by Derek Davison
As talks aimed at a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran continue, with principals from Iran and world powers meeting in Vienna this week, two recent analyses of the negotiations have compared the talks to a “Rubik’s Cube.”
A May 9 report from the International Crisis Group [...]]]>
by Derek Davison
As talks aimed at a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran continue, with principals from Iran and world powers meeting in Vienna this week, two recent analyses of the negotiations have compared the talks to a “Rubik’s Cube.”
A May 9 report from the International Crisis Group (ICG) entitled, “Iran and the P5+1: Solving the Nuclear Rubik’s Cube,” offers 40 recommended action items that Iran and the P5+1 (the US, UK, France, China and Russia plus Germany) could agree to implement in a comprehensive deal. Today the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) also held a panel discussion called, coincidentally, “The Rubik’s Cube of a Final Iran Deal,” moderated by Colin Kahl, the top Middle East policy official at the Defense Department for most of Obama’s first term, and featuring Robert Einhorn, who served as the State Department’s special advisor on non-proliferation and arms control until less than a year ago, Joe Cirincione, the president of the Ploughshares Fund, and Alireza Nader, an Iran expert at the RAND Corporation.
There’s a clear sense in both analyses that a deal is reachable. Cirincione rightly pointed out at the USIP event that the current talks are “the closest we’ve come to an agreement, ever,” and predicted that “absent some unforeseen event, we are going to get a deal.” Indeed, the very existence of something like the ICG report, a specific and detailed look at what a deal might actually contain, would have appeared presumptuous even six months ago but now seems very reasonable given the progress that has already been made.
However, optimism aside, a great deal of work still needs to be done before a deal can be finalized. The level of detail contained in the ICG report speaks to the complexity involved in the negotiations. The ICG recommends, for example, an immediate cap on Iranian uranium enrichment of 6400 Separative Work Units (SWU, a measurement of enrichment capacity that incorporates both the number and technological advancement of operational centrifuges) per year, which is a steep cut from Iran’s current 9000 SWU/year capacity (that Iran sees as already too low), and one that the Iranians may be unwilling to make. That cap would then be lifted, over 8-10 years, to around 19,000 SWU/year, an increase that could theoretically reduce the time it would take Iran to manufacture a nuclear weapon if it chose to pursue that goal. Of course, it remains to be seen whether Iran and the P5+1 would agree to those terms.
The ICG framed its recommendations around four points:
- constraining any Iranian capacity to build a nuclear weapon;
- implementing a stringent monitoring and verification system on Iran’s nuclear program,
- establishing concrete negative consequences for a breach of the deal by either side;
- and establishing positive consequences for compliance.
But the ICG’s recommendations, and the discussion on the USIP panel, make it very clear that these objectives will be difficult to meet in a way that satisfies both parties. The two sides disagree on even basic elements of the talks; as Kahl explained, the Iranian government rejects the P5+1’s continued focus on Iranian “breakout capacity” because it has officially sworn off of any military application of its nuclear program. The P5+1 does not accept those assurances, but Iran also has legitimate questions as to why other countries with civilian nuclear programs have not been subject to the same requirements that Iran has faced.
The USIP panel seemed to reach a general consensus that the biggest remaining hurdles to a comprehensive deal revolve around Iran’s uranium enrichment program. This includes both Iran’s capacity for enrichment and the amount of enriched uranium it will be allowed to stockpile; the level of access that Iran will permit to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its inspectors; and the timing of and conditions for sanctions relief.
The P5+1 are seeking to maximize the limits on Iran’s nuclear program and the IAEA’s access to Iranian nuclear sites while maintaining sanctions at a high level for a considerable period of time, perhaps decades. Iran, obviously, is seeking the opposite – minimal limits on its nuclear program in return for considerable sanctions relief and only a short period in which its program is subject to international monitoring. As the ICG report put it, “it would appear that the P5+1’s maximum — in terms of both what it considers a tolerable residual Iranian nuclear capability and the sanctions relief it is willing to provide — falls short of Iran’s minimum.”
The single biggest complication to these talks is the utter lack of trust on both sides. As Nader argued, mutual trust is not a requirement for success and the lack of trust can be worked around with stringent inspections requirements and firm commitments to agreed-upon sanctions relief. But that lack of trust adds considerable complexity and difficulty to the negotiations. Iran is ultimately being asked to prove a negative, that it has no nuclear weapons program, and because the P5+1 do not trust Iran to uphold its promises, demands for monitoring requirements and caps on nuclear capacity may simply be too much for Iran to accept.
This is particularly true given a domestic political environment that Nader termed “poisonous,” with Iranian hardliners increasingly concerned about President Hassan Rouhani’s commitment to protecting Iran’s interests in these negotiations, and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s support for the talks vulnerable to shifting political winds.
Iran will also have difficulty trusting the P5+1 to uphold its end of a deal to reduce sanctions assuming that Iran meets, and continues to meet, its obligations. Indeed, Cirincione pointed out today out that western banks, fearful of running afoul of sanctions laws, have still not released the Iranian assets that were unfrozen under the terms of last November’s “Joint Plan of Action.” The challenge of getting a final deal through a potentially hostile US Congress, particularly in an election year, could also give Iran reason for concern.
Yet failed talks could be disastrous for both sides, according to the ICG. Failure now would make another attempt at negotiations very unlikely, would result in new punitive measures against Iran (including new sanctions on an already sputtering economy, and potential military strikes on Iranian nuclear sites), and could ultimately push Tehran to rush for a nuclear weapon, something which everyone, including Iran, says they don’t want.
]]>The Iran experts at the Rand Corporation, including Alireza Nader, who has written for LobeLog, are always worth reading. That’s why Iran-watchers like me can willfully spend part of a slow-news Friday reading a Rand report on what regional responses to a final deal with Iran over [...]]]>
The Iran experts at the Rand Corporation, including Alireza Nader, who has written for LobeLog, are always worth reading. That’s why Iran-watchers like me can willfully spend part of a slow-news Friday reading a Rand report on what regional responses to a final deal with Iran over its nuclear program might look like. The video I’ve included above includes discussion on some of the report’s main points and you can read the entire report below or download it on Rand’s website. I was particularly interested in the part on how Israel may react.
[gview file="http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE122/RAND_PE122.pdf"]
]]>by Alireza Nader
Hassan Rouhani’s June 2013 election to Iran’s presidency raised the hopes of millions of Iranians suffering from the calamitous policies of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Rouhani has accordingly done much to fan the flames of optimism in Iran. He has promised to decrease Iran’s isolation, improve its [...]]]>
by Alireza Nader
Hassan Rouhani’s June 2013 election to Iran’s presidency raised the hopes of millions of Iranians suffering from the calamitous policies of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Rouhani has accordingly done much to fan the flames of optimism in Iran. He has promised to decrease Iran’s isolation, improve its economy, and make the country a happier place for its people. His Feb. 5 television interview, billed as a live “discussion” with the Iranian people, was meant to showcase his government’s accomplishments in front of the nation. The broadcast was initially blocked by the head of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), but eventually aired after a puzzling delay.
Rouhani mentioned the delay four times during his interview, stating bitterly that he would not discuss the reasons for it. The interview demonstrated a fundamental reality: Rouhani, while so far effective in Iran’s nuclear negotiations, has an uphill battle at home. While the Iranian conservative establishment is likely to support his nuclear policy for now, it is unlikely to concede him the full economic and political agenda he seeks. Not without a fight, anyhow.
Rouhani’s interview was politically savvy; he bragged about his accomplishments, including the Geneva nuclear agreement, which he claimed “broke the chains around Iran” and served as a blow to “Iranophobia” being spread by Iran’s “enemies.” Rouhani also claimed a significant improvement in Iran’s economy and international reputation, although his evidence — 117 foreign groups and trade delegations that have visited Iran since his election — does not demonstrate a major improvement in the economy or Iran’s geopolitical position. But the President was honest in listing Iran’s numerous problems, from stagflation to horrible pollution and the lack of heating fuel in a country with one of the largest energy reserves in the world. Rouhani asked the Iranian people for more patience given the difficult problems at hand.
Although Rouhani’s plea for patience from the public may succeed, he is less likely to get the cooperation he needs from his political rivals. Iran’s ultra-conservative camp, once ascendant under Ahmadinejad, is suspicious of Rouhani’s intentions and seems to be itching for a fight. For now, the ultra-conservative camp has heeded Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s advice not to criticize the negotiations and the Geneva deal too strongly. But Rouhani has been criticized for his government’s recent handouts to the poor. The long lines formed nationwide for these handouts demonstrated the impoverishment of Iranian society, which is directly tied to the regime’s economic and foreign policies. Rouhani has also been critiqued for cavorting with senior reformist clerics, and for embracing a more open media and cultural scene.
The Geneva deal provides a respite for the entire political establishment. But Rouhani taking credit for it so publicly and positively is bound to stir up resentment. Knowing this all along, Rouhani framed his television interview as a discussion with the people in order to build a base of support among millions of his countrymen. His speech barely mentioned the Supreme Leader and the political establishment and, though it was billed as a discussion, it did not feature call-in questions or any live people.
Hoping to finalize a nuclear deal after the progress made in Geneva, Rouhani is already positioning himself to lead Iran after a deal, and perhaps to introduce more fundamental reforms needed to solve the country’s many problems.
However, the Iranian regime — composed of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s bureaucracy, the Revolutionary Guards, state-owned conglomerates, shadowy pressure groups, and reactionary clerics — is unlikely to concede such a big role to Rouhani. The country is in bad shape, but perhaps not bad enough for Iran’s vested interest groups to give in to Rouhani, the self-styled man of the people.
The IRIB chief is appointed by the Supreme Leader; it is not a given that he will stay in his job, especially if Rouhani pressures Khamenei. But the delay in Rouhani’s interview may just be a sign of things to come. Geneva is a victory for Rouhani, although he will face a challenge in negotiating a final nuclear deal with the United States and its allies. However, his greatest challenge may be at home. Rouhani has promised to tackle Iran’s monumental problems, but his ability to do so remains in doubt.
– Alireza Nader is a senior international policy analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation.
]]>by Alireza Nader
Iran and the P5+1 (the U.S., Britain, France, China, and Russia plus Germany) came tantalizingly close to reaching a nuclear deal this past weekend in Geneva, but the talks ended without an agreement.
Although both Iran and the United States expressed optimism that much was achieved, a blame game [...]]]>
by Alireza Nader
Iran and the P5+1 (the U.S., Britain, France, China, and Russia plus Germany) came tantalizingly close to reaching a nuclear deal this past weekend in Geneva, but the talks ended without an agreement.
Although both Iran and the United States expressed optimism that much was achieved, a blame game between the different players soon ensued.
The international media reported that the French Foreign Minister had “sabotaged” the talks at the last minute, while Secretary of State John Kerry stated that Iran had walked away from a deal.
Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif in turn blamed the United States for “gutting” the deal at the last minute.
The failure to achieve a deal in Geneva has given members of Congress, Israel, and Saudi Arabia a chance to mobilize against what they view as a “bad” deal.
Motivating factors
All the countries involved undoubtedly want to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapons capability, but the Middle East’s geopolitical balance is also at play.
Israel and Saudi Arabia fear that a U.S.-Iran rapprochement may hurt their interests, while France appears to view negotiations as a means to enhance its influence with Tel Aviv and Riyadh.
Meanwhile, the U.S. government faces perhaps the hardest and most complicated task of all: to stop Iran’s nuclear program, reduce tensions with Tehran, mollify its closest allies, and achieve a deal in the face of fierce opposition at home.
French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius was reportedly concerned that the agreement between Iran and the P5+1 did not adequately address Iran’s Arak heavy water reactor.
Reputable organizations such as the Arms Control Association have identified Arak as a long-term proliferation concern that can be addressed in the later stages of nuclear negotiations.
It appears that while Iran would not complete Arak under the first step of the proposed nuclear agreement, it would have nevertheless been able to continue Arak’s construction.
Israel is also particularly worried about Arak, as it could provide Iran with a plutonium-based option to produce nuclear weapons.
The Israelis would also be unable to bomb Arak once it’s completed, as a military strike would create an environmental catastrophe affecting the whole region.
Geopolitics at play
France may have had other motivations in taking a harder line and obstructing what appeared to be a done deal.
Regional American allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia are unhappy about U.S. policy in the Middle East.
Tel Aviv, which saw Iran become ostracized and increasingly weak under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, fears that the new Iranian president Hassan Rouhani will be able to dig Iran out from its state of crisis and restore its position as a major player in the region.
Israel has demanded the full dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program, perhaps knowing that this unrealistic objective may create enough congressional pressure to scuttle a possible détente between Tehran and Washington.
The Saudis also disapprove of U.S. policies in the region, particularly in light of the Arab Spring.
They see the Obama administration’s “abandonment” of Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak and its lack of ironclad support for the embattled and repressive Bahraini monarchy as signs of American fecklessness, or at worst, a lack of U.S. commitment to Saudi security.
Riyadh is particularly unhappy about the U.S. decision not to attack and ultimately overthrow the pro-Iranian Assad regime in Syria.
France appears to have sensed an opportunity to exploit this, and is eager to shore up its alliance with Israel and Saudi Arabia, and perhaps sell more weapons to each.
The struggling French economy could not only benefit from weapons sales, but could attract even more Saudi investments in important economic sectors such as agriculture.
For their part, Rouhani and Zarif are eager to increase Iran’s regional influence by striking a nuclear deal that lifts sanctions while allowing Iran to save face by keeping a significant portion of its nuclear capabilities.
This would allow Iran to fully resume its oil and natural gas exports, and attract much needed Western investment into its energy sector.
Major economic powers such as the UK and Germany, which supported the Geneva deal, may be eager to resume their commercial relations with a more pragmatic and less ideological Islamic Republic.
The French may not be welcomed in Tehran for some time to come.
As for the United States, a nuclear deal would not only stop nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, but also decrease tensions with Iran, which, while weakened by sanctions and isolation, is still capable of destabilizing the Persian Gulf and wider Middle East.
Reduced tensions with Tehran would also allow Washington to lessen its dependence on Gulf Arab states.
American partners such as Saudi Arabia appear to perceive some of their interests as diverging from those of the world’s remaining superpower. A more balanced relationship could therefore benefit both sides.
However, a nuclear deal with Iran will not likely change the fundamentals of the U.S.-dominated regional order.
Neither France nor any other foreign power can replace the United States as the region’s security guarantor.
Saudi Arabia is highly dependent on U.S. weaponry and military technology and needs the United States to deter regional powers such as Iran.
Despite tensions between Washington and Tel Aviv, the Israeli government is unlikely to find a more committed and powerful ally than the United States.
And even Tehran, faced with tremendous economic pressure, needs America more than it would like to admit.
The blame game in Geneva should come as no surprise; the stakes are high for all countries involved, and each one is nervous about its own interests.
But instead of suspecting American motives, Israel and Saudi Arabia should realize that a nuclear deal is meant to preserve a regional order that has benefitted both countries.
Much in the Middle East has changed in the last few years, but America’s fundamental interests and commitments remain the same.
– Alireza Nader is a senior international policy analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation.
Photo Credit: U.S. Mission Geneva / Eric Bridiers
]]>via IPS News
From Tehran’s perspective, the current negotiations between Iran and the United States may be best described as a wrestling match.
Before President Hassan Rouhani’s speech at the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA), his boss, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei spoke of “heroic leniency” toward the United [...]]]>
via IPS News
From Tehran’s perspective, the current negotiations between Iran and the United States may be best described as a wrestling match.
Before President Hassan Rouhani’s speech at the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA), his boss, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei spoke of “heroic leniency” toward the United States. Subsequently, Khamenei’s office issued a telling graphic that depicted a set of guidelines for negotiations. The graphic also called to mind an Iranian zoorkhaneh, or house of strength, where men perform traditional weightlifting and wrestling, one of the most popular sports in Iran.
According to Khamenei, the Islamic Republic is willing to engage its enemy, or show “flexibility,” in order to win the overall competition. However, Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards have also laid out clear red lines for Rouhani. He is to demonstrate no weakness or “humility” with the opponent, the United States. And he should not weaken Iran’s ties and alliances with Islamic and resistance groups, especially Hezbollah.
Rouhani’s recent charm offensive has greatly raised expectations amongst those wishing for U.S.-Iran reconciliation. However, this is not Rouhani’s mandate; rather, the Islamic Republic has tasked him with negotiating the nuclear crisis away and alleviating pressures faced by the regime. Although this may not seem the perfect outcome, it nevertheless presents a unique opportunity for the United States.
It is unlikely that Khamenei and his supporters will ever change their fundamental views of America. Suspicion of the United States may be motivated by religious and cultural values, but only to a limited extent. The regime’s revolutionary ideology and geopolitical interests play a bigger role.
Khamenei sees the global order as tilted in the West’s favour. The United States is the latest of a long line of imperialist powers that have attempted to dominate the Middle East. He views his regime, which replaced Iran’s last monarch, as the focal point of resistance to Western domination.
This has meant an Iranian policy of containment with limited engagement in which Iran limits and rolls back Washington’s influence while pursuing diplomacy when it suits regime “expediency.” (The United States has also pursued a similar policy of containment).
Khamenei has said that he does not oppose negotiating with the United States in principle as long as it does not violate Iran’s interests.
For a long time, his policy seemed to work. Iran carved out a sphere of influence from Afghanistan to the Mediterranean, and could count on its allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and beyond to help maintain its interests. Iran’s economy, while never great, functioned and at times prospered until the imposition of the most punishing sanctions.
Iran earned an estimated 500 billion dollars from oil and natural gas sales during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency, while its nuclear programme progressed in the face of Western opposition. Khamenei was willing to engage the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq in order to enhance Iran’s influence, and no more.
But Ahmadinejad’s monumental incompetence made Iran the loser, not the champion. Iran’s economy is in the dumps, the people are unhappy, and Tehran’s regional influence is in decline. Khamenei needed a new wrestler, and Rouhani appears more than capable. He can manage the economy, negotiate away sanctions, and give the Iranian people a bit more freedom, but not too much.
It is not too surprising that Rouhani did not shake President Obama’s hand during the United Nations General Assembly confab. He may have a mandate to negotiate, but he cannot appear to be weak in the face of the enemy. Khamenei’s “heroic leniency” means a well-defined set of red lines and parametres, rather than gestures that call into question the very purpose of the wrestling match.
However, this does not mean that Rouhani’s diplomacy is false or that Khamenei is merely buying time. In the past, U.S. engagement with Iran has produced results. Iran’s support was crucial in establishing the government of Hamid Karzai after the U.S. overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Limited engagement with Iran focusing on the nuclear programme and perhaps even Syria can work.
Real U.S. wrestlers have competed with Iranians, and have always been greeted in Iran with open arms. However, no one should expect Rouhani to change the dynamics between Iran and the United States, or apparently, to even offer his hand in friendship. The wrestling match is not over, but for now some flexibility from both sides can ensure a managed rivalry, rather than a bloody mess between a beleaguered superpower and its frustrated but determined regional rival.
– Alireza Nader is a senior international policy analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation.
]]>via USIP
Iran has mixed feelings and conflicting interests in the Syrian crisis. Tehran has a strategic interest in opposing chemical weapons due to its own horrific experience during the 1980-1988 war with Iraq. For years, President Saddam Hussein’s military used chemical weapons that killed thousands of Iranian soldiers. So [...]]]>
via USIP
Iran has mixed feelings and conflicting interests in the Syrian crisis. Tehran has a strategic interest in opposing chemical weapons due to its own horrific experience during the 1980-1988 war with Iraq. For years, President Saddam Hussein’s military used chemical weapons that killed thousands of Iranian soldiers. So Iran actually shares interests with the United States, European nations and the Arab League in opposing any use of chemical weapons.
But the Islamic Republic also has compelling reasons to continue supporting Damascus. The Syrian regime is Iran’s closest ally in the Middle East and the geographic link to its Hezbollah partners in Lebanon. As a result, Tehran vehemently opposes U.S. intervention or any action that might change the military balance against President Bashar Assad.
The Iran-Syria alliance is more than a marriage of convenience. Tehran and Damascus have common geopolitical, security, and economic interests. Syria was one of only two Arab nations (the other being Libya) to support Iran’s fight against Saddam Hussein, and it was an important conduit for weapons to an isolated Iran. Furthermore, Hafez Assad, Bashar’s father, allowed Iran to help create Hezbollah, the Shiite political movement in Lebanon. Its militia, trained by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, has been an effective tool against Syria’s archenemy, Israel.
Relations between Tehran and Damascus have been rocky at times. Hafez Assad clashed with Hezbollah in Lebanon and was wary of too much Iranian involvement in his neighborhood. But his death in 2000 reinvigorated the Iran-Syria alliance. Bashar Assad has been much more enthusiastic about Iranian support, especially since Hezbollah’s “victorious” 2006 conflict with Israel.
In the last decade, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards have trained, equipped, and at times even directed Syria’s security and military forces. Hundreds of thousands of Iranian pilgrims and tourists visited Syria before its civil war, and Iranian companies made significant investments in the Syrian economy.
Fundamentalist figures within the Guards view Syria as the “front line” of Iranian resistance against Israel and the United States. Without Syria, Iran would not be able to supply Hezbollah effectively, limiting its ability to help its ally in the event of a war with Israel. Hezbollah wields thousands of rockets able to strike Israel, providing Iran deterrence against Israel — especially if Tel Aviv chose to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. A weakened Hezbollah would directly impact Iran’s national security. Syria’s loss could also tip the balance in Iran’s rivalry with Saudi Arabia, making the Wahhabi kingdom one of the most influential powers in the Middle East.
In the run up to a U.S. decision on military action against Syria, Iranian leaders appeared divided.
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and hardline lawmakers reacted with alarm to possible U.S. strikes against the Assad regime. And Revolutionary Guards commanders threatened to retaliate against U.S. interests. The hardliners clearly viewed the Assad regime as an asset worth defending as of September 2013.
But President Hassan Rouhani, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani adopted a more critical line on Syria. “We believe that the government in Syria has made grave mistakes that have, unfortunately, paved the way for the situation in the country to be abused,” Zarif told a local publication in September 2013.
Rafsanjani, still an influential political figure, reportedly said that the Syrian government gassed its own people. This was a clear breach of official Iranian policy, which has blamed the predominantly Sunni rebels. Rafsanjani’s words suggested that he viewed unconditional support for Assad as a losing strategy. His remark also earned a rebuke from Khamenei, who warned Iranian officials against crossing the “principles and red lines” of the Islamic Republic. Khamenei’s message may have been intended for Rouhani’s government, which is closely aligned with Rafsanjani and seems to increasingly view the Syrian regime as a liability.
Regardless, a significant section of Iran’s political elite could be amenable to engaging the United States on Syria. Both sides have a common interest: preventing Sunni extremists from coming to power in Damascus. Iran and the United States also prefer a negotiated settlement over military intervention to solve the crisis. Tehran might need to be included in a settlement given its influence in Syria. Negotiating with Iran on Syria could ultimately help America’s greater goal of a diplomatic breakthrough, not only on Syria but Tehran’s nuclear program as well.
– Alireza Nader is a senior international policy analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation.
*Read Alireza Nader’s chapter on the Revolutionary Guards in “The Iran Primer”
Photo Credits: Bashar Assad and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei via Leader.ir, Syria graphic via Khamenei.ir Facebook
]]>by Jasmin Ramsey
Dennis Ross, President Obama’s former top Middle East aide, writes that the exclusion of Hashemi Rafsanjani from Iran’s June 14 election signals that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is uninterested in a nuclear deal:
I say that not because Rafsanjani would have been capable of initiating [...]]]>
by Jasmin Ramsey
Dennis Ross, President Obama’s former top Middle East aide, writes that the exclusion of Hashemi Rafsanjani from Iran’s June 14 election signals that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is uninterested in a nuclear deal:
I say that not because Rafsanjani would have been capable of initiating a deal on his own — any deal he might strike would still have to be acceptable to the Supreme Leader — but because if the Supreme Leader were interested in an agreement, he would probably want to create an image of broad acceptability of it in advance. Rather than having only his fingerprints on it, he would want to widen the circle of decision-making to share the responsibility. And he would set the stage by having someone like Rafsanjani lead a group that would make the case for reaching an understanding. Rafsanjani’s pedigree as Khomeini associate and former president, with ties to the Revolutionary Guard and to the elite more generally, would all argue for him to play this role.
Alireza Nader, a Rand analyst specializing on Iran, tells LobeLog the election has more to do with the power struggle in Tehran than Iran’s nuclear program. “Rafsanjani’s disqualification was a result of the rivalry between the former president and Khamenei. The nuclear program is important in Khamenei’s calculations, but it doesn’t appear to be the most important motivation,” said Nader.
In a Rand report released today, Nader expands on this notion, arguing that Khamenei is “primarily concerned with regime security”:
Khamenei will still play the decisive role on nuclear policy after the election. But the next Iranian president could have an opportunity to defuse some of the tensions created by Ahmadinejad. This is not to suggest that the election will lead to an immediate resolution of the crisis, but it is safe to assume that the next president will be less polarizing and more diplomatic than his predecessor. This could provide a limited easing of the nuclear stalemate, but the true problem for Iran’s nuclear program stems from conflicting interests between the United States and Iran, not from vexing personalities.Ross, unlike Nader, does not even allow for the possibility that a new presidential era in an economically pressured Iran — now free from the rabble-rousing Mahmoud Ahmadinejad — could present an opening for a less “intransigent position.”
Unlike Nader, Ross doesn’t even allow for the possibility that a new presidential era in an increasingly pressured Iran — free from the rabble-rousing Mahmoud Ahmadinejad — could present an opening for a less intransigent position. Still, Nader admits that Iran’s next president is likely to pursue the Supreme Leader’s nuclear policy:
…Saeed Jalili, Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator with the P5+1 and one of the main presidential candidates, tends to parrot Khamenei’s discourse of “resistance” regarding the United States. From Tehran’s standpoint, the answer to new and harsher sanctions could be a policy of greater intransigence, a policy that would be supported by both Khamenei and possibly the new president.
As if on cue, the Supreme Leader made another speech yesterday (for the anniversary of Ayatollah Khomeini’s death) urging the presidential candidates not to submit to Western pressure. “Some, following this incorrect analysis – that we should make concessions to the enemies to reduce their anger – have put their interests before the interests of the Iranian nation. This is wrong,” he said.
The US’ current approach has failed to compel Tehran to change it’s nuclear stance, so why not try something new? Enter the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, which published a report on the Iranian sanctions regime this week. ”To make genuine progress on the Iranian nuclear issue, the Obama administration and Congress must shift their focus toward sanctions relief and compromise, rather than sticking with the pressure-only approach that’s proving increasingly counterproductive,” write Usha Sahay and Laicie Heeley. Of course, the opposite seems to be happening.
]]>WASHINGTON, May 18 2013 (IPS) – A nuclear-armed Iran would not pose a fundamental threat to the United States and its regional allies like Israel and the Gulf Arab monarchies, according to a new report released here Friday by the Rand Corporation.
Entitled “Iran After the Bomb: [...]]]>
WASHINGTON, May 18 2013 (IPS) – A nuclear-armed Iran would not pose a fundamental threat to the United States and its regional allies like Israel and the Gulf Arab monarchies, according to a new report released here Friday by the Rand Corporation.
Entitled “Iran After the Bomb: How Would a Nuclear-Armed Tehran Behave?“, the report asserts that the acquisition by Tehran of nuclear weapons would above all be intended to deter an attack by hostile powers, presumably including Israel and the United States, rather than for aggressive purposes.
And while its acquisition may indeed lead to greater tension between Iran and its Sunni-led neighbours, the 50-page report concludes that Tehran would be unlikely to use nuclear weapons against other Muslim countries. Nor would it be able to halt its diminishing influence in the region resulting from the Arab Spring and its support for the Syrian government, according to the author, Alireza Nader.
“Iran’s development of nuclear weapons will enhance its ability to deter an external attack, but it will not enable it to change the Middle East’s geopolitical order in its own favour,” Nader, an international policy analyst at RAND, told IPS. “The Islamic Republic’s challenge to the region is constrained by its declining popularity, a weak economy, and a limited conventional military capability. An Iran with nukes will still be a declining power.”
The report reaches several conclusions all of which generally portray Iran as a rational actor in its international relations.
While Nader calls it a “revisionist state” that tries to undermine what it sees as a U.S.-dominated order in the Middle East, his report stresses that “it does not have territorial ambitions and does not seek to invade, conquer, or occupy other nations.”
Further, the report identifies the Islamic Republic’s military doctrine as defensive in nature. This posture is presumably a result of the volatile and unstable region in which it exists and is exacerbated by its status as a Shi’a and Persian-majority nation in a Sunni and Arab-majority region.
Iran is also scarred by its traumatic eight-year war with Iraq in which as many as one million Iranians lost their lives.
The new report comes amidst a growing controversy here over whether a nuclear-armed Iran could itself be successfully “contained” by the U.S. and its allies and deterred both from pursuing a more aggressive policy in the region and actually using nuclear weapons against its foes.
Iran itself has vehemently denied it intends to build a weapon, and the U.S. intelligence community has reported consistently over the last six years that Tehran’s leadership has not yet decided to do so, although the increasing sophistication and infrastructure of its nuclear programme will make it possible to build one more quickly if such a decision is made.
Official U.S. policy, as enunciated repeatedly by top officials, including President Barack Obama, is to “prevent” Iran from obtaining a weapon, even by military means if ongoing diplomatic efforts and “crippling” economic sanctions fail to persuade Iran to substantially curb its nuclear programme.
A nuclear-armed Iran, in the administration’s view – which is held even more fervently by the U.S. Congress where the Israel lobby exerts its greatest influence – represents an “existential threat” to the Jewish state.
In addition, according to the administration, Iran’s acquisition of a weapon would likely embolden it and its allies – notably Lebanon’s Hezbollah – to pursue more aggressive actions against their foes and could well set off a regional “cascade effect” in which other powers, particularly Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt, would feel obliged to launch nuclear-weapons programmes of their own.
But a growing number of critics of the prevention strategy – particularly that part of it that would resort to military action against Iran – argue that a nuclear Iran will not be nearly as dangerous as the reigning orthodoxy assumes.
A year ago, for example, Paul Pillar, a veteran CIA analyst who served as National Intelligence Officer for the Middle East and South Asia from 2000 to 2005, published a lengthy essay in ‘The Washington Monthly’, “We Can Live With a Nuclear Iran: Fears of a Bomb in Tehran’s Hands Are Overhyped, and a War to Prevent It Would Be a Disaster.”
More recently, Colin Kahl, an analyst at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) who also served as the Pentagon’s top Middle East policy adviser for much of Obama’s first term, published two reports – the first questioning the “cascade effect” in the region, and the second, published earlier this week and entitled “If All Else Fails: The Challenges of Containing a Nuclear-Armed Iran,” outlining a detailed “containment strategy” — including extending Washington’s nuclear umbrella over states that feel threatened by a nuclear Iran — the U.S. could follow to deter Tehran’s use of a nuclear bomb or its transfer to non-state actors, like Hezbollah, and persuade regional states not to develop their own nuclear arms capabilities.
In addition, Kenneth Pollack, a former CIA analyst at the Brookings Institution whose 2002 book, “The Threatening Storm” helped persuade many liberals and Democrats to support the U.S. invasion of Iraq, will publish a new book, “Unthinkable: Iran, the Bomb, and American Strategy”, that is also expected to argue for a containment strategy if Iran acquires a nuclear weapon.
Because both Brookings and CNAS are regarded as close to the administration, some neo-conservative commentators have expressed alarm that these reports are “trial balloons” designed to set the stage for Obama’s abandonment of the prevention strategy in favour of containment, albeit by another name.
It is likely that Nader’s study – coming as it does from RAND, a think tank with historically close ties to the Pentagon – will be seen in a similar light.
His report concedes that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would lead to greater tension with the Gulf Arab monarchies and thus to greater instability in the region. Moreover, an inadvertent or accidental nuclear exchange between Israel and Iran would be a “dangerous possibility”, according to Nader who also notes that the “cascade effect”, while outside the scope of his study, warrants “careful consideration”.
Despite Iran’s strong ideological antipathy toward Israel, the report does not argue that Tehran would attack the Jewish state with nuclear weapons, as that would almost certainly lead to the regime’s destruction.
Israel, in Nader’s view, fears that Iran’s nuclear capability could serve as an “umbrella” for Tehran’s allies that could significantly hamper Israel’s military operations in the Palestinian territories, the Levant, and the wider region.
But the report concludes that Tehran is unlikely to extend its nuclear deterrent to its allies, including Hezbollah, noting that the interests of those groups do not always – or even often – co-incide with Iran’s. Iran would also be highly unlikely to transfer nuclear weapons to them in any event, according to the report.
]]>As Iran faces economic unrest, discussion is intensifying over the impact sanctions are having on Iran’s economy.
But experts doubt that the current situation portends the end of the Iranian regime or Iranian capitulation to Israeli and Western-led demands that it change its nuclear stance.
“You have now a market [...]]]>
As Iran faces economic unrest, discussion is intensifying over the impact sanctions are having on Iran’s economy.
But experts doubt that the current situation portends the end of the Iranian regime or Iranian capitulation to Israeli and Western-led demands that it change its nuclear stance.
“You have now a market that is under a lot of tension” which has “created a big economic crisis for the government”, said Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, a professor of economics at Virginia Tech, during a meeting here Wednesday at the Wilson Center.
But Salehi-Isfahani added that there is a “lot of misunderstanding about the currency system in Iran”, noting that people are confusing it with huge devaluations that occurred in East Asian countries and Zimbabwe.
“Iran is nothing like that,” he said.
While expressing varying views about the severity of Iran’s economic problems, the Wilson Center’s panelists agreed that it’s still able to manage its ailing economy and the resulting unrest.
“Iran has a lot of experience with sanctions. In fact, what they did immediately is open up the books from the 1980s about how to deal with a currency crisis,” he said.
Demonstrators clashed with police outside Tehran’s central bazaar on Wednesday during protests about the Iranian currency’s declining value. The rial has lost an estimated 80 percent of its value against the U.S. dollar in the last year.
Ali Vaez, a senior Iran analyst at the International Crisis Group, told IPS that “the regime is likely to nip it in the bud to prevent (the protests) from snowballing.”
“Although it’s not clear if there will be more protests, one thing is certain: Iran will experience a much more securitised environment in the run-up to the 2013 presidential elections,” he said.
Iranians are also struggling with rising inflation and unemployment amid escalating U.S.-led sanctions linked to the Islamic Republic’s controversial nuclear programme.
Iran maintains that its nuclear programme is entirely peaceful but Western countries led by the U.S. claim that Iran is working towards achieving nuclear weapon-making capability.
Israel has been pushing the Barack Obama administration to move its previously stated “red line” on Iran, a nuclear weapon, to preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons capability, something which Israel claims would seriously endanger its existence and the stability of the surrounding region.
“I’ve been speaking about the need to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons for over 15 years…I speak about it now because the hour is getting late, very late,” said Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during his speech at the 67th annual U.N. General Assembly meeting last week.
Already under six rounds of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council, Iran saw Western sanctions tighten markedly this year with an EU ban on Iranian crude oil purchases going into effect in July.
U.S. sanctions are also increasingly targeting banks that deal with Iran’s central bank, thereby seriously impeding Iran’s ability to conduct international transactions and trade.
Sanctions have not yielded tangible progress toward a diplomatic solution over Iran’s alleged nuclear ambitions, but the protests Wednesday and protests in July in the northeastern city of Nishapur over the rising price of chicken – a main food staple for the Iranian working class – indicate that segments of Iranian society will express their dissatisfaction when faced with serious pressure.
“The chicken prices got the government’s attention,” said Salehi-Isfahani, adding that the “government made a wise move in trying to stabilise the chicken market and not worry about the dollar.”
“The aim of sanctions is to raise pressure against the regime in order to solve the nuclear crisis in a peaceful manner,” Alireza Nader, a senior international policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, told IPS.
“But as we’ve seen, sanctions are also leading to major unrest in Iran and weakening the regime at home and abroad,” he said.
Bijan Khajehpour, an Iranian businessman and specialist on the Iranian economy, explained during the Wilson Center event that a number of factors have been harming Iran’s economy.
“It’s not just the sanctions…Iran’s economic developments have been undermined by sanctions, subsidy reforms, mismanagement and corruption,” he said.
“The degree of instability has reminded many citizens of the days of the Iraq-Iran war” and “public anger is reflecting itself in sporadic unrest, strikes, blogosphere protests and critical comments by artists,” he said.
But Khajehpour disagrees with reports suggesting that the Iranian economy is collapsing. “The current deterioration of the Iranian economy is less a period of economic collapse and more a period of economics adjustment,” he said.
“The citizens are suffering, but the macro economy could potentially benefit,” said Khajehpour, noting that sanctions which have impeded Iran’s ability to purchase the equipment it needs to develop key industries have forced it to produce them itself.
Khajepour added that, “The future story of Iran is in (its gas industry),” which is projected to grow over the next five years despite sanctions.
“The additional gas capacity will generate the potential of investments in gas-based industries with export potential,” said Khajehpour.
Suzanne Maloney, another panelist and Iran analyst at the Brookings Institute, said it’s “incredible and tragic” that “Iran’s economic horizons are more limited today than the last 50 years.
“There are huge constraints on Iran’s growth and development and that presents tremendous political vulnerabilities,” she said.
“Sanctions are working, but we’re not getting anywhere on the nuclear programme and that cannot be lost on anyone,” she said.
Michael Singh, the managing director of the Washington Institute, echoed the consensus among a number of well-known neoconservative analysts Wednesday by writing that more aggressive pressure and punitive measures are needed to change Iran’s nuclear calculus.
“Rather than hoping that giving current sanctions “time to work” will force Iran back to the negotiating table, the United States and our allies should add further pressure to the regime and the elites who comprise it, including through additional targeted economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, bolstering the credibility of our military threat to the regime, and support for the Iranian opposition,” he wrote in an op-ed for Foreign Policy.
According to Trita Parsi, the president of the National Iranian American Council, more pressure alone will not bring about favourable results. “I don’t find it likely that the regime will capitulate due to the sanctions as long as sanctions relief is not part of the mix,” he said.
“The possibility that sanctions will lead to general regime change exists, but the question is what type of regime change would the devastation of the Iranian economy generate?” Parsi asked.
]]>via IPS News
In a move certain to ratchet up already-high tensions with Iran, the administration of President Barack Obama will remove a militant anti-regime group from the State Department’s terrorism list, U.S. officials told reporters here Friday.
The decision, which is expected to be formally announced before Oct. [...]]]>
via IPS News
In a move certain to ratchet up already-high tensions with Iran, the administration of President Barack Obama will remove a militant anti-regime group from the State Department’s terrorism list, U.S. officials told reporters here Friday.
The decision, which is expected to be formally announced before Oct. 1, the deadline set earlier this year by a federal court to make a determination, was in the process of being transmitted in a classified report to Congress, according to the Department’s spokeswoman, Victoria Nuland.
The decision came several days after some 680 members of the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq (MEK), or People’s Mojahedin, were transferred from their long-time home at Camp Ashraf in eastern Iraq close to the Iranian to a former U.S. base in at Baghdad’s airport in compliance with Washington’s demands that the group move. The transfer leaves only 200 militants at Camp Ashraf out of the roughly 3,200 who were there before the transfers began.
Most analysts here predicted that the administration’s decision to remove the MEK from the terrorism list would only worsen already abysmal relations with Iran and possibly make any effort to defuse the gathering crisis over its nuclear programme yet more difficult.
“Delisting will be seen not only by the Iranian regime, but also by most Iranian citizens, as a hostile act by the United States,” Paul Pillar, a former top CIA analyst who served as the National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia from 2000 to 2005, told IPS.
“The MEK has almost no popular support within Iran, where it is despised as a group of traitors, especially given its history of joining forces with Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War,” Pillar, who now teaches at George Washington University, added.
“Any effect of the delisting on nuclear negotiations will be negative; Tehran will read it as one more indication that the United States is interested only in hostility and pressure toward the Islamic Republic, rather than coming to terms with it.”
The decision followed a high-profile multi-year campaign by the group and its sympathisers that featured almost-daily demonstrations at the State Department, full-page ads in major newspapers, and the participation of former high-level U.S. officials, some of whom were paid tens of thousands of dollars to make public appearances on behalf of the MEK.
Officials included Obama’s first national security adviser, Gen. James Jones, former FBI chief Louis Freeh, and a number of senior officials in the George W. Bush administration, including his White House chief of staff, Andrew Card, attorney general Michael Mukasey, and former U.N. ambassador John Bolton.
Created in the mid-1960s by Islamo-Marxist university students, the MEK played a key role in the 1979 ouster of the Shah only to lose a bloody power struggle with the more-conservative clerical factions close to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
The group went into exile; many members fled to Iraq, which they used as a base from which they mounted military and terrorist attacks inside Iran during the eight-year war between the two countries. Its forces were also reportedly used to crush popular rebellions against President Saddam Hussein that followed the 1991 Gulf War.
During a brief period of détente between Washington and Tehran, the administration of President Bill Clinton designated the group as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) in 1997 based in part on its murder of several U.S. military officials and contractors in the 1970s and its part in the 1979 U.S. Embassy takeover, as well as its alliance with Saddam Hussein.
When U.S. forces invaded Iraq in 2001, the MEK declared its neutrality and eventually agreed to disarm in exchange for Washington’s agreement that its members could remain at Camp Ashraf as “protected persons” under the Geneva Convention, an arrangement that expired in 2009.
The government of President Nour Al-Maliki, however, has been hostile to the MEK’s continued presence in Iraq. Two violent clashes since 2009 between Iraqi security forces and camp residents resulted in the deaths of at least 45 MEK members.
Last December, the UN reached a U.S.-mediated accord with the MEK to re-locate the residents to “Camp Liberty” at Baghdad’s airport, which would serve as a “temporary transit station” for residents to resettle in third countries or in Iran, if they so chose, after interviews with the UN High Commission on Refugees.
Until quite recently, however, the group — which Human Rights Watch (HRW) and a significant number of defectors, among others, have described as a cult built around its long-unaccounted-for founder, Massoud Rajavi, and his Paris-based spouse, Maryam — has resisted its wholesale removal from Ashraf. Some observers believe Massoud may be based there.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s increasingly blunt suggestions that the MEK’s failure to co-operate would jeopardise its chances of being removed from the terrorism list, however, appear to have brought it around.
The MEK claims that it halted all military actions in 2001 and has lacked the intent or the capability of carrying out any armed activity since 2003, an assertion reportedly backed up by the State Department.
Earlier this year, however, NBC News quoted one U.S. official as confirming Iran’s charges that Israel has used MEK militants in recent years to carry out sabotage operations, including the assassination of Iranian scientists associated with Tehran’s nuclear programme.
“The Iranian security establishment’s assessment has long believed that foreign intelligence agencies, specifically the CIA, Israeli Mossad, and the UK’s MI6 utilise the MEK for terror attacks on Iranian nuclear scientists, nuclear sabotage and intelligence gathering,” noted Seyed Hossein Mousavian, a former senior Iranian diplomat and nuclear negotiator currently at Princeton University.
“Therefore, the delisting of MEK will be seen in Tehran as a reward for the group’s terrorist actions in the country,” he wrote in an email exchange with IPS. “Furthermore, Iran has firmly concluded that the Western demands for broader inspections (of Iran’s nuclear programme), including its military sites, are a smokescreen for mounting increased cyber attacks, sabotage and terror of nuclear scientists.
“Delisting MEK would be considered in Tehran as a U.S.-led effort to increase sabotage and covert actions through MEK leading inevitably to less cooperation by Iran with the IAEA (the International Atomic Energy Agency).”
He added that government in Tehran will use this as a way of “demonstrating to the public that the U.S. is seeking …to bring a MEK-style group to power” which, in turn, “would strengthen the Iranian nation’s support for the current system as the perceived alternative advanced by Washington would be catastrophic.”
That view was echoed by the National Iranian American Council (NIAC), which noted that the decision opens the doors to Congressional funding of the MEK and that leaders of the Iran’s Green Movement have long repudiated the group.
“The biggest winner today is the Iranian regime, which has claimed for a long time that the U.S. is out to destroy Iran and is the enemy of the Iranian people,” said NIAC’s policy director, Jamal Abdi.
“It will certainly not improve U.S.-Iranian relations,” according to Alireza Nader, an Iran specialist at the Rand Corporation, who agreed that the “delisting reinforces Tehran’s longstanding narrative regarding U.S. hostility toward the regime.
“Nevertheless,” he added, “I don’t think it is detrimental to U.S. interests as Tehran suspects U.S. collusion with the MEDK anyhow, whether this perception is correct or not.”
Karim Sadjadpour, an analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said the move was unlikely to be “game-changer” in that “the MEK will continue to be perceived inside Iran as an antiquated cult which sided with Saddam Hussein during the (Iran-Iraq) war, and U.S. Iran relations will remain hostile.”
“It doesn’t help (Washington’s) image within Iran, certainly, and some Iranian democracy activists may misperceive this as a U.S. show of support for the MEK, which could have negative ramifications,” he noted.
Another casualty of the decision may be the credibility of the FTO list itself, according to Mila Johns, a researcher at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland.
“The entire atmosphere around the MEK’s campaign to be removed from the FTO list – the fact that (former) American government officials were allowed to actively and openly receive financial incentives to speak in support of an organisation that was legally designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, without consequence – created the impression that the list is essentially a meaningless political tool,” she told IPS.
“It is hard to imagine that the FTO designation holds much legitimacy within the international community when it is barely respected by our own government,” she said.
No other group, she noted, has been de-listed in this way, “though now that the precedent has been set, I would expect that other groups will explore this as an option.”
]]>