by Mitchell Plitnick

The tentative outreach from Washington toward Tehran has spurred speculation about a wide variety of connected issues. The desperation with which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has responded to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s so-called “charm offensive” adds fuel to Israel’s part in those rumors. Certainly, it is clear [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Mitchell Plitnick

The tentative outreach from Washington toward Tehran has spurred speculation about a wide variety of connected issues. The desperation with which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has responded to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s so-called “charm offensive” adds fuel to Israel’s part in those rumors. Certainly, it is clear that Netanyahu is worried about something.

The Israeli journalist Ben Caspit speculated last week on a U.S. plan to facilitate a (rather favorable for Israel) two-state deal between Israel and the Palestinians, while compensating Israel with the carrot of resolving the Iranian nuclear issue. Caspit’s view was broadly echoed in Ha’aretz by Barak Ravid after Rouhani’s speech at the United Nations.

According to Caspit, U.S. President Barack Obama was pressing Netanyahu to accede to his outline for a settlement of the Israel-Palestine conflict. In exchange for that acquiescence, Obama would, in this scenario, offer Netanyahu his personal pledge that he would prevent Iran from “acquiring nuclear capability.” That phrase is important, but it’s not entirely clear that Caspit, a native Hebrew speaker, included it intentionally. Indeed, “nuclear capability” is very possibly a threshold Iran has already passed, perhaps even a good number of years ago. Caspit may have meant that Obama would roll that ability back (though the fruits of research cannot be reversed, Iran’s uranium stockpiles and its refinement capabilities could, theoretically, be severely diminished or removed). Or he may have meant what he said.

In any case, Caspit posits that the deal Obama wants Israel and the Palestinians to accept is as follows:

• The permanent agreement will be implemented in phases, and the first phase will have a Palestinian state in a temporary border.
• The United States will commit to the Palestinian Authority to ensure that the full agreement will be implemented according to an established schedule.
• The issues of Jerusalem, the refugees and final borders will be postponed to later stages.
• The Palestinian state will be recognized by the United Nations, with the support of Israel, which will withdraw to the separation fence line.
• Any settlers wishing to stay in what will be Palestinian territory will be able to, provided they are willing to live under Palestinian rule.
• Israel will enact a generous “eviction-compensation” law, with international funding, and the settlers living in remote areas will converge to the borders of the separation line.

If this looks to you like the Oslo Accords reborn, you’re right. But it is also true that Israel’s current government will balk even at this, and it is almost certainly the best deal the Palestinians are likely to get as long as Netanyahu is in office. That alone makes it credible that Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas would agree to such a deal, even though it is highly unlikely to be met with the approval of the overwhelming majority of the Palestinians living in the West Bank.

Caspit reports that many members of Netanyahu’s party and other right-wing politicians and leaders of the settler collective are already mobilizing to thwart this idea. I have no reason to doubt that part of Caspit’s story. He is generally pretty good at getting the inside scoop in Israeli political maneuverings. And, some of my own contacts in Israel have been telling me that the right is very concerned about Netanyahu accepting some U.S. ideas about an agreement.

But Caspit has always seemed to me to be less solid on international matters. The Iran part of his story sounds pretty fishy. If Obama has any hope of lowering the temperature with Iran, something he seems committed to doing, he will have to find a way to live with Iran having enrichment capabilities on its own soil. Iran, as Obama well knows, will not agree to give that up, though they might consent to close monitoring of the process by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). As far as obtaining a pledge from Obama in this regard, that seems like a rather meager payment for Netanyahu. Congressional hawks have already gotten U.S. commitments to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon, and should we discover that Iran has resumed a pursuit of such weapons, there would be plenty of time to mount a military operation. The U.S. has already taken these stances. Obama’s pledge would add little, even if Netanyahu is concerned about a repeat of the backing off from an attack on Syria. If similar opposition to an attack on Iran materialized, a pledge would hardly be sufficient to overcome it, and Congress is unlikely in any case to oppose a strike on Iran the way it did the one on Syria.

No, I don’t think Caspit has the Iran part correct. Its purpose in the narrative is to give Obama something that is both carrot for Bibi and stick, but it would be neither. The value of that part is already in Bibi’s pocket.

But Caspit is very likely correct about that which is concerning the Israeli right. Any deal that is more forthcoming to the Palestinians than the one he describes would never pass Israel’s government, and the U.S. Congress would back the Israeli position to the hilt, mooting the already essentially non-existent hope of genuine U.S. pressure on Israel. But this one could win enough of Bibi’s current government so that Labor and perhaps another small party or two would be able to seal the deal. It would be met with Israeli approval, which means it will also be met with sufficient approval in Congress as well.

The Palestinians would very correctly reject such a deal. It clearly promises a renewal of Oslo, allowing Israel to escape any serious pressure for at least several years to come, with plenty of time for political realities, whether between Israel and the Palestinians or simply significant advancement of the already considerable regional turmoil, to give Israel what it needs to further delay the implementation of further phases. The lives of Palestinians in the West Bank would get even worse, as their cantons would “enjoy” the same independence Gaza currently does. We’ve seen how that goes.

If Caspit is correct, the fact that Abbas renewed his commitment to the U.S.-sponsored peace process on Wednesday is a chilling development. It certainly fits well with Caspit’s narrative. A weak and desperate PA acquiescing to such an awful deal makes some sense. Abbas would know as well as Bibi and Obama that this was the best deal he could possibly get in this process and from this Israeli government. The U.S.’ pledge for “increased involvement” is likely a way to push Bibi, who would still be reluctant to take this deal despite its obvious gains for and bias toward Israel, to accept the deal and to ensure that Abbas also knows that this is the best the U.S. is going to offer him.

Now, while I feel pretty certain that Caspit is right that this is what the Israeli right believes is happening, whether it really is coming about is another matter. He is correct in saying that it is unlikely Bibi would agree to a deal that was significantly better than this one, but that doesn’t mean the Palestinians would take it. There can be no doubt that such a deal would never come close to passing a Palestinian referendum, and, while one might think that this would mean Bibi would accept it easily, he still would be very reluctant to sign off on it, as it would cost him a lot of his political support at home and financial support abroad. The fact that such a peace wouldn’t even materialize would also mean he wouldn’t recoup those losses from more centrist quarters.

So, while it is far from certain that Caspit’s scenario is correct, it is also very possible that it is. It is certain that many in the Israeli right believe it. And it is even more certain that if the United States is pushing such a deal, it would be a disaster. A peace proposal accepted by Abbas and Bibi but rejected overwhelmingly by the Palestinians public would lock the current system in for the foreseeable future.

by Robert E. Hunter

For Secretary of State John Kerry, the good news this past week is that he has finally got Israel and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) to agree to talk directly about peace. The bad news is that Kerry now has the thankless task of delivering the [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Robert E. Hunter

For Secretary of State John Kerry, the good news this past week is that he has finally got Israel and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) to agree to talk directly about peace. The bad news is that Kerry now has the thankless task of delivering the goods.

The Secretary of State is wasting no time in getting started. He has asked Ambassador Martin Indyk to coordinate the process for the United States. Indyk was US ambassador to Israel (twice), assistant secretary of state for the region and senior official on the National Security Council (NSC) staff. He knows the issues and the dramatis personae and is committed to a two-state solution. He has the needed confidence of key people on Capitol Hill and in the American Jewish community. His first test, however, will be to establish credibility with the Palestinians as an honest broker.

The negotiations will be unusual because the most viable solution is well-known, as it should be after 34 years’ efforts. (Yours truly was NSC representative when the talks first began in May 1979). Most diplomats who have been involved in the peace process agree that the best parameters for a two-state solution were laid out by President Bill Clinton in December 2000 (found here). A more detailed variation is the so-called Geneva Accord, designed by some former Israeli and Palestinian negotiators.

By these formulae, Israel would gain sovereignty over portions of the West Bank that include most of the Jewish settlements and swap an equivalent amount of Israeli land to the Palestinian state. Palestine would effectively be demilitarized and security arrangements would be devised. Jerusalem would become the capital of both states. Some compensation would be made for Palestinian refugees from the 1947-48 war. Arab states must bless the arrangements and end all calls of war against Israel.

Other matters of consequence include agreement on a political, economic and physical connection between the West Bank and Gaza, one of which can be found here. The Hamas leadership in Gaza must end the conflict with Israel and recognize it as a Jewish state.

NATO forces could be stationed in Palestine to help provide security, including against terrorism. And outsiders need to provide substantial aid and investments to the Palestinian state, to give it a chance to survive and for the people to have a chance at bettering their lives. NATO countries would agree to provide the former (troops) and the West and hopefully rich Arab countries would provide the latter (money). These are small prices to pay for ending this seemingly endless conflict.

The roadmap to peace-with-security is thus complex but relatively clear. Yet there is so far no indication that either side will make the compromises needed to reach an agreement. The corrosive issue of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem is to be put off until later. Whether Israel will let Palestine share Jerusalem as its capital is far from clear. Nor is it clear that the PNA President, Mahmoud Abbas, can deliver on his part of a bargain, given the politics of the West Bank and Gaza.

Secretary Kerry has thus managed to lead the Israeli and Palestinian horses to water, but they so far lack the political will to drink. Nor is it clear that, if the process reaches the point of deal-cutting, President Barak Obama will assume the political onus of asking Israel to make concessions that will not sit well with some of the important domestic constituencies he needs to help him fulfill his legacy, which is in domestic and not foreign policy. He is not yet publicly invested in Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, though he has given Secretary Kerry free rein to see what he can achieve. At some point, however, Obama will have to do some heavy lifting. Without his direct and resolute involvement, peace will not be possible. Ideally, he should table the Clinton Parameters as the bottom-line US proposal.

There are thus enough doubts to buttress skepticism that Secretary Kerry’s efforts will succeed. But there are even deeper concerns; the peace process can not take place in a political vacuum. For the PNA, it will be difficult if not impossible to reach any viable agreement with Israel unless Gaza is included, and that depends not just on Hamas’ cooperation (now non-existent), but also on Israel ending Gaza’s economic isolation which, ironically, strengthens Hamas politically.

Israel’s politics will be even more difficult. It faces three major security challenges that do not derive, at least primarily, from the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian agenda. The linchpin of Israel’s security is its treaty with Egypt, which provides reasonable confidence that Israel will not be successfully attacked by conventional forces of any possible Arab coalition. With Egypt’s current political turmoil, there is some question whether the treaty will hold. That is likely, but not guaranteed.

More important, Syria’s civil war has transformed its frontier with Israel from being one of the most stable in the region, based on a modus vivendi Israel reached with the current Syrian president’s father after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, to being one of the most uncertain.

Then there is Iran, which many Israelis, including the current government, see as posing a mortal threat if it acquires nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is convinced that Tehran wants to do so and is not far from such a capability, as well as developing an Inter Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) that could reach the US. As he said a week ago on American television, he views the government  in Iran, even with its new president, Hassan Rouhani (who will be subservient to the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei) as a “messianic, apocalyptic, extreme regime.”

With the security challenges Israel sees on three fronts, it is hard to believe that it will be politically or psychologically able to make the compromises needed to reach an agreement with the PNA, even though substantial majorities of Israelis and Palestinians want the conflict to be over and done with, so they can get on with their lives in a peace that has eluded them for decades.

This background has led many observers, myself included, to wonder why Secretary Kerry put the Israeli-Palestinian peace process at the top of his Middle East agenda — if not his global agenda. There is a rationale. If it were possible to broker Israeli-Palestinian peace, at least some things would improve for the US elsewhere in the region, including limits on Iran’s ability to exploit its relationship with Hezbollah in Lebanon and, though the connection is far less substantial, with Hamas in Gaza. The US would be far less likely to be chided by Arab governments over its support for Israel; one recruiting tool used by Islamist terrorists would at least be depreciated; and, not incidentally, America’s much-diminished stature as an effective political force in the region — in the eyes of friend and foe alike — could be refurbished.

But even if the peace process did miraculously lead to an agreement in relatively short order, it would not be enough to meet America’s strategic needs in the region. Leave aside Egypt, which, assuming the treaty with Israel holds, is now less consequential than the Levant or the Persian Gulf. The civil war in Syria is spreading to other parts of the region, where there are deep rivalries between Sunnis and Shiites spurred by the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, which toppled a minority Sunni government that had long dominated the Shia majority. This has led Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey to try redressing the balance by supporting the Syrian rebels’ attempt to end minority Alawite (Shia) rule and bring the Sunni majority to power, even at the price of a worse bloodbath than now and major gains for Islamist extremists.  President Obama, unfortunately, hastily declared two years ago that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad must go — and the White House repeated this demand this week — without first devising a policy to bring it about or to pursue some other alternative consistent with US interests, either in Syria or more broadly in the region.

Equally consequential for its strategic needs in the Middle East, the US has greeted the election of a new Iranian president with cold indifference, along with pressure from the House Foreign Affairs Committee to increase sanctions rather than make a gesture to the people of Iran. The administration has not signaled readiness to try moving beyond mutual hostility toward mutual accommodation. Nor is it willing to accept an obvious requirement of successful diplomacy: no nuclear deal with Iran is possible unless the US publicly recognizes that Iran, as well as the US, Israel and the Gulf Arabs, have some legitimate security interests.

In short, like Winston Churchill’s famous “pudding” that “lacked a theme”, the US still lacks a strategy in the Middle East that brings all the different elements together and charts a course that can meet America’s national interests throughout the region. Thinking strategically needs to be the first task. The second needs to be setting priorities, where Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking should not be at or even near the top.

Be that as it may, now that Secretary of State Kerry is on the verge of getting the Israelis and Palestinians to at least talk to one another, he and President Obama must turn their attention to the larger canvas. The US cannot profit from moving the Israeli-Palestinian peace process a few inches forward if Washington fails to meet more pressing requirements in the region that demand the coherent, committed, intelligent and strategic engagement of the United States, the only power that can even begin to bring some order out of the rising chaos.

by Mitchell Plitnick

All was not as it seemed during President Barack Obama’s appearances in Jerusalem and Ramallah, where he addressed audiences of Israelis and Palestinians. On the surface, it looked like Obama was swearing fealty to Israel, and pledging unconditional US support for any and all Israeli actions. But a [...]]]> via Lobe Log

by Mitchell Plitnick

All was not as it seemed during President Barack Obama’s appearances in Jerusalem and Ramallah, where he addressed audiences of Israelis and Palestinians. On the surface, it looked like Obama was swearing fealty to Israel, and pledging unconditional US support for any and all Israeli actions. But a closer look at what was and was not said, as well as some of the surrounding circumstances, suggests that what Obama was really doing was paving a road toward a reduced US role in the Israel-Palestine conflict.

The contradictions in evidence abound, and could be seen from the very beginning. Obama kept calling Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu by his nickname, Bibi, at their joint press conference. “Oh, yes, we’re just the best of friends. Don’t worry, AIPAC,” Obama seemed to be saying. “Any friction between us is a thing of the past.” Yet, Obama had made a pointed decision to deliver the keynote speech of his trip not at the Knesset, but to an audience from Israel’s major universities. The many students invited excluded only those from Ariel University, the lone Israeli university located in the West Bank settlements.

The ham-handed excuse offered by the US embassy, that they only invited those universities with whom they partnered, was a convenient one. They don’t work with that university because of the political ramifications, and the exclusion here was for the same reason. And that sent a message to Obama’s “good friend,” Bibi.

Not speaking to the Knesset sent a message as well, and it was reflected in Obama’s speech. There is no reason for Obama to speak in a chamber where there is so much hostility toward him. Instead, he told his young Jerusalem audience: “let me say this as a politician — I can promise you this, political leaders will never take risks if the people do not push them to take some risks. You must create the change that you want to see.” Translation: “I can’t work on peace with your current government. You need to drive the change and open the door.” That, too, was a message to Bibi.

But more important than what was said was what was not said. For all the fawning that Obama did, he offered nothing new or of substance — not the slightest deviation from his well-established policies. There’s no new version of Dennis Ross, Anthony Zinni or George Mitchell being sent to the Middle East. There are no new incentives or confidence-building plans, however pointless. There was just a whole bunch of pronouncements about the unshakeable bond between the US and Israel.

Does that sound like a president who intends to maintain the US’ current level of involvement? It seems more like a President who is telling Israelis exactly what AIPAC is buying. The annual military aid will continue, as will money for Iron Dome, and never mind the many federal employees who were just sequestered out of a job or furloughed. The security and intelligence cooperation is likely to continue as well. Israel will, as Obama put it, remain “…the most powerful country in this region. Israel has the unshakeable support of the most powerful country in the world.”

While the US president sent a clear signal that he holds little hope that the current Israeli government is able or willing to pursue peace in any substantive way, he also cautioned Israelis about their growing peril. “Given the frustration in the international community about this conflict, Israel needs to reverse an undertow of isolation,” Obama said. “And given the march of technology, the only way to truly protect the Israeli people over the long term is through the absence of war. Because no wall is high enough and no Iron Dome is strong enough or perfect enough to stop every enemy that is intent on doing so from inflicting harm.”

Note that it’s Israel that needs to reverse this trend, and there’s no mention of any kind of US charm offensive or even advocacy on Israel’s behalf to assist the effort. The implication is clear: Israel’s policies and actions are to blame for its troubles and the US can’t change that, and, because of the political problems it would cause, this administration will not try. Could that also result in a somewhat diminished defense at the United Nations and other international arenas, on the part of the US? Time will tell.

Obama also let the Palestinian Authority know they should look elsewhere. By choosing to condemn Hamas for the rockets that hit Sderot earlier that day during his Ramallah speech rather than in Israel, he surely alienated many in the crowd he was addressing. By refusing to use even moderately stern language on settlements or promise even the mildest pressure on Israel, he seriously undermined Mahmoud Abbas, the man he was purportedly coming to support. Throughout his speech, despite his expressions of sympathy for the daily struggles of Palestinians, Obama never mentioned Israel’s responsibility to end the occupation, let alone to respect human rights or abide by international law.

That sent a very clear message: don’t look to the United States to deliver the goods. If Abbas was listening at all, he must know that internationalizing his cause, as he did last year at the UN, is the only option Obama has left for him. It was so clear, it had to be a deliberate message.

This might all be considered fanciful until one considers the changing position of Israel in the US view. As Aluf Benn, editor-in-chief of the Israeli daily, Ha’aretz points out, the entire Middle East region is of considerably less importance in the broader geo-political strategic view of the United States. “U.S. President Barack Obama said Wednesday his visit to Israel was meant to be a reassuring one,” Benn writes. “He is here to make it clear to Israelis that America stands behind them and will ensure their security, even though the neighborhood has become tougher… The visit comes at a time when the United States is withdrawing from its deep involvement in the Middle East, amid the growing fear of Israel and other regional allies that America will abandon them to radical Islamic forces.”

Benn’s alarmist language aside, he’s right. A big part of this is the oft-discussed “pivot to Asia,” that is the cornerstone of Obama’s foreign policy. Asia’s importance is growing as the Middle East’s is shrinking. The Middle East, particularly the Arabian Peninsula, was once called the “greatest material prize in history” by the US State Department because of its wealth of oil resources. But the US and Europe both see themselves on the road to “energy independence.” This sounds a little more grandiose than it really is. Local oil resources and increased reliance on alternative energy sources will significantly diminish the role of Middle Eastern oil both in terms of serving energy needs and in terms of its role in the global economy, but it won’t eliminate it. OPEC will still be a major force in determining the price and supply of oil, but it won’t have the near-monopoly it does today.

But that’s not the only factor. The so-called “Arab Spring” is not the simple romantic vision of emerging democracy that so many in the West thought it was, while they watched Egyptians oust Hosni Mubarak. It’s also not just the massive violence of Libya and Syria. Even in Tunisia and Egypt, transitions have been bumpy and marked with dissatisfaction and political jockeying as well as some very fundamental debates about the role of women, the military, religion and other key groups and institutions in their respective societies. Moves toward true independence and self-determination in these countries will be a long and unpredictable road. And no matter who ends up controlling the oil, they will have less leverage over the West than their predecessors with even more of a need to sell their oil there. So the strategic situation will be less favorable for the Arab governments that arise from this situation.

Not to mention the situation on the ground. Israel has elected a new government that has no interest in peace with the Palestinians. Settlement expansion continues while the Israeli bunker mentality is fortified. For their part, the Palestinians remain trapped between a Palestinian Authority which has lost virtually all legitimacy in the eyes of its people but is the only acceptable “partner” for the US and Israel, and a Hamas government that no one will talk to. Both sides of that divide seem as uninterested in reunification as Netanyahu is in a viable Palestinian state.

But then there’s the big mitigating factor, the US Israel Lobby. Obama has a lot of work to do in the next four years, and he needs Congress to do it. Much of that work focuses on domestic economic issues, but there are foreign policy questions as well. He simply cannot afford to spend the political capital of his second term fighting with AIPAC all the time. Nor do his colleagues in the Democratic Party wish to see him jeopardize their chances of making gains in the midterm elections by picking a fight with Israel.

But that domestic pressure is really all that is holding the US to Israel at this point. Powerful as AIPAC is, the President can still set broader policy priorities, as he seems to be. Asia will have its own difficulties, but the interests there are growing, while the US stake in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Tunisia, Yemen, and yes, even Israel and Palestine, are diminishing. To be sure, there is still a significant US stake in the Israel-Palestine conflict. And AIPAC will make sure we pay attention to it, as will the fact that Israel is a long-standing ally and while AIPAC may represent a small minority of US citizens, most do not want to see Israel as vulnerable to attack.

Ultimately though, Obama knows that the US has spent inordinate time and energy on this issue. He also knows that it’s becoming less and less vital for US concerns that really matter to him as time goes on. So, he goes to Israel, warms some hearts and minds and gives AIPAC the platitudes and assurances it wants. As Benn wrote, “With every passing day, Israel becomes less capable of taking out Iran’s nuclear facilities by itself, while its dependence on the United States for military superiority just keeps growing.” The US will continue to lead on Iran, which is something Obama wants.

As for the peace process? Obama would like to see Israel make peace possible, but absent that, he’s sent them a message: we’ll help if you want, but until you show some interest in changing the status quo, we have bigger fish to fry.

Photo: President Barack Obama waves to the audience after delivering remarks at the Jerusalem Convention Center in Jerusalem, March 21, 2013. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza) 

by Robert E. Hunter

To say that President Barack Obama’s visit this spring to Israel, the West Bank and Jordan is the proverbial gamble is an understatement. He may end up (rightly) congratulating himself on his wisdom and courage in taking this step and doing so at this time — and [...]]]> via Lobe Log

by Robert E. Hunter

To say that President Barack Obama’s visit this spring to Israel, the West Bank and Jordan is the proverbial gamble is an understatement. He may end up (rightly) congratulating himself on his wisdom and courage in taking this step and doing so at this time — and being thus recognized as a truly valid recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize conferred on him 3 years ago. Or, he may deeply regret venturing into such troubled waters and ending up, like so many of his predecessors, with not much to show for his pains in trying to make peace between Israel and the Palestinians.

In any event, he has now embarked on a course that he must see through to the end or risk making matters worse, possibly for the regional parties and certainly for the reputation of the United States. Yet if he is prepared to do so — with demands that will match anything else in foreign policy that he has done in his presidency — the payoff will be immense, not just in the Levant but throughout the Middle East.

The lack of success in creating a viable Palestinian state, at peace with Israel and with both peoples living in mutual security, is not from a lack of effort from many senior, talented and dedicated people in the 34 years since President Jimmy Carter’s summit at Camp David with Egypt’s Anwar Sadat and Israel’s Menachem Begin launched what were then called Autonomy Talks for the Palestinian territories.

Nor is the lack of success in producing what is known as the “two-state solution” a failure of ideas. These have been fussed over for decades, but have come down pretty much to a consensus on a few cardinal points, looking toward “Final Status.” These were best put in a brief statement by President Bill Clinton in December 2000, following the abortive Second Camp David Summit and a scant four weeks before he left office. They can be found here.

In brief, they propose a swap of land between Israel and the West Bank, so that about 80 percent of Jewish settlers on the West Bank would be incorporated into Israel; the state of Palestine would have contiguity (which implies some link to Gaza); Israel could keep troops in the Jordan Valley for a 3-year transitional period, plus long-term warning stations; arrangements would be made for Jerusalem that boil down to there being two capitals in one city with respect for everyone’s religious sites; there could be any one of five Clinton-suggested approaches to dealing with Palestinian refugees, with at least some being admitted into Israel proper; and Palestine would be a “non-militarized state” with an “international force for border security and deterrent purposes.” With a colleague, I later proposed that this “international force” be NATO, and that idea has gained currency.

Compared with the reams of negotiating documents and the years of talk, this is a simple formulation. It is also recognized by almost everyone who has actually been engaged in these negotiations — as I have — as probably the best that can be achieved and a balanced approach from which all can gain and that could, finally, bring the conflict to an end.

These Clinton Parameters, the obvious solution, were advanced 12 years ago, yet the conflict continues. The reason is manifold: part has been a general lack of political will to move forward, especially with the complex — if not tortured — politics in both Israeli and Palestinian societies; part is the natural human difficulty of taking a leap in the dark after decades of stasis; and part is what else has been happening. And it is this “what else has been happening” that Obama cannot avoid addressing during his visit and that will still be there when he departs, no doubt after applying his well-honed skills of inspiration, intelligence, and honest application to tough problems. This will be so even though opinion polling has long shown that a majority of Israelis and Palestinians want the conflict to be over and done with.

Obama will no doubt reassure all parties of US commitment to be engaged until the job is done — and if he is not prepared to “walk the walk” as well as “talk the talk”, he should stay home — ; to provide reassurances to Israel about its security and to Palestinians about the importance of what they call justice; and to call on peoples and political leaders to seize this particular moment. This should include a major address to the Knesset and some form of symbolic (as well as substantive) encounter with the Palestinians.

Then to the “what else is happening.” On the Palestinian side, Hamas’ control of Gaza and the on-again, off-again nature of its relations with the Palestinian Authority led by Mohammed Abbas on the West Bank are far from propitious, if not now impossible to resolve. Abbas will also insist, once again, that the US president get the Israelis to stop settlement building in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and to ease significantly the isolation of Gaza.

On the Israeli side, current preoccupation is not with Palestine peacemaking, but with a trifecta of Iran, Syria and Egypt, all of which involve real or potential Security with a capital “S.” In Israel, Obama will no doubt be pressed, and pressed again, to confirm that “containment” of an Iranian nuclear capability is unacceptable to the United States and that all options — including the use of military force — are “on the table.” That will certainly not make negotiations any easier with the Iranians, in whatever form and whatever timing they take, and it will be even more difficult for Obama to change the US negotiating position to something that might have a chance of working — e.g., by recognizing that US, Israeli, and Iranian security concerns must all be accounted for. Prime Minister Netanyahu will also underscore Israel’s continuing concerns with attacks coming from Gaza and Iranian support for Hezbollah. And he will want the US strategic commitment to Israel to be further bolstered in concrete military terms.

Israel is also deeply concerned by the civil war in Syria, which, depending on what happens when President Assad departs (assuming that that will happen,) could turn that country into what Lebanon has so often been — a haven for attacks by Hezbollah and maybe others on Israel. President Obama can offer reassuring words, but the US may have little to offer, including in forestalling a larger, slow-burning civil war between the region’s Sunnis and Shi’ites, a byproduct of the misguided US invasion of Iraq a decade ago. And Israel is meanwhile very carefully watching what is happening in Egypt, where the 1979 peace treaty has been the bedrock of Israel’s strategic confidence ever since.

Nothing that President Obama says or does on his trip to the region will change fundamentally any of these factors. And, as usually happens when any positive possibility seems to be emerging in Arab-Israeli relations, a terrorist incident during the president’s trip is highly likely, further stimulating the fears of all those who would like to move forward, and undercutting moderate politics.

All this is the bad news. The good news — or at least potentially hopeful news — is that for the US to become again engaged in Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking is an essential ingredient: despite talk over the years that “we Americans can’t want peace more than the parties,” it has been proved repeatedly that only the US can press the parties forward. (That statement includes whatever other members of the so-called Quartet that the US fostered in 2002 — the United Nations, the European Union, and Russia — will try to do but where they have no capacity to be of much consequence.) It is also true that, when the US commits its prestige and that of its president, “things happen.” This effort is also coming at the start of Obama’s second term, whereas Bill Clinton got engaged seriously only when he was about to leave office — and thus was in no position to put US political muscle behind any forward progress.

Experience also confirms that serious negotiations on Final Status can only truly begin when the US plunks down for consideration the draft text of a complete treaty, perhaps for presentation purposes doing it jointly with the other three Quartet members. At the very least, President Obama needs to outline parameters for a settlement during this trip — whether he just calls them “Clinton” or a more proprietary “Obama” Parameters. He will need to paint himself into a corner in terms of his own personal commitment to success, however long and hard the slog may be.

There is some other news regarding Obama’s spring trip, the impact of which has yet to be proved; it raises questions about why he is acting so soon, other than to splash a big rock in the pool and thereby get everyone’s attention that “the US is back.” Happily, he has appointed a Secretary of State, John Kerry, who is deeply committed to success on this issue, calling failure a “catastrophe.” Yet, by the time Obama goes to the region, Kerry will not have had time to even put his State Department Middle East team together and get his key officials confirmed by the Senate. The NSC staff in the White House will have had to be beefed up with top-notch people in this area; and the nominated Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel, who will need to offer strong backing — especially to reassure Israel of US strategic and military engagement — is not yet even in office. There is also precious little time before the president leaves for the Near East, for the White House to do the essential prior consultations with the Congress and key US constituencies, especially leadership of the Jewish community, if his trip to Israel, the West Bank, and Jordan is to be – as it must now be – about substance and not just symbols.

For Obama to offer more than his own commitment and symbolism of “being there,” he must be ready to take one further step, if Kerry is to be spared having to spend a massive amount of his time and energy on the Middle East account, which regularly eclipses other priorities. That is to appoint a senior-level negotiator who will do what it takes for as long as it takes. The one person with experience who could also provide the necessary political clout as Obama’s personal emissary is obvious: former President Bill Clinton.

WASHINGTON, Dec 6 2012 (IPS) - Increasingly distressed over the possible consequences of Israel’s recent steps to punish the Palestinian Authority (PA) and consolidate its hold on the West Bank, a number of prominent voices here are urging President Barack Obama to exert real pressure on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu [...]]]> via IPS News

WASHINGTON, Dec 6 2012 (IPS) - Increasingly distressed over the possible consequences of Israel’s recent steps to punish the Palestinian Authority (PA) and consolidate its hold on the West Bank, a number of prominent voices here are urging President Barack Obama to exert real pressure on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to reverse course.

His government’s announcement that it will build 3,000 new housing units in East Jerusalem and the West Bank and expedite planning for the development of the area known as E-1, the last undeveloped area that links the northern and southern parts of the West Bank, is seen here as a particularly damaging provocation both for Palestinians and the administration itself.

“Construction in E-1 would make it almost impossible to provide a future Palestinian state the contiguity it needs to be viable and cut it off from East Jerusalem,” warned Debra DeLee, president of Americans for Peace Now (APN), a Jewish peace group.

“Without a viable Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Israel is doomed to become a bi-national state, which means an end to the Zionist vision of an Israel that is both Jewish and democratic,” she added in an appeal to Obama to “personally intervene with …Netanyahu and demand that his government reverse its decision.”

Unlike several European countries, notably Britain, France, Spain, Denmark, and Sweden, the U.S., one of only nine countries – out of 188 – that voted against the PA’s diplomatic upgrade, has not yet formally protested Israel’s actions.

Indeed, its initial reaction to Israel’s announcements was relatively muted. Calling the moves “counter-productive” to the goal of resuming peace talks, the White House simply “urge(d) Israeli leaders to reconsider these unilateral decisions…” After three days, the State Department released a statement noting that construction in the E-1 area would be “especially damaging to efforts to achieve a two-state solution.” Obama himself has been mum on the issue.

The relative mildness of the U.S. response to date has suggested to many here that the president has no intention of taking on the Israeli leader in a renewed effort to get a peace accord, a goal he pursued with considerable earnestness in the first 18 months of his administration before essentially giving up pending the outcome of this year’s election.

Given the Israel lobby’s strength with both sides of the aisle in Congress, Obama may want to avoid more bruising battles in his second term with Netanyahu, whose right-wing coalition is considered likely to win next month’s parliamentary elections, and his powerful supporters here.

He may wish instead to focus on domestic priorities, further reducing the U.S. “footprint” in the Greater Middle East, and consolidating his “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific.

Nonetheless, there is little love lost between Obama and the Israeli leader, who all but publicly endorsed Obama’s Republican challenger, Mitt Romney, during the election campaign.

An hint of that bad blood surfaced this week amidst reports that, in a high-powered, off-the-record meeting with prominent Israelis and their U.S. supporters at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center last weekend, former White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel, who remains close to Obama, accused Netanyahu of having “repeatedly betrayed” the president.

Emanuel, currently the mayor of Chicago, singled out Israel’s latest moves against the PA, which he reportedly described as particularly galling, given Washington’s support for Israel during its brief war last month against Hamas in Gaza and its lonely opposition to the PA’s diplomatic upgrade at the U.N.

Some believe the president may be waiting to take action until he resolves more-urgent business, notably averting the so-called “fiscal cliff” at the end of this month, then negotiating a bigger deficit deal early next year, and getting a new foreign-team up and running.

Others, including former President George W. Bush’s top Middle East aide and a staunch defender of Netanyahu, Elliott Abrams, believe Obama may be playing a double game by, on the one hand, muting U.S. displeasure with Israel while, on the other, encouraging Washington’s European allies to distance themselves from Israel – as they did during last week’s U.N. vote.

The decision by Germany, which has long defended the Jewish state’s actions in world forums, to abstain on the Palestinian vote, reportedly came as a particular shock. Indeed, the only European nation joining the U.S. in the lonely “no” column was the Czech Republic.

“The sense that the Netanyahu coalition can’t get along with Europe or the United States may hurt Netanyahu with Israeli voters – which is perhaps the precise objective of this entire effort,” Abrams wrote in National Review Online.

While such a strategy may indeed bear fruit, others insist that the stakes for the U.S. are too high to forgo more-assertive tactics toward Israel’s leadership, particularly as it has itself moved increasingly rightward. This is particularly true in light of the Arab Awakening and the rise of political Islam throughout the Middle East.

“The clear trend is toward both greater religiosity and greater identification with the Palestinian cause,” noted Amb. Chas Freeman (ret.), a top U.S. Middle East specialist, in a recent lecture in which he also argued that Israel’s “mid-November assault on Gaza has simply re-inforced the regional view that Israel is an enemy with which it is impossible to peacefully co-exist” and that Israel’s land grabs were making a two-state solution increasingly improbable.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, who served as national security adviser to former President Jimmy Carter, argued that Obama should seize back the initiative from the influence of the Israel lobby in Congress, stressing that he can overcome opposition there “if he stands firm for ‘the national interest’.”

Last week’s U.N. vote, he noted, “marks the nadir of the dramatically declined global respect for U.S. capability to cope with an issue that is morally troubling today and, in the long run, explosive.” The greatest opportunity for taking action, he added, would be in the first year of his second term.

Similarly, Paul Pillar, a career CIA analyst who also served as National Intelligence Officer for the Near East from 2000 to 2005, called this week on his nationalinterest.org blog for Obama to treat Netanyahu much the same way as he is dealing with Republicans in Congress over the budget: “by taking his message campaign-style to the country.”

“His appeal over the heads of members of Congress is a recognition that the opposition party understands only the language of political force. But Mr. Obama also has had enough bitter and frustrating experience with Netanyahu to warrant reaching similar conclusions regarding dealing with Israel,” he wrote, noting that policy toward Israel has become “just as much a domestic issue as the budget,” particularly in light of the Israeli prime minister’s own interference in the U.S. elections.

Moreover, he noted, a very recent survey conducted by the Saban Center’s Shibley Telhami found that 62 percent of the Israeli Jewish electorate hold favourable opinions of Obama, suggesting that a “charm offensive” there by the U.S. president could yield dividends.