by Mark N. Katz
What a difference a few months make. During much of 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin was riding high. Russia seized Crimea from Ukraine quickly and relatively bloodlessly. Putin was also able to help pro-Russian forces in eastern Ukraine effectively secede from the rest of the country and prevent the Ukrainian government from retaking these areas. Western governments howled in protest and even imposed economic sanctions on Russia, but were unable to force Putin to back down. Putin’s unsettling actions also seemed to help keep the price of oil high, which Russia benefited from as a leading petroleum exporter. And while the West was highly critical of him, many governments elsewhere—most notably in Asia—seemed indifferent or even sympathetic toward Putin’s actions in Ukraine.
At present, though, things look very different for the Russian president. Western sanctions, which initially seemed quite weak, now appear to be having an increasingly negative effect on the Russian economy. More importantly, the dramatic decrease in the price of oil over the past few months has contributed to a sharp drop in Russia’s export income as well as to the value of the ruble. Eastern Ukraine has meanwhile become an increasingly costly venture for Moscow—not least because of the mounting deaths of Russian soldiers engaged in the fighting there. Absorbing Crimea is also proving costly for an increasingly cash-strapped Moscow. As Western disapproval and even fear of Russia have grown, the ranks of European political and economic leaders calling for accommodating Moscow and cooperating with Putin have thinned. Finally, those non-Western governments that earlier seemed indifferent or sympathetic to Putin’s policy toward Ukraine now seem either indifferent or eager to take advantage of Russia’s increasing economic difficulties.
Putin, in short, now seems to be facing something of a dilemma. Continuing his current policies toward eastern Ukraine will probably not bring about an end to what is becoming a quagmire there for Moscow, and will mean that Western economic sanctions on Russia remain in place or even worsen. Yet withdrawing from Ukraine could weaken Putin domestically since the Russian public has supported his forward policy on Ukraine and would not be happy to see it reversed.
So what will Putin do now? Many fear that he will lash out at the West by supporting Russian secessionists in the Baltics or elsewhere. Putin himself has contributed to this fear by talking about how a cornered rat will attack its pursuers. But despite the deteriorating situation that he now faces, the Russian president need not become that rat in the corner. Indeed, he can be expected to ensure that he does not.
This is because Putin is basically a pragmatist. While he can support Russian secessionists in the Baltics, Belarus, northern Kazakhstan, or elsewhere in Ukraine—as he did with those in Crimea and eastern Ukraine—Putin cannot now be certain that he can gain control over these territories quickly and easily like he did with Crimea. Instead, supporting such groups or intervening directly may only result in more drawn-out conflicts such as the one now taking place in eastern Ukraine. If it is increasingly costly for Russia to be involved in just one such conflict, it will be even costlier still for it to become involved in more of them. If he thought he could replicate what happened in Crimea, Putin might be tempted to do this. Indeed, his quick victory in Crimea may have persuaded him that he could also win in eastern Ukraine. But now that eastern Ukraine has proven to be so problematic, Putin must be aware that similar adventures elsewhere could prove similarly risky—and that Russian forces could only get more thinly spread if they become involved in more such conflicts.
Some fear that Putin might lash out in some other manner by, for example, ending Russian support for the ongoing negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program. But this also seems unlikely because: 1) Russia does not want Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, either and 2) the United States and its Western allies could still reach an agreement with Tehran on this matter without Russian help—which would only serve to demonstrate Russian impotence.
Russia stepping up its support for the Assad regime in Syria is another possibility. Doing so, though, would make Russia more of a target for Islamic State (ISIS or IS). Nor does it seem plausible that Putin would want Russia to become more involved in Syria when Moscow is far more concerned about what is happening in Ukraine and other former Soviet states.
Some fear, though, that reported Russian submarine deployments in Swedish waters, military overflights over several countries, and claims in the Arctic are all signs that Putin is preparing something even worse. However, while hardly reassuring, these moves seem aimed more at showing the Russian public how strong Putin is than as precursors to Russian initiation of conflict.
What all this suggests is that while Putin is aggressive, he is not reckless, and he demonstrated this during a Dec. 18 press conference. Indeed, while insisting that any Russian troops in eastern Ukraine are “volunteers,” he seemed also to hold open the door to cooperation with Kiev—and with Georgia, too (which Russia won a brief war against in 2008).
Returning to the rodentine analogy that Putin himself has used: if a cornered rat lashes out, one that is not cornered is more likely to find a safe place to run to instead. What this means for the West is that while it should assist Ukraine in resisting Russian incursions, it should reassure Putin that if he compromises on Ukraine, the West will not use this as an opportunity to rout him altogether. By continuing to cooperate with Russia on problems of common concern (such as Afghanistan, the Iranian nuclear issue, and terrorism) and by reiterating how Western sanctions would be lifted if Russia modifies its policy toward Ukraine, we can help Putin achieve his own goal of not ending up in a corner.
]]>by Mark N. Katz
All the major actors in the Middle East oppose the rise of the extremist group that calls itself the Islamic State (ISIS). In fact, ISIS has managed to incur the enmity of a highly diverse set of actors who often oppose one another. These include several sets of antagonists such as the United States and the West on the one hand and Russia on the other; Iran and the Assad regime in Syria on the one hand and Sunni states like Saudi Arabia on the other; Israel on the one hand and Hezbollah on the other; and the Kurds on the one hand and Turkey (which fears Kurdish nationalism) on the other. Even al-Qaeda opposes ISIS.
The fact that all the important actors in the region oppose ISIS has given rise to the hope that this radical Sunni group can be defeated. The experience of the Bolsheviks nearly a century ago, however, shows that this might not occur. Indeed, the current situation is reminiscent of Russia after the Bolsheviks seized power there in late 1917. The harshness of their rule quickly resulted in numerous opposition groups rising up against them inside the country. External powers also recognized the Bolsheviks as a threat, and several supported their internal opponents or even directly intervened both in the final year of World War I and for a few years afterward. But even though many internal and external actors wanted to defeat the Bolsheviks, these actors ultimately worked at cross-purposes, which helped the Bolsheviks not only survive but also gain control over most of the former Tsarist Empire and pose a threat to many other nations for years.
Today, as with the threat posed by the Bolsheviks, the common threat posed by ISIS provides no guarantee that the groups who oppose it will put aside their differences and work together to defeat it. Indeed, while hopes for a grand alliance against ISIS have been expressed in many quarters, the achievement of this goal has so far proven elusive—and will likely remain so.
Many of the principal actors in the region are worried not only about ISIS, but also other threats, including one another. Iran and Russia in particular regard the Syrian government—a minority Alawite regime—as an ally and do not want to see it replaced by a Sunni majority regime that would be hostile toward them. Saudi Arabia and several other Sunni Arab states, in contrast, see Iran—along with its Shi’a allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen—as the principal threat and accordingly regard the replacement of the Assad regime as important for their security as the defeat of ISIS. Turkey, for its part, sees ISIS as a threat but apparently regards the possibility of Kurdish forces in Syria (and, as a result, in Turkey itself) growing stronger from ISIS’s defeat as an even greater one.
The Obama administration is pursuing three contradictory sets of goals in the Middle East. First, while Washington wants to preserve American relations with Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Arab states, it also wants to improve ties with Iran with which it hopes to achieve a nuclear accord. Secondly, while the US wants to preserve ties with a Turkish government that very much fears the growth of Kurdish separatism, Washington also sees Kurdish forces in Northern Iraq and in Syria as allies against ISIS. Finally, while the Obama administration genuinely wants to combat ISIS (and has, along with some of its Arab and European allies, launched airstrikes against ISIS positions in both Iraq and Syria), it also wants to do so without sending American ground forces back to Iraq. Yet it will be difficult for Washington to resolve any one of these contradictions—and may well be impossible to resolve all three.
Thus, while everyone wants to see ISIS defeated, the fact that so many of the actors in the region are working at cross-purposes could result in ISIS surviving and prospering despite universal opposition. Just this possibility should focus the minds of policymakers in different countries on how they can work together against the common threat before it grows even worse and becomes, like the Bolsheviks did almost a century ago, even more difficult to deal with.
]]>by Mark N. Katz
Just a few months ago, everything seemed to be going well for Russian President Vladimir Putin in Ukraine. After the initial setback of Moscow’s ally, President Viktor Yanukovich, fleeing Kiev and being replaced by a pro-Western government, Putin seized control of Crimea in a surprise move that succeeded very [...]]]>
by Mark N. Katz
Just a few months ago, everything seemed to be going well for Russian President Vladimir Putin in Ukraine. After the initial setback of Moscow’s ally, President Viktor Yanukovich, fleeing Kiev and being replaced by a pro-Western government, Putin seized control of Crimea in a surprise move that succeeded very quickly and almost bloodlessly. Small numbers of pro-Russian separatists then took over several cities in eastern Ukraine where there are large Russian populations. The new Ukrainian government was powerless to prevent this, and its American and European allies appeared either unwilling or unable to help. Indeed, Germany, France, and Italy in particular seemed more concerned about retaining their lucrative trade relations with Russia than with preserving the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Nor did there appear to be any significant barrier to Putin seizing all of eastern and southern Ukraine. The image of a “rising Russia” stood in stark contrast to that of a weak, ineffectual, and divided West.
Now the situation seems quite different. Ukrainian forces have managed to retake much of eastern Ukraine from the pro-Russian separatists. Western public opinion has become increasingly critical of Russia in the wake of flight MH17 being shot down over territory held by the separatists, and over their truly boorish behavior in allowing Western access to the crash site and recovering the bodies. The United States and the European Union have now gone beyond the largely cosmetic sanctions they first imposed after the Russian takeover of Crimea; this week they announced broader sanctions affecting weapons sales, technology transfer, and Russian access to Western capital markets. Many Western corporations have already announced plans to limit further investment in Russia, or even to pull out of the Russian market. More tellingly, Russians themselves are moving massive amounts of money out of Russia to safer havens.
Some have criticized the European Union for only imposing sanctions that do not hurt its own economic interests. The EU has, for example, placed sanctions on the Russian oil industry, but not the gas industry, which it is more dependent on. Nor does the ban on future EU weapons sales to Russia affect current contracts, including the sale of two aircraft carriers that France has been building for Moscow. Still, these sanctions are much stronger than what appeared likely just a few months ago. And both European and American leaders have declared that they could ratchet up sanctions if Putin does not change course on Ukraine.
Will he? Moscow, predictably, has reacted to these new sanctions “with defiance,” as numerous press reports have indicated. These measures cannot force Putin to withdraw from Crimea or end Moscow’s support for the pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine. However, Western sanctions, combined with the Ukrainian government’s success in retaking some territory in the east, have worked to increase the costs Putin must pay for his Ukraine policy. If the Russian leader previously calculated that he could seize Crimea and eastern Ukraine cheaply and easily and that the West would be unable to impose meaningful costs on him because it “needs Russia” more than vice versa, he now has cause to revise his thinking.
In other words, the broader Western sanctions as well as the more effective Ukrainian opposition to Putin’s policies have served to raise questions about whether the benefits of his efforts to take territory from Kiev are worth the increasing costs of doing so. Putin may accept these costs, but his supporters, who have up to now benefited from doing business with the West, might not agree. If they don’t, the Russian president could find himself in serious trouble.
Western sanctions cannot force Putin to change course in Ukraine, but by raising the costs of his aggressive policies, they can undermine support from the powerful Russian economic actors that he has previously relied on. If he is not careful, the glorious victory he has envisioned in Ukraine will turn into a trap of his own making.
Photo: A memorial for the victims of Flight MH17 at the Amsterdam International Airport (Schiphol), July 21, 2014. Credit: Pejman Akbarzadeh/Persian Dutch Network
]]>by Mark N. Katz
It is not clear when, or how, Vladimir Putin will give up power (as opposed to only pretending to do so as he did during the 2008-12 Medvedev interlude). Nor is it at all clear who will follow him as the most powerful politician in Russia. What is [...]]]>
by Mark N. Katz
It is not clear when, or how, Vladimir Putin will give up power (as opposed to only pretending to do so as he did during the 2008-12 Medvedev interlude). Nor is it at all clear who will follow him as the most powerful politician in Russia. What is fairly certain, though, is that whoever succeeds Putin will likely denounce him or radically alter his policies. Indeed, the successor will probably do both.
This will definitely occur if, despite all Putin’s preventative efforts, Russia finally undergoes democratization. But it will also probably occur in the far more likely event that the Russian political system stays the same, and Putin’s successor rules in much the same manner as the president does now.
This pattern has been in place at least since the 1917 Revolution. Lenin excoriated the policies of both Tsar Nicholas II and the Provisional government he overthrew. Stalin did not denounce Lenin, but he radically altered his domestic policy (replacing the mild New Economic Policy with the horrific collectivization of the First Five Year Plan) and eliminated much of the top leadership appointed by Lenin. Nikita Khrushchev, in turn, denounced Stalin, ended many of his harsh policies, and got rid of many of his supporters. Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin later denounced Khrushchev’s “hare-brained schemes” and changed his policies. The next two leaders, the aged and ailing Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko, were not in office long enough to do much in this regard. Mikhail Gorbachev, though, would denounce Brezhnev’s rule as the “era of stagnation” and embark on a reform policy aimed at correcting its problems. Boris Yeltsin, in turn, denounced Gorbachev’s efforts as inadequate and launched an even more ambitious program of liberalization.
Vladimir Putin with Dmitry Medvedev, March 2008
Putin continued this pattern when he came to power. Although he was Yeltsin’s hand-picked successor, Putin and his cohorts have never ceased to boast about how he has made things so much better in Russia than they were in the 1990s. Dmitry Medvedev, though, did not conform to this pattern. While making a few changes, he never denounced Putin, whom he appointed as his prime minister. In retrospect, Medvedev’s break from tradition was actually a sign that he was not fully in charge. When Putin resumed the presidency in 2012, though, he did not return the favor. Putin and his aides reversed or criticized several of Medvedev’s policies — especially Medvedev’s decision to allow the 2011 UN Security Council Resolution authorizing a no-fly zone over Libya, which Putin says the West used as a pretext to overthrow former President Muammar Qaddafi.
The Medvedev exception notwithstanding, what has happened after almost every Russian leadership change since the 1917 Revolution suggests that something similar will highly likely occur when Putin leaves office for good, even if the current authoritarian system survives. Indeed, the logic of the situation makes this practically inevitable. Even if Putin appoints his own successor — and especially if he does not — the new leader will soon find that he must denounce Putin. Part of what keeps Putin’s cronies loyal now is that there are many who can either hope (however unreasonably) that he will become the next president, or that his patron will. Once a new president has been appointed, though, he will have to deal with many disappointed rivals and those dependent on them. The new president will thus feel vulnerable, and thus seek to protect himself by replacing Putin loyalists with his own supporters. Once this process begins, the old Putin loyalists will attempt to stop it. The new president will then have little choice but to undercut them all by a wholesale denunciation of the Putin era and its “failed policies.” The more Putin’s policies can be discredited, the harder it will be for those people the new president claims are responsible for those policies to remain in office.
Ironically, while democratization would lead to Putin being heavily criticized, it would also afford a better opportunity for his close associates to remain part of the political system, despite their inevitable disagreements with the new president. By contrast, Putin’s success at stifling any progress toward democracy will make it more difficult for those who are not part of the new president’s entourage to do so.
But while his eventual successor will almost surely denounce Putin and change many of his policies dramatically, what cannot be foretold is how he will change them. If tensions between Russia and the West continue (as they undoubtedly will for as long as Putin remains president), the new leader may blame Russia’s increasing economic stagnation and dependence on an ever more powerful and threatening China on Putin’s needless pursuit of an antagonistic policy toward the West. On the other hand, relations with the West may be so bad by then that the new president would blame Putin for making insufficient concessions to Beijing to secure what by then will be desperately needed Chinese military and economic support for maintaining Moscow’s increasingly isolated and beleaguered authoritarian order.
The only real certainty is that whoever succeeds Putin will lay the blame for all of Russia’s problems squarely on Putin, as will those who support Putin now but who will eventually need to prove their loyalty to the new leader in order to gain promotion or just keep their jobs.
]]>by Mark N. Katz
The radical jihadist group, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIL or ISIS), has seized much of Iraq’s Sunni Arab heartland and reached the outskirts of Baghdad. The armed forces of Iraq’s US-backed, Shia majority elected dictatorship have not only failed to prevent this, but are also [...]]]>
by Mark N. Katz
The radical jihadist group, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIL or ISIS), has seized much of Iraq’s Sunni Arab heartland and reached the outskirts of Baghdad. The armed forces of Iraq’s US-backed, Shia majority elected dictatorship have not only failed to prevent this, but are also fleeing as ISIS advances.
There is a real possibility that the government of Nouri al-Maliki will fall, and that ISIS will be able to reassert Sunni Arab minority rule over Iraq, which existed under Saddam Hussein and well before him. An ISIS in charge of Iraq will also be able to aid its beleaguered compatriots in Syria fighting the Assad regime, as well as help Sunni jihadists in other neighboring countries such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and perhaps even Iran (where there is indeed a large Sunni population believed to be highly disaffected from Tehran’s Shia rulers).
What is currently happening in Iraq does not serve the interests of America, its Western and Arab allies, or anyone except the jihadists. The Obama administration, however, is not going to re-intervene in Iraq now after only recently ending the long, costly, and inconclusive US-led intervention there, as well as winding down a similar one in Afghanistan. Congress and the American public are unlikely to support intervention anyway, as the widespread US domestic opposition to Obama’s 2013 request for congressional approval for a much more limited strike on Syria demonstrated.
Can anything, then, be done to stop ISIS from seizing more of Iraq, including Baghdad? Or, under the current circumstances, is that simply inevitable?
Nothing is inevitable. The rise of ISIS so far has less to do with its strength than with the weakness of its main adversary, the Maliki government. Right now, ISIS’s “control” is quite tenuous. Indeed, ISIS might be just as surprised as everyone else that the collapse of the Maliki government has created a vacuum allowing it to move in. Still, ISIS’ newfound gains also mean that its forces are likely stretched thin — and thus vulnerable — at present.
There are accordingly policy options for halting the spread of ISIS and even rolling it back that exist between US intervention on the one hand and doing nothing on the other. One of the most important of these arises from the fact that ISIS is not only opposed by the U.S., but also by neighboring states and important groups inside Iraq. Indeed, the rise of ISIS threatens these local and regional actors far more than it does the U.S., thus giving Washington opportunities to support those who are strongly motivated to resist this jihadist militia. These include:
The Kurds: While the Maliki government’s forces have fled from ISIS, the Kurdish Regional Authority has made clear that it intends to resist and has already seized control of the divided northern city of Kirkuk.
Shia Arabs: The Maliki government’s impotence notwithstanding, the Iraqi Arab Shia majority has a very strong incentive to oppose ISIS’ efforts to re-impose a Sunni minority regime upon them.
Anti-Jihadist Sunni Arabs: While Sunni Arabs initially resisted the American-led military intervention and supported ISIS’ predecessor, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), many Sunni Arab tribesmen later allied with the U.S. against AQI since it was increasingly attacking them. These Sunni tribes, whom Maliki alienated when America withdrew, have not forgotten how al-Qaeda treated them — and ISIS has not forgotten how these tribes fought with the Americans.
Iran: Despite the many differences between Washington and Tehran, one common interest (that is seldom recognized publicly) is that both fear the rise of radical Sunni jihadist movements, including ISIS.
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan: Despite their fears of Iran and their support for the opposition to Tehran’s ally, the Assad regime, these Sunni Arab monarchies in particular have strong reason to fear that the rise of jihadist forces in Iraq will threaten them sooner or later (indeed, this will probably happen sooner rather than later).
There are, then, plenty of local and regional actors that are strongly motivated to resist the rise of ISIS that the US and others can either actively or (in Iran’s case) passively support. The problem, of course, is that these actors often distrust each other and act at cross-purposes. An American diplomatic initiative, though, could help minimize these differences.
Essentially, what everyone needs to understand is that Iraq is simply too fractious to be successfully ruled by a strong central government. Instead, it can either exist as a federation, in which each of its three main communities has autonomy within the area of the country where it is the majority, or co-exist as three de facto, or even de jure, independent states. And, even if the borders between these three regions cannot be completely agreed upon, the areas of disagreement can be minimized and arrangements made to accommodate contested mixed areas in particular.
Those who object to cooperation with Iran on the basis that they are anti-American should be reminded that despite their differences, the US and Iran were able to cooperate to some extent against the Taliban in the early stages of the US-led intervention in Afghanistan, and that Iran gave more support to the US-backed Maliki government than any of Washington’s Sunni Arab allies. We have already proved, in other words, that we can cooperate pragmatically when our interests are at stake.
Those who object to cooperation with Saudi Arabia on the basis that it supported al-Qaeda elements in the past should be reminded that after al-Qaeda began launching attacks inside the kingdom in 2003, Riyadh well understood that Sunni jihadists will attack it when the opportunity arises.
Finally, those who object to cooperation with the Kurds on the basis that Turkey, among others, will object should be reminded that Turkey and the Kurdish Regional Authority in Northern Iraq have established a remarkable degree of economic cooperation, that Turkey has its own internal Sunni jihadist problem, and that a strong Kurdish government in Northern Iraq helps protect Turkey from ISIS or similar groups, which would probably attack Turkey from Iraq if they could.
ISIS will not prevail because it has suddenly grown much stronger. ISIS can prevail, though, if those who could work with one another to stop it fail to do so.
Photo: A screenshot from a video purportedly showing an execution of a man by ISIS.
This article was first published by LobeLog. Follow LobeLog on Twitter and like us on Facebook
]]>by Mark N. Katz
Two storylines about Saudi-Russian relations have recently dominated the airwaves. One is that Moscow and Riyadh are sharply divided by several issues: not only Syria and Iran, but also Crimea and the Russian belief that the Saudis are supporting Muslim opposition inside Russia. The other is that Saudi [...]]]>
by Mark N. Katz
Two storylines about Saudi-Russian relations have recently dominated the airwaves. One is that Moscow and Riyadh are sharply divided by several issues: not only Syria and Iran, but also Crimea and the Russian belief that the Saudis are supporting Muslim opposition inside Russia. The other is that Saudi Arabia is about to buy $2-4 billion (reports vary) worth of Russian arms for Egypt.
It seemed unlikely to me that both these reports could be true. If Moscow and Riyadh can’t see eye to eye on issues of mutual concern, then their relationship is bad and the Kingdom would not buy such a large amount of weaponry for Egypt from Russia. On the other hand, if the Saudis do indeed intend to buy billions of dollars in Russian arms for Cairo, then clearly Saudi-Russian relations must not be as bad as has been reported. The question, then, is: what’s the true story?
A visit to Moscow last week convinced me that both storylines are indeed true. Seasoned Russian Middle East watchers I spoke to indicated that Saudi-Russian relations really are very poor. In 2013, Prince Bandar bin Sultan (who was then the Saudi intelligence chief) met twice with President Vladimir Putin to try to persuade him to end Moscow’s support for the Assad regime in Syria. The prince reportedly offered several inducements, including billions in arms purchases for the Saudi military and billions more in Saudi investments in Russia. Putin, however, rejected these offers.
The Saudis, one Russian source indicated, seemed to think that Moscow would change its policy on Syria if it were offered enough money. But for Putin, Syria is a Russian domestic political issue. To be seen as ending support for a long-time ally such as Assad would undermine Putin inside Russia. Thus, the Russian president refused Bandar’s offers.
Crimea’s secession from Ukraine only served to further worsen Saudi-Russian relations. Riyadh’s expression of concern over Russia’s treatment of the Muslim Crimean Tatar population has only fed Russian fears that the Kingdom wants to foment Muslim unrest inside Russia. The Saudi-Russian relationship, then, is indeed poor.
That said, Russian observers are convinced that Riyadh will make a large-scale arms purchase from Russia for Egypt. Riyadh strongly backs the Egyptian military leader, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi (who was just elected president), and is extremely unhappy that Washington does not . After the Obama administration cut back American arms supplies to the Egyptian government for cracking down on the Muslim Brotherhood (which el-Sisi ousted from power last summer), Riyadh became determined to find another supplier. Russia happens to be the arms producer that can most readily fulfill this need. Riyadh’s buying Russian arms for Cairo, then, is more a sign of Saudi annoyance with Washington and has no implication for improving Saudi-Russian relations more broadly.
Indeed, according to one source, receiving Russian arms will not even serve to greatly improve Russian-Egyptian relations. Egyptian army officers prefer to work with the US, and do not want to go back to working with Russia as their predecessors did from the mid-1950s to the early 1970s (the Egyptian Army officers I spoke to confirmed this). Egypt’s Saudi benefactors would also support the officers’ position.
A development that could serve to improve Saudi-Russian relations, one Russian observer noted, is the very recent trend toward improved Saudi-Iranian relations. One Saudi grievance against Russia is that it has close ties to Riyadh’s rivals in Tehran. But if Saudi-Iranian (as well as US-Iranian) relations improve, then Riyadh will have less reason to resent the Russian-Iranian relationship. Of course, even if Saudi-Iranian bilateral relations improve, the countries are likely to remain at loggerheads over Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Bahrain. With Moscow continuing to support or sympathize with the actors Tehran is backing in the first three of these states, the prospects for improved Saudi-Iranian relations, and improved Saudi-Russian relations, are limited.
Thus, just as the poor state of Saudi-Russian relations will not prevent Riyadh from buying Russian arms for Cairo, even large-scale Saudi purchases of Russian arms for Egypt will not lead to any appreciable improvement in ties between Moscow and Riyadh.
Photo: Prince Bandar bin Sultan (R), and then Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin enter a hall for a signing ceremony in Moscow July 14, 2008. Credit: RUSSIA/RIA NOVOSTI/ALEXEI DRUZHININ
]]>by Mark N. Katz
U.S.-Russian relations have sharply deteriorated, to put it mildly, over Ukraine in recent months. There has been widespread talk about the re-emergence of a new Cold War between Washington and Moscow. Indeed, some have even argued that Moscow does not want to see American sanctions on Iran lifted because [...]]]>
by Mark N. Katz
U.S.-Russian relations have sharply deteriorated, to put it mildly, over Ukraine in recent months. There has been widespread talk about the re-emergence of a new Cold War between Washington and Moscow. Indeed, some have even argued that Moscow does not want to see American sanctions on Iran lifted because this would allow Iran to compete with Russia in exporting petroleum to the West and elsewhere. Yet Russia appears willing to cooperate with the U.S. on several issues, including the Iranian nuclear file. What could explain Moscow’s reasoning? At least four possible explanations stand out.
1) The government of President Vladimir Putin is willing to compartmentalize foreign policy issues. Dramatic disagreement with the U.S. on some issues does not preclude Moscow from cooperating with Washington on others where common interests are involved. Both the U.S. and Russia — as well as many other states — want to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, so it makes sense for Moscow to continue working with Washington in pursuit of this aim.
2.) Moscow is working toward a settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue in part to both limit and ameliorate international opposition toward Russian policy vis-à-vis Ukraine. There are quite a few governments that are far more concerned about the prospect of a nuclear Iran than about what Russia does in Ukraine. These include Israel, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and perhaps even some West European members of NATO. Moscow’s continued serious efforts toward a settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue may provide these states with a convenient rationale to avoid joining U.S.-led efforts to criticize Putin over Ukraine.
3) Moscow’s actual ability to scuttle a nuclear agreement with Iran might be limited. Washington and Tehran, of course, have never lacked reasons for disagreeing with each other in the past. But if a final agreement between the U.S. and Iran over its nuclear program is indeed attainable, neither of these states is going to back away from it at Moscow’s behest. Indeed, any Russian effort to prevent a nuclear accord reached by Iran on the one hand and America and its European partners on the other could backfire and result in Moscow looking weak and ineffective — exactly what Putin wants to avoid.
4.) Finally, Russia could make substantial profits following a final nuclear deal with Iran. While it is true that a final agreement and the reduction (if not elimination) of U.S. and international sanctions against Tehran would mean increased competition from Iran for Russia in exporting petroleum, reduced UN sanctions on Iran would allow Russian firms to invest more in the Iranian petroleum sector. Indeed, just like the Shi’a majority government that the U.S. helped bring to power in Baghdad, Tehran may actually see doing business with Russian petroleum firms as advantageous. A wealthier Iran would also be able to purchase far more nuclear reactors, weapons, and other goods from Russia than it can pay for now.
Of course, these explanations are not mutually exclusive. Moscow may continue to work toward a resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue for any or all of the reasons listed above. Moscow’s unwillingness to cooperate with Washington on Ukraine, then, does not mean that Russia will stop cooperating with America on Iran.
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Photo: U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (center) share a laugh at the signing ceremony of the interim nuclear deal reached with Iran on Nov. 24, 2013 in Geneva, Switzerland.
by Mark N. Katz
How will the crisis in Ukraine turn out? Nobody knows for sure, but a role-playing game that I ran in my undergraduate government and politics of Russia course at George Mason University yesterday offers some insights.
My 79 students (most of whom were present) were divided into thirteen [...]]]>
by Mark N. Katz
How will the crisis in Ukraine turn out? Nobody knows for sure, but a role-playing game that I ran in my undergraduate government and politics of Russia course at George Mason University yesterday offers some insights.
My 79 students (most of whom were present) were divided into thirteen teams of varying size: the United States, Russia, the Ukrainian government, the Ukrainian separatists, Poland, the three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), Germany, Britain, France, Belarus, and China. Our starting point was the present situation in Ukraine, recapped as: following Russia’s successful annexation of Crimea, pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine are seizing government buildings in other eastern Ukrainian cities and calling for Russia to intervene on their behalf. The Ukrainian government in Kiev is meanwhile trying to seize back what the separatists have taken, but is encountering difficulties.
After each team stated its initial position on the situation, they were freed to fashion their policies and make deals with other teams.
The Ukrainian government team decided to press ahead with its efforts to take back territory in the eastern part of the country from the separatists as well as to seek commitments from Western governments to help Kiev. The American team in particular talked about increasing sanctions, but the German team wasn’t sure about taking this step. The French team offered to sell weapons, but no Western team was willing to send their own troops to Ukraine.
In the meantime, the Ukrainian separatist team continued to seize buildings (one student had even brought signs with Russian flags to slap on various pieces of furniture in the classroom) while urging the Russian team to intervene on their behalf. The U.S. team attempted to dissuade the Russian team from taking this step. After some delay, though, the Russian team decided to intervene in eastern Ukraine in order to protect Russian citizens there. Tension in the room suddenly increased.
The Ukrainian government team desperately sought Western support. It even seemed to think that this would be forthcoming, but it turned out that there had been an unfortunate misunderstanding on its part. The German team, though, did agree to impose much harsher economic sanctions. The United States and other NATO countries reiterated their commitment to NATO members in Eastern Europe and the Baltic states.
One surprise development was that the Belarusian team asked for U.S. and NATO help in case Russia turned on it. The American team, though, turned down their request since Belarus is not a member of NATO.
The Russian team responded to the increased Western sanctions by turning to the Chinese team. The latter agreed to buy more Russian oil and gas — though at a discount. Otherwise, the Chinese team kept out of the situation.
The Russian team then announced that Moscow had no intention of intervening any further afield than eastern Ukraine. The U.S. team in particular was relieved to hear this. The American and Western European teams indicated that they could live with this situation. The Polish and Baltic teams were disgusted, but could do nothing.
A spokesperson for the Ukrainian government team denounced NATO for its unwillingness to protect it against Russia, and declared that the Ukrainians would continue to fight. With only a little time left in the class period, I ended the game so that we could discuss what had transpired.
There seemed to be general agreement that if indeed Russia intervenes in eastern Ukraine, but declares that it will not go any further, the West will respond with tacit acceptance. NATO would not be willing to get involved in Ukraine. The West, though, would impose stronger economic sanctions on Russia, though some countries would do this quite reluctantly. If the Ukrainian government does decide to fight on, it will do so largely on its own. However, while the West may not do much for Ukraine, it will no longer regard Russia as a normal state, but as a threat. The big unanswered question is whether Russia would in fact honor any pledge not to intervene beyond eastern Ukraine — especially since it is unclear where eastern Ukraine ends and the rest of Ukraine begins.
Was the outcome of this role-playing game realistic? We may well find out soon.
A pro-Russian protestor yells at Ukrainian riot police outside the regional administration building in the eastern Ukrainian city of Donetsk on March 22, 2014. Credit: Zack Baddorf/IPS.
]]>by Mark N. Katz
As if the crisis in Ukraine wasn’t bad enough, the resulting tensions between Russia on the one hand and the US and most of Europe on the other will likely cause increased tension between Moscow and the West in the Middle East. Moscow can be expected to become [...]]]>
by Mark N. Katz
As if the crisis in Ukraine wasn’t bad enough, the resulting tensions between Russia on the one hand and the US and most of Europe on the other will likely cause increased tension between Moscow and the West in the Middle East. Moscow can be expected to become even more supportive of the Assad regime’s campaign against its opponents in Syria and even less willing to pressure it to pursue peace. Additionally, Moscow may be less willing to pressure Iran to make concessions in its ongoing negotiations with world powers over the nuclear issue. Russia will also try to expand its influence to other Middle Eastern countries.
However, apart from the Syrian regime, others in the Middle East may not welcome these efforts. No matter how much they disagree with Washington on various issues, America’s Arab allies do not see Russia as willing or able to underpin their security like the United States. Indeed, those concerned that the Obama administration is withdrawing from the Middle East will not be pleased about Moscow diverting Washington’s attention to European affairs. Furthermore, Russia and the Middle East compete with each other in the petroleum market. Middle Eastern gas exporters in particular will see a growing European desire to reduce dependence on Russian gas as an opportunity to increase their sales to Europe.
In Syria Moscow played on Western hopes for cooperation with Russia as a means of dissuading Washington from arming the Syrian opposition or intervening on their behalf. Now that the Ukraine crisis has shattered these hopes, the West may become less reluctant to arm the Syrian opposition and more willing to look for alternatives to the jihadist groups they want to avoid. Moscow may still succeed in helping the Assad regime recapture most (if not all) of Syria, but the cost of doing so will now go up.
Iran may also pose more of a problem for Moscow. Now that Russian ties with the West have soured over Ukraine, Moscow may prefer to see Iran remaining at odds with the West rather than improving relations. While there is certainly debate in Iran about the desirability of moving closer to the West, Russia is generally seen by Iranians as a rival and not a friend. Indeed, there are some in Iran who see the worsening of Russian-Western relations as an opportunity for Iran. Growing Western interest in seeing Iranian gas as an alternative to dependence on Russian resources could actually increase the West’s willingness to reduce its economic sanctions on Tehran.
Moscow can also be expected to seek improved ties with other Middle Eastern governments that differ with America over various issues, including its support for Israel and its half-hearted efforts to promote democratization. It is doubtful, though, that Arab governments or publics will see Moscow as much of a champion for the Palestinian cause at a time when Russian-Israeli relations have grown increasingly close. Egypt’s military-dominated government may be unhappy with President Barack Obama for suspending arms transfers over Cairo’s crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood and other internal opponents, but the Egyptian military’s threat of turning to Russia for arms may not be realistic. Egyptian armed forces would have a hard time integrating Russian weaponry into what is now a mainly US-trained and armed force structure. And like Iran, Arab gas exporters (Qatar, Algeria, and potentially Libya) all stand to benefit from European efforts to reduce dependence on Russian gas supplies.
Moreover, Moscow’s annexation of Crimea could lead to an important problem for Russia’s image among Sunnis in the Middle East and elsewhere. If the Muslim Crimean Tatar population, which largely opposed Russia’s move on their territory, is treated badly by their new rulers, concern for their plight could rise in the Muslim World. Renewed opposition activity inside Russia’s North Caucasus and other predominantly Muslim regions and the brutal response this would elicit from Moscow, combined with continued Russian support for Syria’s Alawite minority regime and Shi’a Iran, could contribute to Turks and Sunni Arabs also seeing Russia as anti-Sunni — and to their seeing the West as an essential ally against a common Russian threat.
Finally, the more absorbed the Russian leadership becomes with affairs in Ukraine and Europe in general, the more Moscow’s ability to devote attention and resources to the Middle East may actually decline. Whether Moscow will now be able to increase its influence in the Middle East, then, is very much open to doubt.
]]>by Mark N. Katz
Now that Russian forces have taken Crimea away from Ukraine, what will President Vladimir Putin do next?
There’s one thing he clearly will not do, and that’s give Crimea back to Kiev, as Ukrainian and Western governments have been calling for. Just as Moscow has backed “independent” [...]]]>
by Mark N. Katz
Now that Russian forces have taken Crimea away from Ukraine, what will President Vladimir Putin do next?
There’s one thing he clearly will not do, and that’s give Crimea back to Kiev, as Ukrainian and Western governments have been calling for. Just as Moscow has backed “independent” pro-Russian governments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia ever since Russian forces seized control of them from Georgia in 2008, Moscow undoubtedly intends to maintain the “new order” in Crimea indefinitely.
What exactly will that new order look like? If indeed the Crimean parliament’s plan for a referendum on whether the region should “join Russia” is held on March 16, it will undoubtedly pass. While the Ukrainian and Tatar populations oppose this, the Russian majority in Crimea has long wanted to leave Ukraine and “rejoin” Russia.
(At some point after the Bolshevik Revolution, Crimea was assigned to the Russian Federation, but in 1954 Khrushchev transferred it to Ukraine. This did not matter much as long as the Soviet Union held together, but after it broke up in 1991, Russian nationalists both in Crimea and in Russia itself have been calling for the “return” of Crimea to Russia.)
If this referendum is held and yields the expected result of an overwhelming vote in favor of Crimea joining Russia, it is not clear whether Putin will proceed to incorporate it into Russia, recognize it as independent (like he did in Abkhazia and South Ossetia), or allow it to remain in limbo. Choosing the last of these options would allow hope to remain alive in Ukraine and the West that Crimea will someday return to Kiev’s control — even if Putin has no intention of allowing this. Recognizing Crimea as independent would anger Ukraine and the West, but would still allow them to hope. Incorporating Crimea into Russia, though, would signal that Moscow has no intention of allowing Crimea to return to Ukraine either now or ever.
It might seem that absorbing Crimea into Russia would not be a good choice for Moscow due to the negative effect this would have on Russian relations both with Ukraine and the West. From Putin’s point of view, though, this might actually be the most desirable course of action. Since the “color revolutions” in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan of the mid-2000s, the widespread anti-Putin demonstrations in Russia itself in late 2011/early 2012, and the recent events in Ukraine that led to the downfall of a pro-Russian government and the rise of a pro-Western one there, Putin has been fearful about the growing democratic movement in Russia that could become strong enough to topple him.
But given that incorporating Crimea into Russia would undoubtedly be popular with much of the Russian public, Western insistence that Russia give Crimea back to Ukraine might actually serve to alienate the Russian public from the West and (Putin hopes) democracy.
Russia could also now choose to absorb other parts of Ukraine where there are large Russian populations. While both Ukraine and the West would howl in protest, Western inaction at Putin’s successful wresting of control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia in 2008 and Crimea from Ukraine recently might well lead him to conclude that he can do this again with little cost.
And he might be right. However, in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Crimea Putin benefited from the fact that much of the local populations welcomed his actions. There are places in eastern Ukraine where this would also be true, but there is also a significant Ukrainian population that would oppose such a move. The danger Putin faces is that he might overestimate the local demand for absorption into the Russian sphere of influence and underestimate local opposition to it. The more of Ukraine he decides to “liberate,” the greater the risk that he will encounter this problem. Furthermore, local opposition in Ukraine to absorption by Russia, whether it is violent or peaceful, would not only serve to delegitimize this Russian effort in Ukraine and the West, but could lead to more opposition to his rule inside Russia.
Putin’s success so far in Crimea certainly gave rise to the appearance that he now has additional options to expand Russian influence in Ukraine, and perhaps elsewhere. But a decision to exercise those options in the near term may actually serve to limit his options in the long term.
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