by Peter Jenkins
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has issued its latest quarterly report on Iran. The IAEA Board will consider the Sept. 5 report during the week of Sept. 15.
Much initial comment has centred on signs that the process launched on Nov. 11, 2013, when the IAEA and Iran [...]]]>
by Peter Jenkins
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has issued its latest quarterly report on Iran. The IAEA Board will consider the Sept. 5 report during the week of Sept. 15.
Much initial comment has centred on signs that the process launched on Nov. 11, 2013, when the IAEA and Iran agreed on a framework for addressing all outstanding IAEA concerns about the nature of Iran’s nuclear program, is starting to stall. But first the good news:
- Iran no longer possesses any declared uranium enriched to 20% U235 in gaseous form. Fed into a sufficient number of centrifuges, 20% U235 can quickly be enriched to weapon grade. All this material has either been down-blended or converted into uranium oxide for fuel plates.
- Iran has started to convert its stock of uranium enriched up to 5% U235 from gaseous form into uranium oxide. Once the whole stock has been converted, drawing on it to produce weapon-grade U235 would be an unattractive option.
- Iran has not brought any additional centrifuge cascades into service since the last IAEA report. It is operating 54 cascades at the Natanz plant and four cascades at Fordow.
- IAEA inspectors have been granted access to Iran’s centrifuge workshops and storage facilities, and have had access to a centrifuge research and development centre. These visits have enabled the agency to confirm that the production rate of rotors, a crucial centrifuge component, is consistent with a program for replacing damaged centrifuges (and points away from any clandestine centrifuge acquisition program).
- Iran continues to meet all its commitments under the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) agreed between the US and the P5+1 (US, UK, France, Russia, China plus Germany) last November.
- All nuclear material known to be in Iran’s possession continues to be accounted for and to be in peaceful use.
Together these findings suggest that the purpose of Iran’s uranium enrichment program is the production of reactor fuel, as declared, and not the production of nuclear weapons, which would be a violation of Iran’s obligations as a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It is open to Iran at any time to change course and start using facilities that are inherently capable of serving both civil and military purposes for a military end, but there is no indication in the latest report that Iran has the ‘political will’ to do any such thing.
There is cause for concern, however, in what the agency reports about the implementation of the Nov. 11, 2013 Cooperation Framework. Having addressed all the issues raised by the agency on that date and Feb. 9, 2014, Iran has been slow to address two of the five issues raised on May 20 (but has now done so) and has only just begun to discuss two more.
The two issues on which Iran appears most reticent relate to allegations that Iran has engaged in research and experimentation into certain uses of high explosives, and has studied the application of neutrons to compressed materials.
What concerns the IAEA is that this work could have been relevant to a clandestine nuclear weapon research program. (It is not clear whether the agency has evidence that the work is ongoing. The US intelligence community has stated on record that Iran abandoned systematic nuclear weapon research in 2003.)
Worryingly, the agency reports that on Aug. 28 Iran wrote that “most of the issues” that the agency views as outstanding are “mere allegations and do not merit consideration”. This echoes the Iranian position during a long period that preceded the agreement last November, which seemed to herald a more constructive approach.
Neither party is to be envied. The IAEA has said that its concerns are based on more than intelligence material (which, almost by definition, may or may not be worthy of trust), and cannot retreat without losing credibility. Iran has backed itself into a corner by often denying ever having had any interest in developing nuclear weapons, and may well be nervous about the consequences of self-incrimination, not least because US politics make those unpredictable.
It must be recalled, however, that this process is entirely independent of the process launched two weeks later by the JPA. The JPA does not stipulate that resolution of all IAEA issues is an indispensable pre-condition for the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement. The IAEA has made clear that it is working to a much longer time-scale than those trying to negotiate a peaceful outcome to their nuclear dispute within the framework of the JPA.
So Iran has time to reflect on its position. It also has time to consult the US and others about how they would react to any admission of past weapon-related research, and to exchange assurances. That could be one way out of this impasse.
Photo: IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano at a press conference with Dr Ali Akbar Salehi, Vice President and Chairman of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran during his official visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran Aug. 17, 2014. Credit: Conleth Brady/IAEA
]]>by Peter Jenkins
The latest report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), issued on May 23, suggests a determined and so far impressive effort by Iran to dispel suspicion of its nuclear intentions.
Tehran is complying fully with its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards obligations — both de facto and, [...]]]>
by Peter Jenkins
The latest report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), issued on May 23, suggests a determined and so far impressive effort by Iran to dispel suspicion of its nuclear intentions.
Tehran is complying fully with its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards obligations — both de facto and, with one small exception, de jure. It is implementing fully the “voluntary measures” it undertook in the context of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) Iran signed November 24, 2013 with the US and five other powers in Geneva. It has also implemented thirteen “practical measures” pursuant to its November 11, 2013 Cooperation Framework agreement with the IAEA. (Five additional practical measures were announced on May 21, 2014.)
The IAEA continues to certify that all the nuclear material declared to it by Iran is in peaceful use. The Agency mentions no evidence for Iranian possession of undeclared nuclear material, but cannot yet say with confidence that there is no undeclared nuclear material in Iran. That is a logical consequence of the incomplete nature of the IAEA’s information of Iran’s nuclear program; the November 11, 2013 agreement will help the IAEA round out its knowledge.
Since 2008, the stoking of suspicion as to Iran’s nuclear intentions has relied heavily on fragmentary indicators of what the IAEA refers to, more or less interchangeably, as “a possible military dimension” (PMD) or “nuclear-related activities”. So, arguably, the most interesting paragraph in the latest report is paragraph 56. There the IAEA states that Iran has “shown” the Agency that simultaneous test firings of Explosive Bridge Wire (EBW) detonators (one of the above indicators) took place for a civilian (and not a nuclear weapon) application.
This explanation is credible. There is widespread use of EBW technology in the mining industry, for example. But paragraph 57 makes clear that we must not expect the Agency to pronounce the explanation credible until they have obtained clarifications in relation to the other fragmentary indicators in their possession.
What the Agency says in paragraph 57 is that it needs to be able to conduct a “system assessment” of the outstanding [PMD] issues. That suggests a comprehensive but protracted process.
Also of particular interest is Iranian submission of preliminary design information for a 10MW reactor that will burn low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. The reactor is to be situated near the city of Shiraz. It seems likely that it is the first of four medical isotope-producing reactors of which the President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), Ali Akbar Salehi, has spoken.
A 10 MW LEU reactor will probably be of less concern to Western counter-proliferation experts than the 40 MW natural uranium reactor under construction at Arak, since the plutonium content of spent LEU fuel is smaller and lends itself less to weaponization purposes. Indeed, one of the options under negotiation pursuant to the JPOA involves modernizing the Arak design to lower the reactor’s output and allow it to burn LEU.
Furthermore, the fuel needs of the newly announced reactor (and of a modernized Arak reactor) can provide Iran with a “practical needs” justification for retaining a limited LEU production capacity at its Natanz enrichment plant. Fuelling indigenously designed research reactors is a far more credible need than the oft-asserted need to fuel Russian-designed power reactors, since Russia will want to supply fuel for the latter throughout their operating lives, and since there could be proprietary data obstacles to Iran’s fabricating fuel for them.
Finally, the latest report confirms that, in fulfilling its JPOA commitments, Iran ceased producing 20% U235 UF6 on January 20 and has reduced its 20% UF6 stockpile to 8% of total production up to that date. Iran is now far from being in a position to use 20% U235 material as feed in the “break-out” scenario that some people, such as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, assume Iran’s leaders are secretly conceiving.
The IAEA’s next report will be due in late August. Between now and then falls the deadline for the conclusion of negotiations pursuant to the JPOA. It would be nice if the reassuring picture of Iran’s nuclear program in this latest IAEA report were to influence downwards the demands made of Iran by US negotiators.
In reality, the reassuring picture is more likely to be discounted, cynically, as an indicator that Iran is making a show of cooperation to obtain better terms — and US demands are more likely to be influenced by unshakeable mistrust, and fear of Israeli displeasure, despite all the indicators that Iran’s leaders do not want nuclear weapons and believe NPT-compliance to be in Iran’s interest.
Photo: IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano (left) and Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs Abbas Araghchi shake hands October 28, 2013 at IAEA headquarters in Vienna. Credit: Veysel Kuecuektas/IAEA
]]>To date, negotiators on both sides of the talks over Iran’s controversial nuclear program, which resume next week, have been remarkably discreet. Even at the political level, people have been unusually quiet. This is an excellent omen. In the past, too many opportunities have been nipped in the bud due to [...]]]>
To date, negotiators on both sides of the talks over Iran’s controversial nuclear program, which resume next week, have been remarkably discreet. Even at the political level, people have been unusually quiet. This is an excellent omen. In the past, too many opportunities have been nipped in the bud due to an excess of statements calibrated for domestic purposes (a special mention to Wendy Sherman, the chief US negotiator, for saying so little, amiably, in many background meetings with the press). The involvement of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the negotiations has also been of inestimable value. The Agency offers unique expertise and notarizes regularly the way in which Iran complies with its commitments. It contributes therefore decisively to the smooth progression of the discussions.
Quite unexpectedly, Iran’s negotiators have been the driving force in this process. They have seized President Hassan Rouhani’s initiative to solve the conflict over Iran’s nuclear program and have kept it ever since, setting the targets as well as the tempo. Iran’s foreign minister and lead negotiator, Mohammad Javad Zarif, said on April 7 that the drafting of the final agreement between Iran and the P5+1 (the U.S., Britain, France, China, and Russia plus Germany) should start in May, and that all efforts should be taken to complete the negotiations by the official deadline of July. The Iranians seem set to resolve the conflict over their nuclear program as fast as possible, once and for all.
The Rouhani administration’s determination serves in pleasant contrast to the rather stiff and slow Iranian behavior that was especially exhibited during the Ahmadinejad era, but also, at times, in the most favorable of circumstances, during the 2003-05 period, when Rouhani was himself Iran’s chief negotiator. At that time, the Iranian diplomats on the frontline were subjected to a heavy-handed system of control, which tended to stifle their movements. Having learned from this experience, President Rouhani, elected last June, has obtained a carte blanche from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. While the Leader did issue a set of red lines last month (English diagram), and has issued specific warnings every now and then, he has consistently supported Iran’s diplomats while keeping domestic criticism of Iran’s team at a manageable level.
Indeed, Rouhani may not own the horse, but he controls the reigns. One of his first acts as president was transferring Iran’s nuclear negotiating file from the Supreme National Security Council to the Ministry of Foreign affairs. That enabled him to build a “dream team” of seasoned negotiators, perfectly comfortable with the codes and practices of their Western counterparts. Iran’s new and refined team has stood out in stark contrast to the collective clumsiness of the P5+1 negotiators, as in the early November 2013 episode, when four Western Foreign Ministers rushed prematurely to Geneva, spurring the media to believe, mistakenly, that a deal would be signed (it was signed 10 days later). But, as Marshal Foch used to say: “After leading a coalition, I have much less admiration for Napoleon…”
Getting to the heart of the matter, many points seem close to being settled. Iran is ready to cap at 5% its production of enriched uranium and to limit its current stockpile from further enrichment. The controversial underground facility of Fordow will probably end up as a kind of research and development unit. The Arak reactor’s original configuration allowed the yearly production of about ten kilograms of plutonium, enough for one or two bombs. Ali Akbar Salehi, chairman of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), has hinted that this configuration could be modified in order to accommodate low-enriched uranium fuel rather than natural uranium. This would reduce Arak’s plutonium production capacity by a factor of five to ten. And Iran has already confirmed that it has no intention of acquiring the fuel reprocessing capacity indispensable for isolating weapon-grade plutonium.
Depending on the pace of sanctions relief, Iran also seems ready to return to a kind of de facto implementation of the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, which would provide enhanced monitoring over all of Iran’s nuclear activities. Iran should be ready to initiate the Protocol’s ratification process as soon as the United Nations Security Council shows itself ready to remove the Iranian nuclear file from its agenda, thus erasing the burning humiliation of 2006, when it passed its first resolution on the subject.
The make or break issues
To date, five sticking points remain on the table.
The most difficult issue concerns the format of Iran’s enrichment capacity. The Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), adopted last November, speaks of “parameters consistent with practical needs, with agreed limits on scope and level of enrichment activities”. But the West has focused on “breakout time”, that is, the time needed to acquire enough highly enriched uranium for a first bomb if Iran decided to renege on its commitments. This delay has been estimated at about two months in the current state of Iran’s enrichment program. To extend it significantly, Iran would have to bring down the number of its centrifuges from the present 20,000 to 2-6,000.
A drastic reduction of the number of centrifuges, however, would be a deal-breaker for Iran. Following the conservative elements of the regime, the Supreme Leader has recently excluded any kind of bargaining on Iran’s nuclear achievements.
Fortunately, other solutions can alleviate the West’s concerns. First, having enough highly enriched uranium for one bomb does not mean having the bomb. Several more months would be necessary to make it ready. Second, one wonders why the international community would need more than one or two months to properly respond to an Iranian rush for a bomb. If it can’t make it in two months, why would it succeed in six? Third, this infamous breakout time could be extended without reducing the present number of centrifuges by using, as fast as possible, the low enriched uranium produced by Iran as fuel for nuclear reactors, rendering it unserviceable for further, weapon-grade, enrichment. Here, feeding the Arak reactor with domestic low-enriched uranium could solve a good part of the problem.
It is unfortunate, though, that the Iranians have made so little effort up to now to identify the “practical needs” mentioned, at their initiative, in the Geneva agreement. The spokesman of the AEOI has announced recently that a “comprehensive document” was being elaborated on the subject, and would be submitted for approval to the Iranian Parliament. But this process will probably extend beyond the time limit set for the negotiations.
In the meantime, we know that the Russians are bound to provide for eight more years the low enriched fuel necessary for the Bushehr nuclear plant. After this period, they will resist the introduction of Iranian fuel into the Bushehr reactor, as the selling of fuel is for the Russians the most profitable part of their contract with Iran. Their attitude will be the same when discussing the construction and operation of more reactors in Iran. By all means, new Russian reactors, or any reactors from other origins, will not be active before a decade. All of this is to say that if the current number of 20,000 centrifuges was accepted by the international community, the Iranians would have no “practical need” in the offing to justify a raise of this number in the years to come.
Another difficult point is the question of nuclear research and development. The West would like Iran to forsake such activities, especially in the field of centrifugation. Again, this is a red line for the Supreme Leader and the conservatives, as Iran’s engineers are working on models up to fifteen times more efficient than the present outdated model forming the bulk of its program. Here, a simple solution has been suggested by Salehi: instead of setting a cap on centrifuges, which could be circumvented by using more efficient models, the parties should define this cap in “separative work units”, the equivalent of horsepower in the field of enrichment. The introduction of more efficient centrifuges would thus reduce in due proportion the total number allowed.
A third difficult point is the ongoing exploration by the IAEA of the “possible military dimensions” of Iran’s nuclear program. This demand, reiterated by the IAEA Board of Governors and the UN Security Council, has been fiercely resisted by Iran. In fact, it was the head of the US national intelligence community who said, in 2007, that the Iranian weaponization program was stopped before completion by the end of 2003. Ten years have since passed, and the people involved in that program must have been granted some kind of protection in exchange for their compliance, hence the inherent difficulty for the Iranians of authorizing outsiders to probe too deep into this subject. In former similar occurrences, such as with Egypt, South Korea and Taiwan, the IAEA has accepted not to divulge details on the wrongdoings discovered by its inspectors, once assured of the cancelation of these programs. A similar way out should be explored with Iran.
The fourth sticking point evolves around Iran’s ballistic missiles. The West wants to include them in the negotiations, as a source of worry identified by the UN Security Council, but this has been outright rejected by Iran. Recall that Iran has accepted to negotiate over its nuclear program as a civilian program placed under the aegis of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Negotiations over missiles pertain to a different world, the world of defense and disarmament, in which negotiations are by definition collective, save for unilateral measures imposed upon a defeated country. If there is a solution here, it would require a separate, multilateral discussion on the level and distribution of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, with the aim of convincing concerned states to join the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, adopted in 2002 in the Hague.
The last point, little talked about, but hardly the least difficult, concerns the duration of the future comprehensive agreement to be signed by Iran and the P5+1. Under the Geneva JPOA, this agreement, once fully implemented for the duration of all its provisions, will be replaced by the common regime applicable to all NPT members. Iran would then be freed of specific commitments such as the limitation of its enrichment activities, on which extensive IAEA controls, of course, would remain. Such a shift would mean that the International community would be fully reassured about the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program.
However, to reach such an assessment, the general behavior of the Iranian regime and the quality of its relations with the outside world would be as important as the state of its nuclear program. How long should the assessment process last? These considerations cannot be put into writing. The Iranians will probably insist on no more than five years, while the West would be happy to see this regime of special constraints indefinitely extended. This point could be the last outstanding issue in the discussions. Hopefully, if solutions are found on all the previous questions, there will be a strong incentive to find a compromise here to ensure a final deal once and for all.
Photo: EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif at a joint press conference following talks between Iran and the P5+1 in Vienna, Austria on April 9, 2014. Credit: AFP/Samuel Kubani
]]>by Derek Davison
Although it hasn’t been officially confirmed, Iran’s Vice-President Ali Akbar Salehi declared April 19 that Iran and the P5+1 (the US, Britain, France, China, and Russia plus Germany) had “virtually resolved” a dispute over Arak. What does this mean for the continued negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program?
What [...]]]>
by Derek Davison
Although it hasn’t been officially confirmed, Iran’s Vice-President Ali Akbar Salehi declared April 19 that Iran and the P5+1 (the US, Britain, France, China, and Russia plus Germany) had “virtually resolved” a dispute over Arak. What does this mean for the continued negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program?
What is Arak?
Arak, or araq, is an anise-flavored alcoholic beverage that is especially popular throughout the Levant. It is closely related to the Turkish beverage rakı and the Greek ouzo.
Arak and water over ice
Not that Arak.
Oh, right, the nuclear talks. Sorry.
Arak is a city of over 500,000 people, located in the Markazi province in central Iran. It’s about 150 miles southwest of Tehran. Modern Arak was incorporated in 1795 by a Georgian lord who got on Catherine the Great’s bad side and offered himself and his army to the Qajar ruler of Iran, Mohammad Khan, in exchange for sanctuary. This makes Arak almost as old as the United States of America, but for an Iranian city that’s still pretty new.
What does Arak have to do with the nuclear talks?
Iran informed the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) in 2003 that it would begin construction on a “pressurized heavy water” nuclear reactor (PHWR), named IR-40 (40 because it was designed to run at 40 megawatts), at Arak. PHWRs are generally seen as greater proliferation risks than the more common “light water” reactors (LWR), so the status of the planned Arak reactor has become one of the primary issues in talks over Iran’s nuclear program.
What is a PHWR and why do they raise proliferation concerns?
A sustained nuclear reaction uses the free neutrons produced when one atom of uranium is split (fission) to strike other uranium atoms and cause them to split, but those neutrons have to be “moderated,” or slowed down, so that they will interact with fissile U-235 (the more common uranium isotope, U-238, is not fissile). Where LWRs just use regular water (H20) as coolant and neutron moderator, PHWRs use deuterium oxide (D20). Deuterium is a hydrogen isotope that contains a neutron in the nucleus (the added weight of the neutron is the reason why it’s called “heavy” water); in nature it accounts for less than 0.02% of all hydrogen in water, but the solution used in a PHWR will be nearly 100% D20.
Heavy water absorbs far fewer free neutrons from nuclear reactions than regular/light water, making it a more efficient neutron moderator. This means that it’s possible to run a PHWR using natural uranium, because all those neutrons that aren’t being absorbed are available to strike enough U-235 to sustain a reaction even in natural uranium (which contains very little U-235). LWRs require enriched uranium, which has been altered in centrifuges to artificially increase the percentage of U-235. This is the first reason why PHWRs are a proliferation concern, because while enriched uranium is subject to monitoring safeguards in how it is bought, sold, and transported on the world market, natural uranium is not. But the far greater concern is that PHWRs can produce significant amounts of plutonium as waste product, which can then be reprocessed into weapons-grade material. For example, India’s first tested nuclear weapon, Pokhran-I, was fueled by plutonium reprocessed from its heavy water CIRUS reactor, whose design is similar to IR-40’s.
Why does Iran want a heavy water reactor?
Reactors that are intended to be used for research (for example, to produce medical isotopes) rather than for power generation, often need to use uranium enriched to 20% U-235 or more, which in addition to being costly to produce is also itself a proliferation concern. PHWRs, again because D20 is such an efficient moderator, are an alternative in such applications. Iran insists that IR-40 is intended only to replace its aging Tehran Research Reactor, which produces medical isotopes for cancer patients, but the P5+1 has expressed concern about its potential use in developing a weapon. The Joint Plan of Action that was signed in Geneva in November 2014 stipulated that Iran would take no steps toward bringing Arak online for its duration.
For all the P5+1’s supposed concern about Arak, it must be noted that, as Gareth Porter has pointed out, Iran has made no move to build the kind of reprocessing facility that would be needed to convert IR-40’s plutonium waste into weapons fuel. While it could build such a facility in the future, that would take considerable time and would not be easily concealed from IAEA inspectors, so Arak is not an imminent threat from a proliferation standpoint.
What is involved in this agreement that’s been reached, and what are its implications?
To be clear, so far there is no official confirmation that any deal has been reached. But while Iranian officials have ruled out converting IR-40 to a LWR, they have suggested a willingness to modify its design. Al-Monitor’s Laura Rozen reports that the compromise is likely very similar to a proposal laid out by a group of Princeton University scientists in the journal Arms Control Today, whereby IR-40 would be modified to run on lightly enriched uranium, rather than natural uranium, and would run at a lower temperature, 10-30 megawatts rather than 40. Both of these modifications would substantially reduce the amount of plutonium waste produced by the reactor (to about the same amount as if it were converted to a LWR) without compromising its effectiveness as a research reactor.
Arak has been a prominent element in the negotiations, so if a deal over its status has been reached, then it’s likely that the negotiators are now on the last few major disputes that need to be ironed out for a comprehensive agreement. These undoubtedly revolve around the issues of uranium enrichment and IAEA monitoring, which arms control expert Robert Einhorn has argued are the biggest issues in the talks.
]]>by Dina Esfandiary
Another round of talks between world powers and Iran begins in Vienna this week. Today, both sides want a deal, and fast. The positive atmosphere that characterised the recent rounds will likely endure. Gone are the days of “procedural nonsense,” according to a European negotiator, replaced by “frank discussions.” [...]]]>
by Dina Esfandiary
Another round of talks between world powers and Iran begins in Vienna this week. Today, both sides want a deal, and fast. The positive atmosphere that characterised the recent rounds will likely endure. Gone are the days of “procedural nonsense,” according to a European negotiator, replaced by “frank discussions.” But there remain significant obstacles to a final nuclear agreement. It is unlikely that anything ground-breaking will be achieved in this round of talks. Instead, parties will explore areas of possible convergence and make steady progress towards a potential final deal.
All negotiations are about what parties want and how much they can compromise. What has changed here is not what the P5+1 (the US, Britain, France, China, and Russia plus Germany) and Iran want, but how badly they want a solution. Both sides are painfully aware of the downsides of no agreement. In the words of a participant at a recent workshop hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the best alternative to a negotiated agreement is in this case “very bad” — likely, more sanctions and an Iran closer to a rapid breakout capability. This is why there is a strong incentive to explore areas of potential agreement.
What does each side want? The P5+1 want substantial reductions and the dismantlement of some of Iran’s nuclear program. The main issues of concern are Iran’s enrichment capacity, its Arak heavy water (HWR) reactor and the past possible military dimensions of its program. Iran however, aims to preserve as much of its program as possible, and perhaps even expand its capacity. It wants (preferably total) sanctions relief and a clear guideline on the duration of the final agreement. So far, this doesn’t bode well.
Former US official Bob Einhorn encourages negotiators to focus on Iran’s “practical needs”. The November 2013 Joint Plan of Action (JPA) called for a “mutually defined enrichment programme with mutually agreed parameters consistent with practical needs”. The P5+1 believe that Iran’s enrichment needs for a civilian nuclear program can largely be met through foreign supply and that Tehran does not need to enrich on its soil. But after years of political and economic investment into enrichment, Iran can’t just forgo it. The P5+1 demonstrated their understanding of this conundrum when they stopped asking for enrichment to be fully suspended and accepted it on Iranian soil. The trick now will be to find enough common ground over lengthening Iran’s breakout time by addressing the number and efficiency of centrifuges, while meeting Iran’s current and future needs. Iran repeatedly insists that dismantlement is not on the agenda. Whether that is accurate or part of pre-negotiation posturing, exploring P5+1 condoned research and development into advanced centrifuges as an additional sweetener could make Tehran more amenable to such roll-backs.
The Arak HWR also poses a proliferation concern because of its ability to open up the plutonium route to a bomb for Iran. Despite requiring a reprocessing plant, which Iran does not have and so far does not intend to build, the P5+1 have made it clear that maintaining it in its current form is unacceptable. Iran’s nuclear chief, Ali Akbar Salehi spoke of the country’s willingness to modify the reactor to produce less plutonium to allay Western fears. But the true test is whether the P5+1 can coax Iran to allow the modification of Arak into a light-water reactor. Once again, the P5+1 seem to be exploring positive incentives to address this.
One area of greater agreement is over transparency and verification. Iran insists it is prepared to accept intrusive verification measures to prove the “peacefulness” of its program. In fact, it already did so under the JPA. But the Additional Protocol (AP) is a difficult sell back home. Iranian negotiators are prepared to implement some of its safeguards as long as it’s not branded as such. Iran is also adamant that the scope and duration of these measures must be clearly defined.
This brings us to another important part of these talks: rhetoric. Today more than ever, there seems to be an understanding on both sides about what the other faces back home. Iran knows that US President Barack Obama walks a fine line on these negotiations when it comes to Congress, while the West is clearly more perceptive of the difficulties posed by the hardliners in Tehran and Iran’s need to save face. The P5+1’s willingness to accept suggestions such as implementing intrusive verification measures without naming the AP or framing talks in terms of modernising the Iranian program rather than dismantling it demonstrates this. Some officials recognise the need to ignore Iranian rhetoric, knowing full well that like in the West, the most uncompromising statements are often intended for a domestic audience.
The road to a final agreement is long and complicated. Anything from a small statement by an Iranian or American hardliner to Russian disengagement from the negotiations because of the crisis in Ukraine could derail the talks and take us back to square one. But we keep forgetting how far we’ve come in so little time. A year ago, no one would have thought that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would embrace a more moderate president or that he would agree to an interim deal constraining Iran’s nuclear program. Today, both sides are negotiating wholeheartedly. What they want has not changed. What has changed is how much they want a final solution.
– Dina Esfandiary is a Research Associate and foreign affairs and security analyst focusing on Iran, the Middle East and nuclear issues at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).
Photo:EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton (L) opens with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif (R) during E3/EU+3 – Iran Talks meeting in Vienna on March 18,2014.
]]>by Shawn Amoei
Foreign Affairs
US Secretary of State John Kerry had a 30-minute, one-on-one chat with Foreign Minister Javad Zarif following the P5+1 meeting. Both parties declared the talk positive and constructive. Foreign Minister Javad Zarif said that an American request for a meeting between presidents Rouhani and Obama [...]]]>by Shawn Amoei
Foreign Affairs
- US Secretary of State John Kerry had a 30-minute, one-on-one chat with Foreign Minister Javad Zarif following the P5+1 meeting. Both parties declared the talk positive and constructive.
- Foreign Minister Javad Zarif said that an American request for a meeting between presidents Rouhani and Obama was made on short notice and “enough time to make necessary arrangements” did not exist, but had there been more time such a meeting “could have taken place.”
- President Hassan Rouhani met with top EU officials Thursday including president of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, and EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton.
- In a joint press conference with his Turkish counterpart, Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani announced the reaching of an agreement between Iran, Iraq, and Turkey on the need for a political solution to the Syrian crisis.
- After meeting with representatives from the P5+1, Foreign Minister Javad Zarif announced, “I am satisfied with this first step. Now we have to see whether we can match our positive words with serious deeds so we can move forward.”
- Leader of conservatives in Parliament and recent presidential candidate Gholamali Haddad Adel reacted to President Obama’s UN speech and credited Iran’s election for America’s change of position on Iran, saying, “It [the election] was definitely impactful. When they see a country within a sea of chaos in the region reach a degree of political maturity that, despite sanctions and economic pressure, conducts a peaceful, bloodless election, this means positive developments in Iran have occurred.”
- Safar Naemi-Zar, member of Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, expressed optimism for establishing ties with the US if both sides “control excited political behavior.” He added that “radical groups” exist in the US and Iran that seek to prevent improved ties.
- FM Zarif met separately with foreign ministers from Greece, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Croatia, Australia, Italy, and Switzerland on Monday to discuss expansion of bilateral ties. On Tuesday he met counterparts from Russia, Germany, Bahrain, and Burundi, and on Wednesday with representatives from Poland, New Zealand, Singapore, and Belarus.
- Mansour Haghighatpour, head of the Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, said that relations with the US are within reach provided a shift in position by the US. “The Americans must remove the wall of mistrust that for 60 years they created between Iran and the US and pay the cost from their pocket so the Iranian people may gain confidence by the change in behavior.”
- British Foreign Secretary William Hague with Iran’s foreign minister Javad Zarif Monday. Both emphasized the need for normalizing relations and cooperation on a range of issues.
Nuclear Program
- President Rouhani responded to a question about what time frame he has in mind for resolving Iran’s nuclear dispute by saying, “Iran believes it will take three months. If it takes six months, that is fine too. This issue will be solved in months not years.”
- Head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization Ali Akbar Salehi confirmed the transfer of Bushehr’s nuclear power plant from Russia to Iranian scientists and announced the planned construction of a new plant in the near future.
- Members of Iran’s nuclear negotiating team have been named. Javad Zarif will head the team, while others holding key government posts have been added, including Seyyed Abbas Araghchi, Majid Takht Ravanchi, Hamid Baeidnejad and others from the country’s Atomic Organization and Security Council. The team will also have an official spokesperson.
- Negotiations on the nuclear program between Iran and the P5+1 are scheduled to take place mid-October in Geneva.
Military
- Rouhani and other senior political and military officials attended a military parade on Sunday set every year during ‘Sacred Defense Week’ in commemoration of the Iran-Iraq war.
- Major General Yahya Safavi, senior military advisor to the Supreme Leader, attributed responsibility for US hostility toward Iran to the ‘Zionist lobby’ and advised the US government to “not sacrifice themselves, their country, and their interests for the interests of the Zionist lobby.”
Human Rights
- Attorney-General Gholam-Hossein Eje’i announced the Supreme Leader’s decision to pardon 80 political prisoners, many of whom were arrested in the aftermath of the disputed elections of 2009.
- Minister of Intelligence Hojatoleslam Mahmoud Alavi responded to a question on the release of more political prisoners by suggesting that additional pardons are planned for the holiday of Ghadir Khum that takes place on October 22nd.
Economic Issues
- Optimism stemming from Iran’s new political posture and leadership has led to continued growth in the Tehran Stock Exchange as it witnessed a 4% increase this week.
- Oil Minister Bijan Zanganeh has issued three new orders to boost Iran’s gas production as part of an effort that would see Iran’s output surpass that of neighboring Qatar.
- An Iranian gas field that was jointly operated with BP until sanctions banned the company’s involvement three years ago is increasingly showing signs that the ban could soon be lifted as various top officials in the British government predicted this week.
- Masoud Daneshmand, representative of Iran’s Chamber of Commerce, expressed optimism that improved relations with the US could lead to strong economic ties and the creation of a shared Chamber of Commerce based on a proposal already devised by the Iranians.
Civil Society
- The popular reformist newspaper Hammihan has received license to renew publication after it was shut down during Ahmadinejad’s tenure. The move is part of what appears to be a trend toward greater press freedoms since Rouhani’s election.
- A number of journalists and media outlets awaiting trial on charges lodged against them by Ahmadinejad’s government were dismissed and set free following an order by President Rouhani. The cancellation of all charges is part of an effort to ease pressure on journalists.
– Shawn Amoei is a London-based foreign affairs analyst, specializing in US foreign policy and the Middle East. He writes for Iranwire and the Huffington Post, and can be reached by email.
]]>Foreign Affairs
Addressing an annual gathering of IRGC officials, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei spoke of the necessity for “heroic flexibility” in diplomacy. President Hassan Rouhani welcomed a Russian proposal aimed at eliminating Syria’s nuclear weapons. Rouhani spoke of repairing relations with Saudi Arabia on Thursday, saying, “This issue has [...]]]>Foreign Affairs
- Addressing an annual gathering of IRGC officials, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei spoke of the necessity for “heroic flexibility” in diplomacy.
- President Hassan Rouhani welcomed a Russian proposal aimed at eliminating Syria’s nuclear weapons.
- Rouhani spoke of repairing relations with Saudi Arabia on Thursday, saying, “This issue has been emphasized in the Saudi king’s congratulatory letter to me and in my thank-you letter to him. We are both eager to resolve the minor tensions between us in pursuit of our mutual interests and the interests of the Islamic world.”
- Rouhani met with Russian president Vladimir Putin at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Bishkek. Putin accepted an invitation to meet with Rouhani in Tehran.
Nuclear Program
- At a gathering of SCO member states, Rouhani expressed optimism that his administration can “guarantee” the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program through “political will and mutual respect.” He added, “With mutual confidence building, a guarantee can be reached within a short period of time.”
- The head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization Ali Akbar Salehi said in a IAEA conference on Monday, “I have come to Vienna to close Iran’s nuclear file.”
Military
- Speaking at an annual gathering of IRGC officials, Rouhani referenced Ayatollah Khomeini’s insistence that armed forces stay out of “political games,” telling the IRGC to operate “above political currents.”
- A delegation of senior Omani military officials led by the country’s foreign minister arrived in Tehran Tuesday to discuss and sign defense cooperation agreements between the two countries.
- In his address at the annual gathering of IRGC officials, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei affirmed statements made by Rouhani a day earlier on the need for political non-interference, “There is no need for the IRGC to be active in the political arena.
Human Rights
- Eleven political prisoners were freed Wednesday, including prominent human rights lawyer Nasrin Sotoudeh.
- Freed political prisoner Nasrin Sotoudeh wrote an open letter to Rouhani calling on the president to safeguard the rights of religious minorities, particularly followers of the Baha’i faith, in light of the recent murder of a Baha’i man in Hormozgan Province.
Economic Issues
- The Tehran Stock Exchange saw a growth of 1.19% following positive political news and a drop in value of the US dollar.
At Home
- Mahmoud Vaezi, newly appointed head of Iran’s Ministry of Communication, said during a press conference, “On the basis of our 100-day plan, our goal is to make Internet speed twice as fast.”
- President Rouhani appointed Hesamedin Ashena as his advisor for cultural affairs. Ashena was one of Rouhani’s campaign managers and introduced the famous ‘key’ that came to symbolize Rouhani’s campaign.
- Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed recent presidential candidate and former nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili to the Expediency Council.
– Shawn Amoei is a London-based foreign affairs analyst, specializing in US foreign policy and the Middle East. He writes for Iranwire and the Huffington Post, and can be reached by email.
- Photo: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani meets Omani Defense Minister Sayyid Badr al-Busaidi in Tehran on 17 Sept. 2013. Photo Credit: ISNA/Hamid Forootan
]]>via IPS News
In the wake of a renewed diplomatic push on the Iranian nuclear front, shared interests in Iran’s backyard could pave the way for Washington and Tehran to work toward overcoming decades of hostility.
“I think that if Iran and the United States are able to [...]]]>
via IPS News
In the wake of a renewed diplomatic push on the Iranian nuclear front, shared interests in Iran’s backyard could pave the way for Washington and Tehran to work toward overcoming decades of hostility.
“I think that if Iran and the United States are able to overcome their differences regarding Iran’s nuclear programme, if there begins to be some progress in that regard, then I do see opportunities for dialogue and cooperation on a broader range of issues, including my issues, which is to say Afghanistan,” Ambassador James F. Dobbins, the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, told IPS at a briefing here Monday.
This summer’s election of Iran’s new president, Hassan Rouhani, a moderate cleric with centrist and reformist backing as well as close ties to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, has been followed by signals that Iran may be positioning itself to agree to a deal over its controversial nuclear programme.
Rouhani’s appointment of Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif to oversee Iran’s nuclear dossier has been received positively here by leading foreign policy elites who consider Zarif a worthy negotiating partner.
The Western-educated former Iranian ambassador to the United Nations is slotted to meet with his British counterpart William Hague at the U.N. General Assembly later this month, which could lead to a resumption of diplomatic ties that were halted following a 2011 storming of the British embassy in Tehran by a group of protestors.
Dobbins, who worked closely with Zarif in 2001 after being appointed by the George W. Bush administration to aid the establishment of a post-Taliban government in Afghanistan, told IPS that “Iran was quite helpful” with the task.
“I think it’s unfortunate that our cooperation, which was, I think, genuine and important back in 2001, wasn’t able to be sustained,” added Dobbins.
The U.S. halted official moves toward further cooperation with Iran following a 2002 speech by Bush that categorised Iran as part of an “axis of evil” with Iraq and North Korea.
While President Barack Obama’s “A New Beginning” speech in Cairo in 2009 indicated a move away from Bush-era rhetoric on the Middle East, the U.S.’s Iran policy has remained sanctions-centric – a main point of contention for Iran during last year’s nuclear talks.
Positive signs from both sides
But a recent string of events, which continued even as the U.S. seemed to be positioning itself to strike Iranian ally Syria, have led to speculation that the long-time adversaries may be edging toward direct talks, though the White House denied speculation that this could take place at the U.N. General Assembly.
Iran’s Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Marziyeh Afkham also verified the exchange but denied speculation that Syria was a subject.
“Obama’s letter was received, but it was not about Syria and it was a congratulation letter (to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani) whose response was sent,” Afkham told reporters in Tehran in comments posted on the semiofficial Fars News Agency.
That both leaders have publicly acknowledged such rare contact is an important development in and of itself, according to Robert E. Hunter, who served on the National Security Council staff throughout the Jimmy Carter administration.
“This is an effort as much as anything to test the waters in domestic American politics regarding direct talks, regarding the possibility of seeing whether something more productive can be done than in the past. And except out of Israel, I haven’t seen a lot of powerful protest,” Hunter told IPS.
“The Iranians have already backed off on the stuff about the Holocaust by saying it was that ‘other guy’. Now, and this is a reach, but keep in mind that as the slogan goes, the road between Tehran and Washington runs through Jerusalem,” said Hunter, who was U.S. ambassador to NATO (1993-98).
“A serious improvement of U.S.-Iran relations also requires Iran to do things in regard to Israel that will reduce Israel’s anxiety about Iranian intentions on the nuclear front, and on Hezbollah,” he said.
Hunter added that “compatible interests” between the two countries, including security and stability in Iraq and Afghanistan and freedom of shipping in the vital oil transport route, the Strait of Hormuz, could also pave the way to improved relations.
A shift in Iran
Even Khamenei, who has always been deeply suspicious of U.S. policy toward Iran, has given permission for Rouhani to enter into direct talks with the U.S., according to an op-ed published by Project Syndicate and written by former Iranian nuclear negotiator, Hossein Mousavian.
During a meeting Monday with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Khamenei also said he was “not opposed to correct diplomacy” and believes in “heroic flexibility”, according to an Al-Monitor translation.
Adding to the eyebrow-raising remarks was Khamenei’s echoing of earlier comments by Rouhani that the IRGC does not need to have a direct hand in politics.
“It is not necessary for it to act as a guard in the political scene, but it should know the political scene,” said Khamenei, who has nurtured years of close relations with the powerful branch of Iran’s military.
Iran sends out feelers
On Sept. 12, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organisation Ali Akbar Salehi announced that Iran had reduced its stockpile of 20 percent low enriched uranium by converting it into fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR).
This was described as “misleading” by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) based on how little LEU Iran had reportedly converted to fuel.
“As such, this action cannot be seen as a significant confidence building measure,” argued ISIS in a press release.
But Paul Pillar, a former top CIA analyst who served as the National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia (2000 to 2005), called this “an example of all-too-prevalent reductionism that seeks to fold political and psychological questions into technical ones.”
“Confidence-building measures can mean many things, but in general they have at least as much to do with perceptions and intentions as they do with gauging physical steps against some technical yardstick,” Pillar told IPS.
“Confidence-building measures…are gestures of goodwill and intent. They are not walls against a possible future ‘break-out’. If they were, they would not be confidence-building measures; they would be a solving of the whole problem,” he said.
Photo Credit: ISNA/Mehdi Ghasemi
]]>by Shawn Amoei
Foreign Affairs
President Hassan Rouhani cites improved relations with Europe as a top foreign policy priority. Yemen confirms that a kidnapped Iranian diplomat is in al-Qaeda custody. Audio from a speech by former President Hashemi Rafsanjani blaming Bashar al-Assad for chemical attacks causes [...]]]>by Shawn Amoei
Foreign Affairs
- President Hassan Rouhani cites improved relations with Europe as a top foreign policy priority.
- Yemen confirms that a kidnapped Iranian diplomat is in al-Qaeda custody.
- Audio from a speech by former President Hashemi Rafsanjani blaming Bashar al-Assad for chemical attacks causes conservative backlash, forcing him to backtrack. In his latest comments, Rafsanjani states, “It is possible that individuals have infiltrated the Syrian Army and they could be behind these [chemical attacks].”
- Foreign Minister Javad Zarif traveled to Baghdad to meet with Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and other senior officials in his first trip abroad since taking office.
- Recent presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei says the US would be committing a “big gamble” if it attacks Syria, with repercussions for years to come.
- Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani warns of a “quagmire” for the US if it steps into what he calls a “trap” set in Syria by some regional countries.
Diplomacy
- Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Marzieh Afkham announced Iran welcomes a Russian proposal to place Syrian chemical weapons under international control.
- Foreign Minister Javad Zarif announced plans to meet with EU Foreign Policy Chief Catherine Ashton in New York this month, and signaled willingness to meet with UK Foreign Secretary William Hague at the UN session.
- President Rouhani is scheduled to address the UN General Assembly late September as part of a six-day trip to New York that includes two more speeches at a nuclear disarmament summit and a gathering of representatives from the Non-Aligned Movement.
Nuclear Program
- President Rouhani officially transferred responsibility for the country’s nuclear from the more hardline National Security Council to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Expediency Council chairman Hashemi Rafsanjani said a nuclear agreement is within reach and Iran seeks “real negotiations, with no preconditions, that specify trust-building measures and do not waste time or opportunity.”
- The head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization Ali Akbar Salehi said Iran is ready to move beyond the nuclear issue and seeks a “win-win solution” that relieves Western concerns.
Economic Issues
- Oil Minister Bijan Zangeneh announced structural changes to oil contacts aimed at attracting foreign investors. Six national and multinational companies have been invited to inspect Iranian oil and gas projects, including Shell, Total, Repsol, Inpex, OMV, and Stat Oil.
- Rouhani’s economic team released a report on the critical state of unemployment among youth and college graduates, including a survey that shows at least 43% of families have at least one unemployed family member.
Military
- The head of an Iraqi Hezbollah division armed and advised by the IRGC says it has 23,000 trained fighters ready to attack US interests in Iraq and the Persian Gulf if Syria is attacked.
- General Masoud Jazayeri says Syria will fight ”fire with fire” if attacked. “US allies in the region that provide money, resources and bases for the rebels are in Syria’s range and it is predicted that Syria will retaliate,” he said.
At Home
- Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf was reelected mayor of Tehran for a third consecutive term this Sunday. His main rival was Mohsen Hashemi, the son of former president Hashemi Rafsanjani.
- Recent presidential candidate Mohammad Reza Aref is set to open a major newspaper as part of his effort to establish a new political party. According to his office, the newspaper is expected to hit newsstands in autumn and is currently in the process of receiving a license.
- President Rouhani appointed Masoumeh Ebtekar as Vice President and head of the Department of Environmental Affairs.
– Shawn Amoei is a London-based foreign affairs analyst, specializing in US foreign policy and the Middle East. He writes for Iranwire and the Huffington Post, and can be reached by email.
- Photo: Iran’s Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Marziyeh Afkham. Credit: ISNA/Erfan Khoshkhoo
]]>by Laicie Heeley & Usha Sahay
After months of deliberation, Iranian negotiators and representatives of the 6-world power P5+1 negotiating team have agreed to meet on February 26 in Almaty, Kazakhstan. Hopeful watchers may read some symbolism into the location: Kazakhstan is one of the few nations to have voluntarily [...]]]>
by Laicie Heeley & Usha Sahay
After months of deliberation, Iranian negotiators and representatives of the 6-world power P5+1 negotiating team have agreed to meet on February 26 in Almaty, Kazakhstan. Hopeful watchers may read some symbolism into the location: Kazakhstan is one of the few nations to have voluntarily given up nuclear weapons, and no doubt Western negotiators hope for a similar outcome with Iran’s controversial nuclear activities. Previous negotiations with Iran fell apart in the summer of 2012, and the question on everyone’s mind is: will this time be different?
There’s reason to hope that it will. Certainly, some circumstances have shifted in ways that could be favorable to a deal. Most obviously, the squeeze of sanctions has made it much more difficult for Iran to defy the international community. The depletion of Iran’s currency reserves is testing the regime’s ability to sidestep sanctions, and leaders are worried about public discontent with the state of the economy. Iran has also been downgrading some of its enriched uranium to a level that can’t easily be converted to weapons-grade, which may be a small indication that the government is willing to moderate its stance. Key Iranian figures from the foreign minister to the intelligence ministry have also expressed a measure of willingness to cooperate with Western diplomatic efforts.
On the other hand, the path to negotiations has seen a number of stumbling blocks. Signals from Iran have been mixed at best. Supreme Leader Ali Khameini recently rejected the idea of negotiating with the United States, saying that Iran “would not be intimidated” by US pressure. Iran also just revealed plans to install thousands of new centrifuges at its Natanz nuclear facility. Finally, it’ll soon be election season in Iran, which means officials will be anxious not to be seen as caving under Western pressure.
Ultimately, though, all of this may not tell us much, because what lies behind us is far less important than what lies ahead. The hopeful or ominous developments of the past few months only matter insofar as they signal what negotiators will or won’t be willing to put on the table. To that end, it’s worth speculating not just about what this new centrifuge and that new statement might mean, but also about what compromises could be made to make this round the one that matters.
The crucial issue to resolve is Iran’s production of 20% enriched uranium, and Iran has been relatively more flexible on this than other matters. A workable deal might require Iran to deposit its existing stockpile of 20% enriched uranium abroad, stop enriching at the Fordow facility, and agree to limit future enrichment to a low level suitable for civilian power reactors. Under such a deal, Iran would also need to implement the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol, to facilitate future inspections. In exchange, the P5+1 could offer sanctions relief and a freeze on new sanctions.
That’s how a deal might ideally resolve the thorniest issues in Iran’s standoff with the West. But the talks could bring progress even if we don’t make it that far. An alternative strategy could focus on confidence-building measures, or “baby steps” that ease the two sides out of the straitjacket of mistrust that has constrained previous efforts. For instance, Iran could agree to temporarily halt uranium enrichment or to downgrade its existing stockpile of 20% enriched uranium to the less potent form needed for civilian reactors. In exchange, the P5+1 could agree to temporarily suspend some key sanctions, which would open the door for further sanctions relief once other issues (the Fordow facility, the Additional Protocol, enrichment levels in the future) are resolved.
Negotiators might also take a big-picture approach that brings in other, more long-standing concerns, such as Iran’s alleged links to terrorist groups, suspicions of previous weapons development, and the question of gradually normalizing diplomatic and economic relations between Iran and the West.
In sum, although some forecasts for the talks have been gloomy, there actually is no dearth of options available — that is, if negotiators want to take them. It’s almost a truism to say, but a rehash of last year’s negotiations will only bring a rehash of last year’s dismal outcome. As Einstein famously said, insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.
So this time in Almaty, let’s try a new approach, one oriented around mutual concessions rather than stubborn digging into unworkable positions. If we do that, with any luck, this time really can be different.
- Laicie Heeley is the senior policy analyst and Usha Sahay a Hurbert J. Scoville Peace Fellow, both at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, a Washington-based non-profit think tank.
Photo: The 19 September 2012 meeting of EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton and Dr. Saeed Jalili, the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, in Istambul, Turkey. (Credit: European External Action Service – EEAS)
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