by Charles Naas
The slog to a possible historic agreement between Iran and the P5+1 (the U.S., Britain, France, China and Russia plus Germany) has concluded for now in Vienna and will reconvene there on March 17. The major problems facing the participants are by now well-known. We can accordingly expect both sides to at first deliver their basic positions and any subsequent movement to be laid out in bilateral discussions to assess reactions before anything is made public and formal.
Missing so far from all this is any firm indication of what middle and long-term aims Washington holds. The negotiators and supporting staff at State and the White House have, quite miraculously, maintained considerable discipline and not leaked information. Although the latest round in Vienna ended on a positive note, the administration continues to warn that success in the talks is by no means a sure thing. This somberness may be traditional and wise negotiating tactics but there is little basis for optimism at this point.
When the US finally joined the Europeans in their effort to control Iran’s nuclear program in 2006, its motivations were not at all clear. Obviously the secret talks in Oman (2011-12) and at the UN in 2013 supported the notion that indeed it might be worth our while to test the negotiating waters with Iran more intensely. In time, other secret exchanges will probably be revealed. However, looking ahead, did we enter the talks primarily and largely out of non-proliferation concerns? Were Israeli threats of destroying Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and the real possibility of our being dragged into another crisis or war the principal motivations? At the time, President Barack Obama had indicated he recognized that the American population had no heart for further conflict in the Middle East and was attempting to severely reduce our forces and our aims in Afghanistan.
For a President now well into his second term and facing a Congress in which his own party does not fully support him and a House of Representatives that opposes all his actions, any initiative concerning the Middle East, particularly involving Iran, seems ambitious. He could just let the matter drift and wait until 2016 and go back home to Chicago. But doing so or even just restricting our aims with Iran to the nuclear issue, as important and difficult as it is, is too limiting when the scope of other regional challenges are taken into account.
Iran and Turkey are the largest and — along with Israel — the strongest and most influential nations in the area. Politically, Israel has for some time had an informal semi-alliance relationship with the Arab monarchies — Egypt, Syria and Libya — which were/are torn by currently unsolvable violence. Turkey has meanwhile reduced its ties with Israel, has been forced to limit its hopes of becoming accepted as part of Europe and has been forced to secure its borders with Syria and take care of thousands of Syrian refugees.
Iran has been a missing part of the calculus for us, except for its opposition to our efforts to get through this lengthy period of regional instability in the Middle East. Our relations with Iran historically have gone through the ouster of its Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1953, which we orchestrated; an allied relationship — CENTO and the 1959 bilateral treaty –; the sale of enormous quantities of modern arms in return for very significant aid in the Cold War (ties that became too close to be maintained); and three decades of no official relations brought on by the turmoil of its 1979 revolution. We have experienced the highs and the lows during this time. Have we learned much?
No matter from what direction one views the Middle East, Iran is presently very important. It is a player in the Persian Gulf and in a dominant military position; it is heavily engaged in the Syrian conflict; its influence with Hezbollah and Lebanon is significant; and it’s as concerned as we are over the revival of the Taliban and Sunni Islamic extremism in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Has the administration explored the more obvious areas of mutual interest it shares with Iran, such as security and stability in Afghanistan? Are we looking at ways our ties with Israel do not dominate our Mideast policies and are there ways that Iranian-Israeli hostility can be modified? Little things like President Hassan Rouhani’s public Rosh Hashanah greeting last year and the fact that Iran and Israel stayed in their seats at recent conferences while the other talked may have a larger meaning. The Iranians are sophisticated enough to know that Israeli worries are a major factor within Congress and the general public. For its part, the Iranian government — at least the element to which Rouhani and his Foreign Minister Javad Zarif belong — has indicated that it perceives the solution to the nuclear issues as the opening act of a new relationship. That position, which Zarif has held for number of years, could be an artful “come-on” in an effort to get concessions in the nuclear agreement. But I think not. The sanctions are hurting and Iran is in a period where pragmatic objectives are taking a slim lead over ideology.
Much of this might appear to be useless speculation but it’s all part and parcel of what will take place in Vienna. Either side may be influenced in the nuclear discussions by future hopes. The optimists are already prematurely suggesting opening an Interests Section –one step below an Embassy– to manage our affairs in Tehran. We are approaching a crucial point that will determine whether a strong Iran can become moderate and helpful in addressing the serious matters now blazing from the Mediterranean to the Indus River. Following a failure to get to a nuclear agreement and move on to other matters, it would be difficult to pick up the pieces. That’s why it’s important to begin talking with Iran about areas of mutual interest now.
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