by Henry Precht
Two significant anniversaries this month: the 1914 beginning of fighting in World War I in Europe and the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident in Vietnam.
The outbreak of conflict 100 years ago followed a period of intense diplomacy within and between two alliances. Germany and Austria on one side; [...]]]>
by Henry Precht
Two significant anniversaries this month: the 1914 beginning of fighting in World War I in Europe and the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident in Vietnam.
The outbreak of conflict 100 years ago followed a period of intense diplomacy within and between two alliances. Germany and Austria on one side; Russia, France and Britain on the other. Everyone feared German armed forces on land, Britain’s at sea and Russia’s quickly developing potential for both. Better to strike now rather than wait until the other side becomes more powerful; that was the dominant analysis. Statesmen and politicians engaged in stale, cliché-formed, fruitless wheeling and dealing. Both sides were confident a quick victory would be theirs. “Home by Christmas,” was the motto. Few and easily drowned out were the voices of doubt, delay and debate.
The naval incident off Vietnam in which an American ship was allegedly attacked led quickly to a congressional resolution giving the Johnson administration unfettered authority to wage war against the enemy we inherited from the French colonialists. No members of the House and only a couple of senators voted against it; they were both later defeated for re-election. Some time later convincing doubt was cast on the authenticity of the reported incident and accusations of misleading Congress were cast on LBJ. Never mind, as the incident was reported by the government-fed press, the public stood squarely behind their leader, confident of victory. Their support for the expanded conflict was the product of government fraud.
History is replete with euphoric moments at the start of a foreign adventure. Think of Afghanistan and Iraq. “Missions [Still Not] Accomplished.” Cheers — then terrible consequences, then condemnation.
How wrong, how tragically wrong initially were the leaders and their people. The four years of World War I became an utter disaster for its participants and for the future development of all nations: depression, fascism, communism, World War II and the Cold War. Vietnam became perhaps the single greatest unnecessary disaster for the US — economically and politically and for the future course of our national progress — to say nothing of the Vietnamese casualties.
Why did the enthusiastic support for war lead to deep frustrations and perverse choices? The key elements were two, in my opinion: First was the ease of going into war — much easier than taking the risks for peace, less taxing than applying creative imaginations to the issues at hand. Second was the absence of doubt, of questioning, of debate. No one asked: Could the leaders be wrong in committing forces; might there be another choice, a peaceful solution? It’s hard to be coldly analytical when surrounded by mobs calling your dissent traitorous.
Which brings me to two new statistics this month: In the Gaza war, eighty to ninety per cent of Israel’s population endorsed the actions of its army in severely punishing that hapless land. In Washington, one hundred percent of the Senate and House voted their backing for Israel without a single word of regret for the suffering of the Palestinian victims. Plus, they threw in an extra $225 million in military aid for Israeli defense. (Never mind the defense of our own borders or pressing domestic needs.)
Wouldn’t it have been a better outcome for the future of two peoples, if Israelis and Palestinians had sat together and talked through their differences — rather than hurling missiles at each other and breeding fear, distrust and hatred? Wouldn’t it have been wise if Secretary Kerry had been willing to sit and talk with Hamas, rather than keeping them at arm’s length as a “terrorist” band? It might, just might, have advanced his goal of reaching a two-state solution. Of course, while talking, it would have been necessary to deal firmly with Palestinian and Israeli extremists and essential to stand up to the super-loyal fans of Israel in the Congress. No easy options there.
In fact, generous and always reliable American support for Israel makes it unnecessary for the hardline regime even to contemplate compromise with its Palestinian antagonists.
The lessons of World War I and Vietnam are plain for all of us to read. If the public is willingly led by self- and special-interest politicians with neither courage nor vision, worse times impend. Not just for the regimes directly involved, but also unhappily for their loyal but misled and fearful citizens.
]]>by Henry Precht
Lidice was a town in German-occupied Czechoslovakia that not too many people will remember now. It was there early in World War II that partisans assassinated the local Nazi commander, Reinhard Heydrich. In revenge, the Nazis executed the community’s males: 173 men over the age of 15. In addition, [...]]]>
by Henry Precht
Lidice was a town in German-occupied Czechoslovakia that not too many people will remember now. It was there early in World War II that partisans assassinated the local Nazi commander, Reinhard Heydrich. In revenge, the Nazis executed the community’s males: 173 men over the age of 15. In addition, 184 women and 88 children were sent to concentration camps; 153 women returned, 17 children.
Later, in 1944 in France there was the village of Oradour-sur-Glane where a Nazi commander was believed to have been kidnapped. One hundred forty-two inhabitants were massacred by SS troops and the village destroyed. (Its ruins remain as a monument.) It turned out that the German bureaucracy had gotten confused and originally intended Oradour-sur-Vaynor for destruction as the locus of the kidnapping. Mistakes happen in time of war.
After the war the victorious nations, responding to these and other Nazi atrocities, joined together to draft the Fourth Geneva Convention. The first three conventions, dating from the turn of the 20th century, were an attempt to “civilize” the conduct of warfare. The fourth convention deals with the treatment of civilians in war. The crimes of Lidice and Oradour are banned as collective punishment under paragraph 33. The US, Israel and 194 other nations have signed up.
It seems to me that collective punishment is precisely what Israel with US-supplied weaponry has been inflicting on its Palestinian enemies on and off since territory was seized in the 1967 war. The present surge in violence, including a ground invasion, started when three Israeli teenagers were kidnapped — an awful crime without pardon. Hamas was blamed without a shred of evidence produced. Over 200 people from all walks of life were jailed without charge — except that they were associated with Hamas. Then, in an apparent revenge attack by Israelis, a Palestinian youth was burned to death. Another Palestinian boy, an American citizen, was badly beaten by police and arrested. Six Hamas militants were killed in Gaza.
Tensions mounted. Hamas fired its rockets at Israel, harming no one. That unleashed Israel, which retaliated with heavy firepower, killing over 250 persons at this writing and wounding many more. “Collateral damage which we tried to avoid,” says Israel. One person has since been killed this week on the Israeli side: a volunteer at an Israeli military base near the border. Crowds of Israelis cheer on the bombing in Gaza. Collective punishment in a small space crammed with 1.8 million people, I say. American politicians from the president down only say Israel “has the right to defend itself,” and urge both sides to cool down. No mention of a violation of international law.
Back to the Geneva Convention and its rules. One of them is the requirement that an occupying power (like Israel) will “protect” the inhabitants under its control. That would seem to mean, at a minimum, not bombing Gaza’s water facilities and depriving 1.8 million people of fresh water. Mistakes happen in time of war; yet they can be avoided by not taking risky actions that can be reasonably foreseen to harm innocents.
Another of the Convention’s prohibitions (article 49) is that an occupying power shall not transfer its citizens into occupied territory. That is what makes Israel’s construction of settlements on Palestinian land a violation of international law. Virtually all the world, including Washington, agrees on that charge.
Then why doesn’t “the world” act to enforce international law? In good part because Washington has blocked any such move at the United Nations. Europeans tend to follow our lead, although its dutiful subservience has been weakening of late.
In light of the flaccid official stance private groups and some public entities have begun to use other means of putting pressure on Israel to conform to international standards. This is the “Boycott, Divest and Sanction” movement that advocates cutting ties to Israeli and foreign entities that support the occupation of Palestine. Banks and firms in Europe have moved against Israeli businesses and their cooperating outsiders, for example, Caterpillar, which sells bulldozers used to level homes of Palestinians. Some religious groups have taken similar action.
International isolation worked against apartheid South Africa — in a not dissimilar situation. If ordinary Americans understood the hardships of Palestinians under Israeli occupation, they might generate sufficient pressure to move our leaders towards a more morally balanced posture. As long, however, as our politics are so closely bound up with contributions from special interests, any change will come only very, very slowly.
Photo: Palestinians inspect the remains of a house which was destroyed during an air strike in Central Bureij refugee camp, in the Middle Area of the Gaza Strip, July 15, 2014. Credit: Shareef Sarhan/UNRWA Archives
]]>The Blame Game on Iraq threatens to eclipse the popularity of the World Cup – at least among American self-nominated experts on that poor country. Where have we heard those authoritative voices before – Kristol, Pollack, Wolfowitz – even the castigator-in-chief Cheney. Oh, yes. Now you remember. They were promoters of the 2003 Iraq invasion [...]]]>
The Blame Game on Iraq threatens to eclipse the popularity of the World Cup – at least among American self-nominated experts on that poor country. Where have we heard those authoritative voices before – Kristol, Pollack, Wolfowitz – even the castigator-in-chief Cheney. Oh, yes. Now you remember. They were promoters of the 2003 Iraq invasion which was to have been, they assured us, demonstrative of American power and the first step towards an outbreak of moderation, friendship and democracy not only in Iraq, but all over the Middle East.
Wrong, tragically wrong, they were — a conclusion attested to by 4,500 American dead, many more wounded, over a trillion dollars spent and countless (who counts?) Iraqi casualties. A badly wounded country, Iraq, I mean, although the same adjective would fit this country as well. To keep this background in mind I recommend that media outlets affix to those savants now reappearing in print or on TV the suffix (something like Ph.D. or the British CME) WOI – signifying “Wrong on Iraq” as warning to the unwary public.
But let’s move on to the true facts. Who did lose Iraq and how did they manage it?
First, we swallowed a plateful of our values in supporting Iraq in the war it imposed on Iran (as well as on its own Kurds.) That made it last much longer, busted Iraq and caused it to turn on its supposed benefactors – Kuwait and other Gulf Arabs — and led to the invasion of the former.
After easy Gulf War I, we imposed deadly sanctions for about a decade until Bush II invaded — the worst move in US foreign policy since LBJ and Nixon grievously damaged us by the escalating the Vietnam war.
After “shock and aweing” Baghdad, more bad moves were to come. The Bush perpetrators insured long-term loss by disbanding the Iraq army and the Baath Party. Closing down the army left the country without a defense force for internal and external threats and, with the same adroit stupidity, created a rebel force of unemployed, unpaid, Sunni men opposed to the majority Shia who were taking over the country (for the first time in modern history.)
Casting out Baath party members was almost as dumbly devastating: Under Saddam Iraq was a one party state with membership required for virtually any significant job in government or the private sector. No nation can lose its skilled cadres and continue to function well. Thanks to a US-designed electoral system suitable for New England, but hardly for a sharply divided nation without experience with democracy, Iraq has a Shia government led by Nouri al-Maliki, together with a disgruntled Sunni opposition, quasi independent Kurdish statelet and heavy Iranian influence. No surprise when Maliki rejected the US demand for legal immunity for our troops that might have stayed on. They left — much to President Obama’s pleasure.
Probably that split-up was not only inevitable but a good thing for us. American troops could have remained another decade without basically affecting the structure, dissension and functioning of the country.
But, wait, there’s yet another grievous mistake. Obama decided Assad of Syria had to go – notwithstanding his most formidable enemies were Islamic terrorists (ISIS). We turned our backs as Saudis and other rich Sunnis opposed to Assad’s Iranian backers funneled in cash and arms. Those same Islamic terrorists are now opposed by us as they move to seize Sunni areas of neighboring Iraq. A safe haven for terrorists is being established despite our [indirect and limited] aid to al-Maliki and because of our [indirect and permissive] support for ISIS in Syria.
Last week Obama proposed half a million dollars in aid to ”appropriately vetted” opponents of Assad. Wrong in Syria (WIS) — for the arms will (1) surely filter to ISIS and (2) a weakened Assad will mean a strengthened ISIS.
Enough of the fumbling incoherence of both Obama and his neo-con critics. What should be done?
We should leave those regional states with most at stake to address the problem: Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states plus Egypt. They have the most to lose; they should expend the most. We can cheer from the sidelines. However, any serious commitment of our forces will only suck us in more deeply and, as in Afghanistan and Pakistan, turn people against us.
]]>
by Henry Precht
A bunch of fanatic radicals is on the verge of inflicting grievous damage on the traditional states of the Middle East. Only sensible, but also radical changes in American policy can hope to arrest their advance. The first business is to understand what can’t be changed, what bits of [...]]]>
by Henry Precht
A bunch of fanatic radicals is on the verge of inflicting grievous damage on the traditional states of the Middle East. Only sensible, but also radical changes in American policy can hope to arrest their advance. The first business is to understand what can’t be changed, what bits of history can’t be rewritten:
Next we turn to changes that are essential if the ISIS uprising is to be managed:
An alternative US-led plan to defeat or contain ISIS would involve supplying arms to the Iraqi forces (which have been proved to be in no shape to employ them) or mounting drone attacks and other surgical strikes — with the same probable results as seen on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. If US planes or troops are used against ISIS, their retaliation against American targets can be expected.
The guiding principle for America in this crisis ought to be to stay out and to remain as far back as possible, leaving the heavy lifting to those regional states — however previously repugnant — to do the needful.
This article was first published by LobeLog.
Photo: President Barack Obama convenes an Oval Office meeting with his national security team to discuss the situation in Iraq, June 13, 2014. Credit: White House/Pete Souza
]]>by Henry Precht
Imagine, if you can, the recent scene in the White House situation room in which senior [appointed] officials are debating how to respond to Russia’s take-over of Crimea.
The experts on the media and Congress will speak up first for they will provide the most important bit of context [...]]]>
by Henry Precht
Imagine, if you can, the recent scene in the White House situation room in which senior [appointed] officials are debating how to respond to Russia’s take-over of Crimea.
The experts on the media and Congress will speak up first for they will provide the most important bit of context in which the president’s decision must be taken. Then some knowledgeable folk will talk about the attitudes of US allies in Europe and around the globe. How far are the Europeans — who have big investments with Russia and depend heavily on Russian deliveries of oil and natural gas — willing to go? The Pentagon and CIA will weigh in with their list of moves, short of firing a shot: US forces and spies can demonstrate resolve, project superior strength and warn Moscow of possible dangers ahead. Finally, someone who can pass as a Russian expert will offer a judgment on how that country might respond to elements of the toxic stew under contemplation.
At the end of the conference table will sit the president who must make the final decision. How will the ex-social worker, ex-professor, anti-war liberal decide? He will, almost certainly, have heard before the meeting from private pollsters and special friends who will offer sage advice. He might not decide at all. A naturally cautious man, he may delay, retire for deep, uninterrupted (except for telephone conversations with key friends, e.g., German’s Merkel) thought and then pronounce.
Thus, in all likelihood it was that the elite around President Vladimir Putin (but not the man himself) were sanctioned by Washington — denied visas, assets here frozen. Later the list is expanded for a few other names, a bank and Russia’s membership in the Group of Eight suspended. Worse to come is muttered.
Thus, one more country is subjected to Washington’s favored form of torture — the sanction, so far in this case, the mildest of versions. Five things we can say about this tool of diplomacy:
The Crimea crisis is still hot. Big Thinkers in the administration and in Europe are still trying to devise ways to push Russia into retreat. Russians sinned; they shall be dammed until they repent. Tough love, Washington says, to preserve world order. At some point, maybe after talking to wise parents or spouses without talking points, the big thinking bureaucrats just might reflect and drift towards a different perception:
Maybe, the West isn’t just dealing with President Putin. Maybe he’s closer to reality than we are in speaking of Russian history, sensitivity and nationalism. A sense of betrayal at NATO expansion. Maybe we are dealing with a nation, not a clique.
Another thought intrudes on established, establishment Western truths: Maybe Russia is more important as a partner — even a difficult, tricky one — than as a target of outrage. We are as dependent on Russian cooperation on Iran, Syria and the Middle East as Europe is on the economic linkages. European economies are sickly; they don’t need an infection of troublesome Russian viruses. The US doesn’t need the grave risks from persisting Middle East tensions.
At that point, Big Thinkers will start the search for face-saving measures. That, after all, is the only way to help Ukraine, which must reside between East and West and depend on both. A new regime in Kiev could salve sores and enable the West to shelve sanctions.
]]>by Henry Precht
They used to say during the Cold War that the Pentagon was prepared to fight two and a half wars at the same time. Actually, I can’t think of such a fraught moment in post-World War II history. Vietnam came along after Korea; Reagan took on Grenada and Panama [...]]]>
by Henry Precht
They used to say during the Cold War that the Pentagon was prepared to fight two and a half wars at the same time. Actually, I can’t think of such a fraught moment in post-World War II history. Vietnam came along after Korea; Reagan took on Grenada and Panama after ducking out of Lebanon. Only when George W. Bush pushed troops into Afghanistan and Iraq did we come close to the theoretical limit of our force projection capabilities.
It wasn’t the same with diplomacy: One crisis at a time has been the cap on American Great Power role-playing. The classic case was President Jimmy Carter’s taking a pass on the budding Iranian revolution while at the same time nudging Egypt and Israel into a peace settlement. A 500 percent batting average isn’t too bad, however.
If the one crisis at a time rule still applies, let us extend a bit of sympathy to the Obama White House. I count four major, on-going crises, five pretty big ones holding a serious potential to get worse plus a host of seedlings that should be brought under control. The biggies are:
You can make your own list of the slightly lesser dangers by throwing darts at a map. Let’s limit ourselves to examining the four major threats:
Plainly, the Ukrainian trouble harbors the widest and most severe long-term threat: A renewed Cold War, higher energy costs, ruined economies around the globe and the unrest that will provoke, distortion of domestic priorities — the list goes on and on. Domestic politics and distaste for Russian President Vladimir Putin afflict American diplomacy; domestic sentiments, history and Putin’s pride bear upon Russia’s. The way out is fairly clear: both sides have to switch off their rhetoric and hostile gestures, walk their positions back and prove stronger than their Ukrainian clients. The elements of a settlement can objectively be foreseen: a freeze by all on moves towards Crimea; a new regime in Kiev displacing right-wing elements; free, supervised elections later this year; and generous financial help from both East and West.
Once Ukraine is headed in that direction, work must be resumed on Syria to stop the killing. To do that Russia’s help will be essential as will that of Saudi Arabia (for dealing with the rebels) and Iran (for dealing with Assad). Moscow’s influence will be important with the latter; Washington’s crucial with the former. Assad, having killed so many of his people, must accept early retirement to be replaced by eminent Syrians acceptable to both sides who will in some months oversee national elections. Reconstruction will be the priority task and Saudi money the only possible supplier for that. Again, Washington will have to find the time and means to be persuasive with its royal client.
The same talents in Washington will have to be applied to persuade Riyadh that its interests will be protected when a nuclear deal with Iran is completed — which must happen if the US is to get Iran on board for a Syrian settlement.
And what of Israel? Will Jerusalem twiddle thumbs as the world weaves new alignments? Hardly. No Israeli leaders — or friend in Congress — will sit quietly while Obama offers an olive branch to Tehran while throwing a punch at Israel’s presence on the West Bank. Something will have to give and, as has happened in the past, that will mean peace talks must be slowed down and US pressure quietly eased. Perhaps the Saudis can be persuaded to appease the Palestinians, especially if we agree not to take the side of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt — which we certainly weren’t going to do in any event.
Can all or any of this be accomplished by a one-crisis-at-a-time administration, especially in a very difficult election year with a crowed domestic agenda before a rebellious Congress? No one knows, but if the usual crisis management limitation governs, a potentially explosive Ukraine must obviously receive the highest priority.
The administration’s diplomatic skills should be sufficient to put together a solution — given the time to nurture the necessary connections in Western and Eastern Europe. A measure of luck will, as always, be essential. But the largest lacuna may lie in the requirement for political bravery. The time will have to be found to muster up courage not profiled in Washington in many, many years.
Photo: President Barack Obama convenes a National Security Council meeting in the Situation Room of the White House to discuss the situation in Ukraine, March 3, 2014. Credit: Official White House Photo by Pete Souza
]]>by Henry Precht
It seems a shame to let all that fol-de-rol from the Olympics be cast aside after such an abbreviated run. As Sochi revealed to us novices, there are always new, curious forms of sport that merit recognition.
One of those with growing multi-seasonal appeal to large groups of men and [...]]]>
by Henry Precht
It seems a shame to let all that fol-de-rol from the Olympics be cast aside after such an abbreviated run. As Sochi revealed to us novices, there are always new, curious forms of sport that merit recognition.
One of those with growing multi-seasonal appeal to large groups of men and women in the streets is the popular coup or revolution game. Worldwide, these outbreaks — while spontaneous and adopting local rules of engagement — must adhere to certain principles of revolution that have been set forth by seasoned scholars and pundits parachuting in.
Let’s see who garners the top medals in the twelve prescribed categories:
1. Revolution brings together people of disparate ideologies and goals who are united only in seeking to bring down an autocrat; after success only one faction survives and exercises autocratic dominance over the former allies
Gold Medal: Iran; Silver: Egypt; Bronze: Syria (pending)
2. Revolution begins with economic grievances, adds political complaints and, after success, continues in reverse order, i.e., political, then economic gripes
Gold Medal: Tunisia; Silver: Egypt; Bronze: Ukraine (pending)
3. Parliamentary or other opposition with highest potential for splitting off their territory from the nation
Gold Medal: Ukraine Silver: Taliban Bronze: Arizona
4. Outsiders support opposition forces who are (1) long term enemies or (2) become so
Gold Medal: Syria; Silver: Egypt; Bronze: Libya
5. Outsiders cannot remember who is fighting whom or for what purpose
Gold Medal: Thailand; Silver: Yemen; Bronze: Bosnia
6. Opposition pleads for religious or sectarian freedom, but proponents of those virtues do not listen and persist with oppression
Gold Medal: Israel; Silver: Bahrain; Bronze: China (in Tibet)
7. Victorious opposition which has fought for religious freedom later oppresses its fellow citizens
Gold Medal: South Sudan; Silver: Iraq; Bronze: Turkey
8. Most outrageous assertions of guilt of opposition and purity of rulers
Gold Medal: Egypt; Silver: Saudi Arabia; Bronze: Russia
9. Opposition condemns rival party overreach while raking in cash from wealthy power centers
Gold Medal: Tea Party; Silver: Egypt; Bronze: South Africa
10. Highest level of distrust maintained towards its American partner in the struggle against revolutionaries
Gold Medal: Afghanistan; Silver: Israel; Bronze: Egypt
11. Most comfortable middle class opposition movement
Gold Medal: Venezuela; Silver: Turkey; Bronze: Scotland
12. Most determined to kill as many of its own people as necessary to hold or achieve power
Gold Medal: Syria; Silver: Al Qaeda in Iraq/Syria; Bronze: Chechnya
]]>by Henry Precht
Thirty-five years since the Iranian revolution should be adequate time for aspiring Iran hands to turn a deaf ear to the “Death to America” chants from Tehran and the more polite “They can’t be trusted “ pundit wisdom from Washington. Perhaps, modestly and cautiously, we can draw a few [...]]]>
by Henry Precht
Thirty-five years since the Iranian revolution should be adequate time for aspiring Iran hands to turn a deaf ear to the “Death to America” chants from Tehran and the more polite “They can’t be trusted “ pundit wisdom from Washington. Perhaps, modestly and cautiously, we can draw a few lessons from those bad days for the present moment of hope.
First, what we didn’t know back then was a lot and it did hurt us. Our ignorance was profound. We didn’t know the Shah was condemned by cancer. Had we known, we might have treated him more as we did Marcos and less like, say, our toleration of the Greek colonels. Today’s question relates to President Hassan Rouhani’s political health, his physical health seemingly OK. Should we be nervous, i.e., should we act as if he were politically vulnerable? Or should we consider him in adequate shape to engage with our demands? If he faces trouble, can he be saved by respectful attention? Or should we write him off as a foredoomed aberration? The signs from Tehran incline me to believe that he is worthy of considerable political risk on our part.
We knew nothing about dealing with such a massive movement of millions of people in support of the revolution — a phenomenon rarely if even seen before on the globe. Nor did we have a clue about an Islamic government — another development never before achieved on earth. Today, Iran remains a dark zone. We can’t accurately assess the strength of the reform or conservative movements in Iran. How strong is Rouhani and how wide can he maneuver? I expect the White House is better at evaluating its American support for an agreement with Iran. But can it match Rouhani’s willingness to confront critics? We can only hope that authentic, balanced expertise on Iran is available and listened to in the White House.
Second, Washington 35 years ago was unable to address the crisis in Iran because (1) the White House, State Department and other agencies could not agree on an analysis of the reality in Iran and (2) hence could not settle on a sensible policy. The Shah looked westward for guidance; the West looked inward at domestic critics and commentators. The product was drift towards increasing danger. Today, the administration seems more intent on appeasing senators — whence the real threat — rather than educating its public and building unity.
Third, we appeared to think that because everything had always worked out for the Shah, everything would again swing his way. In our superior self-confidence, we ignored the revolutionary demand for “independence” from our sway. We, in our history with Iran, were a big part of our problem. We declined to shift off any initiative to Europeans who might have been more persuasive, who might have helped moderate the crisis. Today, we resist any move by allies to accelerate the pace of an accommodation with Iran, e.g., easing more sanctions.
Fourth, we grasped at other models to fashion a response to Iran. In some quarters of Washington, officials thought the Shah’s generals and their troops might crack down or even stage a coup when it became necessary. But the generals were appointed mainly on the intensity of their loyalty upwards, not their patriotism, creativity or soldierly virtues. Iran was not Pakistan or a South American republic. And its troops were from the same religious background as those fellows on the other side of the barricades. Today, we should at least question whether in their many sub-groups Iranians hold differing opinions on the nuclear question or are more — or less — willing to question the nature of the regime. Preconceived dogmatic certainties preclude realistic analysis.
Fifth, back in 1978-79 we worried that if we treated the Shah rudely, other autocratic friends — Saudis, Sadat, smaller fry — would get the idea that the US would willingly sacrifice them if it became hard-pressed. While it shouldn’t be necessary to learn a patriotic lesson from another’s revolution, America should always put its interests in front of those of smaller, loudly complaining buddies who are rarely totally satisfied with our behavior.
Sixth, Washington’s attention to the slowly, then quickly moving Iranian crisis was blocked by the enormous attention given to the Camp David peace effort with Israel and Egypt. One crisis at a time, if you please. Can Secretary of State John Kerry and the White House handle Iran, Palestine-Israel, Syria and Egypt, et al, at the same time? They must — in some fashion or another.
Finally, the Shah badly needed American advice or, rather, orders on dealing with his rebellious people. President Jimmy Carter, it was said, was confused by the conflicting advice he received and reluctant to take the responsibility of telling another chieftain how to run his country. So no one did. Tough love and courage are requisites of leadership.
Americans are not particularly good at history. We gather a few facts, stick with them, often creating a myth from out of date supposed truths. Now is the ripe time for opening up to changing realities in Iran, modifying myths and constructing a more hopeful future.
]]>by Henry Precht
In the turbulent weeks after the Iranian revolution we officers in the State Department or in Embassy Tehran struggled to construct a “normal” relationship with the decidedly abnormal, strife-ridden new regime. In frustration I used to tell my wife that we should hang a thick curtain around Iran’s borders [...]]]>
by Henry Precht
In the turbulent weeks after the Iranian revolution we officers in the State Department or in Embassy Tehran struggled to construct a “normal” relationship with the decidedly abnormal, strife-ridden new regime. In frustration I used to tell my wife that we should hang a thick curtain around Iran’s borders and return home. Every so often we would lift a corner and peak in. If conditions seemed to be settling down, we might again venture back. If strife continued, we would pull the curtain closed and patiently wait for more placid times to come.
It seems that the Obama administration has installed an Iranian curtain around Egypt.
Egypt didn’t rate a mention in the President’s State of the Union. The Capitol Hill-White House debate about whether the army’s move to take over last summer was a coup or not seems to have been called a draw. When the regime jails journalists or democracy advocates, Washington is silent or late with a reaction. There’s a simple explanation for this silence or apparent neglect of a country that used to be considered a key ally: No one who is not marching in Tahrir Square has the foggiest idea how to address the strife-ridden land of the pharaohs.
In the old days when neocons were making policy in the Reagan White House and tried to manipulate Egypt for their Cold War purposes (e.g., a base on the Red Sea), I was working in Embassy Cairo. We used to warn, “Don’t take Egypt for granted!” As if the ghost of Nasser might return and resume his dirty work of stirring up regional anti-Americanism and tensions with Israel. But President Mubarak, despite all-out, but clumsy PR efforts, never resembled a mock-up of Nasser. A risk averse leader of a deeply conservative country, he was not about to upset Washington or Jerusalem. Instead, he set his set his heart and nervous fingers to dig into Saudi Arabia’s deep pockets.
Mubarak failed to find enough cash to satisfy his fecund people — except for those who promised that their newly gained wealth would trickle down to the youth gathered on street corners. His great plan for a new, prosperous Egypt failed. And so revolution came — and came again and yet again.
Egypt’s new pharaoh figure is almost certainly to be General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. The senior military chief, he offers his countrymen another Nasser look-alike, with the same seeming rectitude, same toughness in pursuit of patriotism and order plus the Mubarak additional quality of grasping for the Saudis’ sustaining riches.
Al-Sisi’s problem is that the Egypt he will inherit is not the one Nasser and the early Mubarak could depend on. It is, rather, a bit closer to Sadat’s country — expectant, easily disappointed and unfaithful. Probably half the population now stands against whoever wears a general’s uniform with a pharaoh’s double crown promising ample bread and nationalistic rhetoric. These disaffected, first-time voters were the revolution’s ostensible winners; they became after last summer’s coup its losers. This half of the population, feeling betrayed, is infected with the Muslim Brotherhood’s message of guided democracy, legitimacy and religiosity. Unhappily for this year’s new Nasser, his opponents also seem skilled in and determined to use terrorism to fight him.
It is easy in these circumstances to see how an Iranian curtain might appeal to those charged with formulating policy towards Egypt in Washington. On the one hand, there are the old timers for whom the peace treaty with Israel is the only thing that matters. Other Democrats march under the banner of human rights. Fighting terrorism is what matters for a third bunch. The market for arms sales counts most importantly for another group. And, of course, no one wants to offend Saudi Arabia, Cairo’s generous patron.
When offered so many policy choices, some in direct conflict with other options, a president will be tempted to check, “All of the above,” or “None of the above.” That’s where the Iranian curtain comes in handy. Keep quiet whenever possible. Meanwhile, behind-the-scenes send anti-terrorist intelligence and training, utter a whisper now and then about human rights and maintain the continuing, quiet flow of weapons sales.
All the while expecting — hoping — that, as it has for over 6,000 years, the Nile will flow freely, eventually abundant in its gifts and life along its banks will go on with tolerable tranquility.
]]>by Henry Precht
The US faces a grave crisis. One threatening our economic well-being and modern political system.
We seem destined for a ruinous enemy deficit.
If President Barack Obama has his way, Iran and America, after 35 years of enmity, may be headed for reconciliation, a serious diminution of [...]]]>
by Henry Precht
The US faces a grave crisis. One threatening our economic well-being and modern political system.
We seem destined for a ruinous enemy deficit.
If President Barack Obama has his way, Iran and America, after 35 years of enmity, may be headed for reconciliation, a serious diminution of tensions, an end to constant blustering, proxy conflicts and freely flowing bile.
Only a stalwart group of Congress men and women stand in the way of an outbreak of harmony and good feelings with the Persians. Eager to advance the cause of American and Israeli security, they say, and dine from a delicious menu of advanced weaponry, they feel obliged to ignore the contrary judgments of our generously funded intelligence agencies and order up yet more sanctions against Iran. A senator can’t take any chances, they tell us implicitly, especially when his reelection prospects are on the line and generous support is offered by those with a clear preference for nurturing war over deal-destroying peace.
After the Cold War ended came the War on Terror, which spawned the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Both of those fights have or soon will be ended, at least for Washington. Syria is too messy to fully engage us. Yemen and Somalia don’t merit much more than an occasional drone. That leaves Iran as the only credible enemy.
If Iran goes peaceful on us, agreeing to nearly all of our demands, how can Pentagon budgets be sustained? How can the patriotic rhetoric of politicians be taken seriously?
America’s surviving historic enemies are laughable: North Korea’s leadership is moving from nuclear threats to basketball challenges. Russia is a has-been and China is struggling to fill America’s shopping carts. Geriatric Cuba is less of a threat to Florida than another real estate bust.
If “Death to America” chants fade in Tehran, won’t chello kebab soon push out pizza in Washington? We must prepare for the worst: a new enemy must be targeted by the US. But who can our people be taught to hate on short notice?
The best approach would be to go after trusted friends who have betrayed us. It would be easy to charge England with perfidy. But we have already fought two wars with our former masters. The same is true of the Germans. The slippery French are a possibility, but their slogan, “Make love, not war,” would make it hard to mobilize our young for battle.
The best choice, perhaps surprisingly, would probably be Canada. No American has paid any attention to the northern neighbor in a couple of centuries. It would be easy to stir our people up about dimly remembered cheating on the boundary, stealing our freely swimming fish and lobsters or the Canuck’s wrongly asserting sovereign rights to Our Northwest Passage. Think of the ships that would have to be built! The miles of border that would need to be fortified! The hordes of winter visitors that would have to be investigated! An ideal enemy!
Of course, the infinitely polite and hospitable Canadians — like the subtly graceful Iranians — might pleasingly yield to our demands. Should they exhibit incorrigible sweetness, we had best prepare backup antagonists.
What about Israel and Saudi Arabia? Both now delight in spitting in our eyes and kicking our shins when we suggest different behavior. And with Israel, moving to it enemy status would end aid and save us over $3 billion annually.
Except that some members of Congress would insist on voting Israel the usual aid package despite their officially declared enemy status.
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