The Libyan National Oil Corporation (NOC) ended on January 2 a fire that raged for days among tanks in Libya’s largest oil export terminal of Es-Sider, but the militia violence fed by the implosion of governance that caused it continues. Indeed, the levels of suffering, civilian casualties, refugees, and those internally displaced have increased steadily. The talks between Libya’s rival warring governments slated for today have been postponed. Meanwhile, extremist elements are taking greater advantage of the ongoing maelstrom.
The NOC managed to put the fire out, but three days of normal Libyan oil exports were destroyed. Of course, with Libyan crude exports already down to less than 400,000 barrels per day (only 1/3 of normal output), the fire’s impact on global markets was minimal.
Libya’s low exports since mid-2013 pose serious fiscal challenges for the country. The internationally recognized, relatively moderate House of Representatives (HOR), elected in June 2014, headed by Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni, and driven to take refuge in the small eastern city of Tobruk, is in fiscal crisis. The Libyan Central Bank, so far neutral between rival governments, has drawn down Libya’s currency reserves to cover spending. With two hostile governments, there is also no budget for the allotment of funds in 2015.
One might think government spending and a budget would be the least of Libya’s concerns. But beneath the government standoff and rule of local or extremist armed elements around the country, much of the Qadhafi-era’s largely socialist economy remains. If the Central Bank fails to pay government employees, those of the National Oil Corporation, personnel keeping most ports functioning, workers struggling to maintain the electric grid, civil police, and others life would grind to a halt. Goods would stop flowing, businesses would lose customers, and people would not be able to obtain goods and services at the most basic level. Fraud-ridden and often dysfunctional, presently there is an economy just the same.
Tripoli’s Power
Credit: NASA image by Jeff Schmaltz
The Es-Sider inferno was triggered by a rocket fired by Islamic Dawn (LD), the robust Islamist militia comprised of fighters from Libya’s third largest city of Misrata, near Tripoli. LD is the muscle behind the rival Tripoli government.
Since last August when it propped up the Islamist portion of the former parliament, the General National Council (GNC) as a “government,” LD has been gaining ground. Its ability to push nearly 400 miles eastward, to menace Libya’s twin oil ports of Es-Sider and Ras Lanuf plus their supporting oil fields to the south illustrates LD’s rising power at the expense of the HOR and its loyalist allies.
Likewise, 500 miles to the west, LD has been driving toward Libya’s other major oil and gas terminal of Mellitah, near the Tunisian border. Thinni has been struggling to halt this other LD drive using local tribal militias and air strikes. A NOC statement from late December, fearing the loss of Mellitah, said Libyan hydrocarbon production would fall below the levels needed to even meet Libyan domestic demand.
Bloody Benghazi
A severe impediment for the HOR and its loyalist allies is the more extremist militia grouping continuing to dominate much of Libya’s eastern second largest city of Benghazi. Led by the formidable al-Qaeda associated Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL), a militant alliance— despite see-saw fighting—has managed to hold various Libyan military units and former General Khalifa Haftar’s polyglot secular forces allied with the HOR in check.
The commitment of so many HOR military assets to the military meat-grinder in Benghazi to prevent ASL from moving eastward toward Tobruk has weakened its efforts elsewhere. Eleven more died and 63 were wounded in Benghazi on Dec. 22. In fact, most killed in clashes across Libya die in Benghazi. Eastern Libyan jihadists car bombed the HOR’s Tobruk hotel on Dec. 30 wounding 3 deputies.
Human Toll
The UN Support Mission in Libya and the UN’s High Commission for Human Rights announced on Dec. 23 that nearly 700 hundred Libyan civilians have died as collateral casualties of Libyan violence since August; many times that have been wounded. Combatant casualties would likely push fatalities over 1,000. This death toll is lower than those emerging from Syria and Iraq from the regime-rebel civil war in the former and Islamic State-related violence in both. Still, the UN warned commanders of Libyan armed groups they could be charged by the International Criminal Court (ICC) with criminal atrocities.
The refugee situation is far worse. By September, 1.8 million Libyan refugees had sought shelter in Tunisia. Added to those elsewhere, as in Egypt, refugees comprise approximately 1/3 of Libya’s entire population. Those in Tunisia have overwhelmed available humanitarian assistance, particularly now during the cold, rainy Mediterranean winter. Almost 400,000 Libyans are reportedly internally displaced.
No End in Sight
So far, diplomatic efforts seeking some sort of accommodation between Tripoli and Tobruk have been futile. Talks led by UN Envoy for Libya Bernadino Leon came to naught back in September. Leon tried to organize another round for Dec. 9, but this foundered due to more fighting triggered by a failed HOR effort to retake Tripoli. Leon reported to the UN Security Council on Dec. 23 that the two sides had agreed to meet today.
That initiative also collapsed. HOR airstrikes over the weekend against targets in Misrata (the home of the GNC’s “Libya Dawn” militia) came as a surprise. Two reportedly were wounded. An HOR military spokesman said the strikes were retaliation for renewed LD attacks against Es-Sider and Ras Lanuf where fighting has resumed. Yesterday a loyalist warplane struck a Greek tanker near the eastern port of Derna, killing two crewmen; a Libyan military spokesman claimed it was carrying militants.
Meanwhile, General David Rodriguez, head of US Africa Command, revealed on December 3 that “nascent” Islamic State (ISIS, ISIL or IS) training camps had been established in eastern Libya containing a “couple of hundred” militants. Fourteen Libyan soldiers were executed on Feb. 3 in southern Libya by a group calling itself the Islamic State of Libya. Even the more moderate Islamist GNC and LD, already hostile to ASL, condemned the killings. With Libya’s disarray and the grip of ASL and associated extremists over much of Benghazi plus areas nearby like militant-held portions of Derna, IS’s appearance at some point was inevitable.
Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Ahmed Kharti in December chaired a meeting of his counterparts from Libya’s neighbors to express concern about the Libyan crisis’ regional impact. Weighing heavily on participants was the near conquest of Mali in 2013 by extremists, many staging out of and receiving munitions from Libya’s lawless southwest. There also has been arms smuggling from eastern Libyan militants to Egypt’s Sinai-based Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis jihadists, many of whom affiliated themselves with IS in Fall 2014.
Increasingly concerned about Libyan jihadist spillover, French President François Hollande urged the international community today to address Libya’s crisis. In a two-hour interview with France Inter radio, Hollande ruled out unilateral French intervention in Libya itself, but is establishing a base in northern Niger 60 miles from the Libyan border to help contain the menace. Last year, another French base was set up near the Malian border with Libya.
The longer Libya’s chaos remains on the global back burner, the nastier its impact will be in Libya and beyond. Crises left to fester sometimes find their own way to the front burner.
]]>by Wayne White
Libya’s chaos and violence may seem like a continuum of painful replays. However, as the situation festers, the risk of extremist elements gaining a more dangerous foothold and broader freedom of action increases. Indeed, since the beginning of this year, militant Islamists have gained ground overall, undermining what little governance remains. Making matters worse, a Libyan Supreme Court decision has gone against the newly elected and relatively secular government.
Debating whether Libya is a failed state is academic even though the country has resembled one for the past six months. Even a senior Libyan official admitted back in August that most “factors at the moment are conducive to a failed state.” Unfortunately, Libya’s problems won’t be contained. Militant extremists and terrorists thriving amidst this mess will spread violence even farther beyond the country’s practically non-existent borders than they have already.
House of Cards
Most recognizable forms of authority in Libya have steadily imploded this year with the explosion of greater violence in the country’s two largest cities (Tripoli and Benghazi), the flight of foreign workers and embassies amidst kidnappings and murders, and the disarray affecting all manners of central governance (though its writ was already limited). In fact, Libya never evolved beyond the dominance of militias that refused to disarm following the struggle against Muammar al-Qadhafi.
Shaky stability in the capital city of Tripoli until mid-2014 depended on a wary balance of power between two powerful militias employed by Libya’s parliament, the General National Council (GNC). The Islamist militia comes from Libya’s third largest city of Misrata, while the other secular nationalist militia is from the tough Zintan mountain region south of Tripoli. The Misrata militia (now “Libya Dawn”) was linked to Islamist members, and the Zintani forces to its secular caucus. At the time, the GNC had a modest Islamist majority.
But the election in June of a secular majority permanent House of Representatives (HOR) triggered the collapse of the militia power balance. The larger Libya Dawn secured the upper hand over the Zintanis, seizing Tripoli. Libya Dawn reconvened mainly the Islamists from the GNC, proclaiming the body the true Libyan government.
The HOR fled east, taking refuge near the Egyptian border in the small city of Tobruk. Ex-General Khalifa Haftar’s effort since spring 2014 to crush extremists like the al-Qaeda affiliated Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL) had experienced mixed results. Then, after solid gains against ASL forces in Benghazi in October, the beleaguered HOR embraced Haftar as acting on behalf of the newly elected parliament.
But the Libyan Supreme Court declared the internationally recognized HOR unconstitutional on November 6, arguing that the committee that prepared the election law for the June poll, which elected the HOR, violated Libya’s provisional constitution. The court remains, however, in Tripoli under Islamist occupation and originally was not asked to address the legality of the HOR, making its ruling questionable. Moreover, even if there were some inconsistencies involving election procedure, they pale against Libya Dawn’s violent seizure of Tripoli and revival of a rump GNC that no longer has any legal mandate whatsoever. The most recent election, quite an achievement under the circumstances, at least reflected voters’ preferences.
A map featuring Libya’s major cities and border states.
Consequently, despite urgings from some quarters that the HOR be abandoned, the UN and most foreign governments have not done so. As of Nov. 17, Turkey and Chad appeared to be the only exceptions. Embracing the court decision, the rump GNC has offered a national dialogue, something that would have been of value prior to Libya’s descent into far greater chaos in 2014. Earlier this year, when there was more to work with, I had discussed the advantages of such a meeting being held at a neutral venue abroad and being overseen by the UN along with the governments that backed the anti-Qadhafi struggle in 2011.
Of course, Libya has only spiraled further downwards since then. But because both governments share the need for revenue, Libyan exports still rebounded to more than 800,000 barrels per day (BPD) in September (although still only 1/3 of capacity). Following the court decision, however, Libya Dawn sought to control the country’s oil, seizing the 300,000 BPD western El-Sharara field. But Sharara was shut down, with Zintani forces blocking the pipeline to its northern export terminal of Zawiya. Then a security guard strike over unpaid wages closed Tobruk’s Hariga export terminal last weekend. These closures have driven exports down to barely 500,000 BPD.
Whether emanating from a now more aggressive Libya Dawn or the beleaguered ASL (most likely the latter), a number of bombings have also hit HOR-controlled locales in eastern Libya. One went off in the town of Shahat during a meeting there between HOR Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni and UN Libyan Envoy Bernadino Leon On Nov. 10. Several car bombings occurred two days later. One hit a busy street in front of the Tobruk hotel housing the HOR; another hit the airport used by al-Thinni near the town of Bayda. A third bomb blew up in Benghazi (where fighting between the forces of Haftar and the ASL has intensified again).
The fighting in Benghazi became so intense that Leon arranged a 12-hour humanitarian ceasefire on Nov. 19 so the Red Crescent could evacuate civilians and casualties from affected areas. The UN Security Council meanwhile blacklisted ASL branches in both Benghazi and Derna.
Located between Benghazi and Tobruk, Derna has been an extremist hotbed since the 1990s. Youthful demonstrators there declared their allegiance to the so-called Islamic State’s (ISIS or IS) “Caliph” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in late October. With Haftar’s air assets sorely limited, Egypt probably took aim at jihadi targets there with airstrikes on Nov. 12, despite Egyptian denials. Egyptian airstrikes have previously hit Tripoli and Benghazi. Fighter-bombers from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have also staged through Egypt against Benghazi’s extremists.
Spillover Effect
Libya remains a vast arsenal of weapons, ammunition and explosives. The Sinai-based Beit al-Maqdis, which has sworn allegiance to IS, continues to receive Libyan munitions despite Egyptian countermeasures. The Jihadi group killed 33 Egyptian soldiers on Oct. 24. It struck again on Nov. 13, killing five soldiers and police. Near the northern end of the Suez Canal, militants or their smugglers had fired on an Egyptian Navy patrol boat wounding 5 sailors a day earlier, with eight others still missing. Sinai jihadists also released a lengthy video on Nov. 14 showcasing their suicide bombing that killed the soldiers in October, with participants shouting: “good news to al-Baghdadi!” The violence appears to be continuing unabated, with a likely Beit al-Maqdis bombing having hit a police checkpoint in a Cairo suburb just yesterday.
Libya also continues to export violence in various other directions. Four Tunisian soldiers were killed and 11 wounded in a Nov. 5 bus bombing. Much of the residual violence in Tunisia meanwhile stems from the cross-border infiltration of munitions from ASL. Malian jihadists, using Libya as an arsenal and for sanctuary, attacked a border village in Niger on Nov. 19, killing nine Nigerien security personnel.
With the West’s attention absorbed by IS, the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, Israeli/Palestinian affairs, and more, Libya has been woefully neglected. Yet the longer the country’s problems fester, the worse they will get. Indeed, even more IS-inspired connections with Libyan and associated jihadists surely will emerge in this chaotic environment. Simply watching Libya’s meltdown has achieved nothing.
]]>by Wayne White
Former General Khalifa Haftar’s (or Hiftar’s) eastern-based military challenge against parliamentary Islamists and armed Muslim extremists continues to spark more violence. Meanwhile, government authority in the capital of Tripoli has practically disintegrated with two rival prime ministers and a parliament bitterly split between Islamists and more secular elements. Amidst [...]]]>
by Wayne White
Former General Khalifa Haftar’s (or Hiftar’s) eastern-based military challenge against parliamentary Islamists and armed Muslim extremists continues to spark more violence. Meanwhile, government authority in the capital of Tripoli has practically disintegrated with two rival prime ministers and a parliament bitterly split between Islamists and more secular elements. Amidst this chaotic scene, the threat to foreign embassies has increased, including to the US, by Libya’s leading terrorist group.
Haftar presses on
Although failing to capture enough organized support across Libya to make decisive gains, Haftar has been able to sustain a robust challenge from his eastern perch. He has found a ready constituency across the country among relatively more secular — even some moderate Islamist — Libyans weary of militia-dominated politics, governmental division, and Islamic extremist violence.
The extent of popular opposition to Islamic militants is illustrated by the personality cult now evident in various locales built around Egypt’s General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. Posters of al-Sisi and scattered demonstrations in favor of his presidential bid in Egypt since Haftar began his military challenge last month clearly show many Libyans want Haftar to assume a similar role in Libya, cracking down harshly on the extremists.
Libya’s 2012 parliamentary elections (only a month after Mohamed Morsi’s election as Egyptian president) resulted in a noticeably more secular/liberal line-up than Morsi achieved in Egypt. And this was before Morsi’s abuses of power began undermining his image as a relative moderate.
The possibility of valuable support to Haftar was noted in a May 30 Stratfor assessment: although unconfirmed, Haftar could be receiving Egyptian military aid in various forms. In fact, the Tripoli-based Libyan newspaper al-Wasat claimed on June 2 that Libya’s pro-Haftar minister of culture flew to Cairo along with the foreign affairs, civil society and health ministers seeking “assistance in calming the situation.” The largely al-Sisi controlled Egyptian media has, naturally, favored Haftar. So a measure of concrete Egyptian aid for Haftar either now or in the future is a real possibility.
Fighting in the east especially has continued as Haftar has launched more ground and air attacks against Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL), the most dangerous jihadist militia based there (declared a terrorist organization by the US). Earlier this month, air force assets and Libyan Special Forces troops siding with Haftar attacked ASL facilities in and to the east of Benghazi. In the face of air strikes from helicopters and jets, ASL combatants fought back hard. Multiple rocket launcher fire also was exchanged. Casualties were over 100 by June 2, but the fighting appears to have been militarily inconclusive.
Meanwhile, the near continuous clashes have shut down Benghazi. In the latest bombardments, errant bombs hit the university, rockets fell on a warehouse district, and various munitions have fallen in residential neighborhoods.
A tale of two prime ministers
Compounding Libya’s travails, a dispute has been raging since last month over who holds the office of Libya’s prime minister. Islamists, supported by a number of parliamentary independents in Libya’s General National Congress (GNC), appointed — over bitter secularist opposition — a businessman backed by the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, Ahmed Maiteeq. However, Maiteeq failed to receive sufficient votes on the first ballot, and the shadowy second ballot that elected him has raised serious questions.
Since that controversial early May vote, Interim Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni has refused to step down, citing conflicting instructions from the GNC members following the vote. Later in May, the Libyan justice ministry’s legal department ruled that Maiteeq’s election had been illegal. Finally, on June 5, an official of Libya’s Supreme Court said the manner of Maiteeq’s election violated Libya’s standing temporary constitution. But al-Thinni said a final court statement would not be issued until June 9.
Two days earlier, Maiteeq, backed by some militiamen and police, took the prime minister’s office from al-Thinni and held his first meeting with his new cabinet. The GNC’s Islamist Speaker Nuri Abu Sahmain also ordered the Libyan Central Bank to freeze all government accounts to cut off al-Thinni’s cabinet ministers from funding their activities. Al-Thinni, however, remained defiant, awaiting word from the court.
While it might appear that the standoff is being resolved in al-Thinni’s favor, the situation is likely to remain chaotic. GNC Islamists, and possibly their militia ally (the Libyan Central Shield from nearby Misrata) doubtless have been angered and may stand by Maiteeq, trying to arrange another GNC vote in his favor. Al-Thinni went to Benghazi yesterday to express sympathy over the city’s plight, perhaps tellingly visiting with Libyan Special Forces there that have sided openly with General Haftar.
Rising potential threat to the US Embassy
On May 27 Ansar al-Sharia leader Mohammad al-Zahawi called Haftar an “American agent” on Libyan TV and warned if the US continued to back him it would suffer a “shameful defeat.” The State Department quickly said there has been no US contact with Haftar and no support, either “explicit” or “implicit.”
Nonetheless, with Zahawi’s group declared a terrorist entity by Washington and now Haftar’s most notable target, widespread belief probably exists among Libyan jihadists that Haftar has gotten some sort of American assistance. In any case, the US promptly warned its citizens against traveling to Libya and those already there to depart immediately, describing the situation on the ground there as “unpredictable and unstable.” On June 5 a Swiss worker with the Red Cross was murdered in the Libyan coastal city of Sirte by unknown gunmen.
Although an elite US military evacuation (or rescue) force, depending on the circumstances, has been poised in Sicily for over two weeks, US Embassy personnel in Tripoli have not been withdrawn. According to the State Department, embassy staffing is somewhat limited “because of security concerns.” On May 27, State Department Spokesperson Jen Psaki said the US is continuing “to review the situation and address embassy security concerns.”
Last month, the US, along with other major European players, appointed Libyan envoys to work with the UN in trying to engage with Libyan actors interested in “political transition.” UN Libyan Envoy Tareq Mitri, reportedly roughed up by militiamen on his arrival in Tripoli on June 4, warned that it’s ultimately up to Libyans to solve their own problems.
The bottom line now is that with a robust challenge to central authority, governance and the small Libyan military in disarray, militias gaining more sway in Tripoli, and the ASL increasingly under attack and hitting back, there is no coherent security outside the US embassy’s walls. This was illustrated on June 4; hours after Haftar survived a probable ASL truck bombing at his compound near Benghazi, gunmen fired a rocket propelled grenade (RPG) into the same floor of the prime ministerial building in Tripoli that houses Maiteeq’s office.
This apparent tit-for-tat assault (Haftar views Islamists in the GNC backing Maiteeq as aiding “terrorists”) again shows just how vulnerable Libya’s prime ministers have been. Ali Ziedan last year was kidnapped from his office by a militia on the government’s own payroll, al-Thinni’s home was assaulted (unsuccessfully) by gunmen in March, and now it’s clear that Maiteeq has been unable to secure the area surrounding his own offices.
If the very core of governance can be struck so easily, any thought of meaningful local assistance to resist a violent attack against the US embassy is misplaced. And, with embassy staff shielded by defensive walls only meant to slow down attackers, plus a small US Marine security guard contingent not meant to resist a determined attack, reliable local government security is needed for protection. This is true for US embassies around the world. Moreover, aside from the endemic violence that’s now pervasive, it’s not even clear which parts of the government — let alone militias supposedly working for the government — currently answer to whom.
With this in mind, I must continue to warn, as I did on May 22, that it’s imperative for the White House to act quickly to preclude a possible tragedy in Tripoli that could be far more costly than the September 2012 assault on the more thinly staffed US consulate facilities in Benghazi. In fact, a rescue attempt amidst an attack on the embassy by an extremist militia packing heavy machine guns, RPG’s, and light anti-aircraft weaponry also could involve losses among the rescue teams and their helicopters.
]]>by Wayne White
A robust new military challenge to what passes for the Libyan central government has further destabilized the country and placed Western and other diplomatic missions there in greater danger. Although definitions for “failed states” vary, there should be no doubt now that Libya has crossed that line — one [...]]]>
by Wayne White
A robust new military challenge to what passes for the Libyan central government has further destabilized the country and placed Western and other diplomatic missions there in greater danger. Although definitions for “failed states” vary, there should be no doubt now that Libya has crossed that line — one it has been flirting with for quite a while. Under the circumstances, it is now time for the US, and other governments with diplomatic and civilian missions in Libya, to give serious, prompt consideration to evacuating their personnel.
Libya’s lacking security fundaments
The Libyan situation has been tenuous, violent, and jolting from crisis to crisis particularly since last year. Most militias of various local, tribal, and ideological affiliations that fought against Muammar Qadhafi’s regime remain under arms, in part because of Libya’s failure to establish a sizeable, fully trained national army or police force. They clash with each other and assert local autonomous rights, with some backing factions in the Libyan parliament, the General National Congress (GNC). Without other means of maintaining security, the government keeps a number of militias on its payroll for just that reason.
The conflicting militias have caused discord on the streets of Tripoli and the large eastern city of Benghazi; they control neighborhoods and other key pieces of real estate — even sometimes menacing the government for which they supposedly work.
The two dominant militias affecting government affairs in Tripoli have been the Islamist “Central Shield,” based in Libya’s third largest city, Misrata, and a group of secular-oriented militias based in the mountain region centered upon Zintan. They are aligned, respectively, with the Islamist and secular wings of the GNC.
This division within the GNC has significantly paralyzed that fairly elected body charged, among other things, with overseeing the drafting of a constitution as a prelude to the election of a permanent legislature.
The GNC’s original writ ran out in early February, so it extended its own mandate to finish the appointment of a constitutional drafting committee and to maintain continuity. Ever since, it has been branded by many Libyans — as well as self-appointed federalist rivals in eastern Libya — as illegitimate, with calls for it to step down.
The experiences of Libyan prime ministers reflect the dangerous instability plaguing the country. The GNC dismissed longstanding Prime Minister Ali Zeidan in March amidst a tiff over the weak Libyan navy’s failure to stop a tanker with bootleg crude from leaving a port controlled by upstart eastern Federalist and militia commander, Ibrahim Jathran. Yet Zeidan soldiered on despite being kidnapped in late 2013 by an Islamist militia. Then the GNC named Abdullah al-Thinni interim prime minister for two weeks. After gunmen attacked his family compound, al-Thinni resigned, but continues to serve pending the naming of a replacement.
In addition to its seriously flawed, erratic security and central authority, Libya’s governance at all levels is dysfunctional. To a great extent, Qadhafi is to blame. Inheriting a rather decentralized state from the late King Idris, Qadhafi played tribes and regions against each other to maintain power for 42 years. Qadhafi’s bizarre, ramshackle “Jamahiriya” concept of governance degraded rather than reinforced a sense of Libyan civil society, and important governmental and technical skills were woefully neglected. Libya is hugely dependent on foreign companies and contractors for a host of services.
The last key pillar that crumbled from underneath Libya’s waning post-Qadhafi societal stability was the implosion of the country’s oil exports from roughly 1.3 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2012 to only around 200,000 bpd since early this year. Since 2013, most export terminals and inland oilfields have been shut down by a mix of eastern federalist challengers, angry workers, disgruntled guards, or local militias.
Enter General Haftar
Libya’s latest travails stem from a robust challenge to the central government from the self-proclaimed Libyan National Army (LNA) led by former General Khalifa Haftar. Haftar denounced the central government back in February, but his appearance went almost unnoticed outside Libya.
On May 16, however, forces organized by Haftar struck extremist militias in Benghazi (especially Ansar al-Sharia) with troops, artillery and even helicopters “to cleanse the city of terrorists.” Intense, bloody fighting continued through much of the weekend resulting in over 200 casualties. On the 18th, Haftar loyalists, reinforced with pro-secular militia elements from Zintan, attacked the GNC in Tripoli, ransacking parliament, and seizing a member and two staffers for allegedly aiding extremists. Pro-Haftar Colonel Muktar Fernana declared the “freezing of the GNC.”
Since May 18, in the east, Haftar has secured the support of two Libyan Air Force (LAF) bases, and federalist renegade Jathran. Libya’s Special Forces commander even instructed his men in Benghazi to join Haftar’s effort. Then, the LAF’s most senior officer, Col. Gomaa al-Abbani, declared his support for Haftar on the 20th, quickly followed on the 21st by the Interior Ministry, Libyan UN Ambassador Ibrahim al-Dabashi (who said Haftar’s “Operation Dignity of Libya” was “not a coup…but a nationalist move”), as well as the biggest GNC political bloc, the secular National Forces Alliance (NFA). NFA leader Mahmoud Jibril said Libya had been “drowning in a swamp of terrorism.”
In addition, former Prime Minister Zeidan declared his support for Haftar from European exile, and sitting Prime Minister al-Thinni has called upon the GNC to stop working. Late on the 21st, Haftar appeared on TV, calling upon the country’s judiciary to form a “civilian presidential high council” to name a cabinet and oversee a transition toward the election of a new parliament.
Haftar’s challenge might seem refreshing to some, but the situation on the ground has deteriorated markedly. Following al-Abbani’s statement of support, various elements launched rockets against and burned offices on LAF bases in Tripoli. Libya’s Navy commander was wounded in an assassination attempt in Tripoli yesterday. On the 20th, a Chinese engineer was murdered by gunmen in Benghazi.
In Tripoli, more fighting took place May 21, with rockets falling on a residential area last night. GNC members tried to convene at another locale to elect a prime minister, but gave up without a quorum and after coming under rocket fire. That prompted GNC Speaker Nuri Abu Sahmain’s call on the 21st for Misrata’s Islamist “Central Shield” militia to take the field against Haftar to protect the remainder of the GNC and re-secure parliament’s original premises. In response to Sahmain’s call, Misrata’s notoriously tough militiamen were observed taking up positions in the capital this morning.
Foreign diplomats facing more danger
The foreign diplomatic community could hardly remain unaffected. Already, gunmen had attacked the Russian Embassy in Tripoli in October 2013, after which Zeidan reiterated his “unlimited commitment to the…security” of all diplomatic missions. Yet, as we have seen, Zeidan could not even protect himself.
The Jordanian ambassador was kidnapped by Islamic militants in March to free an extremist held in Jordan, with the ambassador released in April in exchange for the prisoner. The Jordanian Embassy was subsequently evacuated. Two kidnapped Egyptian diplomats were only freed in January when Egypt agreed to swap a hard-line Islamist militia leader detained in Cairo. Both cases set dangerous precedents.
After recent threats, Algeria sent its special forces to extract its embassy staff from Tripoli on May 16, and then evacuated all Algerian state oil personnel on the 19th. The Saudi Embassy staff also left that day. Likewise, personnel of several major oil companies and private businesses have fled overseas.
In this veritable maelstrom of violence amidst uncertainty regarding which side controls what in Tripoli, all foreign diplomatic missions and other foreigners are at considerable risk. With Islamic extremists under vigorous attack, there is also a greater danger that such elements will attempt to retaliate against foreign governments imagined to encourage or welcome what Haftar & Co. have been doing.
This makes the US a prime target. A number of Islamic militant elements (like Ansar al-Sharia, formally declared a terrorist group by Washington), militias, or gunmen could attack the US embassy in Tripoli. If so, there is no effective Libyan security to bar the way.
Last week, the Obama administration began positioning US military assets in Sicily to carry out a potential emergency extraction of embassy personnel, including 200 troops from the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force and MV-22 Osprey helicopters. On the 20th, the Pentagon said 60 more Marines were sent plus more Ospreys (now totaling 8). To avoid flying into an already “hot” situation in which a facility is already under attack or surrounded (like the one that wounded 4 US Navy SEALS aboard Ospreys in an aborted attempt to rescue US civilians in South Sudan last December), it would be prudent to execute that contingency plan as soon as possible.
During my State Department career, I participated several times in final deliberations over such decisions. There were always those who opposed withdrawing (regardless of the risk of staying), arguing that leaving the countries in question would reduce the US’ ability to influence events on the ground. Of course, in this case, for quite some time now the US and other Western diplomatic missions have had precious little impact on what has been unfolding in Libya.
Photo: The French embassy in Tripoli, Libya was bombed on April 23, 2013. It was the first attack on the French embassy in the capital.
]]>by Wayne White
In just the past five days, stability in Libya has suffered further setbacks. Yet chronic civil disorder and unrest may seem secondary as many outside observers focus too narrowly, for example, on the status of Libyan oil exports. Then there are human rights and judicial organizations [...]]]>
by Wayne White
In just the past five days, stability in Libya has suffered further setbacks. Yet chronic civil disorder and unrest may seem secondary as many outside observers focus too narrowly, for example, on the status of Libyan oil exports. Then there are human rights and judicial organizations typically focusing on high profile cases while justice is meted out to millions of Libyans through the barrel of a gun amidst degrading central authority. This complex crisis demands more consistently broad-based coverage.
Libya’s parliament, the General National Congress (GNC), ordered interim Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni on April 8 to form another government, ignoring his request for greater powers sorely needed to govern more effectively. Instead, on April 13 al-Thinni resigned “his temporary position,” citing an attack against his family residence that had been a “near miss.”
Al-Thinni was appointed interim prime minister only last month after the GNC dismissed veteran Prime Minister Ali Zeidan. The cause for Zeidan’s removal was, essentially, a GNC temper tantrum over his inability to stop a tanker with unauthorized crude from escaping an eastern oil port controlled by the defiant federalist eastern warlord Ibrahim Jathran. The tanker later would be snared by the US Navy and delivered to a port under central government control. Zeidan, however, a resilient figure who had stayed on despite being kidnapped by a militia last year, was gone. Now, with al-Thinni pulling out, Libya’s shaky central government is more rudderless than ever.
In the latest Libyan violence, gunmen kidnapped Jordanian Ambassador Fawaz al-Itan in Tripoli on April 14, shooting his driver. Kidnappers are demanding that Jordan release Libyan extremist Mohammed Dersi, sentenced to life imprisonment in 2007 for plotting to bomb Amman International Airport. This is just the most recent example of an ongoing wave of kidnappings (and killings).
So far this year, 5 Egyptian diplomats, a Tunisian diplomat, and a South Korean trade official have been seized. Ongoing assassinations of officials, individual Libyans, and foreigners also continue. Last December an American teacher was murdered in Benghazi; in January, a British man and New Zealand woman were shot execution style in western Libya; in February, 7 Egyptian Christians were shot in the east. Meanwhile, a number of Libyan security officials, soldiers, and other government personnel continue to be killed in ambushes.
Nonetheless, organizations like the International Criminal Court and Human Rights Watch (HRW) have zeroed in on the trial of two sons of Muammar Qadhafi, notorious Qadhafi regime intelligence chief Abdullah al-Sanussi, and a few dozen other Qadhafi cronies. These organizations are concerned about the fairness of Libyan justice toward such unpopular figures. Libyan Justice Minister Saleh al-Meghani said the trial would not be a “Mickey Mouse” show trial, and declared: “I will not allow any crazy stuff; I will make sure it meets international standards…; that is why we are having open trials.”
With quite a few defendants still without legal counsel, HRW’s Richard Dicker declared, “This…has been riddled with procedural flaws…,” making it “grossly unfair to the defendants.” The trial adjourned to finish preparations and address shortcomings only hours after it opened on April 14. There are legitimate concerns at this stage, but the government knows the vast majority of Libyans expect a measure of closure regarding the leading figures of such a loathsome regime.
Meanwhile there is a complete absence of functioning courts across much of Libya, with various militias having far more influence than Tripoli upon how local affairs are run. But this yawning legal vacuum, with extra-judicial kidnappings and shootings of many innocents frightfully common, apparently only warrants mention in occasional oversight reports.
The most concentrated of general media coverage involves careful reporting on Libyan hydrocarbon exports — some featuring, say, 2 or 3 reports on Libyan oil and gas reaching markets for every piece on the internal situation writ large. On April 15 the first tanker since last year was lifting crude from one of the two smaller of Libya’s four eastern oil terminals under Jathran’s control. The other small terminal Jathran promised to reopen back on April 6 has not yet been returned to National Oil Corporation (NOC) control. The status of the two largest ones depend on progress in further talks between the central government, the NOC, and Jathran over his various demands.
Indeed, the overall Libyan oil situation remains iffy. With all Western Libyan oil outlets also closed (save for the export and refinery complex at Zawiya including Libya’s 2nd largest refinery), plus the two largest in the east, matters still look grim. Late last week, protestors closed the Zawiya facility too, preventing two tankers from loading. The Zawiya complex reopened on April 13 after NOC officials reportedly resolved most of the issues involved. With some closed facilities in disrepair, and most oil fields still outside NOC control, some terminals can export only what previously had accumulated in their storage tanks.
As the Ukraine crisis has escalated, Europe’s need for energy exports from Libya has grown and so, of course, has legitimate interest. The majority of Libyan gas and oil exports have been down steeply for quite some time. Italy, with its government-affiliated National Hydrocarbons Entity (ENI) geared to Libyan crude and immensely dependent on Russian, Algerian and Libyan natural gas, is especially hopeful Libya will come back online in all respects.
Libyan gas and oil exports, however, will remain unreliable, and proper justice for most Libyans, whether prominent or not, will be illusive until fundamental issues of national unity, governance, and security can be addressed effectively. Perhaps the rising criticality of Libyan energy exports amidst the Ukraine crisis can motivate the US, NATO and EU governments to work with leading Libyan powerbrokers to initiate far more serious engagement aimed at breaking new ground toward grappling meaningfully with the most debilitating sources of internal discord.
]]>by Wayne White
Oil markets received seemingly good news earlier this week: several closed Libyan export terminals would reopen. Yet not only is Libya still beset by a host of crippling problems, even opening the oil taps a bit more remains somewhat iffy. In fact, developments only within the past 2 weeks [...]]]>
by Wayne White
Oil markets received seemingly good news earlier this week: several closed Libyan export terminals would reopen. Yet not only is Libya still beset by a host of crippling problems, even opening the oil taps a bit more remains somewhat iffy. In fact, developments only within the past 2 weeks showcase critical failings that continue to block most aspects of restoring some sense of stability and normalcy. This is a situation crying out for high-level international attention.
Back on April 6, central authorities negotiated with the rival federalist regional government in the east — led by former anti-Qadhafi rebel leader Ibrahim Jathran — the reopening of the smaller two of four oil export terminals under Jathran’s control (and perhaps the other two in about a month). In exchange, Tripoli agreed to drop charges against some of Jathran’s people, pay back salaries to public sector oil employees in the east siding with Jathran, and form a committee to investigate central government corruption. Separately, the government inserted in its new budget a 67% pay increase for oil workers, hoping to secure greater loyalty.
In reality the situation on the ground is more dicey. The cash-strapped Jathran’s cooperation increased only after his effort to export bootleg crude collapsed because of the interception of the first renegade tanker by the US Navy. Since April 6 the government-affiliated Libyan National Oil Corporation (NOC) has also refused to reopen the two eastern Libyan terminals until Jathran’s militiamen turn over the terminals completely to Libya’s official “Petroleum Facilities Guard” (PFG) force.
This has transpired while in western Libya only offshore export terminals remain open because of an ongoing feud between the government and militias controlling both the coastal terminals and the inland oil fields. A recent government-militia agreement to reopen all western Libyan terminals collapsed, with the militias involved falling out with each other over the accord. This makes renewed negotiations by Tripoli with multiple conflicting militia factions that much more difficult.
Meanwhile what passes for the Libyan central government has been struggling to make ends meet since the beginning of the year with a paltry 100,000-150,000 barrels per day (bpd) of oil out of a potential 1.3 million bpd. Worse still, with most border crossings outside official control, customs revenue is also fraction of what it once was.
Nonetheless, authorities are still saddled with Qadhafi-era payments of immense subsidies, such as one that keeps bread at 2 cents a loaf. Then there is the massive, but incredibly dysfunctional, civil service that includes a significant percentage of Libya’s adult population who were placed on the payroll by Muammar Qadhafi to minimize opposition.
This financial crunch has compelled the government to drop most infrastructure projects aimed at run-down roads, schools, hospitals and the like. Still, to balance this year’s budget, the Central Bank had to devalue the Libyan dinar up to 2.00 per US dollar from the previous rate of 1.25. And in this unsettled environment (both politically and financially), investors have fled or remain on the sidelines; Tripoli recently cancelled two conferences, one on oil and gas investment and the other on banking.
Libya’s difficulties are there for all to see. The staff at all 146 branches of one of Libya’s largest banks, the state-owned Jumhuriya, went on strike for two days beginning April 2 after another one of its employees was gunned down while on the job. On the 6th, all public and private sector workers in Benghazi also went on strike over worsening violence there, demanding the Libyan parliament, the General National Congress (GNC), to step down. The strike closed Benghazi International Airport, and on April 7 Lufthansa and Austrian Airlines cancelled flights to Tripoli International because of the explosion of a large bomb on the main runway last month; British Airways and Italy’s Alitalia did so immediately after the bombing.
Amidst all this trouble is an ongoing government crisis in Tripoli. It was rumored that the cabinet of caretaker Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni had resigned because the GNC refused its appeals for more power and a longer mandate (it has to be renewed every two weeks) to address Libya’s pressing problems. Word of the request was true, but not the resignation. The GNC simply responded by ordering al-Thinni on April 8 to form a new caretaker government within a week or resign.
Illustrating the GNC’s lack of credibility and militia power was a video released to all Libyan TV stations earlier this month showing the clearly fearful Islamist head of parliament, Nuri Ali Sahmein, begging a militia commander, Haitham al-Tajouri, to understand why he was caught in his residence with two women. Al-Tajouri is the leader of the “Reinforcement Front” militia (supposedly in government service) that kidnapped briefly then Prime Minister Ali Zeidan last October. In response to the resulting public outcry, Libya’s prosecutor general has summoned both to determine whether al-Tajouri engaged in blackmail or Sahmein broke any Libyan moral laws.
What is supposed to be the nascent Libyan national army numbers only 8,000 — far fewer than the militias potentially arrayed against it. The preparation of even that small force with US, UK, Italian and Turkish assistance has also been delayed by ongoing unrest. Ousted Prime Minster Ali Zeidan commented from his refuge in Germany: “Really there is no army. I thought there was one, but then I realized there really isn’t any.” So the government conducts ongoing negotiations with a welter of semi-official, government-paid, but unruly militias over all manner of issues (with the militias’ dominant loyalty to their own localities, tribes, charismatic commanders, or even certain factions within the GNC).
Desperation among Libyan government leaders was reflected in Foreign Minister Mohammed Abdelaziz’s stunning statement last month calling for the establishment of a “constitutional monarchy;” he even contacted the son of Libya’s late King Idris I. Idris, more than a constitutional monarch, was overthrown by Muammar Qadhafi in 1969. While today his rule could appear idyllic to many Libyans in retrospect, Idris anchored his rule on a mainly eastern tribal and religious base — hardly a model for Libyan national unity.
In this atmosphere, the drafting of a new constitution by the Libyan Constitutional Assembly (elected by a paltry turnout in February) does not offer much hope for real change. Indeed, a referendum in a few months to approve whatever the drafters put forward could be a very messy and contentious affair. As Libya staggers from one crisis to another, it’s becoming ever clearer that it needs outside help.
Although it is not part of the planned political process, the US, UN, EU, and Arab League should urgently offer to host a meeting of all parties (including not only government leaders, but also the most powerful militia commanders, tribal leaders, and Jathran) in a neutral venue outside Libya. The authorities in Tripoli might reject such a conference as undermining their sovereignty (although their current sway is minimal). There is little to lose, however, by offering to bring the players together under one tent in an effort to focus on how so many of them lose amidst chaos and to showcase the benefits of greater national cooperation.
]]>by Wayne White
The Libyan Parliament’s abrupt dismissal last week of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan takes Libya another step closer to even greater confusion and instability. With an oil-starved central government also drifting closer to bankruptcy, Libya’s options going forward have become more daunting. If the international community continues to focus elsewhere [...]]]>
by Wayne White
The Libyan Parliament’s abrupt dismissal last week of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan takes Libya another step closer to even greater confusion and instability. With an oil-starved central government also drifting closer to bankruptcy, Libya’s options going forward have become more daunting. If the international community continues to focus elsewhere in the region while Libya merits high-level diplomatic attention, the prospects for finding a way to halt Libya’s decline will worsen.
The latest disruptive snit was triggered by the escape last week of a North Korean-linked tanker from the federalist rebel-controlled eastern Libyan oil terminal of Es-Sider with a cargo of unauthorized crude. Zeidan ordered the government’s puny navy to intercept it and bring it to a government-controlled port. The tanker was hit by Libyan naval gunfire, but eventually escaped amidst poor weather.
Eastern rebels claimed the cargo had reached its destination on March 14, but a Libyan government official said it was still in the Mediterranean on the 15th. Finally, late yesterday, US Special Forces, acting on the request of the Libyan and Cypriot governments, seized the tanker (the “Morning Glory”) from the few armed rebels guarding it just south of Cyprus.
Earlier, however, an angry parliament (despite the government’s weak navy), chose to blame Zeidan, and voted him out of office on March 11 — ordering him to remain in Libya pending charges. On the 12th, Zeidan fled to Europe. Zeidan was replaced by temporary Prime Minster and Defense Minister Abdullah al-Thinni, but only for two weeks while parliament, the General National Council (GNC), casts about for a more permanent figure. Al-Thinni had only been in his defense post since August 2013.
The tanker’s escape triggered such a flap because Tripoli has been trying to isolate and squeeze the shadow eastern government of former anti-Qadhafi rebel leader Ibrahim Jathran. Jathran has been facing rising discontent because the eastern government has been without enough cash to pay government officials, police, and even disaffected Libyan National Oil Corporations (NOC) workers stationed in the east and assisting in the terminal closures. If the illegally lifted crude had generated payments to new accounts established by Jathran & Co. instead of those of NOC in Tripoli, the funds would have reinforced Jathran’s position.
Meanwhile, on GNC orders, a small contingent of Libyan army troops and a larger force of battle-hardened, notoriously formidable pro-government militiamen from Misrata, Libya’s 3rd largest city, moved east to “liberate” rebellious oil ports and block further illicit shipments. This force compelled Jathran’s troops to fall back from the city of Sirte on the way to Jathran’s area of control on March 11th.
Nonetheless, on the 12th, GNC President Nouri Abu Sahmain, who still wields most of the authority over the military in Libya despite al-Thinni’s appointment, ordered a halt to the advance, giving the eastern rebels “two weeks at most” to restore normal operations at the oil ports before resuming the government’s military advance. The reasons for this reverse were unclear, but the GNC could be skeptical of a successful offensive 200 miles from Sirte to the nearest rebel terminal.
The halt, however, also probably relates to a rivalry between the two powerful militias typically called upon as the government’s military “firemen” (and the GNC factions with which they identify). In addition to the Misrata force, there is the powerful militia from the town of Zintan, south of Tripoli. The Zintani militia has been associated with the parliament’s secular parties. So far, the two militias have not squared off against each other. But that could change if Misrata’s fighters make major gains in the east that boost the power of the GNC’s Islamist wing that the Misrata militia generally supports.
Added to the central government’s own Islamic-secular rivalries that all too often have paralyzed parliament is the threat of going broke. With oil exports down to around 300,000 barrels per day (out of a normal 1.3 million), the government is running low on cash, losing $8 billion in oil revenues last year alone. Al-Thinni declared last week that the government needs an “emergency budget” to deal with its security challenges. Nonetheless, a GNC already unpopular for extending its own mandate last month and gridlocked over lesser matters might not respond despite the gravity of the situation.
Of concern to the international community is that as long as so much of the country remains beyond central authority, a large amount of arms from Qadhafi’s former arsenals will continue flowing across Libya’s borders. A panel of UN experts recently submitted a 97-page report to the Security Council stating that Libya has “become a primary source of illicit weapons.” The panel is investigating alleged shipments to 14 countries. A number of its findings relate to attempts to transfer particularly dangerous shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles. One such shipment, stopped by Lebanon, was bound for Syrian rebels.
Moreover, especially lawless portions of Libya like the desert southwest and some areas in the east adjacent to Egypt serve as safe havens for Islamic extremist elements staging from Libyan territory into neighboring states or assisting foreign jihadists. This has been true of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (IQIM) elements lunging into Algeria and Mali, other groups supplying munitions to militant elements in Egypt following the suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood, and shipments into Tunisia aiding terrorist cells there.
In American minds especially, Libya is firmly associated with Muslim extremism, the result of the Benghazi attack of Sept. 2012. Despite the existence of such groups (like eastern Libya’s dangerous Ansar al-Islam), however, in the defining GNC July 2012 elections, the secular National Forces Alliance, a collection of likeminded smaller parties, and dozens of independents dominated, with Islamists coming in second. In fact, the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in Libya secured only 10% of the vote.
So, unlike the Brotherhood’s decisive electoral victory in Egypt, a majority of Libyans, at least the first time around, voted against an Islamist-dominated future (and, naturally, were horrified by the Benghazi attack and its adverse implications for ties with the US and the West).
With the GNC’s standing shaky because of its self-extended mandate and legislative paralysis, constitutional drafting to be completed in June, and votes on approving the constitution and a permanent parliament to occur this year, the next six months seems to be a make or break period for what is to become of Libya. There already has been a disturbing indicator. Turnout last month for the election of the constitutional drafting body was dismal, reflecting widespread cynicism toward the entire political process.
A conclave of mostly Western and Arab Gulf foreign ministers to discuss Libya did take place in Rome on March 6. Instability and arms smuggling topped the agenda. US Secretary of State John Kerry confirmed that “Libya is at a pivotal moment,” adding that “Libyans did not risk their lives in the 2011 revolution just to slip backward into thuggery and violence.” Yet, little in terms of concrete measures aimed at stepping up the pace — and urgency — of foreign diplomatic engagement came out of the meeting.
Clearly, the international community is far more focused, in the Middle East at least, on halting the fighting in Syria, pursuing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and trying to push the Iran-nuclear negotiations to the finish line. Sadly, however, the prospects for real progress on the first two of those issues are exceedingly poor. In fact, with Western-Russian relations taking such a beating over the Ukraine crisis, the Russian-US led effort aimed at brokering a Syrian ceasefire — already pretty iffy — might collapse.
In any case, it’s time for Western and Arab governments that came together to support Muammar Qadhafi’s overthrow so robustly to make a strenuous effort to help salvage the mess that has developed since. Under the circumstances, without, say, bringing the various key players in Libya together at a neutral venue like Geneva, there is little reason to believe Libya’s domestic agenda in the coming months will play out as planned.
The interception of the “Morning Glory” could provide an important opportunity for such an initiative. Jathran’s so-called Prime Minister Ab-Rabbo al-Barassi said on the 15th that Jathran was ready to negotiate an end to the oil terminal blockade if the government would end its military threat. Now, with the prospect of his own illicit oil exports gone, an already financially desperate Jathran might be ready for serious talks.
]]>