via IPS News
A Dangerous Delusion is the work of one of Britain’s most brilliant political commentators, Peter Oborne, and an Irish physicist, David Morrison, who has written powerfully about the misleading of British public and parliamentary opinion in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq War.
This book will infuriate [...]]]>
via IPS News
A Dangerous Delusion is the work of one of Britain’s most brilliant political commentators, Peter Oborne, and an Irish physicist, David Morrison, who has written powerfully about the misleading of British public and parliamentary opinion in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq War.
This book will infuriate neoconservatives, Likudniks and members of the Saudi royal family but enlighten all who struggle with what to think about the claim that Iran’s nuclear programme threatens the survival of Israel, the security of Arab states in the Persian Gulf, and global peace.
Writing with verve and concision as well as with the indignation that has been a feature of good criticism since the days of Juvenal, the authors spare the reader potentially tedious detail so that the book can be devoured in a matter of hours.
Their purpose, stated early in the work, is to argue that U.S. and European confrontation with Iran over its nuclear activities is unnecessary and irrational. Insofar as some concern about Iranian intentions has been and is justified, that concern can be allayed by measures that Iran has been ready to volunteer since 2005 and by more intrusive international monitoring.
An international legal instrument, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), has a starring part in the story. This treaty, one of the fruits of the détente following the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, has been remarkably successful in discouraging the spread of nuclear weapons. Iran has been a party since the NPT entered into force in 1970.
In 1968 a senior U.S. official testified before the Senate that the newly drafted NPT did not prohibit the acquisition of nuclear technologies that could be used for military as well as civil purposes (dual-use).
It was assumed that parties would have an interest in complying with a treaty designed to limit the spread of devastating weapons and that those tempted to stray would be deterred by frequent international monitoring of the use of nuclear material.
Iran’s troubles began with India’s 1974 nuclear test. Although India had not signed, let alone ratified, the NPT and had used plutonium to fuel its device, the United States and Europe interpreted the explosion as evidence that the NPT’s drafters had blundered in failing to prohibit have-nots from acquiring dual-use technologies such as uranium enrichment.
They formed the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and set about making emerging states’ acquisition of such technologies progressively harder – in a sense, amending the NPT without the consent of most of its parties.
Then, in the 1990s, Israeli politicians began to claim publicly that Iran had a nuclear weapons programme and was only a few years away from producing warheads.
As a result, when Iranian opponents of the Islamic Republic claimed in 2002 that Iran was secretly building a uranium enrichment plant, many U.N. members were ready to believe that Iran was violating or was about to violate the NPT. Such was the sense of danger generated by the United States and some of its allies that people overlooked the absence of evidence that Iran had even intended the enrichment plant to be secret.
Instead, Iranian admission that scientists and engineers had engaged in undeclared nuclear research led people to assume that Iran’s obligation to declare the enrichment plant 180 days before the introduction of nuclear material (and not earlier) would have been ignored had it not been for the opposition group’s whistle-blowing.
Iran’s travails since 2004 – condemnation by the IAEA Board of Governors and the U.N. Security Council, ever harsher sanctions, U.S. and Israeli military threats in violation of the U.N. Charter – would have been both logical and rough justice if there had been evidence that Iran was intent on acquiring nuclear weapons.
That is not the case, however, as Oborne and Morrison make plain. On the contrary, since 2007 U.S. intelligence estimates have stressed the absence of an Iranian decision to use its enrichment plants to make fuel for nuclear weapons; the IAEA has repeatedly stated that Iran’s known nuclear material remains in civil use; and the only nuclear weapon activity in Iran for which there is evidence is the kind of research that many NPT parties are assumed to have undertaken.
Trying to account for this irrational handling of the Iranian case, the authors posit a U.S. determination to prevent Iran from becoming a major Middle East power.
That view may be the most questionable of their judgements, as possible explanations exist elsewhere: intensive lobbying in Washington, London and Paris by Israel and Saudi Arabia, which see Iran as a regional rival and need to justify the strategic demands they make of the United States, the influence of counter-proliferation experts obsessed with closing an imagined NPT loophole, the Islamic Republic’s terrorism and human rights record, and antagonisms born of bitter memories.
The hypocrisy of politicians is, rightly, a target of the authors’ indignation. In 2010 then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, defending the imposition of sanctions, proclaimed: “Our goal is to pressure the Iranian government… without contributing to the suffering of ordinary Iranians.”
In 2012 President Obama, seeking re-election, boasted: “We organised the strongest sanctions in history and it is [sic] crippling the Iranian economy.”
But the authors’ fiercest indignation is reserved for the mainstream media, whom they indict for embedding in public discourse the idea that Iran has or is seeking nuclear weapons by ignoring facts and serving as a conduit for anti-Iranian propaganda.
By endorsing the proposition that Iran’s nuclear ambitions must be curbed by sanctions or the use of force, the mainstream media risk repeating their past mistake of failing to question the Bush/Blair case for war on Saddam Hussein.
A Dangerous Delusion was written before Iran’s June presidential election, begging the question of whether the re-emergence of pragmatic diplomatists in Tehran will encourage Western politicians to heed the “plea for sanity” with which Oborne and Morrison close.
“It’s time we [in the West] asked…why we have felt such a need to stigmatise and punish Iran….Once we do that…we may find it surprisingly easy to strike a deal which can satisfy all sides.”
]]>News and views relevant to US mideast foreign policy for Sept. 20
“Iranian policymakers should understand that failing to limit the enrichment program will eventually trigger war”: The Security Times carries a commentary by Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, an influential British think tank. Outlining the continuing [...]]]>
News and views relevant to US mideast foreign policy for Sept. 20
“Iranian policymakers should understand that failing to limit the enrichment program will eventually trigger war”: The Security Times carries a commentary by Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, an influential British think tank. Outlining the continuing difficulties in negotiating an agreement on Iran’s enrichment activities, Fitzpatrick notes that the lack of an agreement means that pressure will grow to take military action in the coming years:
…. Iran already is nuclear capable – now possessing all the materials and technology, requiring only a political decision – and, while unpalatable, this status has not triggered military action.
The problem is that the red line separating nuclear-capable from nuclear-armed will become less clear as Iran’s enrichment program makes further advances. At present, Iran is still months away from being able to make a successful dash to produce weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU). Because IAEA inspections take place on average twice a month, any such ‘breakout’ at declared facilities would be detected in time.
If, however, the Iranians sought to produce HEU at clandestine plants, they could not be confident the work would remain hidden. Twice already, secret enrichment plants have been exposed. Iran might judge that it could get away with such exposure, claiming, as it does today, that it does not need to follow IAEA rules about early notification of new nuclear facilities.
If this is Iran’s calculation, it could well backfire. Iran does not know how close it could come to crossing the line to weapons production before its adversaries determined it was too close. If Iran’s enrichment program continues unabated, at some point Western intelligence agencies will judge that because the uranium stockpile is too large, the technology too advanced and the hiding places too many, a dash for the bomb cannot be detected in time. The red line of weapons production will have become too blurred to serve as an effective tripwire.
“Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations”: The Congressional Research Service asks “Has Iran Violated the NPT?” in a new report and concludes that the matter is “unclear” though the IAEA believes Iran “has violated its safeguards agreement” and was, until at least 2003, pursuing military research as part of the program. It notes that investigations are still ongoing over claims that Iran violated the NPT’s Article II, “which state[s] that non-nuclear-weapon states-parties shall not ‘manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices’ or “’seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.’”
The 2007 US National Intelligence Estimate assessed in 2007 that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003.
In response to an IAEA Board of Governors ruling that Iran had not met its disclosure (and safeguards) obligations, the Iranian press reported that “Iranian Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani said that the most recent resolution issued against Iran by the International Atomic Energy Agency raises doubt about the benefit of being a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).”
“Who’s Sabotaging Iran’s Nuclear Program?”: Building off an earlier New York Times report on allegations of sabotage against Iran’s nuclear facilities, the Daily Beast’s Eli Lake questions if this is an act of escalation by the perpetrators:
Fereydoun Abbasi, Iran’s vice president and the chief of its nuclear-energy agency, disclosed that power lines between the holy city of Qom and the underground Fordow nuclear centrifuge facility were blown up with explosives on Aug. 17. He also said the power lines leading to Iran’s Natanz facilities were blown up as well. On the day after the power was cut off at Fordow, an inspector from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) asked to visit the facility.
The disclosure is significant. To start, it is the first piece of evidence to suggest opponents of the Iranian program are targeting the country’s electrical grid and doing so on the ground.
The US has publicly denied it is carrying out attacks on any facilities and military or civilian targets in Iran. An NBC investigative report from the summer reported that Israel, not the US, is actually orchestrating the bombings and assassinations. Rather than risk discovery of its own network in the Islamic Republic, the NBC said that the Mossad relies on members of the People’s Mujahedeen of Iran (PMO) to carry out these operations.
“Poll: Majority of Palestinians, Israelis say attack on Iran would result in major war”: Haaretz reports on a new poll in Israel expressing growing concern among Israeli citizens and Palestinians in the Occupied Territories that a war with Iran would “would ignite a major regional war,” though the poll also noted that a significant number of respondents do not believe a war is likely this year anyway:
According to the study’s finding, 77 percent of Israeli respondents and 82 percent of Palestinian respondents said that an Israeli attack on Iran would result in a major regional confrontation.
Regarding the possibility of an Israeli strike without U.S. backing, 65 percent of Israelis were against such a course of action, an increase from 52 percent in June.
Also, the study found that 70 percent of Israelis did not believe Israel would strike Iran in the coming months, with only 20 percent of respondents saying they believe the Iranians’ goal is to destroy Israel.
The Israeli press also reported that US diplomats have warned their Israeli counterparts that should Israel attack Iran this year, it would jeopardize Israel’s peace treaties with Jordan and Egypt.
]]>Laura Rozen clears up the cloud of confusion over Ehud Barak’s comments last week implying that a new U.S. intelligence assessment on Iran that shares Israel’s assessment of Iran’s nuclear program had been released:
Several American former officials told Al-Monitor Thursday that they believed what Israeli officials may [...]]]>
Laura Rozen clears up the cloud of confusion over Ehud Barak’s comments last week implying that a new U.S. intelligence assessment on Iran that shares Israel’s assessment of Iran’s nuclear program had been released:
]]>Several American former officials told Al-Monitor Thursday that they believed what Israeli officials may have been briefed on is not an NIE, but a smaller, more focused report on certain aspects of Iran’s nuclear program.
Non-proliferation analysts speculated that the new U.S. report could focus on one of the categories of continuing research activities listed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in its November 2011 report on Iran.
However, “carrying on scattered research activities does not amount to a full-fledged restart of an integrated weapons program,” Greg Thielmann, a former US intelligence analyst and senior fellow at the Arms Control Association, wrote in an ACA Iran Nuclear Threat Assessment brief (.pdf).
Q: What is the most authoritative U.S. assessment of Iran’s nuclear program?
Daryl Kimball: The most authoritative U.S. government report on Iran’s nuclear program is the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which is an all source, multi-agency assessment of Iran’s nuclear program. Each year the Intelligence Community prepares its annual “Worldwide Threat Assessment”, which includes any updates on Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities. The key findings of the NIE still apply. In presenting the intelligence community’s annual “Worldwide Threat Assessment” to the Senate Committee on Intelligence on January 31, Director of National Intelligence, James R. Clapper, used language identical to that used in recent years on a number of critical points:
- “Iran has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons, making the central issue its political will to do so. These [technical] advancements contribute to our judgment that Iran is technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon, if it so chooses.”
- “We judge Iran’s nuclear decision making is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to influence Tehran.”
Clapper’s testimony acknowledged Iran’s additional accumulation of low-enriched uranium at both the 3.5 percent and 20 percent level and the start of enrichment at its second enrichment plant near Qom.
The senior intelligence officials also endorsed the November 2011 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report as being the best public accounting to date of Iran’s nuclear activities, including information “relevant to possible military dimensions.”
However, the U.S. intelligence community’s assessment of Iran’s post-2003 nuclear activities has apparently not convinced it that Tehran has decided to build a nuclear weapon. Moreover, Clapper’s testimony suggests that Iran has the domestic capabilities eventually to do so, regardless of foreign actions taken against it. The “central issue” is thus affecting political will.
Q: If Iran made the decision to make nuclear weapons, what is the most authoritative estimate of how quickly it could do that?
Daryl Kimball: It is extremely difficult to accurately estimate how long it would take for Iran to make nuclear weapons if it decided to do so, in part because: a) estimates of the efficiency rates of its centrifuges are estimates; b) if Iran did decide to build nuclear weapons it might have a clandestine facility that could accelerate its progress; c) it depends on how many nuclear weapons we are talking about; and d) acquiring enough weapons grade fissile material for one bomb does not a nuclear arsenal make; in order to be able to build and deliver a small arsenal with confidence, a state must build up its supply of fissile material, assemble and possibly test its warhead design, and conduct tests involving its delivery system and the warhead design. At various stages along this path, a state runs a high risk that one of more of these activities are detected.
Taking all of these factors together, most independent experts estimate Iran is years not months away from building nuclear weapons if it chooses to do so. Nevertheless, we should not be complacent about the risk of a nuclear-armed Iran.
Q: Does Iran have a nuclear weapons program?
The November 2011 IAEA report underscores that Iran was engaged in a comprehensive nuclear weapons-related research program, which was halted in late 2003 after being exposed. Since then, some weaponization-related activities have resumed. Unless Iran cooperates with the IAEA regarding the outstanding questions about the past and possibly ongoing “studies” related to nuclear weapons and agrees to a work plan than can help verify that such activities have ceased, it is hard to say with confidence that Iran does not have an active nuclear weapons research and development effort.
Although the IAEA and U.S. intelligence findings show that Iran is slowly improving its uranium-enrichment capabilities and already has some of the expertise needed to build nuclear weapons, they also make it clear that a nuclear-armed Iran is neither imminent nor inevitable.
The bottom line is that Iran is pursuing activities that could shorten the timeframe to build the bomb once and if it makes that decision.
Q: How has Iran failed to live up to its IAEA obligations?
Daryl Kimball: Serious concerns about Iran’s compliance with its IAEA safeguards commitments first arose in late 2002 when the IAEA began investigating two secret Iranian nuclear facilities, a heavy-water production plant near Arak and a gas centrifuge uranium-enrichment facility near Natanz. Since that time, the agency has identified several clandestine nuclear activities and experiments, some of which violated Iran’s safeguards agreement with it. Much of Iran’s uranium-enrichment program is based on equipment and designs acquired through former Pakistani nuclear official A.Q. Khan’s secret supply network.
After the revelations of Iran’s clandestine nuclear activities, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom launched negotiations with Iran to address international concerns about the intent and scope of its nuclear program. These negotiations collapsed in 2005.
In response in 2006, the IAEA Board of Governors declared Iran in noncompliance with its safeguards obligations and referred the matter to the UN Security Council.
Since 2006, the Security Council has adopted a number of resolutions calling on Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment-related activities and cooperate fully with the IAEA investigation.
See the news report on the February 2006 IAEA resolution that outlines the basic concerns and the IAEA resolution itself online here.
Q: The U.S. officially states that Iran has not decided to build a nuclear weapon but there is constant talk about how the world can convince Iran not to build a nuclear weapon. Do we have evidence that Iran is considering that option? What do we know Iran is really doing vs. what people think it’s doing?
Daryl Kimball: What Iran’s leaders ultimately intend to do—to try to build nuclear weapons or not—is not clear. What is clear is that Iran seems to be keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons in part by developing various nuclear capabilities that better position it to produce such weapons, should it choose to do so. Even the U.S. intelligence community acknowledges “We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.”
Q: Professor Daniel Drezner wrote in Foreign Policy last week that the “sanctions policy is pushing the United States into a policy cul-de-sac where the only way out is through regime change”. Washington Post columnist Richard Cohen had said a day earlier that “there’ no sleep here for anyone” if Iran goes nuclear and “The ultimate remedy is Iranian regime change.” What is the Obama administration’s official policy with regard to Iran’s nuclear program? Do you agree or disagree that the sanctions policy against Iran is moving toward regime change and why?
Daryl Kimball: There are a lot of people in Washington who wish they were the Secretary of State. Thankfully they are not. The Obama administration is not seeking regime change, but is seeking to bring increasing international pressure on Iran in order to increase the cost of pursuing actions that could bring it closer to being able to build nuclear weapons and to encourage it to return to the negotiating table. The primary goal of U.S. policy appears to me to be to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran.
The UNSC-mandated sanctions directed at Iran’s nuclear and missile sectors have slowed Iran’s progress and are justified, but the harsher unilateral sanctions now being put in place by the United States and the EU run the risk of hurting the Iranian people and reinforcing Iran’s leaders’ determination to reject overtures and demands to restrain their nuclear program and to negotiate because the sanctions appear to them to be an attempt to destabilize the country and the regime.
Q: Do you think accuracy dominates in the media with regard to reporting facts about Iran’s nuclear program?
Daryl Kimball: Some reporters and editors are on tight deadlines, as well as politicians, and unfortunately they are not always accurate in their characterization of what we know about Iran’s nuclear activities and intentions.
The fact is that IAEA and U.S. intelligence findings show that Iran is slowly improving its uranium-enrichment capabilities and already has some of the expertise needed to build nuclear weapons, but they also make it clear that a nuclear-armed Iran is neither imminent nor inevitable.
On the other hand, there is good reason to be concerned about its nuclear ambitions. There is disturbing and credible evidence that Iran has engaged in activities that have nuclear warhead development applications and it is enriching uranium to levels that it cannot currently utilize for civilian purposes.
What is to be done? UN-mandated sanctions can buy time and improve negotiating leverage, but the time available must be used constructively. Sanctions alone will not turn Tehran around and could harden its resolve.
Moreover, talk of military strikes against Iranian nuclear and military targets is counterproductive and, in the long run, cannot prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. The “military option” would set back Iran’s program for no more than a couple of years, convince Iran’s leadership to pursue nuclear weapons openly, rally Iranian domestic support behind the regime, and lead to adverse economic and security consequences.
Ultimately, resolving the nuclear issue will require sufficient pressure and inducements to convince Iran’s current and future leaders that they stand to gain more from forgoing nuclear weapons than from any decision to build them.
]]>Q: What is the most authoritative U.S. assessment of Iran’s nuclear program?
Daryl Kimball: The most authoritative U.S. government report on Iran’s nuclear program is the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which is an all source, multi-agency assessment of Iran’s nuclear program. Each year the Intelligence Community prepares its annual “Worldwide Threat Assessment”, which includes any updates on Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities. The key findings of the NIE still apply. In presenting the intelligence community’s annual “Worldwide Threat Assessment” to the Senate Committee on Intelligence on January 31, Director of National Intelligence, James R. Clapper, used language identical to that used in recent years on a number of critical points:
- “Iran has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons, making the central issue its political will to do so. These [technical] advancements contribute to our judgment that Iran is technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon, if it so chooses.”
- “We judge Iran’s nuclear decision making is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to influence Tehran.”
Clapper’s testimony acknowledged Iran’s additional accumulation of low-enriched uranium at both the 3.5 percent and 20 percent level and the start of enrichment at its second enrichment plant near Qom.
The senior intelligence officials also endorsed the November 2011 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report as being the best public accounting to date of Iran’s nuclear activities, including information “relevant to possible military dimensions.”
However, the U.S. intelligence community’s assessment of Iran’s post-2003 nuclear activities has apparently not convinced it that Tehran has decided to build a nuclear weapon. Moreover, Clapper’s testimony suggests that Iran has the domestic capabilities eventually to do so, regardless of foreign actions taken against it. The “central issue” is thus affecting political will.
Q: If Iran made the decision to make nuclear weapons, what is the most authoritative estimate of how quickly it could do that?
Daryl Kimball: It is extremely difficult to accurately estimate how long it would take for Iran to make nuclear weapons if it decided to do so, in part because: a) estimates of the efficiency rates of its centrifuges are estimates; b) if Iran did decide to build nuclear weapons it might have a clandestine facility that could accelerate its progress; c) it depends on how many nuclear weapons we are talking about; and d) acquiring enough weapons grade fissile material for one bomb does not a nuclear arsenal make; in order to be able to build and deliver a small arsenal with confidence, a state must build up its supply of fissile material, assemble and possibly test its warhead design, and conduct tests involving its delivery system and the warhead design. At various stages along this path, a state runs a high risk that one of more of these activities are detected.
Taking all of these factors together, most independent experts estimate Iran is years not months away from building nuclear weapons if it chooses to do so. Nevertheless, we should not be complacent about the risk of a nuclear-armed Iran.
Q: Does Iran have a nuclear weapons program?
The November 2011 IAEA report underscores that Iran was engaged in a comprehensive nuclear weapons-related research program, which was halted in late 2003 after being exposed. Since then, some weaponization-related activities have resumed. Unless Iran cooperates with the IAEA regarding the outstanding questions about the past and possibly ongoing “studies” related to nuclear weapons and agrees to a work plan than can help verify that such activities have ceased, it is hard to say with confidence that Iran does not have an active nuclear weapons research and development effort.
Although the IAEA and U.S. intelligence findings show that Iran is slowly improving its uranium-enrichment capabilities and already has some of the expertise needed to build nuclear weapons, they also make it clear that a nuclear-armed Iran is neither imminent nor inevitable.
The bottom line is that Iran is pursuing activities that could shorten the timeframe to build the bomb once and if it makes that decision.
Q: How has Iran failed to live up to its IAEA obligations?
Daryl Kimball: Serious concerns about Iran’s compliance with its IAEA safeguards commitments first arose in late 2002 when the IAEA began investigating two secret Iranian nuclear facilities, a heavy-water production plant near Arak and a gas centrifuge uranium-enrichment facility near Natanz. Since that time, the agency has identified several clandestine nuclear activities and experiments, some of which violated Iran’s safeguards agreement with it. Much of Iran’s uranium-enrichment program is based on equipment and designs acquired through former Pakistani nuclear official A.Q. Khan’s secret supply network.
After the revelations of Iran’s clandestine nuclear activities, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom launched negotiations with Iran to address international concerns about the intent and scope of its nuclear program. These negotiations collapsed in 2005.
In response in 2006, the IAEA Board of Governors declared Iran in noncompliance with its safeguards obligations and referred the matter to the UN Security Council.
Since 2006, the Security Council has adopted a number of resolutions calling on Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment-related activities and cooperate fully with the IAEA investigation.
See the news report on the February 2006 IAEA resolution that outlines the basic concerns and the IAEA resolution itself online here.
Q: The U.S. officially states that Iran has not decided to build a nuclear weapon but there is constant talk about how the world can convince Iran not to build a nuclear weapon. Do we have evidence that Iran is considering that option? What do we know Iran is really doing vs. what people think it’s doing?
Daryl Kimball: What Iran’s leaders ultimately intend to do—to try to build nuclear weapons or not—is not clear. What is clear is that Iran seems to be keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons in part by developing various nuclear capabilities that better position it to produce such weapons, should it choose to do so. Even the U.S. intelligence community acknowledges “We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.”
Q: Professor Daniel Drezner wrote in Foreign Policy last week that the “sanctions policy is pushing the United States into a policy cul-de-sac where the only way out is through regime change”. Washington Post columnist Richard Cohen had said a day earlier that “there’ no sleep here for anyone” if Iran goes nuclear and “The ultimate remedy is Iranian regime change.” What is the Obama administration’s official policy with regard to Iran’s nuclear program? Do you agree or disagree that the sanctions policy against Iran is moving toward regime change and why?
Daryl Kimball: There are a lot of people in Washington who wish they were the Secretary of State. Thankfully they are not. The Obama administration is not seeking regime change, but is seeking to bring increasing international pressure on Iran in order to increase the cost of pursuing actions that could bring it closer to being able to build nuclear weapons and to encourage it to return to the negotiating table. The primary goal of U.S. policy appears to me to be to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran.
The UNSC-mandated sanctions directed at Iran’s nuclear and missile sectors have slowed Iran’s progress and are justified, but the harsher unilateral sanctions now being put in place by the United States and the EU run the risk of hurting the Iranian people and reinforcing Iran’s leaders’ determination to reject overtures and demands to restrain their nuclear program and to negotiate because the sanctions appear to them to be an attempt to destabilize the country and the regime.
Q: Do you think accuracy dominates in the media with regard to reporting facts about Iran’s nuclear program?
Daryl Kimball: Some reporters and editors are on tight deadlines, as well as politicians, and unfortunately they are not always accurate in their characterization of what we know about Iran’s nuclear activities and intentions.
The fact is that IAEA and U.S. intelligence findings show that Iran is slowly improving its uranium-enrichment capabilities and already has some of the expertise needed to build nuclear weapons, but they also make it clear that a nuclear-armed Iran is neither imminent nor inevitable.
On the other hand, there is good reason to be concerned about its nuclear ambitions. There is disturbing and credible evidence that Iran has engaged in activities that have nuclear warhead development applications and it is enriching uranium to levels that it cannot currently utilize for civilian purposes.
What is to be done? UN-mandated sanctions can buy time and improve negotiating leverage, but the time available must be used constructively. Sanctions alone will not turn Tehran around and could harden its resolve.
Moreover, talk of military strikes against Iranian nuclear and military targets is counterproductive and, in the long run, cannot prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. The “military option” would set back Iran’s program for no more than a couple of years, convince Iran’s leadership to pursue nuclear weapons openly, rally Iranian domestic support behind the regime, and lead to adverse economic and security consequences.
Ultimately, resolving the nuclear issue will require sufficient pressure and inducements to convince Iran’s current and future leaders that they stand to gain more from forgoing nuclear weapons than from any decision to build them.
]]>By far the most significant revelation in the piece concerns the recently-completed 2011 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). NIEs represent the consensus judgments of the 16 agencies that make up the U.S. intelligence community, and as such their findings frequently have major political ramifications. The 2007 NIE was particularly important (and contested), for it concluded that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and found no evidence that the program had resumed.
Predictably, the 2007 NIE elicited howls of outrage from hawks who have been pushing military action against Tehran, and in the years since they have constantly attempted to discredit it. It’s worth making clear, however, just what the NIE did and didn’t say. It found no evidence of an active Iranian nuclear weapons program — that is, a nuclear program with elements that had no conceivable civilian uses (e.g., nuclear warhead design). The NIE never claimed that Iran had halted its nuclear program entirely, only that none of the nuclear program’s projects were unambiguously military in scope. Thus, to point to the fact that Iran continues to enrich uranium as evidence that the 2007 NIE has been discredited, as the Iran hawks have frequently tried to do, simply misses the point; the NIE did not suggest that Iran had stopped enriching uranium.
Nor did the NIE claim that it’s inconceivable that the Iranian regime ultimately seeks a nuclear weapon. It’s quite plausible that the regime does (not least, to deter U.S. or Israeli military action). What the NIE claimed was that there was no hard evidence or smoking gun proving that this was the case. Thus the relevant question is not whether we believe in our heart of hearts that Iran is seeking nukes, but whether there is any incontrovertible evidence that it is. This question is particularly salient in the wake of the Iraq war intelligence fiasco. In the runup to war, most people (including many war opponents) suspected that Saddam Hussein had WMD programs of some kind, but the U.S. would have been better served to put less weight on such suspicions and more weight on the actual evidential record.
So what does the Hersh piece actually say? The biggest revelation is that despite four years of intense political pressure from Iran hawks pushing the intelligence community to renounce the 2007 NIE, the just-released 2011 NIE continues to find no clear evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program. According to Hersh, analysts at the military’s Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in particular have pushed back against this political pressure; in fact, the DIA analysts suggest that Iran’s nuclear weapons program was primarily directed at Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, not Israel, and was abandoned following the fall of Saddam.
Typically, a declassified version of the NIE is released for public consumption. This has not been done with the 2011 NIE, however, for reasons that are unclear. It’s possible that the Obama administration fears a political backlash along the lines of the 2007 version, or that it is worried that publicizing the new NIE would undercut its relatively hard-line stance on Iran. Regardless, the fact that an declassified version of the NIE has not been released means that Hersh’s piece is the first time the public is hearing about it.
In light of this, it is obvious that most of the criticism of Hersh’s piece completely ignores its central contention. The issue, once again, is not whether we should believe in our heart of hearts that Iran is seeking a nuclear weapon. The issue is whether the U.S. intelligence community has found any incontrovertible evidence that this is the case. If Hersh’s account of the 2011 NIE is correct, the intelligence community has not, and this is a fact that surely deserves to be mentioned in discussions of the Iranian nuclear issue.
]]>