by Jim Lobe
First, it wanted the Senate to pass a binding bill (Kirk-Menendez, or S. 1881) that was certain to sabotage the nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 (the U.S., Britain, France, China, and Russia plus Germany). When that stalled in mid-January at only 59 co-sponsors, all but [...]]]>
by Jim Lobe
First, it wanted the Senate to pass a binding bill (Kirk-Menendez, or S. 1881) that was certain to sabotage the nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 (the U.S., Britain, France, China, and Russia plus Germany). When that stalled in mid-January at only 59 co-sponsors, all but 16 of whom were Republicans, it initiated discussions about a non-binding resolution essentially endorsing Kirk-Menendez and laying out the conditions for a final “acceptable” agreement with Iran that was also certain to be rejected by Tehran.
It seems now that AIPAC, whose annual policy conference got underway Sunday and is scheduled to last through Tuesday despite ominous warnings of a new winter storm that may limit its 14,000 attendees’ lobbying capabilities, has been reduced to rounding up senators willing to sign a letter to Obama that softens or eliminates some of its previous language but suggests that some of its key demands — most notably, the abandonment by Iran of all uranium enrichment — may still be a sine qua non for Congressional acquiescence to lifting sanctions if and when a final agreement is reached. Gaining as many signatures on that letter as possible is now the top priority in AIPAC’s legislative agenda (although it will also continue pressing lawmakers to co-sponsor or otherwise support S. 1881).
The proposed letter is currently signed by six senators divided in equal parts between Republicans and Democrats. On the Republican side are Lindsey Graham, who’s been wanting to attack Iran for a really long time now; Mark Kirk; and Kelly Ayotte. On the Democratic side are Robert Menendez, Charles Schumer, and Christopher Coons. Of course, Kirk, Menendez, and Schumer were the three out-front and public co-sponsors of what became know as the Kirk-Menendez bill, while the three other letter signers also became co-sponsors. And, of course, Graham’s co-sponsorship, coupled with his long history of war-mongering, makes it difficult for the letter’s Democrats to indignantly insist, as they have in the past, that the letter is designed to reduce — rather than increase — the chances of war. (H/T to Ali)
One has to believe that if AIPAC could’ve gotten one of the Democrats who didn’t co-sponsor S. 1881, they would have preferred him or her to be among the original signatories of the letter. Their absence suggests that the group could run into similar resistance among Democrats even with a much toned-down letter. Indeed, a failure to get more than 59 senators to sign on to a mere letter — which, as I understand it, the administration still strongly opposes due to the baleful impact it could have on the P5+1 negotiations (both on Rouhani’s position and in light of the rapidly rising tensions with Russia over Ukraine ) — would constitute another very serious and highly embarrassing setback for AIPAC amid reports that some of its dissatisfied far-right backers are now mulling the possibility of creating a new lobby group.
But the letter appears to be part of a strategy to overcome that 59-senator threshold. By first asking recalcitrant Democrats to co-sponsor Kirk-Menendez, AIPAC knows it will likely be turned down, at least at this point. But then, by making a second “ask” — to sign a more innocuous-sounding letter — it no doubt believes that a number of Democrats who are uncomfortable about rebuffing AIPAC and/or not sounding “tough” on Iran and/or vesting complete confidence in Obama’s diplomacy strategy at a moment when it is under attack from the right over Ukraine, Syria, etc. etc., will go along in hopes that the Israel lobby will give them a gold star for campaign contribution purposes and not darken their doorway for at least a few months. It seems like a sound strategy, and, if successful, it would help demonstrate to AIPAC’s donors that its effectiveness has not diminished too much, in spite of its recent defeats.
Several points about the letter deserve highlighting:
First, AIPAC has dropped the “wag the dog” provision that called on Washington to provide all necessary help, including military support, to Israel in the event that its leaders felt compelled to attack Iran’s nuclear program. It also forgoes explicit military threats. And, of course, it is non-binding.
Second, it is ambiguous at best about whether its signers find acceptable any final agreement that permits Iran to engage in any uranium enrichment. Its ruling out any recognition of a “right to enrichment”; its demand that such an agreement preclude any “uranium pathway to a bomb;” and its insistence that any agreement cannot lead to any enrichment elsewhere in the region suggest that its authors have not given up on Israel’s “zero-enrichment” position, a stance that the administration and Tehran and Washington’s P5+1 partners all believe is completely unrealistic.
On the other hand, the assertion that there is “no reason for Iran to have an enrichment facility like Fordow” is more intriguing, depending on how you interpret its meaning. It may mean that the enrichment facility at Natanz is kosher, in which case it accepts future Iranian enrichment and demands only that an underground facility like Fordow, which is far more difficult to attack, be dismantled. Or it may mean that it objects to Fordow simply because it is an enrichment facility, thus making Natanz equally objectionable. Indeed, the ambiguity may be deliberate on AIPAC’s part, designed to appeal to those senators who choose to believe that the letter gives the administration the flexibility to accept a limited enrichment program, when, in fact, the letter’s intention is to reduce or eliminate that flexibility.
Third, the letter’s demand that any final agreement “must dismantle Iran’s nuclear weapons program” is tendentious and provocative, not to mention factually inaccurate, simply because neither U.S. nor Israeli intelligence believes that Tehran has made a decision to build a weapon. What we know — and the Iranian authorities admit — is that it has a nuclear program with elements that could contribute to building a bomb, IF and only IF a decision is made to do so. So how do you dismantle a nuclear weapons program if your intelligence agencies believe there is no such thing?
You may see other problems with the language, the ambiguities of which, as noted above, may be intended to rope senators back into the AIPAC fold and get them to sign on to a letter that could be used against them in the future if they try to stick to the administration’s determination to exhaust diplomatic options. Much will now depend on the attitude taken by both the administration and the ten Democratic Senate chairs who came out early and strongly against a vote on Kirk-Menendez.
]]>For a glimpse into this view, particularly in terms of staunch pro-Israel Democrats, read what the archetype of this group, outgoing chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee California Rep. Howard Berman, has to say. Berman gave an interesting interview to the Israeli daily Haaretz where, at times getting combative (literally), he reveals some of the thinking behind the even timid support of U.S. President Barack Obama’s Iran policy.
Let’s start with a minor quibble, but a big picture one. Seeking something to praise in U.S. foreign policy, Berman cites engagement with the Muslim world:
By and large, I think that to have a war with a billion Muslims is not a viable policy. We have to engage with the forces of modernity in the Muslim world. We have to separate moderates from extremists, and engagement that is designed to achieve that makes compelling sense to me.
The “separate” stuff is pure imperial divide-and-conquer strategy. For many of the hardline pro-Israel types, the idea that U.S. policy plays any role in creating enmity toward the U.S. is sacrilegious. In their view the U.S. must, therefore, consolidate its supporters, rather than alleviate legitimate grievances among those who don’t. And the qualifier “by and large,” which means “generally,” is troubling: it implies there could be specific situations where going to “war with a billion Muslims” would conceivably be sound policy.
But never mind my harping on tragically misplaced turns of phrase, let’s look at what Berman had to say about Iran policy. First and foremost, of course, is that the “military option” — let’s call it ‘attacking Iran’ — is “on the table” (interviewer Natasha Mozgovaya’s questions are bolded by me):
Israeli politicians are wondering why the U.S. administration took the military option off the table, even if they didn’t say so explicitly.
The military option is not off the table. It’s on the table.
The Iranians apparently don’t think so.
Who knows what they really think?
Berman goes on to discuss why he thinks that the international diplomacy and the posture of engaging Iran is useful: because it builds “international support”:
We don’t know if the current strategy is going to work. We do know that two years ago we had the most limited, worthless set of multilateral sanctions on Iran that were not enforced, and all the U.S. efforts to make them stronger were to no avail. And the U.S. position on Iran was not the international position, the U.S. was isolated and everyone wrote that Iran is rising in influence.
Two years later we have tough sanctions at the Security Council, and the U.S. and Europeans imposed more far-reaching sanctions. We have evidence it’s causing pain in Tehran inside the regime, Iran feels the pressure and is isolated, and the U.S. position as a result of this administration’s policies has developed international support.
What we don’t know yet is if it will change the regime’s behavior on the nuclear issue. But we are in a much better position to create that change than we were two years ago. And we need to stay very resolved on this, we need to impose sanctions on companies that are undermining our efforts, and we need to build even more international support. This is an example of this administration’s effective use of diplomacy.
One might be forgiven for thinking that an effective use of diplomacy would be to negotiate a deal with the Iran to resolve the nuclear impasse. But for Berman, the focus of diplomacy seems only to serve the cause of isolating Tehran with sanctions. This ambiguity is something U.S. Institute of Peace expert Daniel Brumberg and the Stimson Center’s Barry Blechman took issue with in a recent article on Foreign Policy‘s website:
If, as administration officials insist, sanctions are a “means rather than an end,” we need to define that end far more clearly. If it is stopping Iran’s nuclear program, then let’s be clear: sanctions may be slowing that program down, but by themselves they will not compel Iran’s leaders to comply with the International Atomic Energy Commission or the UN Security Council. To get the attention of Iran’s current leaders, we must decide whether the goal of sanctions (or for that matter, engagement) is to set the stage for war or for sustained peace negotiations.
Clearly for Berman, sanctions — including diplomacy aimed at more rigid sanctions — are an end in and of themselves, though they could be the prelude to something far more daunting: the prospect of war with Iran. Most experts, including Brumberg and Blechman, agree that sanctions and isolation are unlikely to end the nuclear impasse with Iran. The only way to do that, one might surmise, is a negotiated deal, which will require concessions that we can be sure Congressional Iran hawks will balk at.
Berman’s perspective only lends credibility to those critics who questioned whether engagement was ever earnestly tried by the Obama administration. If the Obama foreign policy is based on Berman’s line, it’s likely those critics correctly analyzed the administration’s position.
]]>“The problem,” they write, “is that democratic reform in Iran is a long-term proposition. As a [...]]]>
“The problem,” they write, “is that democratic reform in Iran is a long-term proposition. As a result, it cannot serve as the basis for an effective U.S.-Iran policy.”
“If the Obama White House were to rest its efforts to dissuade Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons on regime change, it would end up with an Iran policy as incoherent as those of the administrations that preceded it.”
Even though President Barack Obama seems to be trying very hard to distance himself from past polices — and avoiding the same results — Burmberg and Blechman write his policy is still muddled. (What are sanctions for, in the end? they ask, for example: “[W]e need to define that end far more clearly.”) The uncertain policy outcomes from the administration’s Iran policy creates room for more radical proposals like regime change:
As support for engagement wanes in Washington, calls for regime change are reverberating in the U.S. Congress and out national media. The idea that we can slay the Iranian nuclear dragon by destroying its autocratic heart will probably become a leitmotif of the House and quite possibly the Senate in 2011.
This seems to be the “forget negotiations” approach taken by a bipartisan group of six Senators who called on Obama to ensure ‘zero enrichment’ in any agreement. It’s almost definitely a deal-breaker for the current leadership of the Islamic Republic — or for even a reformed Islamic Republic.
Brumberg and Blechman explore many of these contradictions. Their piece should be informative for regime change hawks who constantly push the need for more aggressive U.S. support of domestic dissent in Iran (my emphasis):
Political reform will eventually come to Iran, but in manner far more prolonged and partial than that imagined by advocates of a full-scale democratic revolution. This kind of dramatic scenario may pluck a tour heart strings, but it has not been the animating vision of Iran’s reformists. The latter speak for a 25-million urban middle class of Iranians, many whom share one goal: to compel the state to stop forcing religious dogma on the population.
[...]
There is very little the U.S. can or should do to affect this prolonged dynamic [of the reform movement]. The more we embrace Iran’s democratic activists, the more we suffocate them. Iran’s reformists want the international community to stand up for their human rights; they do not want to be pawns of a U.S.-Iranian conflict. In a land where concerns about national sovereignty and religious identity cut across the regime-opposition divide, the quest for democracy will be discredited if it is seen as anything but homegrown.
There is one thing, however, that the U.S. can do promote political decompression in Iran, and that is to make détente with the Islamic Republic a top priority. Sustained U.S.-Iranian engagement would undercut the “threat” that ultra hardliners regularly invoke to legitimate their efforts to pummel or isolate their critics.
That’s been a huge problem of the discourse in the U.S. about Iran — one cannot make a priority both of the nuclear issue and the democracy issue. The same could be said of attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities.
The nuclear clock and the democratic clock are not in sync. Those in the United States who propose bombing Iran in order to both slow down the nuclear clock and speed up the democratic clock are being disingenuous. This is not to say that an accelerated democratic clock — leading to reform — won’t be more favorable to the West and may well slow down the nuclear clock itself. But the process of accelerating the democratic clock (a policy of regime change) holds the dangerous (and likely) possibility of backfiring and creating further insecurity and resentment. And insecurity and resentment would seem to be the top reasons behind the Iranian nuclear drive in the first place.
]]>In a U.S. diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, after being pressed why Russia didn’t focus on the Iranian missile programs, told Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) that Iran would put a high priority on having a full nuclear fuel cycle, including domestic enrichment.
According to the April 2009 cable from the U.S. embassy in Moscow (my emphasis):
]]>Lavrov said he was certain Iran wanted to have a full nuclear fuel cycle and would negotiate from that basis. It was unfortunate that the U.S. had not accepted the proposals a few years before when Iran only had 32 centrifuges; now they had over 5,000. Nonetheless, Russia wanted Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA and implement, and eventually ratify, the Additional Protocol. As agreed to in the E3-plus-3 statement, Russia wanted Iran to prove the peaceful nature of its nuclear program, in a verifiable way.
¶13. (C) Lavrov commended the new U.S. approach to Iran, welcoming President Obama’s readiness for the U.S. to engage ”fully” in talks with Iran. Willingness to discuss “all” the issues was a welcome step, and one which Russia had been advocating for several years, Lavrov said.
The letter (PDF, with full text below), broken by Foreign [...]]]>
The letter (PDF, with full text below), broken by Foreign Policy‘s Josh Rogin, calls for zero enrichment on Iranian soil as a U.S. pre-condition for any negotiated deal to end Iran’s standoff with the West over its nuclear program.
“[G]iven the government of Iran’s patterns of deception and noncooperation, its government cannot be permitted to maintain any enrichment or reprocessing activities on its territory for the foreseeable future,” said the letter. “We would strongly oppose any proposal for diplomat endgame in which Iran is permitted to continue these activities in any form.”
But the Iranians have placed a high priority on domestic enrichment, and would likely oppose a deal precluding such activity. Iran denies accusations from the West that eventual weaponization is the goal of its nuclear program, which is widely considered a point of Iranian national pride.
Even some U.S.-based non-proliferation experts are questioning the wisdom of taking such a hard line as the Senators’ letter.
“There are mixed views in the arms control community,” said Peter Crail, a non-proliferation analyst at the Arms Control Association (ACA). “But there seems to be growing sentiment that if we’re looking at a negotiated solution, ‘zero enrichment’ is not going to be an option.”
“This attempt by congress to bind the adminsitration would kill negotiations,” he added.
Signed by Senators Jon Kyl (R-AZ), Mark Kirk (R-IL), Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), Robert Casey (D-PA), and Joe Lieberman (I-CT), with John McCain (R-AZ) reportedly later adding his name, the letter also called on Obama to “continue ratcheting up” U.S. and international pressure on Iran.
Iran should be squeezed until it freezes enrichment and passes International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections (including submitting to the Additional Protocols, an extended set of safeguards measures), the letter said.
The Senators wrote that their positions are ”reflective of a consensus among a broad, bipartisan majority in Congress.” Despite Peter Baker of the New York Times‘s suggestion that the Senators’ letter was a show of “bipartisan support,” it appeared to instead be a threat of push-back from Congress should Obama pursue a deal that allows any Iranian enrichment.
“[T]he letter makes the point that there will be very strong opposition to any kind of proposal that allows the Iranians to keep some sort of enrichment capability,” an anonymous Senate aide, explaining the “thinking behind the letter,” wrote to the Washington Post‘s new neoconservative blogger Jennifer Rubin. “This is an extremely dangerous idea that it is important to knock down.”
But experts think the tack — pressure for strict pre-conditions to talks — could be repeating the same mistakes of recent U.S.-Iran relations, where Iran was further isolated as its nuclear programs continued.
“This again shows that part of the problem in negotiations has been a lack of political space domestically for both sides,” said Trita Parsi, President of the National Iranian American Council and a Woodrow Wilson center fellow. “Obama realizes that in order to get a deal, there needs to be mutual compromises on both sides.”
“What you have now is that some members of Congress are adopting the (President George W.) Bush position, that, ‘No, we’re not going to compromise on anything, It has to be maximalist approach,” Parsi said. “That has caused problems in the past becaue it makes it impossible to have a real negotiation.”
The Senators pressed Obama just as the first two-day round of talks between the P5+1 group, which includes the U.S., were getting underway. Little had been accomplished as the negotiations drew to a close Tuesday, but another round is expected in January.
Going into the latest round, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton hinted in an interview in Bahrain that the U.S. might be willing to accept Iranian enrichment.
“They can enrich uranium at some future date once they have demonstrated that they can do so in a responsible manner in accordance with international obligations,” Clinton reportedly told the BBC.
“During the Obama period, there has been some ambiguity about whether (zero enrichment) is the American red line,” said NIAC’s Parsi, pointing to Clinton’s comments. “The position that these law makers are taking (in the letter) is identical with the Israeli and Bush red lines, and seems to be at odds with the Obama red line.”
Rumors are already flying that the second round of the latest talks, to be held in Turkey, could see the U.S. offer a deal whereby a fuel swap agreement — involving sending nuclear fuel to Russia for reprocessing — would allow Iran to maintain domestic enrichment.
While Iran says it has a right to domestic enrichment as a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Crail of the ACA notes that the treaty only guarantees “a peaceful nuclear program.”
“In the end, there is an implicit understanding that, yes, countries can enrich,” he said, adding, however, that he prefers that the technology not spread and all nuclear fuel production be internationalized.
But Crail emphasized that Iran, too, must be willing to make some concessions: “According to the NPT, in order for Iran to get all its rights under the NPT, Iran needs to cooperate with international inspections.”
The full text of the letter:
]]>December 6, 2010
The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500Dear Mr. President:
As diplomats from the United States join talks today between the P5+1 and Iran in Geneva, we write to share some thoughts about these discussions, and our broader Iran policy. In particular, we wish to express our support for a set of principles that we believe are reflective of a consensus among a broad, bipartisan majority in Congress, who stand ready to work with you and your Administration to stop Iran from achieving a nuclear weapons capability — a grave threat that would compromise our security and the security of all our allies in the Middle East.
First, we strongly support the cascade of measures that have been put in place over the past several months by your Administration, in cooperation with our partners around the world, to increase the pressure on the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. We applaud and are encouraged by the strong actions taken thus far by the Administration to secure meaningful economic and diplomatic sanctions against the Iranian regime, which are absolutely essential for any prospect of a peaceful resolution to this challenge.
Second, we believe that it is absolutely essential that the United States and its partners make clear to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran that we intend to continue ratcheting up this pressure, through comprehensive enforcement of existing sanctions as well as imposition o new measure, until the full, verifiable, and sustained suspension by Iran of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and heavy water-related activities, as demanded by multiple UN Security Council resolutions. The pressure track should likewise continue on its current trajectory until Iran resumes full cooperation with the IAEA and the Additional Protocol; resolves all outstanding concerns about its nuclear program and complies with the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors and multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions directed at its nuclear program. The government of Iran must undersand that there is absolutely no possibility of any freeze or reduction in the momentum of the pressure track until these minium requirements have been met.
Third, we remain concerned about the possibility that the Iranian regime will seek to buy time or otherwise dilute the focus of our diplomacy through unrelated “confidence-building measures” that fail to address the core concerns associated with Iran’s illicit nuclear activities. Such tactical maneuverings are of course no substitute for a real negotiation, and therefore should not be mistaken as such.
Fourth, we believe that it is critical that the United States and our partners make clear that, given the government of Iran’s patterns of deception and noncooperation, its government cannot be permitted to maintain any enrichment or reprocessing activities on its territory for the foreseeable future. We would strongly oppose any proposal for diplomat endgame in which Iran is permitted to continue these activities in any form.
We thank you for your continued leadership on this matter of critical importance to our national security. We pledge to you our continued support to do all that is necessary to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.
Best Regards,
Joseph I. Lieberman
UNITED STATES SENATORJon Kyl
UNITED STATES SENATORKirsten E. Gillibrand
UNITED STATES SENATORRobert P. Casey, Jr.
UNITED STATES SENATORMark Kirk
UNITED STATES SENATOR
Laura Rozen at Politico reports:
“We have had nearly two days of detailed substantive talks focusing on the Iranian nuclear program and the need for Iran to comply with its international obligations,” European Union High Representative for Foreign Policy Catherine Ashton said in a statement Tuesday at the conclusion of the talks between diplomats from the United States, Britain, France, Germany, China, Russia and Iran.
“We and Iran agreed to a continuation of these talks in late January in Istanbul, where we plan to discuss practical ideas and ways of cooperating towards a resolution of our core concerns about the nuclear issue,” Ashton concluded, walking out without taking any questions from journalists.
Bob Dreyfuss of the Nation offers a good analysis of the talks so far and what to expect going forward. He also comments on a letter sent to President Obama by five Senators (Casey, Gillibrand, Kirk, Kyle and Lieberman), insisting the United States must not negotiate any agreement that would result in uranium enrichment on Iranian soil. The Iranians are sure to reject such a pre-condition.
Dreyfuss writes:
Although the first two days of talks this week didn’t accomplish much, it’s critically important that the talks are happening, and both Iran and the United States are making positive noises about them. Iran, for its part, after saying all along that it wouldn’t even discuss its nuclear program, did exactly that, and the two sides have agreed to continue talking and to meet again, possibly as soon as January, in Turkey. The choice of Turkey is a particulary good sign, since the Turks had repeatedly offered their good offices as mediators in the dispute, and last spring Brazil and Turkey tried to restart the talks by working out an updated version of the October 2009 deal that later fell apart.
As for what’s next, Dreyfuss reports that “insiders” tell him a fuel swap deal might be in the works as a “confidence-building measure.” The deal could allow Iran to maintain enrichment, with the fuel shipped off to Russia for reprocessing. Perhaps this is what inspired the Senators’ ‘zero enrichment’ letter.
All this comports with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s recent comments in Bahrain (in the presence of Iran’s foreign minister, no less) that the U.S. recognizes Iran’s “right to a peaceful nuclear program,” and an interview just ahead of those conference remarks where she said, “They can enrich uranium at some future date once they have demonstrated that they can do so in a responsible manner in accordance with international obligations.” (Note that the BBC version of this comment has Clinton using slightly different language.)
Stay tuned…
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