enforcement mechanism, the international community would have little clout with which to push back via the UN.
Furthermore, Assad’s agreement to sign the 1925 Geneva Protocol is no guarantee–just an opening formality. Egypt signed the protocol, but later used Mustard Gas against the side it opposed in the 1960s Yemen Civil War. Italy’s Benito Mussolini accepted the protocol during his early years in power, only to turn round abruptly in the mid-1930s and use Mustard Gas in his war against Ethiopia. Japan, also a signatory, attacked Chinese forces amidst hostilities in the 1930s with both chemical and biological weapons.
It is not surprising that even the relatively moderate Free Syrian Army (FSA) working with the West has reacted negatively to the emerging arrangement. They know all too well that Moscow has stood by the brutally repressive regime against which they have fought and are shocked to find Russia now at the head of the diplomatic table. Also, with the UN inspection report on the August 21 Damascus CW attack reportedly set for release on Monday (amidst rising evidence the regime carried out the attack), the opposition was stunned as focus abruptly shifted from punishing the Assad regime to cooperating with it on a CW arsenal the same regime previously denied it possessed. Nevertheless, any lack of cooperation on the part of the opposition would make Assad & Co. appear reasonable by comparison.
The Russian proposal, however, should be explored fully. That said, while a peaceful way out of this aspect of the Syrian conflict is preferable, all concerned must also proceed cautiously given Moscow’s stake in the Assad regime. An additional great advantage to most everyone would be to remove Syria’s CW arsenal from the battlefield so no party to the conflict could gain further access to it–neither the regime nor rebel extremists. Yet, although the current approach stems from a likely regime atrocity, if Assad agrees, for the most part, to cooperate in dismantling his CW arsenal in a timely manner, the international community could become vested in an otherwise loathsome regime for a long time as the sole guarantor of that process.
]]>by Robert E. Hunter
…we have reached the conclusion that there is not enough recent progress in our bilateral agenda with Russia to hold a U.S.-Russia Summit in early September…Russia’s disappointing decision to grant Edward Snowden temporary asylum was also a factor…
— White House Office of the Press Secretary, August 7, 2013
[...]]]>by Robert E. Hunter
…we have reached the conclusion that there is not enough recent progress in our bilateral agenda with Russia to hold a U.S.-Russia Summit in early September…Russia’s disappointing decision to grant Edward Snowden temporary asylum was also a factor…
— White House Office of the Press Secretary, August 7, 2013
…Having in mind the great importance of this conference and the hopes that the peoples of all the world have reposed in this meeting…I see no reason to use this [U-2] incident to disrupt the conference…
— President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Paris, May 16, 1960
The cancelling of a projected summit meeting next month with Russian President Vladimir Putin by President Barack Obama has probably attracted more attention than anything substantive likely to have occurred in that meeting. Or at least anything that could not have been achieved through ordinary diplomatic means. In other words, the significance of this meeting was overrated from the beginning, like most other summits in modern history.
Summits involving the Russians have featured in world politics since Napoleon met Czar Alexander I in 1807 on a raft in the middle of the Neman River in the town of Tilsit. Notable were the three World War II summits wherein Marshall Stalin met with the US president in Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam — with the British prime minister tagging along — that dealt with wartime strategy and the future of Europe. Not so much was at stake this time around.
Admittedly, Obama is not cancelling his attendance at the G-8 summit in St. Petersburg, also in Putin’s Russia. But even the G-8 summits are not worth much in terms of substance, compared with what could be achieved, again, through so-called ordinary diplomatic means.
This is not the place to review the full history of modern summitry. In the main, they are held because publics (and politics) expect them and demand “results.” The invention of the airplane and global television, not the seriousness of the agenda, is the causative agent. Almost always, summit agreements, enshrined in official communiqués, are worked out in advance by lower-level officials, with perhaps an item or two — a “sticking point” or “window dressing” — to be dealt with at the top. To be sure, a forthcoming summit, like “the prospect of hanging” in Samuel Johnson’s phrase, “concentrates the mind wonderfully” or, in this case, provides a spur to bureaucratic and diplomatic activity. Issues that have been sitting on the shelf or in the too-hard inbox may get dusted off and resolved because top leaders are getting together with media attention, pageantry, ruffles and flourishes, state dinners and expectations. This is not something to be left to chance nor to risk a potential blunder by the US president or his opposite number, whether friend or foe.
This is not cynicism, it is reality. Yours truly speaks from experience, having been involved with more than 20 meetings of US presidents with other heads of state and government. I witnessed only two where what the president and his interlocutor worked out at the table made a significant difference: President Jimmy Carter’s 1980 White House meetings with Israeli Prime Minister Meacham Begin and (two weeks later) with Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat. Serious decisions were taken because the US president was the American action officer for Arab-Israeli peacemaking; he “rolled his own.”
Summits can also cause damage, as did the 2008 Bucharest NATO summit, where European heads of state and government balked at the US president’s desire to move Ukraine and Georgia a tiny step toward NATO membership. Instead, they made the meaningless pledge that, in time, it would happen. Both the Georgian and Russian presidents read this as a strategic commitment. The upshot was the short Russia-Georgia war that set back Western and Russian efforts to deal with more important matters on their agenda.
Most notorious was the summit President John Kennedy hastily sought in 1961 with Nikita Khrushchev. Their Vienna meeting was represented as having set back the untested president’s efforts to establish himself with the bullying Soviet leader. Some historians believe this encounter encouraged Khrushchev to take actions that produced the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Even worse than the expectations of success that summits generate is the notion that good chemistry between leaders can have a decisive influence. Nonsense. Of course it is better for there to be positive relations, the ability to “do business” as Margaret Thatcher once said about Mikhael Gorbachev — provided, of course, there is “business” to be “done.” Indeed, assessments of chemistry or the lack thereof just get in the way when they obscure realities of power, the interests of nations and leaders’ domestic politics, which are the real stuff of relations between and among states. Many of history’s worst villains have been charming in person.
Cancelling the Obama-Putin summit has taken place over developments that in the course of history are relatively trivial, confirming that it was unlikely to have been significant. If something of importance was to be settled, ways would have been found to finesse the distractions.
Russian misbehavior included not handing over Edward Snowden, the master leaker of sensitive US information, and the Duma’s passing a law against gays and lesbians. US misbehavior included Congress’ condemnation of the Russian trial of a dead man, Sergei Magnitsky, who had been a thorn in Putin’s side. Notably, the reasons for cancelling this summit lean heavily on domestic politics, not matters of state.
What happened with Eisenhower in 1960, referred to above, was much more consequential. The leaders of the four major powers (the US, Soviet Union, Britain and France) were to meet in Paris, for the first time in years, to reduce misunderstandings between East and West that were making inherent dangers even worse.
Ironically, the triggering event then was also about intelligence; this time it is Snowden, that time it was Francis Gary Powers, the hapless pilot of a US U-2 Reconnaissance aircraft shot down over the Soviet Union less than two weeks before the summit. What then transpired — Obama cancelling in 2013 and Khrushchev displaying his patented histrionics in 1960 — fed into the domestic politics of each side. Just as Obama and Putin must both be wishing that Snowden had gone to Venezuela instead of Hong Kong and then Moscow, Khrushchev may well have cursed the Soviet Air Defense Forces for their untimely shooting down of an American spy plane that both sides knew reduced fears of an accidental nuclear war. Ike probably also cursed himself for letting the CIA launch a U-2 flight so soon before the Paris summit.
The comparison of 1960 and 2013 can be taken a step further. Then, at a particularly dangerous moment for the world, the Soviet Union was one of the two most powerful countries. Now Russia is a second-rate power whose greatest importance to the US lies in what it could well become in the future and its current impact, by facts of size and propinquity, on places and problems the US at the moment cares more about.
But a new Cold War? Again, nonsense. Rather, as political analyst William Lanouette has jibed, a “Cold-Shoulder War.”
To begin with, “Cold War” needs to be defined with precision. It refers to the period when the US and Soviet Union were psychologically unable to distinguish between issues on which they could negotiate in their mutual self-interest and those on which neither could compromise. They were so locked into their perceptions and rhetoric that they could not even fathom possible common interests. That is clearly not true, now, and will not be.
The US-Soviet Cold War began to end in the 1960s, when the two countries developed the weapons and doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), which in practice meant that each side accepted responsibility for the others’ ultimate security against nuclear annihilation. This spawned détente, the eventual end of the Cold War, and the sinking of the Soviet Union and European communism through their internal contractions.
Do US-Russian relations matter? Certainly, but not like US-Soviet relations before 1989. The difference is visible in today’s elevation of US concerns over internal developments in Russia, although, for Russia to be fully accepted, respected and trusted on the world stage, it must conform to growing civilizing tendencies in international relations and state behavior within at least a fair amount of the globe. Far more importantly, there are US-Russian differences, both in view and national interests, which make relations difficult at times but must be sorted out in one way or another.
A key focal point of today’s differences exists in the Middle East. The US objects to Russia’s unwillingness to assist efforts to depose the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, which the US president called for before thinking through the means or implications. It is also not confident that Russia truly supports the US-led confrontation over Iran’s nuclear program.
But both US positions beg big questions: on Syria, what the consequences would be there and in the broader region if the US got its way with Moscow, given the unlikelihood of a good outcome in Syria, the slow-rolling Sunni-Shiite civil war underway in the heart of the Middle East, Washington’s lack of clarity over what it is prepared to do militarily and even what outcome would best serve US interests. Russia might thus be cut some slack over its temporizing.
Regarding Iran, the US wants Russia, China and Western powers to hold firm on sanctions (while Congress wants to ratchet them up, despite the inauguration of a new Iranian president who could be better for the US than his predecessor). But Washington has yet to demonstrate that it will negotiate seriously with Iran, and, as states do when there is a vacuum, Moscow is taking advantage.
In addition to dismantling some remaining Cold War relics, notably the excessive level of nuclear weapons both countries still deploy (some absurdly kept on alert), is the issue of when and how much Russia will regain a prominent role in international politics, how and how much the US will try to oppose that inevitable “rebalancing” while its own capacity to affect global events has diminished significantly and if Washington and Moscow can work out sensible rules of the road with one another in the Middle East, Southwest Asia and elsewhere. Russia needs us as partner in some areas; in others it will inevitably be our rival and vice versa.
As two great hydrocarbon producers with interests and engagements that touch or overlap — such as concerns about terrorism, desires that the Afghan curse not cause both of them further troubles in Southwest Asia and the need to influence the rise of new kids on the block (China and India) — the US and Russia have lots to talk about.
But Obama and Putin wining and dining one another has little to do with it.
]]>by Robert E. Hunter
Edward Snowden has left Moscow for an “undisclosed location” in Russia, with a one-year freedom-of-the-country pass. The US government is naturally incensed with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
To borrow a Russian phrase coined by Nikolai Chernyshevsky and plagiarized by V. I. Lenin, Что делать? (Chto delat), or, “what [...]]]>
by Robert E. Hunter
Edward Snowden has left Moscow for an “undisclosed location” in Russia, with a one-year freedom-of-the-country pass. The US government is naturally incensed with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
To borrow a Russian phrase coined by Nikolai Chernyshevsky and plagiarized by V. I. Lenin, Что делать? (Chto delat), or, “what is to be done?”
Case Snowden is not an isolated event involving a felon who stole secrets that were properly and necessarily classified and willfully leaked them, knowing this would be detrimental to the country whose security he had sworn to protect. Nor is he a whistleblower who was rightly — in his view — trying to promote a national debate on things that have “gone too far.”
What is taking place is the coming together of two strands. And understanding context is necessary to understanding current events.
The first strand is the fact that “9/11” is now almost 12 years in the past, and, except for a few isolated instances — a shoe bomber, an underwear bomber, a nutcase in Times Square and the horrendous bombing at the Boston Marathon (not part of organized terror) — the United States has been more-or-less free from terrorism in the homeland. How much of that is due to the actions of US security institutions and personnel, no one can tell, but it’s probably considerable.
This very success has led to the attenuation of fear in the US about more terrorism here. Except for New York City, that fear hovers around like what scientists call “background radiation” — something that is always there but not worried about in our own lives. Furthermore, the average American has tuned out of the two wars that were spawned by 9/11, one that has been dubbed a “war of necessity” — Afghanistan, though that is a debatable proposition, beyond the initial spasm response in later 2001 — and the other “war of choice” in Iraq, which has helped create the mess in Syria and a general Sunni-Shite low-grade civil war throughout the center of the Middle East.
Against this background is questioning around whether a second look should be taken at the balance struck after 9/11 between “homeland security” and civil liberties, including the adequate and fair functioning of the US criminal justice system.
This questioning has had several parts, including the continued incarceration of alleged terrorists at Guantanamo; the use of military tribunals rather than civilian courts for Guantanamo inmates who have had trials; the holding of Private Bradley Manning in solitary for a long time before his court martial this month on multiple counts, including “aiding the enemy;” revelations about US spying on allies including the European Union missions in Washington and New York; surveillance activities by the National Security Agency, about which we still have been told very little; and even the appearance of NSA Director General Keith Alexander at the Black Hat hackers’ conference in Las Vegas.
Case Snowden is only one element of this overall picture and is playing out against the failure of the US government to makes its case in public that its activities in the sphere of intelligence-gathering and protecting pass muster and are indeed needed to keep us all safe. Indeed, a Quinnipiac poll indicates that a majority of Americans surveyed believe that Snowden is just a whistleblower.
Strand two is in Russia. When the Soviet Union came to an end, Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton worked hard to prevent the principal successor state, the Russian Federation, from being stigmatized as a loser: “Costa Rica with nuclear weapons.” For a long time, it was a country whose GDP was equivalent to that of the Netherlands, save for oil and gas, where Russia was bursting at the seams but which, any economist can tell you, made Russia a “rentier” state, able to sell stuff that comes out of the ground but not able to do much else. The Russian military even took five days to gain the upper hand in its 2008 mini-war with Georgia, a country well down the league table in military terms — simultaneously with the Beijing Olympics, which showed off an economic powerhouse.
Russia has also objected to US (and NATO) plans to extend anti-ballistic missile systems to part of Central Europe. The Russian elite has to know that this in no way would pose a threat to Russian offensive nuclear missile systems; at least part of Moscow’s objection must be due to the sense that, somehow, the US is taking advantage of its relative weakness. We can reject that reasoning but we should not just dismiss the possibility that it could be real psychologically and hence politically for the Russians.
Something we do have to take more seriously is Russia’s interest in being more directly engaged in the Middle East. In major parts, our interests are at least compatible; in others (Syria, and beneath the surface of a supposed agreement on Iran) far less so; and, in general, we have to deal with one another at a structured, strategic level, beyond the often episodic nature of current US-Russia relations regarding this region. Snowden is grist to this particular Russian mill.
Despite what Presidents Bush and Clinton tried to do to provide Russia with at least some (limited) role in the European strategic future, it was natural that the new Russia was portrayed negatively by a lot of people, some who had (legitimate) scores to settle with the Soviet Union. A lot of Americans did likewise; it even took 20 years for the US Congress to repeal the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which had been designed to encourage the Soviet Union to permit the emigration of Soviet Jews; and the US and others did not permit Russia until August 2012 to join the World Trade Organization, despite urging by some of us, then serving in the US government in the 1990s, to do this instantly — WTO membership criteria be damned. We urged this in order to help give the average Russian a sense that, despite having lost so much, their country could become engaged in the global economy, with benefits for their daily lives and thus perhaps helping to engender a more positive attitude toward working with the West.
The Clinton administration did the right thing in balancing NATO enlargement, designed to provide confidence to Central European states, with the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997; and the George W. Bush administration took a small added step at the Rome NATO summit in 2002. But there was still no real acknowledgement, whether earned or not, that, like Pinocchio, Russia had become a “real boy” in the international political and economic system.
Case Snowden also has come at a time when the US, in particular, has been objecting to certain human rights practices in Russia, including limits not just on non-governmental organizations that are exclusively Russian, but also those which have foreign ties, like the Carnegie Moscow Center and the German political party foundations. And there have been the show trials of people who have fallen out with Putin and his supporters. The US Congress has even passed condemnatory legislation, an ultra vires action if there ever were one — except that, as the principal successor state to the Soviet Union, Russia is still bound by the 1976 Helsinki Final Act, with its human rights and activities provisions, even within the territory of sovereign states.
Take me seriously, as well as my country, Vladimir Putin is saying; and surely most Russians agree. And given that the Snowden affair at least raises issues of “fairness” and “human rights,” Putin is enjoying the chance to play games with the United States. (Of course, Putin might have more serious business in mind, which may be detrimental to US and Western interests, and this needs to be tested).
These two strands — U.S. Post-Terrorism-Stress-Rebalancing and Putin/Russia’s search for a renewed place in the sun — come together and at least in part explain the current imbroglio in US-Russian relations over Edward Snowden’s fate.
Chto Delat?
Since even in the medium-term, neither Russia nor the US really has very much to gain by this continuing controversy except mutual headaches, some way out needs to be found.
The first thing is for the US to make clear that President Obama will take part in next month’s G-8 Summit in St. Petersburg and will not make the Snowden business hostage to his being there. Of course, as host, Putin has a stake in helping the president save face. Experience from 33 years ago counsels this approach. President Jimmy Carter pursued a “Rose Garden Campaign Strategy” in 1980 because of the Iranian hostage crisis. It cost him at the polls. And the US boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympics over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This also cost Carter at the polls.
Step two is for both countries to lower the rhetoric and, at the same time, transition to grown-up diplomacy, with an aim to get this matter resolved by the time of the G-8 summit. From the US perspective, the objective should be Snowden’s either deciding to return voluntarily to face the music, or showing himself unwilling to take any responsibility for his declared ambition and goals as a whistleblower.
For the US to achieve this means doing things about the two strands, noted above. On the role of the US intelligence community and government secrecy, it means getting on top of the controversy now rather than later and coming clean about what it is doing and what it is not doing and what it is prepared to place off-limits in the future. That includes revisions to the secret FISA Court (one that might actually turn down more than a tiny handful of government requests for surveillance authority); coming clean with Congress and the public about surveillance activities that affect Americans (where some small steps toward reassurance have been taken); and creating a process with congressional and public participants to ensure that civil liberties will indeed be protected; in effect, to strike a new, valid and enduring balance between security and citizens’ civil liberties and privacy rights.
At the same time, the Justice Department, along with the security agencies, needs to make clear that if and when Snowden returns to the US, he will be properly tried in a civilian court with a limited number of charges directly related to the real damage he (allegedly) has done to US security. No “secret list” of supposed damage to national security, where US government credibility has suffered so much. No piling on of charges, with potential consecutive sentences that add up to multiple lifetimes. And no overreaching, which even the military judge in the Manning court-martial decided the government had done by charging him with aiding the enemy.
If Snowden is thus assured of a fair trial, maybe he would then come home. Certainly, Russia could not detain him. If instead he decided to remain a “man without a country,” he would lose in the court of public opinion. Further, the damage he can cause to national security has already been done; but a standard for whistleblowing could be reset, with reasonable protections for those who do see misfeasance and malfeasance, but no free pass for those who cross the line.
Then, about Russia. Here, Putin has as much of a role to play as the US. While we need to show that we respect legitimate Russian interests that are not in conflict with ours, Putin and company have to recognize that, to be taken seriously in the outside world, they have to play by the international standards that have been developing over the last half-century. Cracking down on foreign NGOs has to be beyond the pale, as well as trying and convicting dead people (Sergei Magnitsky) who have challenged Putin’s authority or who have had the temerity to try running for Mayor of Moscow next month as a Putin critic (Alexei Navalny). What’s the point of Putin’s doing all this? These actions, while “sending signals” to other Putin opponents, should be small beer for him compared with the needs of an aspiring great power to be taken seriously by other countries.
The “Snowden part” of this drama cannot be brought to resolution unless and until he decides that he will return home. The “Putin part” can be bought to resolution when grown-ups in Moscow and Washington get together and understand why the needs of their mutual relationship should not be held hostage to anything that is not genuinely important to one side or the other.
We shall see if both sides have the wit and wisdom to proceed in this way.
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